THE THEOLOGY OF THE CROSS AND MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN : WITH REFERENCE TO THE CARIBBEAN

Winston Dwarka Persaud

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
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

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AND MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN,
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being a thesis presented in candidature

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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

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ABSTRACT

The theology of the cross is both a method of doing evangelical theology, as well as an evangelical confession of the Chrsitian Faith. It is universal in scope, and it is set within the context of the Reformation doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. It, therefore, insists that while the Kingdom of the world and the Kingdom of Christ are to be distinguished from each other, nevertheless, they constitute an intrinsic unity.

Marx's concept of man and his theory of history constitute his peculiar atheistic Weltanschauung. This preoccupation with man as an alienated being is paralleled by the concern for man's salvation as expressed in the theology of the cross. However, Marx's anthropology remains one-dimensional in scope, and is thereby placed within the realm of the Kingdom of the world.

The Marxian claim that man is the centre of himself and the final and sole arbiter of his own destiny, and that God is a totally human idea which / ultimately enslaves man, challenges the Church to proclaim and "incarnate" the liberating message of the Gospel anew today. The Church is called to articulate a theology of the cross in which God is confessed as being pro-man. The Church points to the cross of Christ where it sees God paradoxically revealed in suffering, shame and death. Where God seemed (and seems) to be most absent, it is precisely there that He is most present, actively struggling on behalf of man. Cross and Resurrection are bound together. The Christian life is therefore a life of celebration and hope sub cruce.

/ Caribbean

Caribbean theology is at the crossroads: it is historically connected with Western theology and finds some "natural" affinities with Liberation Theology. However, while it may and should attempt to draw from the richness of both theologies, it should guard against capitulating to either of those forms. It must articulate an indigenous theology of the cross which maintains the tension between identity and relevance of the Gospel. To do otherwise would lead to a theology (or ideology) of glory. In short, Caribbean theology's primary concern must be the proclamation and "incarnation" of the message that the Triune God, through the praxis of love in His Son, and through the witness of His Spirit, is present in suffering and death, wrath and judgement, working on behalf of man and his reconciliation.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the following thesis is based on the results of research carried out by myself, that it is my own composition and that it has not previously been presented for a Higher Degree. The research was carried out at the University of St. Andrews under the supervision of _____

_____

(Candidate's signature)

CERTIFICATE

I certify that _____ has fulfilled the conditions of the resolution of the University Court, 1967, No. 1, and that he is qualified to submit this thesis in application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

_____

(Supervisor's signature and address)

STATEMENT

I graduated from the University of Guyana in 1974 with a B. A. Degree in History, and from Wartburg Theological Seminary in 1977 with a Master of Divinity Degree. I was admitted as a full-time candidate for the Degree of Ph.D. under Resolution of the St. Andrews University Court, 1967, No. 1, on 24th January, 1979, with effect from 1st October, 1977.

DEDICATION

In loving memory of my father, Joseph Jhag(a)ru Persaud, and to my dear mother, Anne Basant Persaud, and to Ashton, Linette and Radha who, through their understanding of and patience during my extended absence away from home, have taught me much about gratitude and joy of being accepted in a family community, and about Christian vocation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study was prompted by the encouragement of my teachers and fellow students at Wartburg Theological Seminary, Dubuque, Iowa, who shared my concern to interpret the message of the Gospel in the context of the Caribbean. I would like to thank Dr. William H. Weiblen (President, WTS) for procuring the scholarship funds for my studies at St. Mary's College, and for his continuing interest and support in my work. I would also like to thank Pastor and Mrs. Irving N. Tange, and Pastor and Mrs. Paul G. Hansen for their support.

Special thanks to my supervisor, Dr. George B. Hall, who introduced me to the early Marx, and whose grasp and appreciation of the study as a whole was an ongoing inspiration throughout the period of study. I am grateful to Principal James A. Whyte and the St. Mary's College community for their warm welcome. I have appreciated the keen interest which Professor Donald M. MacKinnon showed in my work. Many in Deanscourt and elsewhere helped to ease the pressures I felt at times. I am indebted to the library staff of the University library who spared no efforts in providing valuable resource material and information. The patience and understanding of my fiancée, May-Elizabeth Burt, do not go unnoticed. Finally, thanks to Mrs. Rose Hall who carefully typed the final manuscript.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

As the title of this thesis indicates, we are concerned with three areas of study: the theology of the cross; Marx' concept of man; and Christianity, Marxism and the Caribbean.[1] In the actual development of the thesis the order of those areas will be altered. We will begin with a discussion of Marx's anthropology which will then be followed by the argument for a theology of the cross, and finally with a discussion of the Caribbean and how theology may be done there.

The overriding motivation in undertaking such a thesis is existential; i.e., it is an attempt to respond to the ongoing challenge to the Church to articulate the Christian faith in a manner that is intelligible and relevant to contemporary man. Implicit in this challenge is a recognition of the temporal and historical nature of the Church's statements of the faith throughout the centuries in various societies, under various and sometimes divergent conditions. It is also a tacit confession of the dynamic activity of the Spirit who has called the Church into being and who sustains and preserves it through His activity in the Word and sacraments.

It is assumed, moreover, that confessing the Faith in a way that is intelligible to contemporary man is an intrinsic demand of the Gospel itself. The message of God's reconciling love through the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is mediated through the Spirit in Word and Sacrament. Thus, the Scriptures, the Creeds, and the traditions and teachings of the Church, which have come down to us through the ages, are not viewed as the objects of faith, but as the necessary vehicles through which the message of the Gospel is communicated and clarified. The mission of proclaiming the Gospel

today will not be effectively and evangelically met by simply articulating so-called modern creeds which are more 'suited' to the spirit of the times (Zeitgeist), than the old formulations are. According to Pannenberg, that route would be "the cheap way out".[2] Christian identity is bound up with the Scriptures, the Creeds and traditions. This is not to deny that there has not been distorted and even dehumanizing uses of them. But genuine evangelical confession requires us to take due account of them. Speaking about this dilemma in relation to the Apostles' and Nicene creeds, Pannenberg writes:

> The more or less obscure discomfort with certain formulations should not lead to the cheap way out - to the excluding of the Creed from use in Church and its replacement by other, supposedly more contemporary formulae, which at best could never fulfil the function of the old creeds - that through them the individual Christian can enrol himself in the communion with all Christendom. But even as regards the content of faith, nothing is gained by a change of words. What is needed is an exploration and understanding of the things of the Christian Faith, which have found their expression in the ancient credal formulations. To reject these formulations simply because we find them incomprehensible is uneducated.... We could only justify their rejection if they had to be discarded because they were simply wrong. But today's widespread lack of comprehension of the credal formulae is a call, not for their abolition, but for their explanation. 3

As will be seen below, this lack of comprehension of "the credal formulae" and of the Scriptures as a whole concerning the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob ... and of Jesus Christ is acutely present in the Marxist challenge to evangelical theology. Both Marxists and Christians need to be reminded that God, Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, works on behalf of man for man's total reconciliation. We will therefore point the way to the cross of Christ where we find God, through the death and resurrection of His Son, engaged in His most definitive and decisive activity on behalf of man. It is God's nature to love, a love which includes suffering. Thus, the event of

the Cross and Resurrection is an expression, the unique expression, of God's love for man. Through Word and Sacrament the Holy Spirit bears witness to God's reconciling love through the crucified and risen Jesus Christ. Thus, the theological response we will advocate is trinitarian in form.

The concern with the task of Christian confession, in word and deed, in the Caribbean is unique: it must be done in dialogue with Marxism, within societies whose alienated identity is bound up with colonialism, slavery and indenture. Caribbean man's identity is bound up with the Judeo-Christian tradition in two significant ways. Firstly, it emerged from the colonising impact and influence in the Caribbean of Western-European civilisation upon peoples from Europe, Africa and Asia - the population of the indigenous peoples in the islands were soon decimated after the arrival of the first Europeans. Secondly, it also emerged from the salvific efficacy of the Gospel upon many among the oppressed who experienced the love of God in Christ in the midst of their enslavement and suffering, some of whom were inspired to express their freedom by working to undermine the oppressive system under which the masses lived. Unfortunately, the message of the Gospel was experienced very often as Law and not as Gospel for the Gospel was often used to make slaves and members of the lower strata of society docile and manipulable. This fact cannot be overlooked by the Church in its attempt to carry out its mission of reconciliation through Jesus Christ. At the same time, however, the Church must not be afraid to proclaim the scandal of the cross which gives it its peculiar identity as an eschatological community with historical relevance and concreteness.

In the face of the ambiguous experience of the Judeo-Christian

tradition, it is not surprising, that Marx's anthropocentric philosophy with its emphasis upon man's "salvation" through his own liberating praxis-theoria activity, might be, and, in fact, is appealing to many people in the Caribbean, not least among significant sectors of the intelligentsia, including the political leadership. It is to be remembered that Marx stands within the Judeo-Christian tradition. Whereas, on the one hand, the Church must (and does) evaluate and judge its action in terms of the Law, on the other hand, Marx's philosophy judges the Church and society in terms of its "principle of ideology". At times the two will coincide, but this does not provide the basis for the Church either to dispense with the use of the Law in preference to Marx's "principle of ideology", or to turn a blind eye to the Marxian critique. In the freedom of the Gospel, the Church can find the courage to adopt a critical, not compromising attitude towards Marx's philosophy, including his concept of ideology.

This, therefore,leads us to an enunciation of our primary thesis on Marx: Marx's philosophy of man and his theory of history are regarded as an anthropocentric theory of a real, historical and ultimate way of salvation. This means that his philosophy is viewed as a Weltanschauung. According to our argument, in his early writings, Marx sketched out his world-view which was intrinsically atheistic and anthropocentric. This world-view remained implicit throughout his life, even in his mature writings. Furthermore, in relation to alienated Caribbean man, living in an explosive situation, it is argued that this Weltanschauung promises not merely a way out of the economic morass in which Caribbean man finds himself, but a radically different self-understanding and conception of total reality which is in contradiction to a theocentric (trinitarian) view of

reality. This new self-understanding, according to Marx, can only result from a radical transformation of the productive process from which all superstructures, including consciousness, are derived. Marx's world-view is totally immanental. Thus, the only meaning given to transcendence is that of historical transcendence through human praxis. In this process man acts in harmony and in conjunction with the material forces of history, i.e. the mode of production. Thus, man's future, his "ethical" standards, his whole society, are to be entirely the product of his own activity. Only man is capable of ultimately liberating himself and the whole of society completely. This outlook stands in polar contrast to the Christian view of reality where transcendence is defined in terms of God and where man's ultimate future is not his to create, but is a gratuitous gift of God to be received in faith. Whereas Marx sees man's alienation as historically produced, which will be therefore historically transformed through man's revolutionary recreation of the productive process, Christian theology sees man as being fundamentally alienated from God and that he can be and is reconciled only through the loving praxis of God through the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Yet, Christian theology does admit that man, and certainly Caribbean man, suffers from socio-economic and political alienation which the Church must both verbally denounce and practically strive to minimize if not totally eliminate. This it does on behalf of the neighbour. In a curious and ambiguous way, the Church's credibility (and its message) in Caribbean society is bound up with its response to this challenge in the name of the Gospel for the sake of the suffering in society.

In presenting Marx's anthropocentric, atheistic world-view, we will suggest that there is a continuity between the "early" and

"mature" Marx. We will show that this continuity surrounds Marx's use of the term alienation, and his indebtedness to Hegel and Feuerbach. It will be shown that this concept is not peculiar to Marx, or Hegel, or Feuerbach, for both before and after their time, the concept was used in varying and different senses from theirs. Moreover, Marx's preoccupation with man leads us to consider his critique of religion, atheism, and false consciousness as a whole, followed by an attempt to piece-together Marx's definition of human nature, which Marx assumes could not be defined a priori since it is always being historically created by man. We will conclude Marx's description of man as an alienated species-being, with Marx's projection of the unalienated future of man which will be created by man alone.

A discussion of Marx's theory of history naturally follows the discussion of his concept of man for the two are inseparably bound together. Here it will be shown that Marx viewshistory as universal history. He posits history as the de-alienating and ultimately free creative activity of man in community. All alienating forces are totally historical. In this presentation we will note the dialectical interplay between the mode of production and human activity - i.e. between historical materialism and proletarian messianism. Finally, we conclude this section with a consideration of the question of a Marxian ethics.

What we wish to achieve in our discussion of Marx's concept of man and his theory of history is aptly summarized by Pannenberg who notes:

> A critique that only zeros in on one or another of Marx's conclusions, whether it be the prophecy of the demise of capitalism or the utopia of the communistic society of the future, would be a critique that would not do him justice.

> His thought draws its power from its anthropological roots. 4

Therefore, in our account of Marx's anthropocentric world-view, we will attempt to show the interrelatedness of Marx's "prophecy of the demise of capitalism" and his prophecy of "the utopia of the communist society of the future" which are derived from and built upon his preoccupation with alienated man and his transcendence of alienation.

Following the discussion of Marx's concept of man and his theory of history, we will then argue for the theology of the cross as an evangelical response to the challenge of Marx's anthropocentric Weltanschauung . Such a response stems from the conviction that God is neither absent from nor unmoved by human suffering. Moreover, His freedom and sovereignty do not dehumanize man nor work for man's alienation but for his salvation and reconciliation. It is precisely because He is both the God of wrath and the God of love that He stands above man as judge and suffers on behalf of man in history. To speculate about who this God is, it will be argued, leads to a theology of glory. This God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and of Jesus Christ, reveals Himself in the cross and resurrection of His Son. On the cross God the Father suffers the forsakenness of His Son and His Son experiences the forsakenness of His Father for he cries out "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" Jesus Christ suffers death and the grave because of the love of God for man, and because of the Son's love of the Father. Jesus' suffering and death on the cross is seen in the context of this manifold nature of God's love. Jesus pays the price of human sin including alienation, and breaks the power of the forces of evil that have held man and the whole of creation in captivity. This means that the triumph of God's activity through Christ is in both

Cross and Resurrection. The two are held together. Thus, when we speak of a theology of the cross, we include both the suffering and death of Jesus, and His resurrection.

Because of this salutary event of Jesus Christ, Christian theology dares to speak of God in the face of Marx's challenge to theology. We will therefore argue that in the midst of man's historical experience of all forms of alienation, God is not absent, even when it appears that He is. His presence is in hiddenness, in suffering and shame, in weakness and humility, in love and freedom. The paradox of His revelation is that He reveals in the contrary. This is intrinsic to the scandal of the cross.

In arguing for a theology of the cross as an evangelical response to Marx's Weltanschauung, we will look at Luther's theologia crucis, followed by a discussion of Moltmann's "Trinitarian, political theology of the cross". Finally, we will turn to a critical consideration of the "Theology of Human Brotherhood" in Liberation Theology in Latin America. In this critique, Luther's theologia crucis, and to a lesser extent Moltmann's "Trinitarian, political theology of the cross" will be used as the criteria for evaluating Liberation Theology's way of talking about God.

It was pointed out above that the geo-cultural area in which we are concerned to explicate the Christian Faith is the area comprising the Commonwealth Caribbean. Therefore following our discussion of the theology of the cross, we will focus our attention on the meaning of alienation in this area. We will pay special attention to colonial history and its legacy, alienation and pluralism, as well as to some of the specific characteristics of alienation in the region and among its peoples. This picture will form part of the background against

which we will sketch out the directions which Caribbean theology might pursue as expressed in the "tentative" suggestions made by certain ecumenical voices in the Caribbean "Church". In tracing some of the implications for doing theology in the Caribbean arising from these "tentative" suggestions we will look at the question of the theological understanding of alienation in the Caribbean. The task of maintaining inherent unity between faith in God and love of neighbour, as well as the tension between the "already" and the "not yet" (i.e. between prolepsis and eschatological fulfilment) which the Church has, leads us to a critical treatment of Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms. Finally, we will conclude with a summary sketch of the total picture that emerges from the thesis.

Chapter I.

Marx's Concept of Man

A.

The "early" and the "mature" Marx

In our attempt to uncover Marx's anthropology we are confronted by the unavoidable problem of deciding where in the plethora of Marx's writings we should look for the description of his concept of man. This problem poses a crucial hermeneutical task for the student of Marx, since the primary and more significant works of his youth were not published until the 1930's. Among these were his primary philosophic writings which have come to be known as the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.[5] The relative neglect of these early texts meant that only Marx's later works which have been labelled "mature" and "authentic", and which were already published and in use, came to be regarded as authentic writings of official Marxism.[6] In the Soviet Union, for example, it was the Communist Manifesto, German Ideology, and above all Das Kapital, which were all published after 1844, that were considered to be the literary corpus of authentic Marxism. Marx's thought was therefore crystallized around these works,[7] and any attempt to deviate from them was not merely discountenanced by the authorities, but radically supressed by them.[8]

But despite a rather pervasive dismissal of the early texts by both the guardians of official (mature) Marxism and the non-Marxist critics of official Marxism, the twentieth century saw the emergence of a growing and sustained interest in these so-called "corrupt" Marxian writings. Indeed their publication in 1932 was both a sympton

of this interest, as well as an added stimulus to it. As Schaff explains, there was a growing realization among scholars that "a fuller knowledge of the young Marx's intellectual evolution is necessary for the deeper understanding of the origins and development of Marxism ... [and that] ... false political considerations [had] militated against the discussion of early Marxian humanism." Schaff adds that a "second reason for the topicality and attraction of" the young Marx may be described as "existential". He notes, for example, that in the current ideological struggle in Poland there was a commonality of interest in man in the young Marx and in the concerns and struggles of young Poles. He tells us:

> The young Marx, as is easily understandable against the background of his age and his personal development, wrestled with the problem of the human individual and his relationship to society and nature (the world) ... It is not surprising that in circumstances of psychological shock and ideological chaos, they [young people] began to interpret the 'newly discovered' Marx in their own way, although in fact, because of textual difficulties and complicated connections between Marx and the young Hegelians, unknown to our readers, they simply did not understand him. 9

The "rediscovery" of the "early" humanistic Marx created an ideological and a methodological problem. To those who had gradually become disenchanted with the cold, scientific and impersonal "mature" Marx of official Marxism, the salutary concern of the early, philosophic Marx for the individual provided new impetus to the study of Marx's philosophy. "Early" Marx was seen as a necessary corrective to the excesses of official Marxism. According to them, it was a philosophy that was first and foremost concerned with man - man in his present predicament of alienation under the capitalist system. This was a Marx that argued for the relativeness of "ideology" which meant that no programme for the transformation of society could

legitimately be considered applicable for all time.[10] Naturally such an understanding of this "unhistorical" and "subversive" Marx was a serious threat to the hitherto existing "historical" Marxism. For example, as Fetscher reports, "Lukacs and Korsch were reproached by those from the side of the social democratic and communist orthodox writers for their undue interest in the young Marx."[11] The summary dismissal of the early writings by the guardians of the authentic Marx could not and did not avert the ideological crisis within the Marxist bloc. On the contrary, the protective action which was taken by the authorities to correct this heretical tendency merely intensified the crisis. Moreover, western interest in existentialist themes, especially alienation, a theme which was Marx's focus in his early writings, contributed, albeit indirectly, to the crisis.

In the debate on how to rightly appropriate the early philosophic writings there emerged two apparently antithetical halves of Marx's thought.[12] This accentuated the crucial question, which had emerged during the foregoing debate, of the relevance and accuracy of the existing general method of historical investigation.[13] Critical questions were raised: Of what value is the thought of the young Marx for an accurate understanding of the writings of the mature Marx? Contrariwise, of what value is the thought of the mature Marx for an accurate appraisal of the thrust of the thought of the young Marx? Are all the writings of Marx to be treated as a whole on the assumption that there is an implicit (and explicit) continuity of thought throughout Marx's works? Is there continuity within discontinuity? It is to these and other questions we now address ourselves.

a.

Continuity within dis-continuity in Marx's thought.

There is unanimity among scholars that in his early texts Marx displayed a youthful preoccupation with philosophical anthropology and a "corresponding critique of human culture".[14] However, there is no such unanimity that in his mature writings Marx is primarily concerned with "philosophical anthropology". Scholars argue, instead, that in those writings Marx's primary concern is with enunciating the inherent weaknesses within the capitalist system which, he is convinced, would eventually undermine it and lead to its ultimate collapse. The lack of unanimity stems from the dispute over the continuity in Marx's philosophic perspective; that is, the extent to which Marx is seen as a philosopher even during the writing of his later works. There is general agreement among scholars that in his later writings Marx was more the economist, sociologist and political scientist than the philosopher. As Aron tells us, "It might be said that, from 1848 until the end of his life, Marx apparently ceased to be a philosopher and became a sociologist and above all, an economist."[15] Furthermore, Aron points out the centrality of Marx's economic analysis in Marx's thought, when he states:

> Marx's thought is an interpretation of the contradictory or antagonistic character of capitalist society. In a certain sense, Marx's whole canon is an attempt to show that this antagonistic character is inseparable from the fundamental structure of the capitalist system and is, at the same time, the mechanism of the historic movement. 16

There seems to be a contradiction between what Aron says here and his suggestion elsewhere that Marx "until the end of his life ... remained in a certain sense a philosopher." The contradiction may be corrected by noting that for Aron the distinction between the economist of the later writings and the philosopher of the early works hinges

upon what is central to Marx at a particular time in contrast to what may be nascent and secondary, or obsolete. For Aron, whereas Marx the economic theorist was in his nascent state in the early Marx, Marx the philosopher was more obsolete than merely hidden in the later Marx.[17]

Daniel Bell, who argues that, "Having found the answer to the 'mysteries' of Hegel in political economy, Marx promptly forgot all about philosophy", seems to corroborate Aron's arguments.[18] For Bell, Marx ceased being the abstract speculative philosopher when he realized that philosophy could be realized and hence transcended only in economics. But this did not mean that he ceased being a practising philosopher. Indeed, Bell adds, Marx was never really interested in economics. Bell sums up Marx's excursus into economics thus:

> The question why men were propertyless turned Marx to economics. For a man whose name is so linked with the 'dismal science,' Marx was never really interested in economics. His correspondence with Engels, in later years, is studded with contemptuous references to the subject (which he at one time referred to as the 'economic filth'), and he resented the fact that his detailed explorations in the economic mechanisms of society prevented him from carrying on other studies. But he continued because, for him, economics was the practical side of philosophy - it would unveil the mystery of alienation - and because he had found in the categories of political economy the material expression of that alienation: the process of exploitation. 19

Marx's pursuit of economic theory, then, was the result of his more fundamental preoccupation with alienation. Beneath his elaborate and often vague and laborious discussion of political economy was the primary motivating consideration: the condition of man in capitalist society.

It would seem natural and useful for us to proceed to establish that the theme of human alienation is the primary and overriding concern of both the early and later Marx. Bell's argument does appear on the

surface to support this conclusion. However, on another occasion Bell argues that the "historical Marx" rejected the concept of alienation. He notes that in the early Marx there was a double vision of alienation: economic and humanistic.[20] However, he continues, "Marxist thought developed along one narrow road of economic conceptions of property and exploitation, while the other road, which might have led to new, humanistic concepts of works and labour, was left unexplored."[21] The implication here is that in the movement of the concept of alienation from the purely speculative, philosophic, and humanistic realms to the categories of economic analysis of property relations under capitalism, a split occurred between the early and mature Marx.[22] This implication is inconclusive. The unveiling of the mystery of alienation in order to reveal the concrete reality of economic exploitation did not mean that "alienation" ceased being the primary motif in Marx's thought after 1844. Rather, it persisted throughout his writings, and, this recognition is crucial for a more balanced treatment of the concept.

Despite the argument for a continuity in Marx's thought, the debate concerning Marx's and Engels' attitudes, after 1844, towards the early writings of Marx continues to be inconclusive. It is not clear whether Marx did in fact abandon his early writings, deeming them inaccurate in their description of his mature thinking. McLellan points out that:

> Certainly he [Marx] did not care much about the fate of his early manuscripts. In the preface to his Critique of Political Economy, he said that he and Engels had abandoned the manuscript of The German Ideology (1846) 'to the gnawing criticisms of the mice all the more willingly as we had achieved our main purpose - self-clarification'. 23

Even in the pre-1844 years Marx understood that in his early writings he was aiming at self-clarification. He was attempting to provide the

philosophic basis for his later economic discussions. In explaining the aims of the journal, Deutsch-Französische Jahrbucher, Marx declares,

> So we can summarize the tendency of our journal in one word: self-understanding (equals critical philosophy) by our age of its struggles and wishes. This is a task for the world and for us. It can only be the result of united forces. What is at stake is a confession, nothing more. To get its sins forgiven, humanity only needs to describe them as they are. 24

Speaking about the reform of consciousness, he further explains the aim of seeking self-clarification:

> The reform of consciousness consists solely in letting the world perceive its own consciousness by awaking it from dreaming about itself, in explaining to its own actions. Our whole and only aim consists in putting religious and political questions in a self-conscious human form, as is also the case in Feuerbach's critique of religion. 25

It would be stretching the point to suggest that having achieved the objective of "self-clarification" in his early writings, Marx was able to move on to something totally new. Instead of claiming that there was such a radical break, it would seem more reasonable to argue that the explicit philosophy in Marx's early writings continued to provide the basic framework for his later, economic analysis of capitalism.

There is general agreement among scholars that the continuity in Marx's thought depends upon the fundamental and persistent influence of Hegel upon Marx. Though Marx came to reject Hegel's primary thesis that reality was the self-positing of Absolute Spirit, he, nevertheless, continued to use Hegelian categories in both his early and later works.[26] Admittedly, he was attempting to realise philosophy through revolutionary, historical praxis. But, he sought to do so precisely by attempting to place Hegel "right side up." Consequently, Marx's writings are to be seen as an attempt to dispute Hegel's claims by replacing them with his own philosophical, and, later, economic interpretations. Commenting

on the pervasiveness of Hegel's influence throughout Marx's writings, Tucker writes:

> This inversion of Hegel's dialectic of history was the constitutive act of original Marxism. And now, in 1873, Marx describes it as the constitutive act of the mature Marxian dialectic. The plain implication is that he considered the manuscripts of 1844 the birthplace of mature Marxism, the founding documents of scientific socialism. 27

Tucker concludes that the presence and influence of the Hegelian dialectic in its materialist form, in both the early and the later writings of Marx, clearly shows that for both Marx and Engels "there were not two Marxisms but one." He concedes, however, that there is some truth in the argument for two Marxisms, i.e., only "in the peculiar and limited sense in which the adult may be said to be a different person from the child." Tucker explains that according to Marx and Engels:

> ... Scientific socialism, embryonic already in Hegel's Phenomenology, was delivered into the world in Marx's manuscripts of 1844. The philosophical terminology of the latter was simply the umbilical cord binding the new-born child to its philosophical parent. And mature Marxism was the baby grown to adulthood. Consequently, it was perfectly proper to speak of the mature doctrine in terms applicable to original Marxism. 28

This "developmental" view of the unity in the Marxian corpus of writings appears somewhat similar to Bell's view discussed earlier. Both Tucker and Bell seem to espouse the view that Marx's later writings arose out of his early philosophical thought. However, whereas Tucker sees no discontinuity between the philosophy of the early Marx and the political economic theory of the later Marx, Bell argues that Marx abandons the early philosophy. This would lead one to conclude that the later Marx was only minimally a Hegelian if at all. On the other hand, it is true, as McLellan points out, "that

Marx always remained in some sense a Hegelian; and that the early writings are important since they document the formation of Marx's attitude to Hegel's philosophy."[29] But the argument may be advanced even further where it can be said with Lenin, "it is impossible to fully grasp Marx's Capital and especially the first chapter, if you have not studied or understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, none of the Marxists for the past half century has understood Marx!"[30]

The publication of the Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Oekonomic (Elements of a Critique of Political Economy) 1857/8, for the first time in 1939, revealed the fundamental influence of Hegel upon the later Marx. Problems and concepts, such as"alienation" and "objectification", which Marx had reflected upon, especially in his 1844 Manuscripts, were also considered at great length in the Grundrisse.[31] Viewed as the Preface to Capital, it certainly bridges the apparent hiatus between the early philosophic writings and the mature writings of political economy. But to conceive of the Grundrisse as such an intermediary link is to suggest that Capital was the centrepiece of Marx's writings. This suggestion is disputed. McLellan writes,

> The Grundrisse, of which the Critique of Political Economy and Capital are only partial elaborations, is the centre-piece of Marx's work. It is the basic work which permitted the generalizations in the famous Preface of the Critique of Political Economy. The Preface is not matched by the work that follows it. Marx himself describes it in a letter to Lasalle as: 'the result of fifteen years' research, that is to say the best years of my life'.32

It is not our concern to enter into the debate about the correct location of the Grundrisse and Capital in the pyramid of Marx's writings. We are content with pointing out that, along with the 1844 Manuscripts, it shows a continuity in Marx's thought which is

firmly bound up with Hegel's influence upon Marx.[33]

In the above, mention was made of Marx's preoccupation with "alienation" and "objectification" which shows his intellectual and philosophical attempts at coming to grips with the Hegelian system. We shall now attempt to demonstrate briefly that the problems of "alienation" and "objectification" which occupied his attention and energies in his 1844 Manuscripts, and which display Marx's anthropology, remained his concern throughout his mature works. As Thielicke notes, the young Marx's "doctrine of man which is not only not concealed but is even set forth programmatically"[34] permeates the entire corpus of his writings. The early philosopher who later became an economist, a sociologist, and a political scientist in the years following the writing of the 1844 Manuscripts, did not abandon his humanistic concerns; he did not cease being a philosopher for he did not conpletely dispense with Hegel's influence upon him. These components, when bound together with Marx's analysis of "alienation" and "objectification", serve to demonstrate the continuity within discontinuity in Marx's thought.

Like the 1844 Manuscripts, the Grundrisse is somewhat fragmentary in nature. But this does not prevent the Hegelian categories, in which Marx formulates his thought, from being obvious to the reader of this work. "Questions that were prominent in Marx's writings in 1844 - such as the true nature of labour and the resolution of the conflict between individual and community - are taken up again and filled out with a wealth of detail."[35] The following quotation gives an indication of the tone of the Grundrisse:

> Thus the ancient conception, in which man always appears (in however narrowly national, religious or political a

> definition) as the aim of production, seems very much more exalted than the modern world, in which production is the aim of man and wealth the aim of production. In fact, however, when the narrow bourgeois form has been peeled away, what is wealth, if not the universality of need, capacities, enjoyments, productive powers, etc. of individuals, produced in universal exchanges? What, if not the full development of human control over the forces of nature - those of his own nature as well as those of so call 'nature'? What, if not the absolute elaboration of his creative dispositions, without any preconditions other than antecedent historical evolution which makes the totality of this evolution - i.e. the evolution of all human powers as such, unmeasured by any previously established yardstick - an end in itself? What is this, if not a situation where man does not produce himself in any determined form, but produces his totality? Where he does not seek to remain something formed by the past, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? In bourgeois political economy - and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds - this complete elaboration of what lies within man, appears as the total alienation, and the destruction of all fixed, onesided purposes as the sacrifice of the end in itself to a wholly external compulsion. 36

In this extended extract, we are confronted by a number of themes which were prominent in the early Marx's description of man's alienated condition. Here we note the emphasis on man as a creature of "needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive powers, etc." Man, we are told, produces himself through his productive labour. He is described as being more fully himself when he gains control of the forces of nature. He produces, i.e. "objectifies", what lies within him. Unfortunately, this man, in bourgeois society, is alienated, and is manipulated by forces external to him.

Having pointed out that the mature Marx of the Grundrisse remains preoccupied with many of the philosophical themes and problems of his youth, it still remains to be shown that in Capital, Marx's primary economic work (written during his mature years), the concern with man and "alienation" still persists, and, indeed, in spite of the cloudy mists of economic details and categories, remains a primary concern.[37] It is here that we have Marx's most elaborate and significant attempt

at realizing philosophy through political economy, which is based upon a philosophic anthropology that is spelled out in the 1844 Mauscripts, and partly reiterated, and further developed in the Grundrisse. It is to be noted that the term "alienation" occurs and/or its meaning is described several times in Capital.[38] For example, Marx writes, "the character of independence and estrangement which the capitalist modes of production as a whole gives to the instruments of labour and to the product, as against the workman, is developed by means of machinery into a thorough antagonism."[39] McLellan adds that

> ... It is not only a question of terminology; the context, too, of Capital is a continuation of Marx's early thoughts. The main theme of Volume 1 of Capital, surplus-value, rests on the equation of work and value that goes back to the conception of man as a being who created himself and the conditions of his life - a conception outlined in the Paris Manuscripts. It is man's nature, according to the Marx of the Paris Manuscripts, to be constantly developing, in cooperation with other men, himself and the world about him. 40

When we come to Capital, McLellan asserts, we find that here Marx is describing

> ... How this fundamental role of man, to be the initiator and controller of the historical process, has been transferred, or alienated, and how it belongs to the inhuman power of Capital. Moreover the counterpart to alienated man, the unalienated or 'total' man of the Manuscripts, also appear in Capital. In the chapter of Volume 1 on 'Machinery and Modern Industry' Marx makes the same contrast between the effects of alienated and unalienated modes of production in the development of human potentiality. 41

Concluding his argument for continuity between the Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts and the Marx of Capital, McLellan rightly draws attention to the fact that "the section of Capital that most recalls the early writings, is a final section of Chapter I, entitled "Fetishism of commodities".[42] In McLellan's estimation, "the whole section is reminiscent of the section on alienated labour in the Paris Manuscripts

and of the notes on James Mill which Marx composed in 1844."[43] On the question of labour's objectification of itself in its products, Marx writes:

> A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of man's labour appears to them as objective character stamped upon that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour, is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. 44

We began by acknowledging that the apparent existence of an "early" and a "mature" Marx, presents a hermeneutical problem as regards the source of information related to Marx's concept of man. It was argued that, whereas the early Marx was more the philosopher than the later Marx, who was ostensibly more the political economist (than the speculative philosopher), this did not detract from the essential unity that exists between the early and later Marx. This unity, it was noted, is centred around Hegel's influence on Marx which is most clearly seen in the early (and mature) Marx's discussion of the themes of "alienation" and "objectification". There is no doubt that Marx in his mature writings came to speak of 'alienation' in concrete terms such as the "fetishism of commodities". But his attempt at grounding "alienation" in the material base of the productive process is also to be found in his 1844 Manuscripts, albeit in a nascent state.[45]

We therefore agree with those scholars who argue that there is a continuity within a discontinuity in Marx's thought. The continuity is to be found in the persistence of Marx's concern with alienation which is described in philosophic terms in his early writings, and in economic terms in his mature works. At the same time, we find that even in his early writings, Marx devotes some attention to the problem

of grounding philosophy in the material process of production. By the same token, we find that the philosophical anthropology of his early writings continues to provide the basic framework within which he analyses bourgeois capitalism. In the movement from an explicit to an implicit philosophical anthropology, there is a break for a shift in emphasis occurs in his mature work, especially Capital, he is concerned with "alienation" in relation to the inherent "laws" of capitalism that would lead to its eventual demise and the end of all "alienation". There is therefore a continuity within a discontinuity in Marx's thought.

Finally, our primary concern in the preceding analysis of the unity between the early and mature Marx, was to show that, viewed as a whole, Marx's writings has as its primary concern, man as the creator of his own history. Despite the developmental changes that take place in Marx's concept of man,[46] nevertheless, the anthropology of the early Marx remains the presupposed functional anthropology of the mature Marx. Axelos expresses this case succinctly when he writes,

> The building of Marxian doctrine is a methodical development around the theme of man as endowed with a will capable of taking hold of the world by virtue of technique.... Marx believes he has brought about the permanent collapse of a heaven now empty, its gods gone; and he can hardly allow that heaven continue to overshadow earth. Marx is determined that his anthropology and philosophy of history, as well as his programme of salvation and his, shall we say, eschatological vision, be altogether real and deeply, radically immanent. 47

His anthropology and philosophy of history, so rooted in socio-economic realities, attempts to ignore metaphysics. As we shall see below, this attempt was unsuccessful. In asserting that man creates himself (and history, for history is the account of man's creative

activity), through his interaction with nature, Marx boldly declares that salvation - the transcendence of alienation - will be ushered in by man. Thus, whatever may be said about Marx as philosopher, economist, sociologist, political scientist, etc., it is to be concluded, above all, that his philosophy of man (and concomitantly of history) was pivotal for his understanding of reality.

B.

Alienation in Popular Usage.[48]

In the discussion on the unity in the early and mature Marx, it was argued that the inherent unity in Marx's writings hinged upon Hegel's influence upon him, especially in the former's use of the word "alienation". It was claimed that Marx's anthropology was built around his concept of alienation and its historical transcendence. For Marx, man, whether worker (proletariat) or bourgeois capitalist (owner of the means of production), was in a state of alienation. This alienation had reached its apogee under the modern industrial capitalism of Marx's day. To define what man is, albeit without arguing for a fixed essence of man, inevitably involves the concept of alienation. The centrality of this concept in Marx's anthropology therefore leads us to an examination of the meaning(s) the term had for Marx.

But before we do so we must take note of the problem of definition that attends the concept "alienation". We are bombarded by a widespread and variegated usage of the term, not only by contemporary writers, but also by writers, thinkers, artists, etc., throughout the centuries. In fact, it is argued by some, that the popularity of the

term today did not stem primarily from Marx's usage. Rather, it came down to us via another route.[49] Be that as it may, no one could seriously dispute the impact of the publication of the 1844 Manuscripts, in which the concept is very much central, upon the popularization of the term. Indeed, the availability of the 1844 Manuscripts in 1932 (in English in the 1950's), coupled with a renewed interest in Hegel served to further the popularization of the use of the term "alienation".[50]

The popularization of any concept which is employed with relative ease and frequency by writers who represent many varied disciplines and different points of view, certainly does not allow for any systematic and precise meaning of the term. Not only do the phenomena being described by the concept vary with each discipline, but, also, even within a particular discipline the term may be applied to phenomena of a significantly varied kind. Needless to say, this makes it impossible to delineate any one precise meaning of the term. An analysis of the usage of "alienation" quickly reveals this inconsistency and imprecision in its use. Frank Johnson offers a useful summary of this problem when he says,

> Most terms which possess scientific bite are characterized by a reasonable specificity of denotation, a clarity of meaning within particular disciplines, and an absence of serious internal paradox or ambiguity. None of them adhere to the word, alienation. Alienation is used to denote a great variety of often quite dissimilar phenomena. Moreover, its meaning within separate disciplines are confusingly interrelated, and the word, of course, is stricken with severe inconsistency and vagueness. 51

Let us now look at some illustrations of the variation and ambiguity in the meaning of the term "alienation". We will follow mainly Arnold Kaufmann's discussion on the subject, and, to a lesser extent, Richard Schacht's as well. The vagueness and inconsistency in the meaning of the term is very much evident when it is used as an ontological category

in the conception of reality. In relation to this usage Kaufmann tells us, " 'alienation' and 'Entfremdung'... (are) ... a human state of being - the state of being alienated or estranged from something or somebody."[52] He justifies the usage of the term as an ontological category by pointing out that,

> The verb 'alienate' is transitive like its two German equivalents, and its literal meaning is 'to make strange, to make another's.' But the noun 'alienation' like the German Entfremdung and unlike Entäusserung, does not usually bring to mind an activity, except in special contexts where it functions as a technical term. 53

The use of the term "alienation" in the young Marx and the early Sartre illustrates the active sense of separation which the term connotes. It is also to be noted that there is a real difference between the way the term is used by the two thinkers.[54] As Kaufmann explains, on the question of describing human nature as alienated:

> The main difference between the young Marx and the early Sartre is not the one has such a concept of human nature while the other rejects it; it is rather that Sartre concentrates on the psychological processes that lead men to see themselves as objects, as things, as unfree, while Marx concerns himself with the economic processes that lead to much the same result. Both are concerned with man's loss of freedom, but Marx sees the unfree as victims while the early Sartre insists that we are our own victims, that we really are free, and that we are at fault for not realizing it. 55

Here we see that the same phenomenon - lack of freedom - is described by Sartre in psychological terms and by Marx in economic terms. This distinction is very significant, for, as we will see below, Marx views psychological alienation as a derivative of the more basic, "infra-structural", socio-economic alienation of the mode of production.

Yet another meaning of alienation is provided by Plato who represents the discipline of philosophy, indeed the primeval state of Western philosophy. Plato's description of the meaning of alienation is well illustrated in his conception of man. With Schacht we note:

> Plato does not merely divide man into body and soul; he further divides the soul into three parts, and he argues for the existence of the three parts by calling attention to instances in which they are at odds with each other and pull us in different directions. Thus Plato also knew the experience of the divided self. He felt at home neither in his body nor with his appetites. 56

Man's divided self, whose separate parts exist in antagonism to each other, seeks release from "alienation" through separation of body from soul. It is to be noted that whereas Marx speaks of alienation in historical and existential terms, Plato uses ontological categories to describe the conflict between body and soul in man. It is a fair conclusion that Marx argues for a more dynamic concept of human nature in contrast to Plato's concept which is rather static.[57]

A somewhat different use of the concept of alienation is to be found in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Here we will follow Kaufmann's discussion. He notes that in Judaism and Christianity, the individual was to be constantly reminded that he was a pilgrim, an alien in this world. Kaufmann explains further that both religions,

> agree in their original challenge to men to alienate themselves from nature, society and themselves. The individual is not supposed to feel altogether at home in nature; Judaism lifted man out of nature and stressed the discontinuity between man and nature, the cardinal differences between man and animal. Moreover, it is one of the leitmotifs of the Hebrew Bible that the people are not supposed to be 'like all the nations' but a people apart. Theoretically, this could have meant that their sense of community compensated them entirely for their alienation from all other nations.... We find in the Hebrew Bible a succession of imposing figures who not only tell their people that they should be different but who are themselves thoroughly alienated from their own society. 58

In contrast to the negative connotation of the term in Marx and Sartre, "alienation" is used here in an obviously positive sense. The believer is to pursue "alienation" or "separateness" in order to minimize if not totally avoid, the corrupting influences of the outside environment upon him. The communities of Judaism and Christianity are to be closed

off from evil and corrupting influences and forces. But even within each community there were some like the Jewish prophets, Moses, Elijah, Amos, Hosea, and Jeremiah who found that they were strangers among their own people.[59]

On the contemporary scene there are several writers who argue that, in spite of the fact that "alienation" has been employed in many different contexts, nevertheless, certain common features may be discerned from its various uses.[60] Arnold Kaufmann, for example, asserts: "'To claim that a person is alienated is to claim that his relation to something else has certain features which result in avoidable discontent or loss of satisfaction'."[61] Lewis Feuer, to take another example, declares that "the word 'alienation' is used to describe the subjective tone of self-destructive experience."[62] He adds, "'Alienation' is used to convey the emotional tone which accompanies any behaviour in which the person is compelled to act self-destructively."[63] Finally, Kenneth Kenniston argues that "most usages of 'alienation' share the assumption that some relationship or connection that once existed, that is 'natural', desirable, or good, has been lost."[64] Schacht rightly concludes that "while each of these general analyses may be plausible, they are by no means identical."[65]

In our brief survey of the concept "alienation" it was noted that the term is used in both an active and a passive sense. With the exception of its use in the Judeo-Christian tradition, its use is to describe an undesirable state which must either be transformed radically or accomodated creatively. In the active sense "the individual experiences something as 'other' or separated from him." Here he is conscious of the state of his existence and both his thoughts and his feelings tell him that he is either a stranger, or else something or

someone is a stranger to him. In contrast to the active sense, the passive sense of the term "alienation" is seen in the situation "in which the individual is alleged to exist in a condition of separation from something, of which he may be unaware." Schacht provides a perceptive analysis of the difference between the two senses in which the term "alienation" is used, and points to the problem of achieving a precise and unambiguous definition of the term. He says:

> It is possible to speak of an 'alienness' in both cases; but the nature of the alienness is quite different. In the first case, feelings of alienness are involved; certain things are apprehended as separate, or strange, or different, or remote, or indifferent, or incomprehensible, or distasteful, etc., by the individual termed 'alienated'. In the second case, on the other hand, feelings of this sort are not the issue. The alienness in question is rather the individual's purportedly factual separation from something, which is detected through an objective comparison of his actual state with a conception of what the relevant sort of unity or identity would be like. While neither general use of the term 'alienation' is inherently objectionable, it is hard to imagine a situation more conducive to confusion than one in which the term is allowed to function in both ways. For if the same terminology may be used in both cases, there will be a tendency to blur this important distinction. 66

As we shall see later, Marx's use of the term "alienation" shares in this ambiguity for he combines the two senses of the term in his analysis of "alienation in its totality" as he sees it in bourgeois capitalism.

From the differing usages of the term "alienation" to characterize a situation of separation, and/or a loss of unity, one is led to ask whether there was an essential state of unity and harmony which was disrupted; and/or whether it is possible to regain or attain that lost unity. Notice that the first question may imply the second, but not necessarily so. In fact, writers who conceive, albeit vaguely, of a primeval unity, do not necessarily envisage a return to such unity. Instead they seek to understand the separation in order to find ways

and means of living creatively with the disharmony and lack of unity. On the other hand, writers who argue for a struggle for the attainment of unity and end of separation do not necessarily conceive of a lost state of non-alienation.

In relation to man, the question of alienation raises the issue of whether man is separated from his "essence". In other words, in speaking of alienated man, as Marx does, for example, is it being suggested that alienation arises out of a disparity between man's "essence" and his "existence"? What is self-alienation, we may ask? These are difficult questions which have not been adequately answered with any notable degree of consistency in the use of the term "alienation". It is clear from our discussion that popularization of the term does not allow for its clarity and precision of meaning. Rather, inevitably, there occurs a proliferation of different and conflicting meanings which is a serious obstacle to any attempt to understand a particular writer's usage of the term. In our case, Marx's concept of alienation needs to be stripped of the un-Marxian over-coating in which it has been dressed in consequence of the popularization of the term. This is not to deny that in comparing and contrasting Marx's use of the concept with those of others we are not aided in the process of understanding Marx. Having shown that the term lacks precision in its usage, we now move on to Hegel's description of alienation, for it was Hegel, more than anybody else that influenced Marx's use of the concept.

C.

Hegel's Usage of Alienation.

It is generally accepted that Marx's philosophy of praxis is built upon the premise that Hegel's philosophy marked the culmination of the development of Western philosophy.[67] Hegel was seen as the modern Aristotle.[68] Speculative philosophy had reached its zenith, and, therefore, according to Marx it must be transcended by realizing it. This meant that the synthesis in thought which Hegel had pursued and achieved must be actualized in reality. For Marx, this actualization and realization of philosophy was to be achieved in the socio-economic realm. Let us look briefly at the dilemma which Hegel faced and what he tried to achieve.

Taylor, in his monumental work on Hegel, attempts to give "an idea of the fundamental problems and aspirations which Hegel's philosophy was addressed to."[69] He suggests

> that we can best see these in the light of the yearning of his time to find a way of life and thought which would unite two powerful aspirations, which were both connected yet opposed. One [of those aspirations] is that unity with nature, other men and himself which man demands as an expressive being; the other is to the radical word autonomy which reached paradigm expression in Kant and Fichte. 70

Hegel's realization by the early 1800's that "these two aspirations were opposed to each other" led to the further discovery "that freedom required the breaking up of the expressive unity, of the original undivided wholeness within man and communion with other men and nature, which he, like many contemporaries, attributed to an earlier age - principally that of ancient Greece."[71] This fragmenting process was inevitable and necessary "for the full realization of man as rational and free agent."[72]

Indeed, this "necessary division was to be healed in a higher reconciliation."[73] This reconciliation was already immanent in the process of fragmentation.

Taylor seems to be correct in his conclusion that "the major task of philosophy for Hegel can be expressed as that of over-coming opposition. The oppositions are those which arise from the breaking up of the original expressive unity."[74] Thus, in Hegel's view philosophy was primarily concerned with Entfremdung and Aufhebung, "alienation" and "reconciliation". This philosophical basis was certainly very attractive to Marx, who was concerned with man as he was in the bourgeois capitalist society of his day.

Explaining Hegel's dialectic, Taylor points out that Hegel posits the universe "as the conditions of existence of God or Geist."[75] Absolute Idea or Spirit undergirds everything that exists. It is necessary for the existence of Spirit that it creates the conditions whereby it becomes manifest. This means that Spirit does not exist apart from the vehicles in which it becomes manifest. The primary embodiment of Spirit is man. Through man Spirit is manifested as finite being though it remains infinite.[76] Taylor points out,

> If Geist as subject is to come to rational self-awareness in freedom, then the universe must contain, first, finite spirits. Geist must be embodied. But bodily reality is external reality, it is partes extra partes, extended in space and time. Hence for consciousness to be it must be located, it must be somewhere sometime. But if a consciousness is somewhere, sometime, it is not somewhere else, sometime else. It thus has a limit between itself and what is not itself. It is finite. 77

Finiteness becomes necessary for Spirit's consciousness of itself as real. Spirit's existence therefore requires the rational consciousness of itself as being embodied and expressed in man.

This whole process of Spirit's self expression is inextricably

bound up with the rational expression of freedom. Spirit is free to realize itself through expressing itself in finite being. Taylor draws attention to this fact when he declares:

> But freedom, on the expressivist view is the condition in which the self is adequately expressed. Hence full self-awareness is impossible without freedom. If we add to this the notion that self-awareness is of the essence of the subject, then the converse proposition is also true: freedom (that is, full self-expression) is impossible without self-awareness. Now Hegel would add to this common basis of expressivist theory, the thesis that the essence of subjectivity is rational self-awareness, that self-consciousness must be in the clear medium of conceptual thought and not in cloudy intuition or ineffable vision. Hence rationality, too, is for him a condition of integral expression or freedom, and reciprocally. 78

Now in the process of externalizing itself in finite being, Spirit gradually comes to conceive of the finite as being separate from it. The Infinite (Spirit) stands opposed to the finite. Though finite proceeded from, and, hence, is a part of Absolute Idea, it finds itself in opposition to Geist. Externalization has led to alienation. The necessity for Spirit's existence in the finite has led inevitably to separation and opposition. This alienation and its projected unity is known through the activity of consciousness.

In his description of this separation or alienation, Hegel has a two-fold usage of the concept of alienation. In categorizing this two-fold usage, Schacht speaks of 'alienation'$_1$, where Hegel "uses it to refer to a separation or discordant relation, such as might obtain between the individual and the social substance, or (as 'self-alienation') between one's actual condition and essential nature;" and of 'alienation'$_2$ where Hegel "uses it to refer to a surrender or sacrifice of particularity and wilfulness, in connection with the overcoming of alienation, and the reattainment of unity."[79]

In the first sense of alienation ('alienation'$_1$), Hegel is

considering the situation in which separation occurs after there was a state of unity. Spirit, for instance, in coming from universality to particularity through embodiment in man, is at first at one with itself - i.e., there is unity between universality and particularity. However, in the course of time the particular person, the individual, comes to conceive of himself as being distinct and separate from the social substance.[80] Schacht notes that "Hegel considers this to be a desirable development, in that it marks the emergence of a dimension of distinct individuality and independent existence, which is necessary if man's essential nature is to be realized completely."[81] This process of 'alienation' results in 'self-alienation'. For Hegel, man is essentially spiritual. Therefore, as Schacht notes, "loss of universality thus has the result that one 'thereby alienates himself from his inner nature and reaches the extremity of discord with himself'."[82] When the individual loses his universality through a disunion with the social substance, he no longer possesses his essence. In consequence, he alienates himself from his essence and thereby exists in the state of 'self-alienation'.[83]

Hegel uses the term 'alienation' in a sense different to that of 'alienation', when he attempts to describe how 'alienation' and 'self-alienation' will be transcended.[84] This usage which Schacht labels 'alienation' is intended to connote an act of wilful surrender on the part of the alienated person. The alienated individual can attain a higher unity with the social substance and his 'essence' only if he wilfully gives up his assertion of individuality which he had hitherto asserted. The individual can no longer insist upon the supreme importance of his individuality at the expense of universality; rather, he must surrender "the possession of an individual will which...

has not yet... been surrendered qua will."[85] The following is Hegel's summary of this relinquishment:

> For the power of the individual consists in making himself conformable to that substance, i.e., in relinquishing his self, and thus establishing himself as the objectively existing substance. 86

For 'alienation'[2] and its consequent unity with the social substance to occur, the individual must surrender his particular interests, desires and inclinations to the extent where universality is not lost to or submerged in particularity, but is in fact realized thereby.[87]

Marx's Criticism of Hegel

It should not come as a surprise that Marx who wrote, "The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it,"[88] considered Hegel's analysis of alienation and its transcendence to be too abstract and speculative. In his evaluation of Hegel's description of alienation, Marx argues that Hegel concentrated his thought on the abstract categories of consciousness and self-consciousness. He asserts:

> For Hegel,...the alienation of self-consciousness is not regarded as the expression of the real alienation of man's essence reflected in knowledge and thought. The real alienation (or the one that appears to be real) in its inner concealed essence that has first been brought to the light by philosophy, is nothing but the appearance of the alienation of the real human essence, self-consciousness. 89

Hegel, Marx adds, conceives of alienation as an awareness of finite being, who, as consciousness embodied in man, comes to think of himself as being alienated. There seems to be no grounding of alienation in the social conditions in society. Transcendence of alienation therefore requires a mere change in self-awareness. All this, says Marx, is too

abstract and more apparent than real. Speaking about this transcendence he says:

> On the one hand, this supersession is a supersession of something thought and thus private property as thought is superseded in the thought of morality. And because this thought imagines that it is directly the opposite of itself, sensuous reality, and thus also that its action is sensuous, real action, this supersession in thought that lets its object remain in reality believes it has really overcome it. On the other hand, since the object has now become for it a phase in its thought process, it is therefore regarded in its real existence as being a self-confirmation of thought, of self-consciousness and abstraction. 90

Alienation conceived of in terms of consciousness is not real alienation; its transcendence conceived of in terms of a change in consciousness is illusory. Throughout the process of supersession it is only abstract self-consciousness that is confirmed in its existence.

Marx finds a circularity in Hegel's argument that reality is the self-positing of Spirit.[91] Noting that the process requires "an agent, a subject" which "only comes into being as the result... (of)... the subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness... God, absolute spirit, the idea that knows and manifests itself,"[92] Marx draws the conclusion that

> Real man and real nature become mere predicates or symbols of this hidden, unreal man and unreal nature. The subject and predicate to each other is thus completely inverted: a mystical-object or subjectivity reaching beyond the object, absolute subject or a process (it externalizes itself returns to itself from its externalization and at the same time re-absorbs its externalization); a pure and unceasing circular movement within itself. 93

Richard Schacht and Richard Norman, among others, question the full validity of Marx's arguments that for Hegel alienation and its transcendence were conceived in thought only.[94] Schacht draws attention to a contrary example in which Hegel describes alienation in terms of a separation between the social substance and the individual. In this situation, it is the 'thought' that is the reality of alienation.

Schacht adds,

> The individual regards the social substance as something alien as a result of conceiving of himself in a certain way. He ceases to do so when he comes to see himself and the substance in a different light. All of this takes place at the level of 'consciousness and self-consciousness', and would be inconceivable in any other terms. 95

Schacht therefore concludes that it is

> no objection to Hegel's discussion that it is cast in these terms, even if there should prove to be phenomena of a more 'concrete' nature which are also characterizable as instances of alienation. 96

Norman, in his argument, suggests

> that Hegel sees the overcoming of alienation in thought as requiring the return of pure thought to the real world, and therefore as depending on the overcoming of social alienation. 97

Having said this, however, Norman goes on to add that at a deeper level Marx is correct in his criticism of Hegel. He points out that

> The trouble with Hegel's account is that, having brought the alienation of pure thought back to its roots in social alienation, he then treats social alienation as itself an alienation of consciousness. (Norman's emphasis). 98

The difference between Hegel's conception of alienation and Marx's is brightly limned in the contrast between the conception of the independence of the social substance from the individual as only an activity of consciousness, on the one hand, and as an actual separation in the worker's relation to the social product, on the other. Marx insists that when the individual does in fact come to see the social product as alien to him, it is because it is foreign and belongs to another.

Finally, it is to be noticed that Marx seems to understand Hegel's use of alienation to mean objectification equals separation, i.e., opposition. Spirit, in realizing itself through externalizing itself in finite being, inevitably finds itself alienated from finite being. Finite being, which shows spirit to be real at the same time posits

spirit as being in opposition to it. "What is supposed to be the essence of alienation that needs to be transcended," says Marx, "is not that man's being objectifies itself in an inhuman manner in opposition to itself, but that it objectifies itself in distinction from, and in opposition to, abstract thought."[99]

D.

Marx's Use of the Term "Alienation".

Richard Schacht points out that under the influence of Hegel's usage of alienation as "separation" and "alienation" as "wilful surrender", Marx proceeds to combine the two images in a single general sense of "separation through surrender".[100] Schacht explains that this fusion of meaning was not a deliberate act. Instead it was the result of Marx's failure "to distinguish them in his discussion of Hegel".[101] Schacht's summary of this synthesis is very useful:

> His own use of the term is the result of a (perhaps fruitful) confusion of them, through which the ideas of both 'separation' and 'surrender' come to be suggested. He gives the term many different applications. In each case, however, it is used to suggest the existence of a separation of some sort. And in each case, the separation to which the term 'alienation' refers is related in some way to a certain surrender: namely, the surrender of one's control over one's product and labour. This affords a contrast with Hegel's two senses of 'alienation'. In Marx, the separation is the result of the surrender; whereas in Hegel's discussion of the relation of the individual to the social substance the separation (alienation$_1$) is overcome through the surrender (alienation$_2$). 102 (Schacht's emphasis)

In seeking out the specific meaning of the term in Marx's use of it, one needs to bear in mind that Marx took the liberty to apply the term to numerous and different situations. Though its basic sense of "separation through surrender" remains fairly consistent, care must be taken to distinguish the various contexts in which the term is

applied in order to grasp some of the depth of meaning which the term possesses in Marx's thought.

As its name implies, the 1844 (Economic and Philosophic) Manuscripts, clearly shows that Marx was concerned with the interrelationship between philosophy and economics. Steeped in Hegelian philosophy and confronted by the exploitative character of modern industrial capitalism, Marx could not avoid the question of "alienation". Indeed he attempts to face the socio-economic and political plight of the worker, albeit in philosophic categories, as he proceeds to analyse the concept of "alienation".[103]

Marx argues that there are essentially four categories of alienation which are all related to production - man's creative work. Firstly, man is alienated from his product. In political economy, he notes, the worker suffers from increasing poverty the more he produces. He is a mere worker whose product is in the hands of someone else, the capitalist, the man of means. As the worker produces the capitalist is enriched since the former's compensation for his labour is not commensurate to the value of the product produced. This disparity is engendered by the capitalist. The capitalist exploits the surplus value of the worker's labour. The man of means acquires his wealth precisely because of the exploitative nature of production which he is able to manipulate to his advantage but to the worker's detriment. The product which the worker expends his labour to produce is alienated from him because someone else usurps his right to its "value".[104] Money, which specifies the demeaning value of the worker's labour objectified in his product, is the impersonal link between the worker and his labour. In the productive process the worker is preoccupied with the wages he receives. His value is not in the beauty and quality of his product. Though the product is the

physical substance of his labour, the worker is not free to use or dispose of it as he wills.[105] To the capitalist the worker's value is in his capacity to produce. He views the worker as a mere producer of commodities. The worker, for his part, internalizes this estimate of his worth, and comes to see himself as being valued at the level of his wages. Marx puts this degeneration of the worker very aptly when he says,

> The worker becomes a commodity that is all the cheaper the more commodities he creates. The depreciation of the human world progresses in direct proportion to the increase in value of the world of things. Labour does not only produce commodities; it produces itself and the labourer as a commodity and that to the extent to which it produces commodities in general. 106

In producing commodities the labourer creates himself as a commodity as well. Thus, in actual fact he is the architect of his own alienation.

To illustrate the hostility which the worker experiences between himself and his product which now stands over against him, Marx writes,

> ... the object that labour produces, its product, confronts it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is labour that has solidified itself into an object, made itself into a thing, the objectification of labour. The realization of labour is its objectification. In political economy this realization of labour appears as a loss of reality for the worker, objectification as a loss of object or slavery to it, and appropriation or alienation as externalization. 107

The worker's creativity, objectified in production, is experienced by him as loss because he is producing not for the sake of the object but for the wages;[108] and it is not he himself that appropriates the use and value of the products. The capitalist, who is considered a non-worker, dominates the worker and his products. Under the exploitative capitalist system, the product is not an affirmation but a denial of the human value of the worker. Marx concludes, therefore, that,

> the externalization of the worker in his product implies

> not only that his labour becomes an object, an exterior existence but also that it exists outside him, independent and alien, and becomes a self-sufficient power opposite him, that the life that he has lent to the object affronts him, hostile and alien. 109

Secondly, the worker is alienated from the activity of production.[110] The whole process is dominated by the capitalist who is driven by egoistical greed. Production is therefore geared to maximise profits and not for the human benefit of the worker. Consideration of the worker's welfare is secondary to the amassing of wealth - the primary motive of production.[111] The man of means occupies his dominant position not because he himself has expended his physical energies to produce. Rather, it is the result of his relegation of the worker to material production which involves the expenditure of physical energy, while he himself elevates himself to the position of authority and expends only mental energy.[112] It is this division of labour that serves to perpetuate alienation.[113] Marx sums up this kind of alienation thus:

> Therefore he does not confirm himself in his work, he denies himself, feels miserable instead of happy, deploys no free physical and intellectual energy, but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. Thus the worker only feels at home outside his work and in his work he feels a stranger. He is at home when he is not working and when he works he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary but compulsory, forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need but only a means to satisfy needs outside itself. 114

The worker's activity is turned into passivity, his power of creativity has become his weakness. It is no wonder then "that when there is no physical or other compulsion, labour is avoided like the plague".[115] This, says Marx, is the epitome of the worker's alienation from the productive process.

Thirdly, the worker is alienated from his <u>species-being</u>.[116] Man's species-life is turned into a means toward his individual life. Like other animals, man has physical needs; but unlike other animals

man has "species-needs" - needs related to man's expression of the being he is. The physical, animal functions of eating, drinking and procreating, etc., which man shares in common with other animals are met by man in such a way that he shows himself to be a creative self-conscious being, which other animals are not. He can freely express his creativity as he satisfies these physical needs.[117] But satisfaction of mere egoistic, animal needs are not his primary concern. In production, man is primarily concerned with the expression of his "essence" which is freedom.[118] Man, Marx declares, has a capacity for culture and for the cultivation and appreciation of the aesthetic.[119] In Hegel's terminology, man is concerned with the "spiritual", in addition to and above his concern with the "physical".[120]

Unfortunately, in his present state, man has become primarily concerned with the satisfaction of physical needs. The "spiritual" has become subordinated to those selfish ends. Acknowledging that "eating, drinking, procreating, etc. are indeed truly human functions," Marx immediately points out that even so "in the abstraction that separates them from the other round of human activity and makes them into final and exclusive ends they become animal."[121] Marx concludes that, in its alienated state, labour "alienates species-life and individual life, and ... in its abstraction it makes the latter into the aim of the former which is also conceived of in its abstract and alien form."[122] Man's vital activity and productive life work are seen by man only as the means to the satisfaction of physical needs so that physical existence may go on. In contrast, unalienated productive life is species life. It is life that produces life, instead of impersonal things which are devoid of human essence.

In an effort to heighten the contrast between man as unalienated

species-being and man as alienated worker, Marx draws further upon the difference between man and animal. He asserts that, unlike the animal for whom there is no distinction between itself and its vital activity, "man makes his vital activity itself into an object of his will and consciousness. He has a conscious vital activity. He is not immediately identical to any of his characterizations."[123] Only man is capable of perceiving himself as the being he is; the animal cannot do this. It is this consciousness that distinguishes him from "animal vital activity," and makes him a species-being. It is only man who sees his own life as an object to himself. Therefore unalienated man is able to act according to his species, and in so doing affirms his "species-nature". Thus his activity is free activity. On the other hand, "alienated labour reverses this relationship so that just because he is a conscious being, man makes his vital activity and essence a mere means to his existence."[124] Whereas unalienated man can and does see his species as well as other species as objects without thereby being estranged from either of them, alienated man's objectification of himself leads to his perception of such objectification as separate from and alien to him. Likewise, the worker views his "essence", i.e. his species-being, as alien and hostile to himself. He also has a similar experience of his fellow-workers. Marx argues that man no longer relates to "himself as to the present, living species," that is, "to himself as to a universal and therefore free being."[125] Instead, he relates to himself as to a particular, enslaved being.

Furthermore, man is not only capable of perceiving his needs, of assessing his resources to satisfy those needs, but he is also capable of deciding how those needs may be met. He is capable of "technique".[126] He can and does build "mediations" between himself and nature. He

interacts with nature, the organic objective world, which he fashions and shapes, and which, in turn, fashions and shapes him as well. This is a process of mutual interaction.[127] Nature is therefore perceived by man, who is both a physical and a species-being, in two complementary ways. It is the source of the resources for his survival, and it is a part of him.[128] This is how Marx describes this creative tie between man and nature:

> Physically man lives solely from these products of nature, whether they appear as food, heating, clothing, habitation, etc. The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the universality that makes the whole of nature into his organic body in that it is both (i) his immediate means of subsistence and also (ii) the material object and tool of his vital activity. Nature is the inorganic body of man, that is, in as far as it is not itself a human body. 129

It would appear from Marx's argument here that unalienated man will live in creative harmony with nature. Even now, albeit in an alienated way, he organizes the productive process, whereby he "fashions things according to the laws of beauty."[130] Moreover, he fashions things not only according to the standards and needs of the species to which he belongs, but also according to the measure of every species. He "knows everywhere how to apply its every species inherent standard to the object."[131] Advanced technology and "human" ways of using such technology are integral tothis complex process.

The sad commentary on the condition of man in capitalist society, Marx makes clear, is that advanced and advancing technology have seen the continued degradation of man. Alienation has torn man from his creation, and from nature, and vice versa. In the image of the world he has created, alienated man does not see that he has duplicated himself, both intellectually and actively in reality. He is torn from the object of production, including his "mediations", and from his

species-life, "the real objectivity of his species."[132] Moreover, alienated labour has turned "the advantage he ... (had) over animals into a disadvantage, in that his inorganic body, nature ... (has been) torn from him."[133] This process continues ineluctably.

Finally, Marx speaks of the alienation of man from man. "Every self-alienation", Marx declares, "of man from himself and nature appears in the relationship in which he places himself and nature to other men distinct from himself."[134] It is only through the real interpersonal relationships between men that alienation can appear in the practical, real world. Organization of the productive process entails organizing social roles and distribution of workers. Noting the active role man plays in the ensuing relationships, Marx asserts;

> Through alienated labour then man creates not only his relationship to the object and act of production as to alien and hostile men; he creates too the relationship in which other men stand to his production and his product and the relationship in which he stands to these other men. 135

In his alienated state, man continues to produce further alienation. His perception of reality is distorted, and his actions are selfish and hostile. This is certainly a strong case for man being the architect of his own destiny, albeit an alienated one. It was also the worker who made possible the position occupied by the capitalist, a position diametrically opposed to, and dominant over that of the worker.[136] There is no doubt in Marx's mind that the man of means is himself alienated; and, even as he proceeds to exploit the worker to his advantage, he furthers both his own and the worker's alienation.[137] Marx sums up the foregoing description thus:

> Just as he turns his production into his own loss of reality and punishment and his own product into a loss, a product that does not belong to him, so he creates the domination of the man who does not produce over the production and the

> product. As he alienates his activity from himself, so he hands over to an alien person an activity that does not belong to him. 138

This fourth usage of alienation incorporates Marx's concept of man as a social being.[139] Man, we are told, knows that he is the being he is, a species-being, in contrast to mere animal. He also knows that he is distinct from other species-beings. In his pursuit of the satisfaction of needs of the species-being, both physical and spiritual, he acts within a community.[140] He affirms himself within a community and not apart from it. In unalienated society, unalienated man experiences concord and harmony with his fellows. There is mutual exchange of creative activities without the concomitant dehumanization of the workers which characterizes alienated, capitalist society. This fact is brought into clear focus when Marx says,

> Exchange, both of human activity within production itself and also of human products with each other, is equivalent to species-activity and species-enjoyment whose real, conscious and true being is social activity and social enjoyment. Since human nature is the true communal nature of man, men create and produce their communal nature by their natural action.... 141

Here we have a glimpse of Marx's vision of the communal harmony that would characterize the future communist society. This sanguine apocalypse is in polar contrast to his description of the disharmonious, non-affirmative inter-personal relationships which exist among workers, and especially between the capitalist class and the proletarian masses. It is in relation to this antagonism between the two classes that he makes the following summary:

> The first remark to make is that everything that appears in the case of the worker to be a state of externalization, of alienation appears in the case of the non-worker to be a state of externalization, of alienation.
>
> Secondly, the real, practical behaviour of the worker in production and towards his product (as a state of mind) appears in the case of the non-worker opposed to him as

> theoretical behaviour. Thirdly, the non-worker does everything against the worker that the worker does against himself but he does not do against himself what he does against the worker. 142

It does appear here that true *praxis* is reserved for the worker, and that the state of the non-worker is more static than dynamic, hence the ontological description of his condition.

E.

Religion, Atheism and False Consciousness.

The unwary reader of Marx may be easily misled into concluding that there is no significant place for 'theory' in Marx's concept of reality. This misunderstanding is often the result of the dichotomy that seems to exist in his thinking concerning *praxis* and *theoria*. Marx, it will be recalled, accuses Hegel of conceiving of reality in terms of theoretical consciousness, the mere activity of the mind. Drawing on Feuerbach's reduction of Hegel's *Geist* to man as a *species-being*, Marx came to realize that man and not *Geist* is the centre of the universe. Despite Feuerbach's positive influence on Marx, Marx himself later criticized Feuerbach for not having gone far enough in his reductionism. He had not been radical enough in that he failed to conceive of real sensuous man. He was still very much wrapped up in his idealism and man was therefore limited to an object of contemplation. This is how Marx sums up Feuerbach's deficient conception of reality:

> The chief defect of all previous materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that things (*Gegenstand*), reality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the *object*, or of *contemplation*, but not as *human sensuous activity*,

> practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was set forth by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. In Das Wesen des Christenthums, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary', of practical-critical, activity. 143

Marx's insistence on praxis as the basis of all forms of consciousness, does not negate the importance of consciousness. Indeed, as he himself admits, praxis and "theory" are bound together. Consciousness is derived from praxis, but then praxis is in turn shaped by consciousness. There is therefore a relational dynamic operating between the two.

Now, in his description of man, Marx is preoccupied with man as an alienated being who must be (and who will be ultimately) rescued from his dehumanized and depersonalized state. Man suffers from total alienation; his consciousness of himself and the world is distorted and demeaning. The capacity to perceive his world, to know that he is the being he is distinguishes man as a species-being from animal. But, though man still retains the quality of knowing who he is, and that he lives in society participating in activities of the species, he, nevertheless, suffers from illusions and distorted perceptions and conceptions of reality. His thinking mirrors his alienation and serves to perpetuate it even further. Both the capitalist and the worker suffer from such false consciousnesses. The capitalist's attempt at micro-reform are doomed to failure from the very outset. He is not radical in his thinking for he merely seeks to reform society after having accepted it as it is. The legitimacy of his dominant and exploitative position in society is never questioned. He is unable

to see that all his efforts at reform are only "patchwork" relief, which are incapable of reducing, let alone ultimately ending political and religious alienation. Despite the capitalist's efforts at reform, socio-economic alienation remains intact. This means that human emancipation is still a far cry from historical realization. Marx is convinced that the capitalist would not embark on a radical socio-economic transformation of society which would endanger his dominance over the worker - his labour, his product, his consciousness, etc. The worker, for his part, is still unaware that he is both the architect and victim of his own alienation. He is forced in his imagination to make real what is not. He suffers from ideology which is imposed upon his consciousness by the bourgeoisie.[144]

Thus alienated, the worker (and the non-worker) responds by creating various and sundry fetishes. "Imagination", Marx says, "born of desire gives to the fetish-worshipper the illusion that an 'inanimate object' is about to abandon its natural character and acquiesce in his lusts. Therefore the crude desire of the fetish-worshipper smashes the fetish when it ceases to be its docile servitor."[145] This process recurs again and again and serves to re-inforce and further man's alienation. Because he is alienated man's needs and desires do not accurately reflect the needs and desires of his <u>species-being</u>. Indeed, they are distorted reflections of his "essence", and in his attempt to satisfy these needs and desires, his creativity is turned to alienating ends. He is constantly creating fetishes, pouring upon commodities and other objects of his own creation, awe and power, and noble and highly esteemed qualities which rightfully belong to himself. His experience of his products, both practically and theoretically, is that of alienation. Having a sense of something higher and superior to what he

presently experiences, he continually fails to see and acknowledge that it is an integral part of himself that has become separated from and dominant over him.

Marx had a healthy appreciation of the tenacious grip ideas can come to have over the mind. He therefore argued that alienating ideas which distort reality must be radically rooted out. This is no simple task. In his initial reactions to French socialism we gain a fairly illuminating picture of Marx's understanding of the power of ideas. He states:

> We are firmly convinced that the true danger does not lie in the practical attempt to carry out communist ideas but in their theoretical development; for practical attempts, even by the masses, can be answered with a cannon as soon as they become dangerous, but ideas that have overcome our intellect and conquered our conviction, ideas to which reason has riveted our conscience, are chains from which one cannot break loose without breaking one's heart; they are the demons that can only by overcome by submitting to them. 146

It was only later that Marx came to hold the view that ideas are part of the super structure which is built upon the socio-economic base of society. Then he realized that it is only in transforming the socio-economic base, especially the mode of production that the mind will be freed of enslaving and alienating ideas. Marx became convinced that, however much people are coerced into giving up their practices and ideas, such an attempt at ending alienation would still be an abstraction and an ideological imposition. The question of force and ideology takes us into the realm of ethics which is another subject. We will forego our discussion of this crucial area of Marx's thought at this point so that we may take up the question of religion.

Marx's radical criticism of ideology as false consciousness meant that religion did not escape his scathing denunciation. Like philosophy,

religion was seen by Marx as alienating consciousness. He was not as charitable as Hegel in his estimation of this abstract, speculative system of ideas. Whereas Hegel saw religion as expressing inadequately what philosophy expressed adequately, Marx came to regard religious consciousness as the nadir of false consciousness, the most extreme form of alienation. Before we present his treatment of religion, however, we must first look at Feuerbach's anthropological reductionism of religion for it was via the latter that Marx attempted to turn Hegel right side up.

Perhaps the two concepts in Feuerbach's philosophy which Marx found most attractive and appealing were those of "projection" and "alienation".[147] According to Feuerbach, man is continually projecting his nobler self onto God, a creation of his consciousness. Thus, the question of the nature of God is really the question of the nature of man. Wartofsky notes that "for Feuerbach, the question of proving God's existence becomes a meaningless question once it is revealed that the 'existence of God' is the unconscious religious metaphor for the existence of man's self-consciousness."[148] It is the self-consciousness of man that is real and not God.[149] The existence of God is therefore a derived and dependent existence functionally related to man's self-consciousness.

Feuerbach goes on to argue that the projection of a supreme Being who is superior to man, is both necessary and inevitable. It becomes necessary for man to create God since man needs man. The need for God reflects men's indispensable need for each other. This is because man cannot know himself to be the <u>species-being</u> he is, apart from the other. As a being of consciousness, he requires objects, predicates, to know himself in distinction from other beings. Wartofsky provides

a useful summary of this argument when he says:

> Man needs God because man needs man. Thus, the creation of God by the praxis of belief is an expression of the dependence of human beings on each other. According to Feuerbach, consciousness of an other as a being like myself, in the I-Thou relation, is the species nature. The very recognition of oneself as a species being is the very act of species being that constitutes the species itself as a species. But this is only the form of species being. Its content is the need for the other, the dependence upon the Thou as an existential condition. In this interpretation the essence of species being is not species consciousness as such, but the dependence of man on man, which expresses as species consciousness. The activity of species consciousness, its praxis, is its expression, or its objectification of this dependence. 150

Therefore to be a species-being means that man has a need for other species-being. However, because the existential conditions do not fully conduce, but do in fact militate against the experience and enjoyment of harmonious inter-personal relationships, man is faced with the critical question of his being: what is its true nature? He suffers from alienated consciousness and is consequently moved to project his noble qualities onto a being who gradually comes to be regarded as superior to and independent of man. He posits God. Thus "projection" is inevitable. Man has created his "essence", albeit in an estranged form.

We see here an attempt by Feuerbach to give Hegel's concept of reality as the self-positing of Geist an anthropological centre. Understanding Hegel to be arguing that Geist is the most "real" and that man is the "finite", transitory self-manifestation of Spirit, Feuerbach "stands Hegel upon his feet" by positing man and his self-consciousness as a species-being as what actually constitutes reality. The concept of self-positing Geist is illusory for it is a mere projection of man's alienated consciousness. Wartofsky notes that consciousness for Hegel "is the ontological ground of its manifestation."[151] Thus, according to Hegel, consciousness is dynamic, not static; relative

to man's "essence", it is consciousness that is ultimately the basis of man's being. Feuerbach, on the other hand, argues that the "essence" of man is in the process itself - i.e., in the dialectic.[152] Noting this difference in Hegel's and Feuerbach's conception of consciousness, Wartofsky writes:

> The species concept is not the living nature in itself, but only as it is reflected upon as the object for consciousness. Hegel wants to find the ontological ground for the very possibility of such a species consciousness in the nature of consciousness itself. Thus, living nature is, for him, nothing but the external form, the projection, and thus, the objectification of the nature of consciousness itself. Feuerbach's move has a Kantian flavour: he finds his ontological ground for the possibility of species consciousness in limiting the 'living nature' that embodies this species to human nature. Moreover, the dialectical relation between consciousness and its object, in Feuerbach, rejects the notion of a prior essence either in the object, mankind as living nature, or in the subject, the consciousness of man.... In the dialectic as an evolutionary process, man creates himself as man, in the very process of coming to self-consciousness. 153

There is therefore no Absolute Spirit in Feuerbach which stands over and above man to whom man owes the source and power of his being, rather the dynamic nature of man continues to change as new needs arise. He argues that because those needs are alienated needs, then, inevitably, man's "nature" becomes manifest in the act of projection, especially in religion, where man's predicates are projected onto God. Thus religion itself is transformed. Since God is ultimately man's own perception of himself, then, in order to understand and grasp the nature of man, one has to equate the divine attributes with the higher and "ideal" attributes of man. With this anthropological reduction of religion before him, Marx proceeded to describe religion as a phenomenon arising out of the socio-economic base.[154]

Marx, we have been arguing, was primarily concerned with man - man as a creative, historical being. It was noted that man's "essence"

is not fixed, having been derived from outside of man and history, and unrelated to the economic mode of production. On the contrary, Marx is concerned with man whose "nature" is ever changing and is inextricably related to the material base of reality. Like Feuerbach, Marx argues that it is self-consciousness which is real and which creates God who is merely a figment of the imagination. God's existence is dependent upon the recognition of the world's imperfections. Man is faced with the perpetual need to cope with alienation, and in the process his alienated consciousness creates gods who ostensibly make alienated life less burdensome, but, who, in actual fact, robs man of his "being", dwarfing him into a despicable creature whom he comes to abhor. Religion then furthers rather than halts alienation. Man's consciousness is made captive to the caprice of illusions about reality. As Parsons explains, Marx argues that religion deflects "man's attention from the conditions and problems of his real life, and rivets man to a 'fantastic' and 'illusory' happiness."[155] He is deceived into believing that his condition is improved by positing God as being the ultimate creator of all. The degeneracy of man in consequence of God's increasing rise in stature, majesty and power, constitutes real idolatry. Parsons writes,

> For Marx idolatry consists in man's production of a god on which he depends, which commands his devotion without his entirely knowing that it does, which man accepts with a certain degree of consciousness (and hence choice) as the centre of his life, and which progressively destroys man because it stands in the way of man's free, unalienated labour, his fulfilment, and the creative transformation of the economic and social order. 156

In this situation, man is no longer the centre of his life and of the universe. Instead, God - his own creation - is.

As the epitome of false consciousness, religion blinds man to his

possibilities as a creative being. His potentialities lie dormant, unrecognized by man, even as he robs himself of his higher capacities by transferring them to the being of God. Moreover, as Parsons points out, "In religion, man is still unconscious of himself, of the conditions of his enslavement, of his possibilities, of the need and possibility of his liberation, and of the way of his liberation."[157] Not only is man incapable of seeing the wretchedness of his alienation because religion as ideology dulls his senses even as it legitimates his exploitation and dehumanization, but he is also unaware that the possibility for liberation exists, and, indeed, it exists with him.

Furthermore, Marx tells us that man, suffering as he does under alienation, finds in religion an opiate which eases the burden of living under such depressing and depersonalizing conditions.[158] Man, whose nature is not only to have needs, both physical and spiritual, but also to have the intellectual (and other) capacity to satisfy those needs creatively, wastefully lavishes his creativity in furthering his alienation. Creative freedom is turned against him and intensifies his need of religion.[159] But to take Marx's assertion that religion "is the opium of the people", by itself, apart from its context, as the definitive appraisal of the function of religion is blatantly to misconstrue Marx, and deprive religion of the redeeming quality that it has in his estimation. Taken within its context the quote reads thus:

> Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world and the soul of soulless circumstances. It is the opium of the people.
>
> The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions about their condition is a demand to give up a condition that requires illusion. The

> criticism of religion is therefore the germ of the criticism of the valley of tears whose halo is religion. 160

Here we see Marx at the height of his polemic on religion. Having denounced religion as illusory, he now turns and says that it is invaluable as a sympton of alienation. He argues that as long as it exists, alienation will continue to exist. Moreover, it is not just an alienation of consciousness, but a total alienation which is rooted in the distorted mode of production. Marx reminds his readers that though in and through the human cry of despair and suffering, of protest and call to action, it is man's alienated religious consciousness that is expressing itself, nevertheless, the cry is real and so are the protest and suffering. Religion, then, can and does both hide suffering, and expose it. Once again, Marx repeats his central thesis concerning revolutionary praxis: if the cry is heard and radically understood, then it will be seen that it is a demand to relinquish and transform those conditions - materially based - through which illusions eventuate.

A natural question that may be raised at this stage is: what is the function of a philosophy of atheism in counteracting and eventually eradicating the influence and existence of religion? Marx, it will be remembered criticizes Hegel for conceiving of alienation only within consciousness. He also criticized Feuerbach for not being fully radical in his reduction of God to man. He felt that the latter was still too abstract since he had not reduced religious self-alienation to its secular base. This secular base, Marx claims, "must itself, therefore, first be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionized in practice."[161] In Marx's estimation, Feuerbach had failed to conclude his reductive process in such revolutionary praxis. Bearing this attitude in mind, i.e., of Marx to Hegel's and Feuerbach's conceptions of reality, it is not surprising to find

that Marx does not advocate a philosophy of atheism to eradicate religion.[162] This does not mean, however, that he denies that theoretical and ideological atheism haveno value in minimizing the influence of religion. What it does mean is that atheism is a mediation which must itself be replaced when alienation at the socio-economic base is transcended. Marx asserts:

> Once the essential reality of man in nature, man as the existence of nature for man, and nature for man as the existence of man, has become evident in practical life and sense experience, then the question of an alien being, of a being above nature and man - a question that implies an admission of the unreality of nature and man - has become impossible in practice. Atheism, as a denial of this unreality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a denial of God and tries to assert through negation the existence of man; but socialism as such no longer needs this mediation; it starts from the theoretical and practical sense-perception of man and nature as the true reality. 163

It is instructive at this stage to ask what was the primary concern of Marx in his criticism of religion as false consciousness. The answer is unmistakably man, universal, social and sensuous being. In his description of man's "essence" he points out that freedom is a characteristic of man which will come to full expression after alienation has been transcended. Religion denies man his autonomy and impinges upon his freedom. It mars his dignity. Atheism, as a theoretical activity, is not an end in itself but a transitory stage in man's quest for de-alienation. Marx is not primarily concerned with religion. Such a concern would only lead to further alienation since religion is part of the superstructure. Rather, he is concerned with man's historical "becoming" as he shapes and influences, and is shaped and influenced by the productive process in society. Since Marx denies the ultimate existence of anything which transcends man to which he is held accountable, then it is logical that he would attack religion. This attack upon religion is therefore a consequence

of Marx's anthropological concern and not the reverse. Norris is correct when he notes that, for Marx, religion "is grounded not in political or scientific negations of religion, but squarely in the affirmation of human autonomy."[164] We gain a fairly illuminating picture of alienated man's dilemma of losing his autonomy in religion when Marx, in reference to Creation, says:

> A being only counts itself as independent when it stands on its own feet and it stands on its own feet as long as it owes its existence to itself. A man who lives by grace of another considers himself a dependent being. But I live completely by the grace of another when I owe him not only the maintenance of my life but when he also created my life, when he is the source of my life. And my life necessarily has such a ground outside itself if it is not my own creation.[165]

Having seen that Marx does not attack consciousness per se but only religious and other ideological forms of consciousness, we will now turn our focus on Marx's description of human nature. This consideration is most crucial for it brings us to the central issue in our study: Marx's concept of man. How does Marx define man without reference to God?

F.

Marx's Concept of Human "Nature" ("Essence").

The following discussion will attempt to show that Marx fails to define in precise and unambiguous terms exactly what he means by human "nature" ("essence"). It is obvious that he was convinced that man was not what he ought to be, and certainly not what he will be in the future, unalienated society. Moreover, it is inconclusive to argue that Marx found a satisfactory and comprehensive definition of man's

nature in what God, especially the "God-man" in Christianity, is. It is evident that this was a guide, but Marx refused to accept such a definition as binding for all time for that would be too static a definition. It would be a priori and would be contrary to his principal thesis that consciousness - and this would include any definition of man's nature - is socio-economically determined. To do otherwise would be anti-revolutionary and would mean contributing to the alienating autonomy of consciousness. In short, certain forms of consciousness would then remain absolute, instead of being relative and eventually becoming obsolete in another era when the socio-economic base of society has been transcended and a new matrix of material conditions were then obtaining.

Marx, we have been arguing, was primarily concerned about man. He perceived the world with man at the centre, no longer subservient to God, but in command of his own destiny. He did espouse Feuerbach's description of his own doctrine:

> My doctrine in brief (says Feuerbach) is as follows: theology is anthropology. I.e., that which reveals itself in the object of religion - in Greek, called Theos, in German, Gott - is nothing other than the essence of man. In other words, the God of man is nothing other than the divinized essence. 166

However, Marx went beyond Feuerbach in positing that man's essence was socio-economically determined. In his estimate, Feuerbach had not been radical enough in his anthropological reductionism. In his sixth thesis on Feuerbach, he wrote:

> Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations.
> Feuerbach, who does not attempt the criticism of the real essence, is consequently compelled:
> 1. To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something for itself and to presuppose an abstract - isolated - human individual.

> 2. The human essence, therefore, can with him be comprehended only as 'genus', as a dumb internal generality which merely naturally unites the many individuals. [167]

Here we find that Marx is insisting that there is no fixed "essence" or "nature" in man. What constitutes the human person is not to be abstracted from outside of man. There is no God or other power external to and separate from man that determines man's "essence". His "essence" is created by man even as he participates in productive activity.

It is disputed whether Marx's argument that there is no fixed "essence" in man is unambiguously laid out in Marx's writings. Let us recall his use of the term "self-alienation". Schacht points out that in using the term "self-alienation", Marx "has in mind both the separation from a person of something which is very much a part of him, and the resulting separation of the person from his essential nature."[168] On the one hand, Marx uses "self-alienation" "to characterize more profoundly the alienation of labour, and occasionally, that of the product."[169] It will be recalled that in Marx's system, labour is a man's life which becomes objectified in the product produced. Now when both the labour and the product are alienated from him, then it is his own "self" which is alienated from him. Schacht draws attention to the fact that:

> In 'the relationship of the worker to his own activity as something alien and not belonging to him', Marx argues, it is 'his personal physical and spiritual energy, his personal life' that is alien to him - 'for what is life but activity?' [170].

Schacht rightly concludes that, according to Marx, when the labourer's "'personal physical and spiritual energy,' as manifested in his productive activity or labour, is subjected to the direction of another, his very life is no longer his own. He is therefore, 'self-alienated'."[171] This is the first sense of "self-alienation" in Marx's usage.[172]

On the other hand, Marx speaks of "self-alienation" when he wishes to convey "the idea of 'a total loss of humanity'."[173] Alienated labour produces man as both spiritually and physically dehumanized. Schacht notes that here self-alienation "is virtually synonymous with 'dehumanization' (Entmenschung)."[174]

The second understanding of "self-alienation" as being a separation of essence and existence raises the question whether Marx was undecided, or not, about man having a fixed and constant "nature" spanning all time.[175] Kamenka raises this issue for us when he notes an "obvious distinction between Marx's conception of alienation in the Paris Manuscripts and his later conception."[176] He states:

> In the Manuscripts , he still sees man as alienated from a generic, social being which is at once the universal nature common to all men and the essential nature underlying man's empirical development. In the Theses on Feuerbach , the German Ideology and the Communist Manifesto he rejects this conception specifically. There is no eternal or essential human nature from which man has become alienated, no 'Man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy'. 177

Kamenka contrasts what Marx says in his sixth thesis on Feuerbach (which was quoted above) with Marx's description of man as a species-being. Whether or not man has a fixed "essence" will not preclude man from displaying what is uniquely his "species-nature" vis-a-vis "animal nature".[178] It is only man that has the capacity for culture. He alone is capable of recognizing himself to be the creature he is; and in so doing he "becomes" the being he is. Man can and does create "mediations" between his needs and the means whereby he may satisfy those needs.[179] Now, despite this summary of Marx's argument that man is a species-being, man's nature still remains an enigma in Marx's writings.

Plamenatz gives us a poignant description of this dilemma of

discerning whether Marx argues for a fixed in contrast to a created nature in man. He argues:

> To hold that we cannot explain how living and working together with others of his species affects man in ways in which it does not affect other animals without attributing to him capacities which are peculiar to him and yet not products of social intercourse (though developed by it) is one thing; to hold that these are among his social activities some (namely, those that constitute 'material production') which determine in general that character of the others, is quite another. 180

Plamenatz admits that "both these assertions might be true." He claims, however, that the truth of the first assertion does not consequently imply the truth of the second assertion. Marx, he points out, does not explicitly say this. According to Plamenatz, "Marx does not even distinguish between the two questions. Rather, he seems at times to vacillate between the two, as if he thought them equivalent." In Plamenatz's opinion, Marx's disciples follow their master in maintaining this ambiguity.[181]

It would seem logical to conclude that since Marx argues against a fixed "nature" of man, then, man's nature is relative, i.e., it is both relative to and a function of the economic mode of production.[182] Man becomes what he is through work, which is his creative activity. His essence therefore arises out of the constellation of variables such as the relationship to his species-being, to his product, to the activity of production, to other species-beings, etc. He is motivated by needs, both spiritual and physical, and it is in satisfying these needs that his "nature" is formed. Culture, which reflects the state and level of his nature, influences his needs and his creative activity, and is in turn influenced and shaped by them. In each succeeding generation, new needs arise and old ones disappear: these needs are reflective of the nature and level of the productive process. Consequently, man's "essence" becomes transformed and evolves to

succeedingly higher levels.[183] Many questions still remain unanswered: what is universal "essence", and what is particular "essence"? What is the relationship between the two? What are the specific criteria for delineating what is human "nature"? These are crucial questions. This is noticed especially when they are seen in the context of Marx's projection of man's revolutionary transformation of both himself and the material conditions of existence.

The question of criteria raises a further significant question: From where does the criteria come? In Marx's thought, it is clear that he believes that they are immanently present in the socio-economic base. This answer is far from satisfactory or helpful, and it does not demonstrate that Marx was the thorough "empirical" materialist he assumed he was.[184] However, it is also obvious, that religion and other forms of "false consciousness" cannot provide the criteria. They are themselves alienated and alienating forms of consciousness.

This vagueness is illustrated in Marx's discussion of morality and law. In anticipation of the unalienated society, Marx gives the impression that there will be harmony in the "essence" of alienated beings. For example, Marx suggests that the laws of the "future" society will reflect the inner core of man's essence - freedom. A "true" law therefore indicates the existence of freedom, and not the absence or suppression of it. Marx asserts that it is

> only when his [man's] behaviour has actually shown that he has ceased to obey the natural law of freedom,... [that] the state law compels him to be free. Similarly physical laws only appear alien to me when my life has ceased to be the life of these laws, when it is sick. Thus a preventive law is a meaningless contradiction. 185

It seems appropriate to ask: Would a "true" law become a preventive law when it is transferred from one age to another? Marx leaves us without an answer.

It is a vain search to find Marx's definitive answer to the critical question of what constitutes man's "nature". We may find answers which show what it is not: for example, it is not a metaphysical abstraction related to God. But what it is remains an enigma to us. Marx is as dogmatic as he is vague in his description of man's "nature". Axelos catches sight of this dilemma when he sums up Marx's anthropology thus:

> It is man who produces man, according to Marx. By producing his life, man produces himself. Man owes his (human) being, his essence and his existence to his productive labour alone. Man is created neither by God nor by Nature. As man, he has created himself. Marx's humanism is altogether radical. He recognizes no court of determination higher than that of human productivity. Productivity is an absolutely thetic power; in it resides first positing action. Production is as well the motor force of negativity, and it develops antithetic powers. Finally it is in production, and by production, that the supreme synthesis is worked. 186

The student of Marx is left to wonder at the precise meaning of the concept of man as the "realizer" of his "essence", and also as the creator of that "essence". Does man realize what he essentially is? Does he become what he is? Or does man become what he creates? We return once more to the question of "essence" and "existence", and are without a definitive resolution of the issue.[187] We are left to tentatively summarize the foregoing discussion thus: The creative power of man is his "essence". This "essence" is freedom - creative freedom to transform nature and to satisfy physical and spiritual needs.[188] In the process of satisfying needs, man's "nature" which is comprised of "spiritual" needs, becomes a new matrix of human needs, and so on. Thus it is through his work that man expresses his "essence".[189]

G.

Communism, the Future Society and the End of Alienation: Marx's Utopian Vision.

In our discussion so far, we have attempted to show that Marx's concept of man is inextricably bound up with his concept of alienation. Man, we are told, is alienated from himself, from his fellow human beings, from the productive process and from his own product. The picture of alienated man reflects the state of the worker in nineteenth century bourgeois-capitalist society in Western Europe. Inevitably, Marx's description reflects the visionary in him even though he claims objectivity for his analysis. But perhaps it is in his speculations about unalienated society, communism, that we see Marx's utopianism at its best. Convinced beyond any doubt that alienation was historically produced, Marx dared to predict that it would likewise be historically eradicated.

It will be recalled that Marx argued that man's rightful place is at the centre of creation, i.e., at the centre of the universe. While nature provides the raw materials for man's creative activity and acts upon and shapes man, it is man who gives the world its shape as he transforms nature. History then is the history of the mutual interaction between man and nature which leads to the humanization of nature.[190] This presupposition about the humanization of nature undergirds Marx's postulation of the de-alienation of man and the complete transcendence of alienation. It is here we glimpse an optimism that befits the Jewish prophet rather than the cold, calculating empiricist who refuses to project a future beyond that which can be verified by the objective data available.[191] Unfortunately, Marx

neither described in full the future society he envisaged, nor did he articulate in clearly defined terms the path to be trod and the means to be used in the achievement of the transcendence of alienation and the realization of free, uninhibited, humanized, creative man.[192] Nevertheless, the glimpse that we are able to catch sight of provides an indispensable insight into his understanding of history which will eventually tell a history of (even as it will be) man's transcendence of alienation and his creation of his truly human "essence".

However, before we embark on our discussion of history and the transcendence of alienation, we must first piece together some of the fragmentary descriptions of the unalienated society that Marx gives us.[193] It should be noted that Marx is here describing a reality that has never been known in the history of the universe. According to Marx, it is not a "picture" of a lost paradise which is about to be regained.[194] Marx does not speak in such static terms; for him, the future is ever open and yields the dynamically new.

Marx argues that in the future, free society, there will be no longer any state which acts as an "intermediary between man and his freedom."[195] The emergence of the future society will mean that the state has disappeared. So long as the state exists, even when it facilitates the experience of an increasing measure of freedom for its citizens, man is still alienated for he is thereby made to recognize himself by detour - i.e. through the state. According to Marx, even in a state in which its citizens have gained political emancipation, the communist society is still a far cry. Remembering that Marx saw religion as a phenomenon - part of the superstructure - whose presence in any so-called "free" state is a blatant reminder that alienation still

plagues such a society and its people, his criticism of the situation in the North American states is to be noted. He says,

> The question is: what is the relationship of complete political emancipation to religion? The fact that even in the land of completed political emancipation we find not only the existence of religion but a living existence full of freshness and strength, furnishes us with the proof that the existence of religion does not contradict or impede the perfection of the state itself. 196

Marx, therefore, concludes that the future, unalienated society is nowhere in existence not even where there has been political emancipation. Political emancipation is not human emancipation, and hence religious emancipation is still to be effected even when political emancipation has been legislated into operation.[197]

Marx points out that in the perfected political state dichotomies continue to exist; in fact, they are integral to the existence of such a state. For instance, there is the opposition between the "species-life of man" and his "material life". Egoism remains unchecked and is even fostered by civil society which stands opposed to the state. This is how Marx describes the situation:

> The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of men in opposition to his material life. All the presupposition of this egoistic life continue to exist in civil society outside the sphere of the state, but as proper to civil society. When the political state has achieved its true completion, man leads a double life, a heavenly one and an earthly one, not only in thought and consciousness but in reality, in life. He has a life both in the political community, where he is valued as a communal being, and in civil society where he is active as a private individual, treats other men as means, degrades himself to a means and becomes the plaything of alien powers. 198

Marx adds that the political state cannot extricate itself from the insiduous and perpetual domination of religion which, even at its best, is profane and limits man's experience of freedom. He claims:

> The political state has just as spiritual an attitude to civil society as heaven has to earth. It stands in the same opposition to civil society and overcomes it in the

> same manner as religion overcomes the limitations of the profane world, that is, it must likewise recognize it, reinstate it and let itself once more be dominated by it. Man in the reality that is nearest to him, civil society, is a profane being. Here where he counts for himself and others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where man counts as a species-being, he is an imaginary participant in an imaginary sovereignty, he is robbed of his real life and filled with an unreal universality. 199

However, political emancipation is not without any positive value. It is a necessary step towards complete human emancipation. As Marx explains, "Political emancipation is of course a great progress. Although it is not the final form of human emancipation in general, it is nevertheless the final form of human emancipation inside the present world order."[200] The problem with political emancipation is that it is mistaken for real human emancipation.

It is to be noted that Marx's description of his conception of "human emancipation" and the "future society" forms part of the core of his argument that man is the measure of man whose rightful place in the world is as the Subject and Centre of history. On the question of human emancipation, Marx argues:

> All emancipation is bringing back man's world and his relationships to man himself.
>
> Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one hand to a member of civil society, an egoistic and independent individual, on the other hand to a citizen, a moral person.
>
> The actual individual man must take the abstract citizen back into himself and, as an individual man in his empirical life, in his individual work and individual relationships become a species-being; man must recognize his own forces as social forces, organize them and thus no longer separate social forces from himself in the form of political forces. Only when this has been achieved will human emancipation be completed. 201

This is yet another illustration of Marx's rhetoric concerning the need for man to assume control of the forces of history which are intrinsically his. What Marx makes clear here is not how man will achieve this utopia;

rather, he reiterates his thesis that as long as man is not in control of those forces, he is still alienated and unfree.

Noting that, for Marx "the true communist revolution could not be political, as was the bourgeois revolution, but is human and social," Kostas Axelos makes the following comment about human emancipation:

> It is in ceasing to be the alienated worker and the abstract citizen that man can become what he is: species being. It is in ceasing to be the egoistic individual that he can regain his community essence. The recovery by man of all his properties, the abolition of the worker and the citizen in favour of the real man, the regaining by species being of all activities: this is the meaning of human emancipation. Such was Marx's thinking when he tried to exorcise the ghost of political communism. 202

The anticipated erruption of human emancipation will usher in freedom hitherto unexperienced in the world. Whereas under capitalism, the worker was reduced to a mere wage-earner, enslaved by private property which is his own crystallized labour estranged from him, under communism, he will be free to choose whatever occupation he desires. In this way, he will be able to develop himself in a holistic way and not be inhibited by restraints in either the mode of the production or the relations of production. The world here described sounds more like a fairy-tale, an idyll, rather than as a reality in the actual, material conditions of life. In the <u>German Ideology</u>, Marx and Engels provide a vivid contrast between the alienated work situation and the unalienated, free world of productive and creative human activity:

> And finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of the fact that, as long as man remains in naturally evolved society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and

> must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. 203

Whereas in natural society (naturwüchsigen Gesellschaft), man's activity is naturally not voluntarily divided, thereby making man's own labour into an alien power that subjugates and depersonalizes him, in the "free" society, man will exercise freely the will to choose among an innumerable variety of activities that will facilitate his humanization rather than promote his alienation. History - man's creative activity with nature - will show man's humanization of nature; no longer will the primitive natural order persist and dominate man. Axelos provides a useful summary of Marx's sanguine vision here when he says,

> In the world of planetary technique and the most powerful development of the totality of productive forces, in the world that will have completely transformed nature into history and stripped all that is of natural character, in the world that will no longer know the distinction of labour into mechanical work and spiritual work nor the opposition of city and country, the communist man will be able, following his will and good pleasure, to give himself to these primitive ancient, and medieval activities; he will be able to hunt, fish, raise livestock, and criticize. 204

One of the crucial problems with Marx's description of the future society is that it arises from alienation itself. It is therefore logical to ask whether his claims that he is promoting the humanity of man are plausible. Is his perspective not inherently ideological, legitimating fundamental dehumanising tendencies in both man and society? Axelos grasps this dilemma when he asks: "Is not this anticipatory vision of total man's activities in total society, such as is expressed by the fanatic opponent of all ideology and every utopia, itself ideological, touching as it may also be in its naïveté and its rural idyllic

tones?"[205] The implication is certainly to be noted, even when it is also appreciated that Marx was thinking in universalistic terms that spanned all of humanity and human history and not only the industrial societies of his time.

Marx argues that with the State abolished, and private property, division of labour, money, etc. that perpetuated man's alienation transcended through communism, the triumvirate of the "essence" of reality - society, nature, and man - will become free to work cooperatively and harmoniously. Man's nature will be "restored" and through mutual interaction with nature, and with society, he will continually develop his authentic "nature". It cannot be otherwise, for, as Axelos explains:

> The realization of man's naturalism along the axis of the humanism of nature can take place only by way of society and through the life and social activity of men. Nature must not be given a privileged position at the expense of man and society, nor man at the expense of nature and society, nor society at the expense of nature and man. 206

In short, all hierarchical systems must be and will be abolished in the future society. Marx assumes that the three - society, nature and man - are interrelated and form a "common being"; hence, they must not be separated from each other. Axelos draws attention to the fact that:

> Properly speaking, one must not even distinguish here these three aspects of the same thing, of common being, of the being - in - becoming of totality. Indivisibly naturalistic, humanistic, and socialistic, communism will reconcile what was in conflict. 207

Marx's concern about the future society draws its inspiration from his primary preoccupation with man as a social being. The future society is there not postulated as an abstraction which will replace the present alienating and abstract society.

The society of the future will therefore be naturalistic, humanistic and socialistic. Man will be no longer dominated by envy, greed, egoism,

physical need that seek utilitarian gratification; rather, he will ever pursue that which makes for human self-realization. Under communism, man's focus will be on the future. Axelos tells us:

> When man will have overcome his fragmentation and the duality that arises between the sensuous and material aspect of beings and things and their meaningful, spirit-order (spiritual) aspect, thereby finding the unified expression of the unity proper to his essence, then will he be able to appropriate his being in a universal way by appropriating at the same time the universal essence of all that is. 208

Everything, man, nature, society, will be in a state of perpetual change being impelled by the future which will not be bogged down by the past which is plagued by alienation. The future, as Marx conceives it, will ever bring new and harmonious mutations conducing always to reconciliation.[209] The enigma in describing this future is well illustrated by Axelos's criticism of Marx's failure to bother himself with the extreme difficulty of achieving a reunification of what has become separated. He points out:

> Marx pays scant attention to the difference that separates any <u>original unity</u> from an <u>enterprise of unification</u>, and he does not let himself be bothered by the extreme difficulty involved in any attempt to <u>reunite</u> what was <u>separated</u>, when he conceived active humanism as generating total man and total society, and the total activity of man as inserting organically into Totality. 210

Disregarding the alienated state of affairs that currently obtains, Marx envisages a future that will be free of <u>exclusiveness</u>, <u>acquisitiveness</u> and <u>having</u>. He argues:

> Similarly the positive supersession of private property, that is, the sensuous appropriations by and for man of human essence and human life, of objective man and his works, should not be conceived of only as direct and exclusive enjoyment, possession and having. Man appropriates his universal being in a unified manner, as a whole man. Each of his human relationships to the world - seeing, hearing, smell, tasting, feeling, thinking, contemplating, willing, acting, loving - in short all the organs of his individuality, just as the organs whose form is a directly communal one, are in their objective action, or their relation to the object, the appropriation of this

> object. The appropriation of human reality, their relationship to the object, is the confirmation of human reality. 211

Man, the architect of his own liberation, the centre of the universe, will, in the future society, rightly appropriate subject and object and thereby realize his human essence which is universal human essence.

The description of "communism" which we gain from Marx's writings serves to further clarify his picture of human emancipation. Our concern throughout has been with the picture Marx gives of the society which he calls unalienated, and which he envisages will supersede the present alienated one. Because the term "communism" may be easily construed to mean a static state to be achieved, he substituted the term "future society" instead, for the most part. But "future society" is not without its ambiguity and like "communism" does allow for a connotation of a goal to be achieved which suggests a static future. However, when Marx uses the term "communism" he is certainly thinking of a future not yet present, but it is a future that is "naturalistic, humanistic, and socialistic."[212] It is a future that is dynamic, and, as Axelos explains, it

> is the movement whose burden it is to accomplish the task of universal reconciliation and to allow the full satisfaction of the totality of human needs, needs that renew themselves endlessly as they are satisfied. 213

It has already been stated that Marx was convinced that alienation can and will be transcended through human activity. Not only was alienation created by man, but it will also be historically superseded by him. Marx bases this hypothesis on the premise that

> Communism is for us not a <u>state of affairs</u> which is to be established, an <u>ideal</u> to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the <u>real</u> movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the now existing premise. 214

As could be expected from one who wished to realize philosophy in <u>praxis</u>,

Marx insists that communism is a practical movement of negating that which negates the human "essence". It pursues the satisfaction of practical needs and does so by practical means. It involves practical-critical activity and not one or the other, in isolation from the other. As Axelos sums it up:

> It is in movement and its "essence" is mobile. It posits negation as negation in order to negate the world as it exists, the world that nevertheless provides it with its preconditions; and it comes to posit the negation of negation as a new and unprecedented position, as the point of departure for the movement that moves toward the total, practical appropriation of all that <u>really</u> exists. 215

The future to which it moves is an open future which is characterised by the ongoing process of the negation of the negation. Marx implies that it is a positive process which man knows and understands fully, for he is (will be) simultaneously the creator and the created. Marx himself points out,

> Communism represents the positive in the form of the negation of the negation and thus a phase in human emancipation and rehabilitation, both real and necessary at this juncture of human development. Communism is the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism is not as such the goal of human development, the form of human society. 216

The final goal, then, is not communism, necessary (and inevitable) though it is for human emancipation. It is a phase in the process of human development which will be eventually transcended. It is therefore limited. Failure to recognize this will lead to distortion of the liberation process, and will stultify human growth. Such a failure would be castigated by Marx as being ideological - demeaning of man, and alienating in its consequences on man, nature and society. To avoid such a blatant retrogression, communism must be taken for what it is. Axelos therefore concludes:

> Though it is the movement of victory over Totality and of the (re) conquest of the essence of human totality, it hardly

> escapes limitation. Communism will be in turn transcended, but not before it has been completely realized. 217

Finally, it should be noted that Marx's optimistic, utopian vision is based upon his acceptance and transformation of the Hegelian dialectic. As we pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, Marx was influenced by Hegel throughout his life. The most pervasive influence is in relation to the concept of alienation and its dialectical transcendence. Though Marx applies the dialectic to socio-economic categories in the first instant in his attempt to realize philosophy, he, nevertheless, continues to view reality in dialectical terms, i.e., in terms of inherent contradictions which possessed their own solution (higher synthesis). Unlike Hegel, he envisages a historical transformation of alienation and the emergence of the emancipated society. However, he continues to base his theory of history upon the Hegelian dialectic. It would seem that the ongoing process of future contradictions will not lead to further alienations but to ever higher syntheses and the realization of an ever widening freedom. With this in mind, we turn next to a discussion of Marx's theory of history.

Chapter II.

Marx's Theory of History

A.

Premises for Transcending Alienation. (History as Universal History)

No one reading Marx's description of alienation, with its wretchedness and dehumanization, juxtaposed to the unfinished, speculative picture of the future society to be ushered in by communism, can help but wonder at his optimism about the historical transcendence of alienation. It cannot be disputed that his description of alienation, one-sidedly economically determined thought it is, is a most perspicacious analysis of nineteenth century society. Marx has really captured the state of man-in-alienation in bourgeois capitalist society.

But, by the same token, it cannot be seriously disputed that his description of communism, fragmentary though it is (and must be), takes us into realms hitherto unexperienced in human history. Nowhere has man been able to completely avoid alienation, not even in primitive societies. History, for Marx, has always been a history of human alienation.[1] His expectation, therefore, that alienation will be transcended by human activity, leaves us wondering: how will this be achieved? Indeed, the significance of our query is sharpened when it is realized that Marx did not have a clearly defined plan of action whereby man will liberate himself and the whole of human history.

In our feeble attempt at piecing together the unfinished indications of how reconciliation will be achieved, we are led to investigate Marx's theory of history since it is man's alienated creation, and also

because it will eventually become authentic human history. Are there forces, both human and impersonal, which will collaborate to abolish alienation? What are the premises upon which Marx bases his optimism? Is the solution to the human predicament inherent in the situation? These and other crucial questions will be taken up in the following pages.

It is fairly clear that the premises upon which Marx bases his argument for the historical transcendence of alienation are not completely empirical in content. As Axelos points out, Marx's primary premise is not empirical but metaphysical. Neither before, during, nor after Marx's time have there been found a group of historically and empirically verifiable premises to demonstrate conclusively that history - and this includes human activity - has been, is following, and will follow patterns which are empirically calculable. This does not rule out the possibility of discerning certain tendencies of and within history. Admittedly, Marx is concerned with the concrete activity of real men and with the concrete, material forces of production. We note, for example, his theory of history as universal history of alienation, as well as his argument that the abolition of private property is a <u>crucial</u> step towards the transcendence of alienation. However, this is not the same as saying that Marx provides a scientifically verifiable programme of de-alienation. We therefore agree with Plamenatz's conclusion that Marx's optimism about man's transcendence of alienation and his creation of the "free" society is a significant reminder of a latent prophetic zeal characteristic of the prophets in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Attention was drawn earlier to the fact that Marx was convinced that speculative philosophy has reached its culmination in Hegel.

There was no way beyond that point that is not ideological, except through praxis. This was the gist of his eleventh and final thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." The translators of the Collected Works, (Volume V) note that "Marx himself separated this thesis from the preceding ten, as though underlining its summarizing character. We must understand the world in order to change it, instead of interpreting it one way or another in order to reconcile ourselves with what exists. Such in substance is the true meaning of this thesis."[2] Moreover, they add, there is another thought, which is organically bound up with the foregoing one:

> The world cannot be changed by merely changing our notions of it, by theoretically criticising what exists; it must be understood, and then, proceeding from this, transformed by effective action, material revolutionary practice. This thesis concisely formulates the fundamental difference of Marxist philosophy from all earlier philosophy, including pre-Marxian materialism. It concentrates into a single sentence the effective, transforming character of the revolutionary theory created by Marx and Engels, its inseparable connection with revolutionary practice. 3

This revoluttionary praxis which Marx has in mind is not confined to any particular sector of mankind - not even to Germany, or to bourgeois capitalist society. It is universal in scope. Over the years through successive epochs, the base has been broadening until the whole of humanity is finally divided into two camps - two classes, the exploited and the exploiters.[4] Marx illustrates this argument in his discussion in German Ideology of the connection between "the ideas of the ruling class" and "the ruling class itself", when he says:

> For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution comes forward from

> the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class, but as the representative of the whole of society, as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class. 5

This pretense of universality is not without substance since the non-ruling class does, if it is successful, gain benefits, not only for itself but also for a wider mass of alienated humanity. "Its victory, therefore, benefits also many individuals of other classes which are not winning a dominant position, but only insofar as it now enables these individuals to raise themselves into the ruling class."[6] Piecemeal, temporary "victories" are achieved, but the mass of humanity continues to suffer alienation, with the small elitist ruling-class feeding parasitically off the former's own energy and creation. The growing intensity of this inhuman struggle seemingly continues unabated, for, according to Marx and Engels:

> Every new class, therefore, achieves domination only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously; on the other hand the opposition of the non-ruling class to the new ruling class then develops all the more sharply and profoundly. Both these things determine the fact that the struggle to be waged against the new ruling class, in its turn, has as its aim a more decisive and more radical negation of the previous conditions of society than (33) all previous classes which sought to rule could have. 7

At the very heart of this class conflict is the basic socio-economic conflict out of which all other conflicts in history arise. Discussion of class conflict which Marx predicts will culminate in the proletarian revolution will be taken up later, but it should be noted en passant that Marx argues that conflict leading to change arises when changes in the mode of production leads inevitably to disharmony between the forces of production and the relations of production. It must not be forgotten that Marx's optimism for a resolution of alienation rested a great deal upon the new possibilities contained within the womb of ever advancing technology. Prior to and up to the present day every

succeeding generation found "itself in possession of the productive forces won by the previous generation which serve it as the raw material for new production."[8] All of history is inextricably linked together and history is the history of all mankind. Moreover, this process occurs even when the mass of humanity is unconscious of its participation. Even during the decadence of alienation the resolution of the conflict is occurring, albeit in a hidden and obscure way. Noting Marx's letter to Annenkov, Brussels, December 28, 1846, Jean Hyppolite explains that during (and because of) this inter-generational transmission of the productive forces,

> ... A connection arises in human history, a history of humanity takes shape which has become all the more a history of humanity since the productive forces of man and therefore his social relations have been extended. Hence it necessarily follows: the social history of men is never anything but the history of their individual development, whether they are conscious of it or not. 9

This ignorance of its role in history will not characterize the proletarian class at the moment of its messianic overthrow of the alienated (and alienating) productive process. For then it will be fully conscious of its salutary activity for the benefit of the whole of humanity. Of course, during these preparatory epochs, parochialism, rationalism, and other exclusivistic and separatist attitudes and tendencies will be the order of the day. In spite of this, Marx is able to perceive history in its intrinsically universal scope and to proceed with optimism to announce the coming of de-alienation and human reconciliation.

Marx's argument that history is universal history of human alienation and development is also related to his concept of human "essence" as being comprised of needs. It will be recalled that mention was made of the fact that man, like other animals, has certain basic

physical needs which he seeks to satisfy through his encounter with nature. Unlike other animals, man is able to create culture which he transmits from generation to generation. Culture is a human deposit of man's creative use of nature to satisfy his needs. This process has the effect of giving rise to new and higher needs which are peculiar to the human-species and are directly related to the level of technology that obtains at each particular stage of socio-economic development. Yet he speaks of needs of the species-being as if he is conceiving of universal species-being. The needs therefore of these species-beings are envisaged to be the same everywhere (or at least it is assumed that they will reach that point during communism, if not before). Man as worker who is alienated in the ways discussed earlier, finds that the essence of all his needs is in the universal desire for freedom and redemption. This concept of history tracing out the cry of the species-being for the satisfaction of his pervasive need of reconciliation and de-alienation is yet another indication of Marx's understanding of history as universal history.

The question of the history of nature prior to human presence in it and their mutual interaction with each other is an abstract and speculative question. History has its origin in man's encounter with nature. "When you enquire about the creation of the world and man," Marx suggests, "then you abstract from man and the world."[10] With his emphasis upon history being the creation of man, Marx categorically denies the creation of man or nature by any grand designer or heavenly- or spirit-creator. As he himself says, "spontaneous generation is the only practical refutation of the theory of creation."[11] Further on he concludes:

> But since for socialist man what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labour and the

> development of nature for man, he has the observable and irrefutable proof of his self-creation and the process of his origin. Once the essential reality of man in nature, man as the existence of nature for man, and nature for man as the existence of man, has become evident in practical life and sense experience, then the question of an alien being, of a being above nature and man - a question that implies an admission of the unreality of nature and man - has become impossible in practice. 12

Marx does not subscribe to any metaphysical idea of or belief in a being who existed prior to creation. That would be tantamount to a denial of human autonomy and would thereby further alienation. To posit creation as the act of some being or agency outside of man-in-nature, is to deny that history is man's creation generated by human impulse. Man's roots would then be outside of himself and his experience of de-alienation would be subject to the caprice of some paternal benefactor. But this is mere abstract and speculative thinking, which has no grounding in the real and actual conditions of life. It would not be scientific, and Marx wants to be certain that his theory of history is seen as being fully empirical. Axelos sums up Marx's argument here very appropriately when he says:

> The origin of man is nature, his nature is human; the Nature with which he is involved is always social, and its becoming is historical. (Cosmic) Nature and (human) nature, (social) technique and (historical) becoming are therefore inseparably bound and manifest themselves together from the very beginning. The visible beginning of all that is, the originating act of the World, is human history, for 'history is the true natural history of man', and 'only naturalism is capable of comprehending the act of world history'. The originating act of all that is, the plan from which it all can be grasped, is this point of intersection of the 'humanism of nature' and the naturalism of man. 13

In his survey of the state of capitalist society of the nineteenth century, Marx discovered what he took to be the arch-enemy of human freedom: private property. The worker had created his own alienation which is tangibly and potently present in the form of estranged surplus production owned by the non-working employer. There is no mistaking

that all around him the worker feels totally alienated. According to Marx, this phenomenon will become universal even as capitalism spreads. But the function of private property in society is ambiguous. Marx tells us,

> Precisely in the fact that division of labour and exchange are embodiment of private property lies the twofold proof, on the one hand that human life required private property for its realization, and on the other hand that it now requires the suppression of private property. 14

We return to the problem of the circularity of Marx's argument concerning the causes and effects of alienation. Private property, Marx informs us, arose out of the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist who kept back a disproportionate part of the worker's production for himself. It arose out of an already existing mode of production. This alienated mode contributed to the further development of succeeding alienated modes of production throughout history up to and until the emergence of the capitalist mode which, Marx points out, is the most alienated of all previous modes. According to Marx, such an alienated pattern of development was historically necessary and inevitable. Private property, for its part, since its existence was tied to the productive process, also grew and spread, becoming increasingly pervasive over each succeeding society. Along with the development in the mode of production and private property, the development of "technique" also occurred. However, the satisfaction of human needs was only partial. As Axelos explains:

> Technique served up till now to provide a partial, select, and fragmentary satisfaction of human needs, but that all took place within the world of private property wherein subjects were separated from objects. The abolition of private property will permit man to regain his human, that is, social, existence in the satisfaction of the totality of needs in a human way. 15

Marx concludes that, when the usefulness of private property is ended

and it therefore becomes inverted, then, the worker, acting in solidarity with all other workers, must engage in a revolutionary transformation of the productive process in order to abolish the alienating existence of private property.

Once again we are confronted by Marx's enigmatic description of the abolition of private property in actual "human" history. Fired by his sanguine vision of the historical transcendence of alienation and the "restoration" of everything to full and authentic human use, Marx boldly asserts:

> The supersession of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely in that these senses and qualities have become human, both subjectively and objectively. The eye has become a human eye when its object has become a social, human object produced by man and destined for him. Thus in practice the senses have become direct theoreticians. They relate to the one thing for its own sake but the thing itself is an objective human relationship to itself and to man and vice versa. (I can in practice only relate myself humanly to an object if the object relates itself humanly to man.) Need and enjoyment have thus lost their egoistic nature and nature has lost its mere utility in that its utility has become human utility. 16

The abolition of private property, we are told here, will effect a total human self-transformation. However, nowhere has this been achieved before. With the abolition of private property, man will be no longer enslaved by egoistic need and enjoyment, and mere utilitarian satisfaction of such selfish desires. Everything, the human senses, relationships, and human "essence" will be fully humanized.[17] However much we may criticize Marx's vision as being utopian and naive, and, indeed, such it is,[18] we cannot escape noticing his persistence in firmly anchoring his de-alienated future in man whose creative power is necessary for both his own humanization as well as the humanization of need and property.[19] As Axelos notes, "This can all actually take place in historical time, because the subjective and objective nature of man,

the human essence of all that is, both allows it and requires it."[20]

At this point it will serve our purposes to ask: What is the nature of the fundamental premise that allows for the historical transcendence of alienation? This question is implicit in the following quote from Axelos where he provides a summary answer to it:

> The fundamental premise that allows the transcendence of alienation, namely, the essence of man (something that has never yet been empirically found), is metaphysical in nature. And it is metaphysical in the traditional sense of that term, since it goes beyond the data of experience. Marx has never been able to establish the empirical existence of this natural, social, human, species essence of man - an essence whose history is but the history of alienation and which will show itself for the first time in the kingdom of universal reconciliation. 21

The use of the term "metaphysical in the traditional sense", at a first glance, strikes us as being odd and inaccurate, for Marx himself does castigate the presupposition of an other-worldly creator standing over and above man regulating the affairs of man. But the term is appropriately used since, as Axelos rightly points out, there is no empirical evidence for the "utopia" that Marx envisages. It is therefore an "other-worldly" picture of the future of this actual and real, sensuous material world. We are surprised even further to learn from Axelos that Marx was unaware of "the metaphysical dimension of his thought".[22] In the German Ideology under the caption "Premises of the Materialist Conception of history", Marx writes:

> The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in the pure empirical way. 23

Commenting on this text Axelos raises serious doubts about Marx's assumption that the premises are empirically verifiable. He asks:

> But can the species essence of man, natural, social, human being, which is its own foundation, an essence never yet

> realized but nevertheless the thing that makes possible and necessary the transcending of alienation - can this basic metaphysical presupposition be verified in a purely empirical way? Can the prospect of radical dealienation, faith in the possibility of the total transcending of all alienation, and hope in the future universal reconciliation be sustained on the basis of the data of experience? Are all those things implied in the wondrous development of technique as liberated from all impediments? 24

Though the answer to these questions is in the negative, we shall put off making a final assessment of Marx's theory of history until after we have discussed some of the other significant facts of this theory.

B.

The Evolutionary Development of the Mode of Production.

In the preceding section it was noted that Marx was not totally immune to non-empirical ideas, even when he was dealing with alienation under capitalism and the necessity and possibility of its transcendence through man's initiative. The bourgeois capitalist societies of his day provided the primary "data" for his formulations about the actual state of man. Every concern and focus were directed towards understanding the alienating influence of capitalism. No consideration was seen in isolation from capitalism.[25] This peculiarly Marxian outlook is directly related to his thesis of history as universal social history. Pre-capitalist formations, which Marx argues there were, were regarded as being in some way related to the emergence of the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the ambiguous historical development of human "nature" also took place prior to the birth of capitalism. As Marx himself claims, history has always been the history of human alienation, hence, even as technology advanced and

culture was transmitted from generation to generation reflecting a real development of human "nature", alienation gradually became worse until it reached its nadir under capitalism.

The history of alienation, Marx tells us, begins not with capitalism, but prior to that period, with the "pre-capitalist economic formations".[26] However, as Hobsbawm explains, "Marx concentrated his energies on the study of capitalism, and he dealt with the rest of history in varying degrees of detail, but mainly in so far as it bore on the origins and development of capitalism."[27] Hobsbawm states further, "Now it is generally agreed that Marx's and Engels' observations on pre-capitalist epochs rest on far less thorough study than Marx's description and analysis of capitalism."[28] In his study of the development of capitalism, Marx assumed a priori that the movement of history prior to the emergence of modern bourgeois capitalism had a definite link with capitalism. For Marx, his study of pre-capitalist economic formations confirmed this assumption. However, he did not demonstrate conclusively how the connection may be empirically verified. The Hegelian influence on Marx may be held accountable for this intuitive rather than apparent unity which the title "Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations" verbally connotes.

Eric Hobsbawm provides a useful analysis and summary of the main ideas of the Formen. Noting that "the Formen are both more general and more specific than the Preface, though they too ... are not 'history' in the strict sense," Hobsbawm argues that Marx is concerned here with establishing "the general mechanism of all social change."[29] Hobsbawm explains further that this mechanism is

> the formation of social relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of the

> material forces of production; the periodic development of conflicts between the forces and relations of production; the 'epochs of social revolution' in which the relations once again adjust themselves to the level of the forces. This general analysis does not imply any statement about specific historical periods, forces and relations of production whatever. 30

Commenting on Marx's inclusion here of pre-capitalist formations in his view of history as universal history, Hobsbawm notes that Marx does so "on a materialist and not an idealist basis."[31]

Secondly, Hobsbawm says that in "the Formen (Marx) seek (s) to formulate the content of history in its most general form. This content is progress."[32] By progress, Hobsbawm continues, Marx means "something objectively definable, and at the same time pointing to what is desirable."[33] It would appear that Hobsbawm, taking Marx's general description of progress at its broadest, interprets him as meaning "the triumph of the free development of all men."[34] According to Hobsbawm, Marx takes it as axiomatic that the phenomenon of "progress" (or emancipation), will be objectively seen and recognized as such. Hobsbawm notes, "Progress of course is observable in the growing emancipation of man from nature and his growing control over nature."[35] Moreover, that the "triumph" is not only desirable but inevitable, is not a matter of abstract, ideological hope and longing, but a matter of the empirical accuracy of Marx's analysis. Hobsbawm puts it thus:

> The strength of the Marxist belief in the triumph of the free development of all men, depends not on the strength of Marx's hope for it, but on the assumed correctness of the analysis that this is indeed where historical development eventually leads mankind. 36

In the period described as "pre-capitalist" Marx distinguishes four principal historical periods directly related to the socio-economic "progress" of society. These are the "Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois".[37] It is to be noted that the four periods

followed in a natural progression from one to the other, beginning with the Asiatic, which gave rise to the ancient, which gave rise to the feudal out of which the modern bourgeois society finally emerged. Marx himself admits that there were periods in which different societies were in differing socio-economic stages. However, he was more convinced that the so-called "Germanic system" - a particular manifestation in feudalism - was "the direct ancestor of bourgeois society" than of any other connection between any two of the other forms of society.[38] Admitting to the difficulty in ascertaining from Marx's notes an accurate schematization of the historical stages, Hobsbawm suggests the following summary interpretation:

> The oriental (and Slavonic) forms are historically closest to man's origins, since they conserve the functioning primitive (village) community in the midst of the more elaborate social super structure, and have an insufficiently developed class system.... The ancient and Germanic systems, though also primary - i.e. not derived from the oriental - represents a somewhat more articulated form of evolution out of primitive communalism; but the "Germanic system" as such does not form a special socio-economic formation. It forms the socio-economic formation of feudalism in conjunction with the medieval town (the locus of the emergence of the autonomous craft production). This combination then, which emerges during the Middle Ages, forms the third phase. Bourgeois Society, emerging out of feudalism, forms the fourth. 39

Being aware of the ambiguity of the foregoing summary in terms of leaving the erroneous impression of a "unilinear view of history", Hobsbawm immediately adds the cautionary word:

> The statement that the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and bourgeois formations are 'progressive' does not therefore imply any simple unilinear view of history, not a simple view that all history is progress. It merely states that each of these systems is in crucial respects further removed from the primitive state of man. 40

Hobsbawm concludes that for Marx, the relevance of his (Marx's) analysis of "particular socio-economic formations" is in the light it throws on the "long-term transformation".[41] To speak in chronological terms, as

Marx conceives of it, is to embrace centuries and continents in a broad sweep of thought.[42]

Our repeated assertion of Marx's thesis that history has always been the history of alienation, leads us to ask: what picture of man does Marx give us here? The "progress" which Marx argues occurs in history, the growing emancipation of man which Marx sees arising out of the changing productive forces, is one of "human individualization."[43] Beginning with the time of man in his original natural conditions down through the centuries until the eruption of modern bourgeois society, man has suffered the paradoxical experience of increasing isolation and alienation (from communal ownership, etc.) even while at the same time he was gradually moving closer to "the ideal of free individual development" until in bourgeois society that ideal is closer to its realisation "than it ever was in all previous phases of history".[44] Reflecting upon the error of imagining primeval man's subservience to man as a natural condition, Marx tells us,

> It is of course easy to imagine a powerful, physically superior person, who first captures animals and then captures men in order to make them catch animals for him; in brief, one who uses man as a naturally occurring condition for his reproduction like any other living natural thing; his own labour being exhausted in the act of domination. But such a view is stupid, though it may be correct from the point of view of a given tribal or communal entity; for it takes the isolated man as its starting point. 45

Note that Marx is positively attracted to this perspective on primitive society because it makes isolated man "its starting point".

In support of his argument that individualism was more characterstic of man in bourgeois political economy, than of man at any other stage in history (and certainly not of man at the "beginning" of "pre-history"), Marx boldly asserts, once again (using the strong adversive "But") that "man is only individualised through the process of history."[46] Moreover,

Marx continues, "He originally appears as a generic being, a tribal being, a herd animal - though by no means as a 'political animal' in the political sense. Exchange itself is a major agent of this individualisation. It makes the herd animal superfluous and dissolves it."[47] We are left in no doubt that Marx intends us to understand that the social relations in which man originally functioned were transformed for the communal relations eventually gave way to individualism and separation.

Hobsbawm states that Marx was convinced that in this state of total alienation, there are "immense possibilities for humanity."[48] In support of this conclusion, Hobsbawm points to a passage which he describes as "full of hope and splendour."[49] Marx writes:

> Thus the ancient conception in which man always appears (in however narrowly national, religious or political a definition) as the aim of production, seems very much more exalted than the modern world, in which production is the aim of man and wealth the aim of production.... In bourgeois political economy - and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds - this complete elaboration of what lies within man appears as the total alienation, and the destruction of all fixed, one-sided purposes as the sacrifice of the end in itself to a wholly external compulsion. 50

Here Marx argues that despite the fact that man in bourgeois society experiences "the universality of needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive powers, etc.," as "total alienation", nevertheless, these powers are still latently hidden within bourgeois society. This is the occasion for hope in the future transcendence of alienation. Marx concludes that the future is dialectically present.

C.

"Crude Communism" to"Final Communism": De-alienation through History

We have already noted that, for Marx, abolition of one or more but not all of the forms of alienation - for example, economic, political, social, religious, or ideological alienation - still leaves alienation intact with man the victim of all dehumanizing activities. However, to treat all forms of alienation as being equal in relation to the source of alienation is misleading and ultimately unfruitful for the total transcendence of alienation. What needs to be recognized is that alienation is at the base socio-economically determined, and to begin from there. Consequently this leads to an attack on private property which is of the very nucleus of capitalism. This process is a historical one just as the process of pre-capitalist economic formations was. Therefore the movement from capitalism to "final communism" - the movement for the total transcendence of alienation and the de-alienation of man, and the birth of real, "human" history - covers a path of inauthentic or crude communism to begin with. In other words, the process does not occur over-night: it takes time. There is a gradual humanization of man and society.[51] With the parallel between the process of pre-capitalist formations that finally led to capitalism, and the movement from capitalism through "crude communism" to "final communism", in mind, we now turn our attention to the development of communism which Marx discussed at some length in the 1844 Manuscripts. In describing this development, Marx refers to three stages or forms of communism.

To begin with, "crude communism", in its attack on private property, appears "first of all as generalized property."[52] As Marx himself goes on to explain, "In its original form (it is) only a generalization and

completion of private property."[53] Marx explains that at this stage its appearance has

> a dual form: firstly, it is faced with such a great domination of material property that it wishes to destroy everything that cannot be possessed by everybody as private property; it wishes to abstract forcibly from talent, etc. It considers immediate physical ownership as the sole aim of life and being. The category of worker is not abolished but extended to all men. The relationship of the community to the world of things remains that of private property. 54

In the stage of "crude communism", private property is taken to its logical conclusion. Marx calls the stage "only community property". The primary difference between this state and the previous one which it has negated, is not that alienation has ended; rather, as Axelos points out, it is in fact "that the community continues to maintain a relationship of ownership with the world of things."[55]

Proceeding with his description of the "nature" of this form of communism, Marx considers the degeneration of women in marriage to a universal state of prostitution as analogous to the universalization of private property. He says:

> this process of opposing general private property to private property is expressed in the animal form of opposing to marriage (which is of course a form of exclusive private property) the community of women where the woman becomes the common property of the community. One might say that the idea of the community of women reveals the open secret of this completely crude and unthinkable type of communism. Just as women pass from marriage to universal prostitution, so the whole world of wealth, that is the objective essence of man, passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage to the private property owner to the relationship of universal prostitution with the community. 56

Private property is the crystallized "essence" of the worker's labour which is in the hands of the non-worker. By universalizing this "essence" man gains control over his property, thereby ending alienation. Before this stage occurs, however, in the intermediate state of "crude communism", the phenomenon of private property in the hands of

a few becomes widespread everywhere, and is therefore no longer confined to a few select societies. The meaning of Marx's analogy of prostitution to explain this development in the development of private property is not clear. It appears that Marx sees the parallel in terms of the relative increase in freedom: the woman in marriage, by becoming the property of the community, is freed from her husband who had hitherto had exclusive rights over her. Marx infers that this change in the status of the woman is parallel to community-ownership of the means of production. The ambiguity of this freedom is seen in the fact that the woman is reduced to prostitution. Freedom from the single capitalist (husband) leads to enslavement to the whole community. Prostitution is therefore not a final stage. The woman must eventually be freed from the community. Interpreted this way, Marx's analogy of prostitution supports his argument that "crude communism" is only a transitional stage which must be overcome by "final communism".

Under "crude communism", the alienated "essence" of man - his needs, desires, etc. - are also universalized. Marx writes:

> Universal envy setting itself up as a power is the concealed form of greed which merely asserts itself and satisfies itself in another way. The thoughts of every private property owner as such are at least turned against those richer than they as an envious desire to level down. This envious desire is precisely the essence of competition. 57

He explains further that this process of competition must run its course before it can be transcended. Thus he states:

> Crude communism is only the completion of this envy and levelling down to a preconceived minimum. It has a peculiar and limited standard. How little this abolition of private property constitutes a real appropriation is proved by the abstract negation of the whole world of culture and civilization, a regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor man without any needs who has not even arrived at the stage of private property, let alone got beyond it. 58

Such a process may be rightly called "generalized capitalism" since

its principal intention is towards universalized private property.[59] It is to be noted that everything that "cannot be possessed by all as private property" will be abolished.[60] Furthermore, since "crude communism" is characterized by a real degeneracy, it is therefore limited in scope and should not be confused with "final", positive communism which will usher in the age of de-alienation, of real and not "sham universality", where man "is the universality and power of society" and not capital, as is definitely the case in the former.[61] In summing up his description, then, Marx declares:

> The first positive abolition of private property, crude communism, is thus the only form in which appears the ignominy of private property that wishes to establish itself as the positive essence of the community. 62

Should transcendence end with "crude communism", alienation will still continue to plague man and society. This is a sober warning to those who optimistically argue that the fundamental problems of man will be (almost) solved if private property is abolished through a radical programme of state nationalization in society. It is an un-Marxian optimism, which, it must be stressed, however, is not unrelated to the ambiguity in Marx's thought concerning the relation between the abolition of private property and the transcendence of alienation. It is helpful to see nationalization of all property and industry as a form of "generalized capitalism" under "crude communism", for, in doing so, we are able to maintain the dynamic of this process which is certainly the way in which Marx's thought of it.

The second form of communism which he points out is political in nature and it is either democratic or despotic.[63] He claims that though the state may be subsequently abolished, political communism still remains incomplete and is "still under the influence of private property, i.e. the alienation of man."[64] In spite of these deficiencies,

however, communism with or without the state, "knows itself already to be the reintegration or return of man into himself, the abolition of man's self-alienation."[65] There is certainly a most decisive and significant difference between the first two forms of communism. Yet, Marx warns, as we have just noted, optimism must not run so high that the transitory and limited nature of this second stage is forgotten or consciously overlooked. The inveterate enemy is private property whose alienating influence persists almost irrevocably. As Marx explains: "But since it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property or the human nature of needs, it is still imprisoned and contaminated by private property. It has understood its concept, but not yet its essence."[66] The point is that, at the stage of political communism, proletarian awareness of the situation has not as yet matched the revolutionary praxis which is explicitly and implicitly being called for. Theoria and praxis do not as yet constitute that dialectical and revolutionary unity which is necessary for total human emancipation.

It is therefore the third form of communism that will finally achieve this. Here, "final communism" is the solution to the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution." Private property is abolished, and alienation is transcended. We have already discussed this above.

D.

The Class Struggle and the Proletarian sense of Messianic Mission to liberate humanity and create authentic, unalienated human history.

In his critique of Hegel's conception of reality as the self-positing of Absolute Idea, and of the historical movement as a movement

of consciousness, Marx argues that it is the socio-economic conditions that determine consciousness, and not consciousness that determines the socio-economic conditions. Therefore, to conceive of the transcendence of alienation simply as an act of consciousness, and not in the real transformative movement of the mode of production leads to further alienation. However, having said this, Marx goes on to assert that consciousness, theoria arising out of and inextricably bound up with praxis is indispensable for the abolition of all forms of alienation. This liberating consciousness is the consciousness of real, living human beings. Such an emphasis safeguards Marx from the accusation of being a dialectical materialist who sees the productive process, with man as part of it and not man himself as the centre of it, as the centre of human existence.

We recall that Marx does not subscribe to the view of an independent Nature following its own inherent course of historical development.[67] Man, Nature, and Society are all bound together in a mutually interactive process.[68] As Marx sees it, history is the product of human activity. In the context of his anthropology, history is therefore the alienation of man. This is pre-history as opposed to real history which begins with the eventual transcendence of alienation. When history is viewed only as the process of dialectical materialism then the "conscious-shaping" influence of man upon history - that is, his conscious transcendence of alienation and his consequent creation of a dynamic, non-alienated future - is denied reality. Hence, instead of speaking of dialectical materialism we prefer to speak of historical materialism to describe Marx's conception of history. The latter does not deny the dialectical nature of history; rather it acknowledges the primacy of man's shaping influence especially in the transcendence

of alienation, in the very dialectical movement of history.

With this in mind, we are now free to explore Marx's description of the messianic mission of the proletariat in the overcoming of alienation. In our description of Marx's concept of alienation, it was made very clear that both the capitalist and the worker were alienated, suffering from alienating consciousness. The capitalist was driven by egoistic, limited desires, and was unaware of the alienating influence of the productive process as the root of all alienation. Through ideology (false consciousness) the capitalist safeguarded his position even while he attempted to alleviate the burden of the worker; but his efforts were to no avail in ending alienation and effecting human emancipation, which, Marx argues, he did not, and could not really grasp. The worker, for his part, was ignorant of his condition and was, for the most part, the unsuspecting victim of ideological imposition by the dominant class in society. Marx points out that the worker did not possess a liberating awareness of his condition as a member of a wider socio-economic grouping. Marx repeatedly insists that "other worldly" liberation was projected because of this ignorance of his real state, its origin and the possibility of its historical transcendence. Such degradation reached its nadir under bourgeois capitalism.

Notwithstanding this depressing state of human existence, Marx boldly announces that there is "good news": capitalism was carrying within its womb the necessity and real possibility of a proletarian revolution which would overthrow capitalism and its alienating stranglehold on man and society.

In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels wasted no time in announcing the new dawn that was about to arise under the auspices of the proletarian class. History, they argue, has been a

history of class struggles:

> Freeman and slave, politician and Plebian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. 69

History has been characterized by conflict, revolution, transformation and ruin. Society was never conflict-free and this conflict and contradiction has intensified over the centuries until the class struggle has polarized the bourgeois (capitalist) and the proletariat (working class). But, they insist, the good news is: "Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeois, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: It has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other - bourgeois and proletariat."[70]

Both classes are the products of the socio-economic development of society. For example, in a rapid and cursory description of the development of the bourgeousie, we are told, "the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange."[71] Marx and Engels continue, "Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of the class."[72] This advance was made through revolutionary action on the part of the bourgeois class. Its role there is in marked contrast to its present reactionary and anti-revolutionary role. Marx and Engels note that, for instance, in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, it reduced every relationship to its base-money relation and economic exploitation - even as it facilitated the gradual destruction of all forms of deference. Marx and Engels explain further:

> The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put

> an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn assunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors,' and has left no other bond between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment.' It has drowned the most heavenly ecstacies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers. 73

Returning once again to the contemporary scene, Marx and Engels state that in order for the bourgeois class to continue to exist it constantly has to revolutionize "the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society."[74] The bourgeois class is convinced that they must be in the driver's seat if it is to survive, and its dominance in all areas of life to be perpetuated. Marx and Engels inform us that its impregnable and dominant status was achieved because over the years it has rapidly expanded and exploited a world market, improved the productive process and the means of communication, in addition to having "created enormous cities, ... greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural...."[75] Its record during its relatively short rule of about one hundred years is most impressive. Summing up this record, Marx and Engels write:

> The bourgeoisie ... has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour? 76

This situation is obviously explosive and, as far as Marx and Engels were concerned, was in need of immediate radical redress.[77] The time is ripe for the bourgeoisie are no longer able to maintain their ascendancy. "The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself."[78]

In theological language, it may be said that Marx and Engels envisaged that under capitalism the "fulness of time" had come. Prior to this time, there was no point where the contradiction between the forces and relations of production coincided with the emergence of the proletarian class which was so totally alienated. Marx insists that only when this coincidence occurs in history will the messianic and salvific proletarian revolution occur. Returning to the German Ideology, we are reminded that this epocal moment in history is not like previous moments in history in which the revolution was conceived and hatched in the minds of the philosophers. Commenting on this fact Marx and Engels state:

> This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and every generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as 'substance' and 'essence of man', and what they have deified and attacked: a real basis which is not in the least disturbed, in its effect and influence on the development of men, by the fact that these philosophers revolt against it as 'self-consciousness' and the 'unique'. 79

The bourgeoisie have disturbed the real basis of society but they were unable to effect the abolition of alienation. The moment had not arrived for this to be enacted. Only when the socio-economic conditions are fully "ripe" will the great "leap" forward occur.[80] As Marx and Engels explain:

> These conditions of life, which different generations find in existence, determine also whether or not the revolutionary convulsion periodically recurring in history will be strong

> enough to overthrow the basis of everything that exists. And if these material elements of a complete revolution are not present - namely, on the one hand the existing productive forces, on the other the formation of a revolutionary mass, which revolts not only against separate conditions of the existing society, but against the existing 'production of life' itself, the 'total activity' on which it was based - then it is absolutely immaterial for practical development whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already, as the history of communism proves. 81

Even in their own time, Marx and Engels made triumphalistic pronouncements concerning the dawning of precisely such a "kairos". In the Communist Manifesto they write, "But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself, it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons - the modern working class - the proletarians."[82] We rightly wonder about what it is that makes the proletariat so unique.[83] Marx explains that they are the most debased class, and are therefore the only class which, in seeking to emancipate itself from its conditions is capable of emancipating the whole of humanity and of ending all alienation. In Kantian terms, only they, that is, the proletarian workers, are capable of making the movement from a class "in-itself" to a class "for itself" into a movement of universal consequences. Axelos explains Marx's argument here when he writes:

> Deprived of all property and all satisfaction the working masses, even though they activate productive forces and produce the wealth, take account of the fact that they have only to overturn those who hold the means of production and direct the relations of production in order to gain access to a human existence. Being reduced to a state of subhumanity and crushed by inhuman powers, the majority of mankind is the motor of the movement that leads to the appropriation of man by man and for man. The individuals that compose this class are no longer empirical, particular individuals. They are nothing and they have nothing in the present world. 84

It is in the face of such utter alienation that Marx and Engels sound their clarion call: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their

chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!"[85]

But the proletarians can only emancipate themselves and the whole of humanity if they have a transformation of consciousness. Marx does imply that he anticipates such a transformation.[86] In his peculiar "sketchy" style, from what he says about philosophers, bourgeois capitalist thinkers, etc., the following conclusion concerning the proletarian consciousness suggests itself: Unlike those who conceived of real movement in thought alone, the proletariat conceive of historical movement in terms of the real, sensuous, material conditions of life which are firmly rooted in the production process. Whereas their historical precursors before this time never fully saw themselves as having the messianic mission to emancipate the whole of humanity, the proletariat are fired by the vision of the possibility and inevitability of an unalienated future.[87] This future is only theirs to create through their liberating praxis. They are no longer the victims of a false consciousness which leads them docilely to accept their lot in silence. There is a feeling of solidarity and mutual interdependence among them.[88] The proletariat is the only class in the history of man that is capable of discerning the readiness of the objective conditions for the abolition of all alienation, and only that class can take the necessary steps to turn the productive process towards a communist future which will in turn be transcended.[89] In seeking to establish a connection between the proletarian consciousness which Marx envisages and Hegel's notion of the awakening of consciousness, which is so important in the dialectic of Hegel's Phenomenology, Jean Hyppolite clarifies the nature of the proletarian consciousness when he notes:

> The awakening of consciousness is not the passive reflection of some state of affairs. It is that which alone can embody

> the dialectical contradiction and at the same time demand its resolution. The action in which the proletariat becomes conscious of the alienation of man signifies a contradiction within man himself. This contradiction is a real one and demands a solution precisely for the reason that it is at once objective and subjective. It expresses an empirical situation - man posited, as it were, outside himself, like an object - and the negation of that situation - man as an inalienable subject for whom it is impossible to recognize himself as a mere object. For Marx the proletariat is the subject that experiences to the extreme the extreme of the human condition and is thereby capable of resolving it forever. 90 (Emphasis mine.)

Only the proletariat is capable of this active, revolutionary self-consciousness.

Our presentation of this transformed consciousness of the proletariat - the subjective side of the conditions preparatory for the revolutionary emancipation of alienation - has a strong note of inevitability.[91] As we have already noted, Marx does speak in terms that would suggest that the revolution is a fore-gone conclusion. He anticipates, as we said before, that both the objective and subjective conditions of the revolution will occur (and have in fact occurred) simultaneously under bourgeois capitalism. In spite of this, Avineri raises the question of whether the awakening of the revolutionary consciousness in the proletariat is indeed inevitable, given the objective conditions. He argues that such a question takes us back once again to the problem of "determinism versus voluntarism."[92] He adds, that in his view this dilemma is transcended by the dialectical nature of the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. However, he insists that, instead of providing any guarantee concerning the success of the revolution prior to its occurrence or simply assuming a priori that the revolution will succeed, Marx "only indicates its possibilities historically."[93] That is, he indicates that the revolution will occur provided that there is a unity of theory and praxis , of the subjective and objective conditions

in history. Avineri sums up his argument thus:

> If a revolutionary consciousness exists, then the revolution is bound to happen. The activist and practical elements of this consciousness imply that circumstances will change with the self-change of the proletariat. In other words, under these conditions the revolution is already taking place. If, on the other hand, such a consciousness is lacking, then the revolution lacks its main impulse and is stillborn. If the proletariat has self-consciousness, it will sustain the revolution. Its self-consciousness is already a major component of the revolutionary situation. If, however, the proletariat is still unaware of its own historical position, if it does not possess an adequate world view, then the objective conditions by themselves will not create the revolution until and unless the proletariat grasps that by shaping its own view of the world it also changes it. 94

Thus, since the proletarian revolution is a contingent revolution, then, as Avineri explains, Marx is not concerned primarily with predicting the inevitability of the revolution without paying regard to the nature and state of the revolutionary forces in history.

This interpretation of Marx is of special significance for our analysis of Marx's teaching about the historical inevitability of the revolution precisely because it raises the following questions: Will the proletariat really possess such a consciousness? If they do not, and, consequently, the revolution remains in the womb of history or is stillborn, do they still qualify for the title "proletariat" in the Marxian sense? Given that the capitalist class will not be able to go beyond a certain point in preventing the revolution, and that "sin" is nothing more or less than historical alienation which man will ultimately transcend, who will ultimately bear the blame and responsibility for the failure of theory and <u>praxis</u> to unite? Furthermore, what if men like Marx and Engels from the bourgeois class, or, more accurately, the bourgeois intelligentsia, are possessed of a messianic consciousness, but obviously are not the most deprived and dehumanized people in the world, do they qualify for the description "proletariat "?

In the latter case (as well as in the former) the question might be raised as to whether the "objective" conditions actually do obtain in either society, or not.

The proletarian revolution has not occurred as yet; it remains eschatological. Consequently the questions above remain rhetorical. However, they are critical, not only for an historical appraisal of Marx's "predictions", but also for a realistic and honest appraisal of all "revolutions" which are in one way or another connected with Marx's philosophy. All too often "revolutions" which were ostensibly advocated and enacted on behalf of the "proletariat" have resulted in a state of oppression against man. While in some instances such failure leads to cynicism, disenchantment, and even despair, in others it stirs the utopian zeal to lead the "true proletarian revolution". In short, Marx's "proletarian soteriology" continues to entice both proletarian worker and bourgeois revolutionary, self-styled or real.

E.

Marx and Engels - Dialectical and Historical Materialism.

Until now we have dealt with the "pre-capitalist economic formations" and the development of communism from "crude communism" to positive, emancipating communism, as "separate" movements in history leading to the birth of bourgeois capitalism and as arising out of and abolishing capitalism totally, respectively. Such a separation is chronologically necessary since they occur in two different time periods: pre- and post-capitalist. However, they are bound together in an inseparable unity since their movement is dialectical. By this

is meant the actual movement in history of one "mode" out of the one immediately preceding it which contained the necessary ingredients in its womb. Of course, from Marx's standpoint these "modes" are to be understood in terms of their socio-economic bases from which all superstructures are dialectically derived. Dialectic also involves negation, for what comes out of it is something new and different from its immediate precursor.[95] Nevertheless, an essential unity exists between the two modes. This negation, for Marx, borrowing from the Hegelian dialectic, is the negation of the negation: the negation of all that negates man as authentic being, that which alienates man making him a mere thing.[96]

This dialectical conception of reality - real, material, sensuous reality - is the primary argument used in support of the view that Marx was no determinist, be it teleological, economic, materialist, technological or mechanical.[97] As Avineri explains:

> Marx's approach to communism demonstrates his belief that the crystallization of socialist forms of society cannot be achieved through a deterministic teleology, but grows out of the causal analysis of existing social forces. If communism cannot be understood otherwise than by its emergence from capitalist society, then the study of capitalism provides the best means to comprehend the development that will ultimately bring communism about. Moreover the emergence of communism from the womb of capitalist society draws attention to the dialectical relationship between the two societies. The possibility for a development in the direction of communism thus depends on a prior development of capitalism. 98

It was noted earlier that, according to Marx, this dialectical relationship between capitalism and communism also characterized the emergence of capitalism from its "pre-capitalist economic formations". Avineri concludes that "communism is nothing else than the dialectical abolition of those hidden potentialities which could not have been historically realized under the limiting conditions of capitalism."[99] Avineri's

interpretation does in fact take note of Marx's implicit assertion, in the Communist Manifesto, that "what the bourgeoisie produces is above all its own grave diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable."[100] Commenting on this passage, Avineri says, "Capitalism thus creates urges that it cannot itself satisfy and it is in this sense that Marx refers to its digging its own grave."[101] It would be instructive for our purpose to examine in some detail the attempts by scholars to interpret Marx's "dialectic" in light of the apparent controversy concerning the "inevitability" of communism. We shall concern ourselves with the works of two scholars: William Shaw and Bertell Ollman.

In one of the most recent studies on Marx's theory of history, William H. Shaw declares his intention "to champion a technological-determinist interpretation" in his work.[102] This interpretation, he explains further, "credits the forces of production with the determining role in history."[103] Finally, he attempts "to illuminate more precisely the primacy of the productive forces and their explanatory role within historical materialism."[104] At first glance it would appear that Shaw's exposition of the foregoing purpose would be better placed under our discussion of Marx's materialist conception of reality. This conclusion follows the obvious concern of the writer with the primacy of the productive forces over all other forces in the historical movement of man and society. According to Shaw, "Marx believes that the introduction of new relations of production is contingent on the development of the productive forces in a way in which those forces are not dependent on the relations."[105] Shaw adds that Marx was convinced that "without a sufficient level of productivity, communal production relations would only result in stagnation and decline in

in the mode of production - from which class distinctions would re-emerge."[106] In anticipation of criticism of this Marxian hypothesis, Shaw states further:

> A critic, even if he accepted this, might argue that given an adequate high level of the productive forces, certain superstructural elements are still necessary for a change in production relations. In a sense Marx would agree with this, but he avers that the presence of those other factors stem from the existence of the new productive forces. The emergence of these forces (and, one supposes, men's consciousness of this) both stimulates and makes possible the introduction of new relations of production. 107

But the conclusion that Shaw was concerned with Marx's materialist conception of history, does not rule out the possibility of his discussion of the dynamic change that Marx sees occurring in man, society and nature through their dialectical inter-relationship.[108]

But, do these changes in the relations of production and all forms of superstructural activities simply arise out of changes in the mode of production in a simple and direct relationship of cause and effect? Shaw replies in the negative arguing that Marx did not propound an economic determinism.[109] To conceive of the above relationship in direct and not dialectical terms would invariably lead to the postulation of "laws of development" which would mean that society simply follows an evolutionary process governed by pre-determined, inexorable laws. This would rule out the efficacy of human decision-making and creativity in determining and shaping society. Man would be simply a mechanistically-determined being whose "nature" is continually characterized by alienation with no hope of real and total transcendence. In short, man would not be the centre, as well as in control of human history. On the question of economic determinism, Shaw has this to say:

> Just as for Marx there are no substantive general laws of economic life, though each period has its own, so with the connections between the economic structure and superstructural relations. It is a law for Marx that the superstructure is derived from the base, but this is a law about laws: in each social formation, more specific laws govern the precise nature of this general derivation. Engels seems to have appreciated this: 'All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be examined individually before the attempt is made to deduce from them the political, civil-law, aesthetic, philosophic, religious, etc. views corresponding to them'. 110

Here we find that according to Shaw's interpretation, Marx sees the connection between the "economic structure and the superstructural relations" not as being governed by inexorable "laws" which stand objectively outside of the particular historical epoch being considered. Rather, Marx sees these "laws" as integral and unique to the particular epoch in which they operate. Therefore in using the term "laws", Shaw seeks to point to Marx's conception of historical processes as dynamic rather than static relations. Moreover, when Shaw refers to Marx's thesis that "the superstructure is derived from the base" as "a law for Marx", it is not to be interpreted to mean a law in the natural sciences. It cannot be tested by using the empirical framework of the natural sciences. Indeed it would be more appropriate to speak of presupposition, premise or assumption rather than law in this respect.[111] It is certainly evident throughout Marx's works that the thesis that base is prior to and also gives rise to superstructure is central to his presuppositional framework.

On the question of the functional relationship between the base and superstructure, Marx argues that it is dialectical. This means that not only does the base influence the superstructure, but the reverse process also occurs. This process, Marx states further, is characterized by progress which arises out of the conflict between base and superstructure, or, more precisely between the mode and the relation

of production which are in perpetual conflict. According to Shaw, Marx also assumed that this conflict did not contain its own resolution. Shaw writes, "Marx held that any specific capitalist society would in fact be racked by the contradictions which his theory delineates."[112] He adds, however, that Marx "would not have maintained that it would proceed acquiescently to the end point of those contradictions in order to be redeemed by the negation of the negation."[113] This conclusion conflicts with Marx's explicit and implicit statements about the historical transcendence of alienation through communism.

In his explanation of his interpretation of Marx, Shaw asserts:

> The point is not just that capitalism is prevented by the intervention of the proletariat from proceeding to its final collapse, but there is no final contradiction followed by disintegration. Capitalism begets contradictory tendencies, which increase in strength, but it neither contains within itself the possibility of their reconciliation nor permits the final triumph of one over the other: each violent disruption only restores the disturbed equilibrium. The increasingly antagonistic propensities of capitalism render it historically untenable: they do not imply that the system must 'self-destruct' - that is, that its continued existence becomes logically impossible. 114

The problem with Shaw's argument here is that in refuting the "deterministic" expounders of Marx's theory of history, he minimises the use Marx made of Hegel's dialectic.[115] This minimization of the influence of Hegel's dialectic upon Marx's conception of historical reality inevitably distorts Marx's conception. Shaw's distortion of Marx naturally follows from the notable omission of Marx's philosophic perspective from his (Shaw's) analysis.[116] Shaw's conclusion should therefore be viewed in the light of the historical distance between Marx's time and the present, and, especially in the light of the fact that the proletarian revolution has not occurred in that interim period and that it seems unlikely to occur as Marx had predicted. Where the accuracy of Marx's analysis and prediction are being brought into question, Shaw's argument provides

plausible grounds for changing Marx's imminent eschatology to a less imminent one.

Contradictions in contemporary capitalism are certainly more varied and complex than those of the "modern" capitalism of Marx's day. These contradictions have accompanied the unprecedented technological development that has occurred since then. But to be guided by such a perspective does not allow for an accurate assessment of Marx's projection of historical de-alienation arising out of the contradictions in capitalism. This is a type of "revisionism". Moreover, despite Shaw's decision to stay clear of the "philosophical" Marx, it is clear that his analysis has a noticeable Hegelian influence.[117] It should be remembered that it was Hegel who conceived of reality as the self-positing of Absolute Spirit which externalises itself in order to realize itself in the process of which objectification is conceived as alienation which is then subsequently transcended. This process continues ad infinitum with each succeeding transcendence attaining a level higher than the one previously attained. But in Hegel alienation is an ineradicable part of reality. Marx, on the contrary, conceives of both alienation and its transcendence as historical phenomena. This means therefore that alienation could be abolished completely. Despite the deficiency in Shaw's treatment of Marx's conviction that the dialectical transcendence of alienation is inevitable, Shaw opens up for us the crucial question of whether transcendence is dependent not only on the forces of production and the proletariat working harmoniously, but also on some force "outside" of the material conditions of life. As Shaw himself said, "capitalism ... neither contains within itself the possibility of their (contradictions) reconciliation nor permits the final triumph of one over the other", and, again, "they (antagonistic

propensities) do not imply that the system must 'self-destruct'."[118] Contradiction is inherent in "dialectic", and, for Marx, reality is dialectical, hence, there is no final, inevitable resolution of contradiction - that would be the end of the dialectic!

Bertell Ollman provides a provocative analysis of Marx's theory of history based on a "relational" concept of reality. He recognizes that Marx openly acknowledged that a conceptual framework was indispensable to man's revolutionary transformation of history. Marx, he continues, saw that concepts were absolutely essential for man to have a comprehensive grasp of the whole of historical reality.[119] Marx himself demonstrates the need for concepts in his own analysis of the condition of man in history. This fact is illustrated throughout our study of Marx. Moreover, Ollman does not find that Marx's approach, properly understood, contradicts Marx's materialist conception of reality. With this presupposition in mind, Ollman proceeds to elaborate a "relational" view of reality which, he argues, is central to Marx's thought.

Noting that Marx draws attention to the "distinction between subject and categories", "in his unfinished Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy," Ollman points out the indispensable function of concepts as mediators of reality. "This distinction," he says, "between subject and categories is simple recognition of the fact that our knowledge of the real world is mediated through the construction of concepts in which to think about it; our contact with reality, in so far as we become aware of it, is contact with a conceptualized reality."[120]

Ollman's interpretation of Marx's understanding of concepts reminds us of the definition of symbol as that which participates in the reality it describes.[121] For example, having pointed out that Marx declares

the categories he is describing "to be 'forms', 'manifestations' and 'aspects' of their own subject matter," and that "the categories of bourgeois society 'serve as the expression of its conditions and the comprehension of its own organization'," [122] Ollman concludes that the categories "express the real conditions necessary for their application, but as meaningful, systematized and understood conditions. This is not merely a matter of categories being limited in what they can be used to describe; the story itself is thought to be somehow part of the very concepts with which it is told." [123] Ollman summarizes his argument in another way when he states:

> ... Marx grasped each political-economic concept as a component of society itself, in his words as an 'abstract one-sided relation of an already given concrete and living aggregate'; that it is intimately linked with other social components to form a particular structure; and that this whole, or at least its more significant parts, is expressed in the concept itself. 124

It is to be noted here that Ollman assumes that Marx's presupposition that concepts are derived from the socio-economic basis of society is a sound one. In fact, according to Ollman, the intrinsic unity between the socio-economic base and the concepts used to describe it is clearly conveyed by the concepts themselves. He therefore concludes that the unity must not be broken and the two components divorced from each other. [125]

Ollman asserts further that the distinctiveness "in Marx's conception of social reality [indeed all reality] is best approached through the cluster of qualities he ascribes to particular social factors." [126] He illustrates his argument by referring to Marx's conception of "Capital". He points out that "where capital 'is something purely material, a mere element in the labour process'," [127] Marx portrays it as "'that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and which

cannot increase except on condition of getting a new supply of wage labour for fresh exploitation'."[128] In contrast to the view expressed here where the inherent relational unity of the social factors is absent, Ollman makes the following suggestion:

> What requires emphasis is that the relation between capital and labour is treated as a function of capital itself, and part of the meaning of 'capital'. This tie is extended to cover the worker as well, where Marx refers to him as 'variable capital'.129 The capitalist is incorporated into the same whole: 'capital is necessarily at the same time the capitalist ... the capitalist is contained in the concept capital'. 130

What Ollman is attempting to demonstrate through these references to the varied conceptions of capital is that there is "a conception of capital," which, he argues, Marx offers, "in which the factors we generally think of as externally related to it are viewed as co-elements in a single structure'."[131] In summary, then, Ollman's thesis is: "Every factor which enters into Marx's study of capitalism is a 'definite social relationship'."[132]

Ollman applies the "relational" model of reality to Marx's analysis of the world which is in a state of perpetual change. In his application, he assumes that each social factor is "internally related to its own past and future forms, as well as the past and future forms of surrounding factors."[133] He explains that Marx sees the world as a "Totality" comprising of social factors that are constantly changing, thereby producing new and different matrices of social relations. Consequently, the "Totality" is not static but is rather in a state of perpetual change, acting and being acted upon by its constituent factors. A useful analogy of the dynamic state of both the "Totality" and its constituent factors is that of the image of the earth spinning on its axis while it rotates around the sun, the former movement being a smaller movement within a wider movement. Present, past, and future

are all related and should be conceived of as a unity which in fact they are. Summing up the foregoing explication, Ollman writes:

> The present, according to this relational model, becomes part of a continuum stretching from a definable past to a knowable (if not always predictable) future. Tomorrow is today extended. To speak of such a relation between the present and the future, within the context of formal logic would indicate belief in a vitalistic principle, divine will or some other metaphysical device. But, here, all social change is conceived of as a coming to be of what potentially is, as the further unfolding of an already existing process, and hence, discoverable by a study of this process taken as a spatial-temporal Relation. 134

The fluidity in this relational model certainly facilitates a deeper and more functionally fruitful conception of Marx's vision of the underlying unity in history - of man, nature, and society. It is a constant critique of any attempt at rendering static Marx's "open" view of reality. In fact, we are better able to understand his world-view as a process which is open to dynamic change. This view also makes Marx's conviction of an historical transcendence of alienation seem more realistic, for it posits the Marxian dialectic of progress as arising out of the contradictions inherent in capitalism. However, there are some significant short-comings. They are centred primarily around the interpretative accuracy of Ollman's exposition of Marx's conception of historical reality. It is to be emphasized once again that Marx himself claims that ultimately all manifestations in society are socio-economically determined, that is, they arise from the changes in the mode of production. The crucial priority of the socio-economic base is certainly impaired in Ollman's relational model. In arguing that Marx did in fact conceive of reality in relational terms, Ollman obfuscates the causal connection that exists between the socio-economic base and the factors that are derived from it. The thrust of his argument allows of the tendency of the levelling down of both groups of

factors in the process of the historical transcendence of alienation. Shaw provides a perceptive summary of the foregoing critique of Ollman's interpretation of Marx when he notes:

> Ollman, for example, takes the line that Marx views the capitalist system in all its economies, social, political, and ideological aspects, as an organic whole without assigning causal primacy to any single realm. This absence of causality seems to be dictated in Ollman's mind by the very organicism of Marx's outlook. Not only do Ollman and others of similar persuasion appear to operate with a billiard-ball model of cause and effect, but they make the mistake of supposing that the conceptual interrelatedness of events or social relations forbids their causal connection. Marx did have a very 'organic' conception of society, yet causal notions are integral to his social and historical views and to the scientific work which he believed himself to be carrying out. 135

So far we have seen that Marx's "historical materialism" means that the forces of change and development are immanent within the very contradictions in society. It was noted that, in Marx's view, transformation is inherent in the process of history of bourgeois capitalism, that is, it is self-evident that the new socio-economic conditions that emerge out of the conflict have latent if not manifest de-alienating forces which will eventually eradicate all alienation. But we are not told why the process operates in this way. The answer to that question would lead to metaphysical speculations: a <u>divine mover</u>, the force or power that undergirds everything. For Marx, to take that route would be to return to the enslavement of human consciousness, and of man as a whole - man as a material, sensuous being. Marx preferred to have Hegel's dialectic of the negation of the negation as a <u>law</u> of human existence without the reality of Absolute Spirit. Despite Marx's preference, the question of God remains valid. For Christian theology, this question arises both in response to the challenge presented by Marx, as well as prior to Marx's challenge, that is, as a response of faith in the crucified and risen Lord, Jesus Christ. There is a

distinction here which must not be forgotten. But there is also a unity in the two-faceted Christian response which must be preserved for gift and response are of the very character of the Christian faith. We will turn to the question of God shortly, but, first, let us look at the question of a Marxian "ethics". This question points, once again, to the interplay between the metaphysical and philosophic thought of Marx, on the one hand, and his economic and "materialist" thought, on the other.

F.

Marx and Ethics.

Throughout our discussion of Marx's philosophy that spanned both the "early" and the "mature" Marx, we have centred our focus on Marx's anthropology. This task has led us to the consideration of the concept of alienation which was central to Marx's thought, both early and later Marx, though latterly the concept was more implicitly present than explicitly discussed, and was also replaced by other terms such as "exploitation" and "fetishism".[136] These terms certainly reflected the shift in interest in Marx's thought from philosophy to political economy. It was argued above that the crux of Marx's Weltansschauung was elaborated as early as 1844, and with the exception of a few changes, this world-view persisted throughout his entire career.

The explication of Marx's concept of man and his theory of history have led us to a consideration of alienation and its transcendence through the abolition of private property under communism. It was made obvious that Marx's analysis contained antithetical terms and ideas which demonstrated, on the one hand, that there was a state of human

existence that was to be condemned, particularly that which obtained under capitalism. On the other hand, there was a state of human existence that was to be commended, namely, that under communism. These notes of condemnation and of commendation therefore raise the unavoidable question of whether Marx was an ethicist: Did he have a system of ethics that was peculiarly his? What were the criteria upon which he made his obvious evaluations? These and other related questions on ethics are critical for a balanced perspective of Marx's world-view . Moreover, they gain added significance when they are raised in spite of (and even because of) Marx's claims to being scientific in his analysis of man and society.

Marx was convinced that when he criticized philosophy and religion as being ideological his premise was historical and scientific rather than moral or ethical.[137] Thus, when he argues that the workers must overthrow the existing mode of production, he does so on the basis of his assumption that the very forces of history would make the revolution possible. According to Marx there is a diametric difference between his philosophy of revolutionary praxis and a philosophy of ethics on how to "behave" in this world under the present order of things, that is, under the existing mode and relations of production, private property, money, division of labour, and all that he condemned as alienating man from his species-being. But by the same token we wonder on what grounds Marx justifies his critique of bourgeois political economy that prevents it from being labelled ideology as well. For him, the crucial difference between praxis-theoria and bourgeois ethics is that the former advocates a revolutionary transformation of the very base of society, while the latter merely attempts to preserve the status-quo. The latter is the product of alienated, false "consciousness". Even when it sees

the acute need for change in society to alleviate human suffering, it merely appeals to men's consciences. It is therefore ideology. However, despite these differences, it is difficult not to speak of Marx's philosophy in terms of an ethical system. This difficulty may be formulated in the following questions: On what grounds does Marx make and justify his critique of bourgeois political economy that preserve his critique from being itself critiqued as false consciousness and ideology? How can one criticize, condemn or advocate a particular form of human behaviour, as Marx does, without using some ethical or moral standards by which to do so?

With the foregoing consideration in mind we now turn to a discussion of Marx and ethics. It should be noted from the outset that our concern is with the ethical teachings in Marx's works that pertain to his anthropology. We shall therefore not attempt a detailed and critical study of the subject which has been so well done by Eugene Kamenka in his two well-known studies. In fact, we shall be drawing a great deal upon the resources made available in Kamenka's works.

We recall that Marx claimed that the root of alienation lies in the alienated productive process which has been alienated since the beginning of history, that is, since man's interaction with nature began. This productive process did not exist in a static but in a dynamic state. The arrival of the capitalist mode of production brought with it the total and complete alienation of man. Marx spared no effort in voicing his invectives on the system and its perpetrators. His condemnation, in the opinion of Karl Popper, "is fundamentally a moral condemnation."[138] Kamenka points this out even as he notes that Popper was "a critic not at all interested in alienation."[139] Popper argues

that:

> The system is condemned, for the cruel injustice inherent in it which is combined with full 'formal' justice and righteousness. The system is condemned because by forcing the exploiter to enslave the exploited it robs both of their freedom. Marx did not combat wealth, nor did he praise poverty. He hated capitalism, not for its accumulation of wealth, but for its oligarchical character; he hated it because in this system wealth means political power in the sense of power over men. Labour power is made a commodity; that means that men must sell themselves on the market. Marx hated the system because it resembled slavery. 140

While accepting Popper's argument that Marx's critique of capitalism was moral in nature, Kamenka is quick to point out that this confrontation was not made on the basis of "a moral principle established independently of his inquiries."[141] Furthermore, capitalism was not being condemned "for not being 'what it ought to be'."[142] Kamenka argues that, on the contrary, "the distinction between dependence and freedom ... rests ... on an empirical basis."[143] Explaining his conclusion, he writes:

> If Marx and his readers are drawn toward freedom and repelled by dependence and alienation, this is not because he has striven to show what they 'ought to be'. It is rather because some goods, at least, operate in Marx and in many of his readers, so that the morality of freedom, the sympathies and antipathies of goods themselves, are something he and they can also feel. 144

Kamenka's suggestion here is that the feelings of antipathy and sympathy naturally effuse from man. This is in keeping with Marx's thesis that man is the measure of man. What neither Marx nor Kamenka tells us is how to determine whose feelings are correct. It is certainly not self-evident that the capitalist and the proletariat cannot and do not share the same feelings about many significant things, while simultaneously having different and conflicting reactions to other significant phenomena.[145]

Capitalism is judged and condemned for being primarily geared to protect the interests of the ruling class. Marx, it will be recalled, argues that the whole socio-economic base of society must be revolutionized

completely, and capitalism overthrown and totally abolished. The premise for this argument was not external to actual conditions of life, but was intrinsic to them. Marx and Engels claim that they had discovered the "laws" of history which show that history was moving towards the proletarian revolution. Consequently, Marx, "in his mature work as much as in his earlier work, wants to go somewhat further than" stating natural feelings of antipathy and sympathy.[146] As Kamenka explains:

> He (Marx) wants to show that history is inevitably working toward freedom, toward the Communist society where men's production will no longer enslave them, but will become part of them, where tools will cease to be men's masters and become their servants. But however unfounded this view may be, it, too, is not - in Marx's sense - a moral view. It neither presupposes nor establishes a new moral obligation in place of those which Marx exposed. 147

Despite Marx's assumption to the contrary, it is, nevertheless, obvious that Marx's condemnation of the bourgeois capitalist class, and his advocacy of the cause of the proletarian class are based on a peculiarly Marxian ethics. Marx's "ethics" are unique for they attempt "to put the thought of science at the service of the proletariat."[148] It is a proletarian ethic.

The question of Marxian ethics being a proletarian ethic takes us back to the thorny problem in Marx's thought of determinism and freedom; that is, to the question of the inevitability of the revolution, and the place of proletarian initiative in ensuring the successful occurrence of the revolution. This dilemma has resulted in the polarisation of the interpreters of the ethical content of his thought into two schools: the ethical and a-ethical.[149] One notable student of Marx who shares the view that there are two such schools is Stojanović. He explains that he "... represents the view that Marx's thought contains ethical values which can serve as a point of departure for a Marxist ethics."[150]

He adds, "Marx also gave occasion for the contrary - a-ethical - interpretation."[151] This ambiguity in Marx's writings inevitably creates problems of interpretation of his thought. Stojanović states, "This ambivalence creates difficulties for any Marxist-oriented philosophy of morals. In addition, however, there is one more, significantly larger obstacle, i.e., Marx's understanding of historical determinism."[152]

Let us look at some of the evidence in Marx's works that support the argument that he was a-ethical in his philosophy. Marx himself points out that a change in his earlier outlook took place in the mature years of his life. He describes the change as a movement from the realm of speculative philosophy into the region of "real, positive science."[153] Stojanović explains that Marx's later development was the latter's attempt "to establish a scientific socialism, as opposed to the moralizing-utopian socialism which had existed previously."[154] He notes further that the proponents of the "a-ethical interpretation of Marx's thought" base their argument upon passages like the ones quoted below:

> Communists cannot preach any kind of morality at all, something that Stirner does altogether too much. They cannot pose any kind of moral demands at all to people: love one another, do not be egoists, etc. On the contrary, they know very well that egoism, just as well as self-sacrifice, is in specific conditions a necessary form of individual self-affirmation. 155

> Communism is for us not a stable state which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. 156

> Law, morality, religion, are to him (the proletarian) so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests. 157

In the first passage it is noticed that Marx reiterates his conviction that "egoism" and "self-sacrifice" are firmly tied to the "specific conditions" from which they arise, as superstructure is tied to base.

Therefore to call upon people to be loving and altruistic would be to demand of them something that may be desirable but not realistic in view of the alienated socio-economic base of society. The second passage reminds us that Marx does not conceive of communism as an ideal, fixed state of human existence. He thinks of communism in terms of movement or process which means that it is a dynamic and not a static condition. Thus, morality, which posits fixed, eternal standards, is anathema to Marx. Finally, the third passage illustrates the point made earlier that "law, morality, religion" are tied to particular classes, and so they lack universality. They have the character of representing and appealing to particular vested interests.

In contrast to those who advocate the view of Marx's thought as being "a-ethical", Stojanović tells us, there are those who use passages like the following to illustrate the ethical content of Marx's philosophy.[158]

> The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the highest being for man, that is, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all circumstances in which man is humiliated, enslaved, abandoned and despised, circumstances best described by the exclamation of a Frenchman on hearing of an intended tax on dogs: Poor dogs! They want to treat you like men! 159

> The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, self-contempt, abasement, submission, humility, in short, all the qualities of the canaille, while the proletariat, not wanting to be treated as canaille, needs its courage, pride, and sense of independence much more than its daily bread. 160

> The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; The standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity. 161

In the first passage it is to be noted that Marx uses the imperative "categorical". This is a highly moral exhortation. The clarion call to the proletariat to usher in the revolution is sounded. The second passage deals with the contrast between the qualities, such as "cowardice,

self-contempt, abasement, submission, humility", etc., which vulgarize man, and those, such as "courage, pride, and sense of independence" - in short, freedom and dignity - which characterize authentic, unalienated man who is not simply reduced to the level of mere natural needs such as hunger. Man is totally alienated and dehumanized. As the second passage indicates, Marx believes that the ethics of Christianity promotes the alienation and debasement of man. It endorses and sanctions "all the qualities of the canaille". In contrast to this, Marx asserts that the proletariat are motivated by a revolutionary zeal which leads them to reject the condition of the "canaille" even if their physical needs are not met. In this ethics of freedom, "courage, pride, and sense of freedom" are valued above "daily bread."[162] It is not surprising that Marx does have a system of ethics, nor that the ethics he articulates are peculiarly humanistic in intention. As Stojanović points out, "From his earliest through his latest works, Marx wrote as an heir of the great European humanistic-ethical tradition."[163] This fact, Stojanović adds, has been conceded by "many non-Marxist thinkers."[164]

The discussion of some of the passages in Marx's works which illustrate the ambiguity in his thought - that is, the conflict between scientific, a-ethical statements and his ethical injunctions and evaluations - suggest that Marx did not construe the terms "scientific" and "moral" to mean "value-less" and "value-laden," respectively. The distinction he makes between these two concepts is based on his materialist conception of history. In this conception, "scientific" refers to the material conditions of life, while "moral" refers to whatever is abstracted from the real situation. But this distinction does not refute the argument that Marx's outlook is ethical as well as scientific.

In Marx's thought, Sollen and Sein form a dialectical unity. Stojanović states:

> From Marx's belief in the scientific character of his own teaching, of course, it does not at all follow that this teaching was not ethically colored. The point is that Marx did not take 'science' to mean 'value-free' intellectual activity, which is what certain Marxologists have in mind when they speak of 'science'. Marx never drew the kind of distinction between cognitive and value statements which would place the latter outside of the realm of science. We can never overlook the fact that Marx was a student of Hegel, and that Hegel had rejected Kant's dualism because he was convinced of the unity of the Is and the Ought, of Sein and Sollen. 165

It is therefore to be concluded that only by maintaining the dialectical unity between ethical and scientific, in Marx, can a really Marxian interpretation of Marx's writings be made. Such an interpretation argues for an interrelational dynamic in the functioning of the two groups of concepts. Therefore, while Marx's ethics do take seriously the material conditions of life that obtained under capitalism, by exposing and condemning its intrinsic evil in moralistic terms, it also serves the interests of the "scientific" analysis of capitalism. Furthermore, it is intended to aid the proletariat in awakening its radical consciousness. At the same time, Marx's "scientific" analysis will promote the ethics of revolutionary praxis. Marx, it will be recalled, is convinced that the socio-economic dissolution of the capitalist mode and relations of production would lead to a moral revolution. Moreover, he argues that complete and total human emancipation cannot and will not occur if appeal is made only to the moral consciousness of man without the concomitant attempt to both understand and change the mode of production.

Marx's conviction that moral exhortations are impotent to effect the proletarian revolution best explains why he did not formulate

a systematic ethical theory.[166] As Stojanović explains:

> In contrast to moralists, Marx held no illusions about the efficacy of moral judgements which do not coincide with real interests, and although he evaluated capitalism from a humanistic standpoint, he did not feel the need to formulate and explicate the principles upon which he had based these judgements. Marx was a critic, and an ethical critic at that, but he was not a systematic ethical theorist. 167

There is a great merit in recognizing the ethical content in Marx's thought. This recognition is crucial for a more accurate picture of Marx's emphasis upon human creativity and responsibility for the abolition and the transcendence of all forms of alienation. It is important that the centrality of human activity is not obscured, neither partially nor totally. When this is allowed to occur the struggle of man for the redemption of man is left to the caprice of "accidents" in the historical forces. We return once more to the argument that Marx conceives of human creativity and the material forces of production as existing in a dynamic and dialectic unity. The argument is well illustrated in the two passages below which are taken from Marx's writings:

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. 168

> World history would indeed by very easy to make if the struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances. It would on the other hand be of a very mystical nature, if 'accidents' played no part. These accidents naturally form part of the general course of development and are compensated by other accidents. But acceleration and delay are very much dependent upon such 'accidents', including the 'accidents' of the characters of the people who first head the movement. 169

Marx's preoccupation with man as subject of history who will be self-determined when freed from alienation, naturally leads to his rejection of any utilitarian concept of man. Utilitarianism lacks the ethics of human freedom to create the new instead of merely seeking

to live in harmony with its environment by simply adapting to and becoming accommodated by the given situation. Kamenka writes:

> For utilitarianism takes the desires and expectations of man at any given moment as an ultimate; Marx's morality seeks to transform and 'enrich' his wants, to increase his expectations, to prevent him from finding 'happiness' by tailoring his demands to his satisfactions, by learning to like what he gets. Utilitarianism works within a given social and political system and criticises it only where it fails to satisfy demands expressed within the system; Marxian humanism is prepared to transcend the system, to criticise the system itself for the wants and demands it creates. 170

But despite the greater possibilities for human realization and fulfilment in the ethics of "Marxian humanism" vis-a-vis the ethics of utilitarianism, (and of Christianity as Marx's conceives it to be), it must be remembered that the Marxian ethics must have checks placed upon it. These checks are necessary in order to prevent the Promethean tendency in man from displaying the demonic side of its "nature".[171] This argument takes us beyond Marx's ethics, and, indeed, beyond his concept of man. It takes us to the fundamental short-comings in Marx's concept of man. "The horrifying excesses of Hitler and Stalin",[172] to take two modern illustrations, are stark reminders that any Promethean ethics, whether Marxian or not, which is allowed to operate freely without realistic restrictions, would degenerate into a demonic power that threatens the very existence of man. It is this fear, Kamenka argues, which has led many scholars from various fields to advocate an anti-Promethean ethic as a check against the destructive potentialities within man.[173] Summing up the situation, Kamenka says:

> Man's potentialities are for good or for great evil; it is best if he does not become drunk with his own power, but proceeds little by little, respecting the actual, empirical desires of others and keeping within rules meant to restrain his passions and his experiments. This is the - anti-Promethean - message of a great deal of contemporary moral and political writing. It appeals greatly to the increasing number of

> (middle-class non-'coloured') men who are reasonably comfortable in their own existing society and believe in the capacity of a system that has institutionalized change and technological progress to deal with strains and injustices without major dislocation or revolutionary outbursts. 174

Unfortunately, the anti-Promethean ethic promotes the interests and welfare of a small, privileged and influential minority whose institutionalization of change is seen and experienced today, by a growing majority, as alienating, oppressive and dehumanizing. It is an explosive situation which, Marx would agree, calls for a radical proletarian ethics. Indeed, it is not surprising at all that various versions and "brands" of Marx's ethics are currently being propagated in so many areas of the world where alienation is being felt to the very hilt. It is precisely within this turmoil that the question of God is seen as ludicrous, or as anachronistic and presumptuous; but, also, as the only way of hope, both within, and beyond historical existence. This attempt at pointing the way to God, before whom man lives, is intrinsic to an evangelical theology of the cross. We shall therefore turn our attention to such a theology.

Chapter III.

Marx's Weltanschauung and the God who is pro-man: Towards a theology of the cross.

Introduction

In our discussion of Marx's concept of man and his theory of history as a Weltanschauung, it was emphasized that Marx's fundamental concern was with alienated man and his future liberation. This concern for human liberation was crystallized in a radical philosophy of praxis which, according to Marx, was unlike all hitherto existing philosophies, i.e., instead of merely calling for a new understanding of historical reality in order that man may accommodate himself to the existing socio-economic and political structures, Marx's philosophy called for a revolutionary tranformation of the socio-economic base of society. It was a philosophy that was intended to fire the imagination of the proletariat - the most debased class in society - and move them to liberate all of humanity from the alienated and alienating mode and relations of production.

Marx's dismissal of religion as the epitome of false consciousness, and his concomitant emphasis upon the transcendence of alienation through human praxis, naturally brought his philosophy into conflict with theology. His explicit atheism, in the form of his anthropocentric world-view, was construed by theologians as a critical challenge to the future of theology. To replace God with man, and the praxis of God with the praxis of man certainly raised the crucial question: How might theology continue to talk about God? If man can do the work hitherto associated with God, what is there left for God to do? If man changes the conditions that give rise to talk about God, then God is not only obsolete or irrelevant,

He is dead for He has served His historical usefulness.

Talk about God did not die as Marx predicted it would. On the contrary, it has continued for almost a century and a half since Marx's day to today. Moreover, it has shown great awareness of various challenges, including the Marxian challenge, to Christian faith. In the encounter between Christian faith and Marx's world-view, for example, some theologians have sought ways and means of making "talk about God" "come of age", even as man, according to Bonhoeffer, has "come of age".[1] Does this therefore mean that theological maturation occurs when talk about God merely reflects the "spirit of the times"? Does theology necessarily lose its evangelical soundness in this process of re-interpretation and rejuvenation? How might we speak about God in response to the Marxian challenge?

These are crucial questions which are not confined to the challenge of Marx's Weltanschauung to theology? However, in the face of the Marxian challenge, they cannot be avoided. They are of central significance to our discussion below since our response to Marx will not be in terms of a Christian apologetic, or an analytical appraisal of the accuracy or inaccuracy of Marx's claims. Rather, our response, which is mainly theological and doctrinal in nature, is in terms of a formulation of the central features of a theology of the cross which provides a solid basis for any apologetical undertaking. Such an undertaking is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.

In the first section of this chapter we will attempt to point to the need for a theology of the cross as a way of continuing talk about God which is both evangelical and relevant in the face of Marx's call for the liberation of man in history. We shall therefore speak about the praxis of God as a way of emphasizing the dynamic and gracious activity of God - the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob ... and of Jesus Christ.

This means that the praxis of God is salvatory, and it is therefore noted in contrast to the praxis of man which, in terms of Christian theology, is not saving in relation to man's ultimate future coram Deo. Man's praxis is the response of love for the sake of neighbour; it is not a way of salvation.

Following our argument for a theology of the cross, we shall turn our attention to a discussion of Luther's theologia crucis. Luther is generally considered the principal exponent of the theology of the cross since the Apostle Paul. In fact he saw his own theology as a return to Biblical theology which is none other than theology of the cross. The underlying assumption in our treatment of Luther's theology - which we have sub-titled: theology of "radical reversal" - is that it is crucially relevant to the ongoing mission of the Church in the face of the various challenges which she continually encounters; more specifically, in the face of the challenge presented to it by Marx's world-view. Moreover, by returning to the sixteenth century Reformer, we are able to maintain the dialectical unity between the confession of faith today and the confession of faith in Luther's day. Consequently, talk of God is seen as a historical faith which is not captive to the "spirit of the times" even as it faces the ongoing challenges in history.

Our aim in this chapter as a whole is to show that man's liberation in history and beyond history is inextricably bound up with the God who reveals Himself in the cross of Christ. It will be shown that instead of enslaving man further as a "Zeus-like" god would, the God of, and who is also Jesus Christ always acts on behalf of man. Such a God is not threatened by man's humanization; nor does He wish to threaten man and prevent him from realizing his authentic humanity. He is totally pro-man.

A.

The Praxis of God and the Salvation of Man.

It should be made clear at the very outset that in meeting the Marxian challenge, theologians cannot simply resort to arguing the case of theism vis-a-vis atheism. It would be speculative and abstract if the argument is characterized by the antitheses: "God exists" and "God does not exist". In spite of Marx's materialistic conception of reality, there is no way of empirically verifying that religion is a mere projection of alienated man. Indeed, because of the very nature of Marx's conception which, as we have seen, is not devoid of metaphysical elements, such empirical verification must be ruled out as an impossibility. But, by the same token, Christian theology cannot demonstrate that God exists. The implication of this dilemma for evangelical theology is that it must go beyond confessing that God is, to an elaboration of the confession of faith concerning who God is, and where He is. Christian faith is apostolic faith. Thus it proclaims that God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God is the Triune God who creates, redeems and sanctifies life. We have looked at Marx's struggle on behalf of man, we must now show that Christian faith is not less concerned about man; indeed, because of the nature of the God of the cross of Christ, it goes beyond Marx in seeking the historical as well as the transcendent salvation of man.

When we look at the sporadic and, consequently, ambiguous criticisms of religion in Marx's writings, it becomes clear that his protest against God was made in order that man might be man. Marx's atheism was therefore a form of "protest" atheism. "The essence of Marx's atheism," Van der Bent notes, "was not the theoretical denial of God. Instead,

it resulted from the necessity of fighting against the church and political clericalism."[2] When Marx argues that God does not exist, it is his way of protesting against the God whose existence dehumanizes man. God exists at the expense of man. Thus, in Marx's view, to deny the reality of God is a negative way of affirming man as the measure and end of what is human.

This point raises the question of whether Marx's atheism was methodological by nature, and, hence, derivative. Miguez Bonino, on the one hand, has noted that Father Guilio Girardi supports such a reading of Marx. According to Girardi, atheism is a secondary and not a primary thesis in Marx. This means that Marx's atheism is a negative way of asserting "the absolute value of man over against a diminution of man which would be implicit in the acceptance of God. If the disjunctive God/man should prove false, atheism would cease to be necessary for Marxism."[3] Czech Marxist, Milan Machovec, noting the transitory nature of Marx's atheism, adds weight to Girardi's argument:

> Atheism has meaning only as a critique, limited in place and in time, of certain dominant models used in contemporary religious faith. Marx developed his 'atheism' as a critique of the conventional nineteenth-century representations of God, and should these change, then the genuine Marxist would have to revise his critique. 4

Henry J. Koren, on the other hand, claims that Marx's atheism is <u>a priori</u> for it precedes the development of his philosophy of man and of history. He rejects the conclusion that Marx was a methodological atheist. In support of his argument, Koren reminds us:

> In one of his earlier works he [Marx] even called the negative critique of religion 'a presupposition of all other critique'. In later life, however, he no longer ascribed such a fundamental role to the critique of religion, but was satisfied with incorporating it into his general theory of estrangement as an 'opium for the people' and an instrument of power in the hands of oppressors. 5

In the light of Marx's assertions of the primacy of the socio-economic

infrastructure in his conception of reality, it seems more logical to accept the argument that Marx was a methodological atheist. This fact, however, does not necessarily invalidate the contrary argument that Marx a priori assumes atheism as a guiding hypothesis. It is not an either/or question: Was Marx a methodological atheist? or Was he an a priori atheist? There is a relational dynamic connecting these two opposing views of Marx's atheistic position. His overriding anthropocentric concern is premised upon the Feuerbachian argument that the truth of God is man. He therefore assumes an atheistic position which, in his view, he methodologically demonstrates to be true by placing man at the centre of human existence.

Marx's atheism does have a place in the "talk about God" for it raises the question of which God, Zeus or some other, is for and not against man. If God is like Zeus, or some other being, who, though possessing all power, is incapable of "pathos", then man would be better off without him. In such a case, Marx's Promethean man's defiance of the gods would be appropriate. As Moltmann explains:

> A man who experiences helplessness, a man who suffers because he loves, a man who can die, is therefore a richer being than an omnipotent God who cannot suffer, cannot love and cannot die. Therefore for a man who is aware of the riches of his own nature in his love, his suffering, his protest and his freedom, such a God is not a necessary and supreme being, but a highly dispensable and superfluous being. 6

We recall that Marx was convinced that religion, in spite of its real protest against real suffering, was a potent means of furthering man's alienation. God was seen as being removed from, and oblivious to the suffering of man.

It is obvious that in his writings, Marx's "protest" atheism was not designed to remind theology of its evangelical roots in the God of the Bible, i.e., the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who is also the

God of, and is Jesus Christ. Marx did not attempt to explicate the Christian confession that God suffers with and for His people. Rather, his "protest" atheism was aimed at pointing man to the need to liberate himself from all forms of alienation. Marx regarded it as only a temporary phase in the historical movement from alienation to de-alienation and the emergence of free, unalienated man in the free, unalienated society. However, despite its transient nature, "protest" atheism was still considered by Marx to be thorough-going atheism. It was intended to lead to a radical doctrine of "man for man" and not to a pure doctrine of "God for man". Moltmann argues that this anthropocentric reductionism which Marx derived in part from Feuerbach led to the deification of man. He concludes that that was de facto a reverse form of theism. Thus, while acknowledging the value and necessity of such an "atheism" that opposes a conception of God apart from the cross of Christ, Moltmann soberly reminds us:

> But atheism in rebellion against this kind of political, moral and philosophical theism has long been nothing more than a reversed form of theism, especially in modern times. It has not been able to break free from its opponent. It thinks of man at God's expense as a powerful, perfect, infinite and creative being. 7

The obvious antithesis and polarity between man and God in Marx's atheism is bound up with his "materialist" conception of reality. Milan Machovec supports this argument when he says:

> The materialism of Marx means unambiguously the supremacy of man and of the human principle in the cosmos. It is not that Marx and his followers turn lifeless matter into a 'counter ideal' to God, but rather that man with all his intellectual and spiritual gifts and values fulfils this role. 8

Marx assumes that religion is epiphenomenal in essence and is therefore transitory. He is convinced that with the transcendence of the alienated socio-economic base in society man will no longer be religious. There will be no need for God. Christian faith, on the

other hand, declares that man is not the centre of the cosmos, God is. Therefore, to posit man as the measure of himself and the ultimate source of his being and the meaning of his existence, is not only idolatrous, but enslaving of man. Thus, Christian faith claims that the question of man contains the hidden question of God. In the light of this, Moltmann asserts that "only a revolution in the concept of God" could make this fact clear, and "free" both God and man for liberating fellowship with each other.

> Without a revolution in the concept of God, however, there will be no revolutionary faith. Without God's liberation from idolatrous images produced by anxiety and hubris, there will be no liberating theology. Man always unfolds his humanity in relation to the divinity of his God, and he experiences himself in relationship to what appears to him as the highest being. He directs his life toward a highest value. He decides who he is by his ultimate concerns. As Martin Luther said: 'Where you put the trust of your heart, that in fact is your God.' That holds true for the Christian faith just as for every secular faith. 9

Whereas Marx claims that only the consciousness of God and not God Himself is real, for God is man's consolatory projection, Christian faith argues that not only is the "consciousness of God" real, but God Himself. Indeed, man's consciousness of God results from God's self-disclosure. Thus God exists prior to the emergence of human consciousness of him. This means that Christian theology is based upon the presupposition that man asks the question of God because it is intrinsic in his very "nature" to do so. Therefore, according to Christian theology, to speak of God as being only a projection of human consciousness, as both Feuerbach and Marx do, is to distort the truth about man and God.

However, there is a sense in which talk about God is "human talk". For example, all talk about God is done by man. What man says about God is always expressed in human language. Thus theological statements suffer from inadequacies inherent in all discourse. But talk of God is

not an empty projection as Feuerbach suggests it is. God is a necessary idea for man. As Russell Norris correctly points out:

> It is a necessary idea because it is inherent in human nature to look for meaning and fundamental reality outside and beyond the phenomenal world. This reality, beyond all that we can measure, predict, and control, meets man and transcends everything sensible. 10

Thus man continues to be man only as long as he continues to perceive his "essence" as being rooted in God. Now, having said this, we must immediately add that Marx's atheism confronts Christian faith with the crucial question: Which God? Who is this God?

So far in our discussion, we have tried to show that the challenge to theology posed by Marx's atheistic world-view cannot be effectively met by merely advocating a theistic world-view. We have seen that, through the influence of Feuerbach, when Marx speaks about human nature he paints a picture of man in possession of the attributes hitherto associated with God alone. This means that "anthropocentric" faith has replaced the theistic faith of Marx's day.[11] In its attempt to refute such a pervasive tendency and affirm the truth of Christian theology's confession of faith in the Triune God who suffers for and with His people, Christian theology cannot simply resort to a speculative philosophy, or point to the moral conscience or to mystical contemplation as the means of knowing who this God is. That would only lead (and has in fact led) to the "death of God". As Miguez Bonino explains:

> Liberal theology, whether idealistic, Kantian or existentialist, has carried this purification (of Yahweh's essence) to its logical conclusion. The fundamental presupposition is always the same: there is an essence of God which we can know through philosophical speculation, moral conscience or mystical contemplation before meeting the specific manifestations and concrete demands in which God comes - and has come to us. It is only natural that, when these philosophies prove untenable, and the 'essence' of God vanishes, we shall have a theology 'of the death of God', the Christian faith will be reduced to some form of philanthropic activity and Jesus left hanging in the air as an example. 12

Bonino is convinced that knowledge of God arises out of the praxis of God. Any knowledge that speaks about God in static terms is not knowledge of the God of the Bible. Such knowledge, Bonino claims, is unrelated to man, and is degrading of man. In contrast to this knowledge of God, he points to the true knowledge of God who becomes known through His praxis on man's behalf.

> ... It is precisely the characteristic of the Lord that he manifests his identity by announcing an action which involves man in an active relationship with his neighbour and with the world. There is no manifestation of God in Scripture in which a specific form of action is not included. God does not speak merely to inform or to notify: he speaks in order to invite, to command, to forbid a certain course of action. And this action is always related to a particular historical content - to men, nations, things, events. 13

God makes Himself known to man through His praxis. When He does so, He always takes the welfare of man with utmost seriousness.

Guilio Girardi argues that when we speak of God as seeking the welfare of man, as showing his "essence" through praxis, we are thereby positing a relationship between God and man which is characterized by a "dialectic of love" and not by the "dialectic of master-slave". In this "dialectic of love", the freedom of man, though subordinate to the freedom of God, does not reduce man but upholds and builds him up. Girardi suggests that even from the Marxian point of view, not all subordination to ends, per se, is excluded, but only those forms which further alienates man by reducing him to a means. Marx's radical concern for man does not transcend Christian faith's concern for man. Girardi argues that this is seen when the "master-slave dialectic" is transformed into a "dialectic of friendship" by Christian faith which sees the latter as the interpretative key for understanding our total dependence on God. Accordingly, the transcendence of the alienation between man and God does not mean the destruction of one by the other for it results from a transformation of the relationship

between man and God. This situation is analogous to that between men who overcome alienation through transformation of their alienated relationship.

> The affirmation of God would, in fact, be alienating if our relationship with him were exhausted in the master-slave dialectic, e.g., in a voluntarism that would expose man and his destiny to the divine free will; but it ceases to be so if the relationship is understood in terms of a dialectic of love, as an encounter between two liberties. Finally, religious alienation, like every other form of alienation, must be fought in the name of religion. 14

Our discussion of Girardi's argument brings us to the point where the freedom of man raises the question of the congruency of the freedom of God with human freedom. Instead of accepting Marx's thesis that man realizes his humanity through his own initiative alone, Christian faith points to God who is "for man" and through whom man becomes truly human. "But in order to satisfy man's expectations God must be God. In other words, God must be the totality of being and of value, and must, for this very reason, be infinitely superior to man, totally other than he and his complete master."[15] Thus the transformation of the "dialectic of master-slave" into the "dialectic of love" does not negate the relationship of subordination of man to God. Making man an equal with God would thrust upon him demands which would transcend man's creaturely limitations. In spite of man's exaltation, alienation still persists. At the same time, elevation of man would mean that God would not be God any longer. It follows then that God must be God if man is to be truly man. The awesomeness of God's greatness and majesty are not aimed at man's annihilation. "In reality, God's greatness does not destroy that of man but forms the basis of it. Man cannot be great unless there is someone infinitely greater. His destiny must be in the hands of infinite love."[16] This is therefore a rejection of Marx's thesis that all of reality is ultimately socio-economically determined, and that man's need of God is

not a genuine human need, but a dehumanizing and transitory need that arises out of his alienation. Marx's thesis is rejected on the grounds that it is one-dimensional in scope.

Henry Koren perceives that Marx's limitation of man's existence to the immanent, socio-economic base of society denies man his more authentic humanity which is only possible under the aegis of the transcendent God confessed by evangelical Christian theology. He says:

> On the contrary, we must ask ourselves whether Marx's a priori limitation of man's humanity to earthly existence does not violate man's integral humanity for Marx simply dismisses the possibility that man can have a fundamental orientation to a Supra-worldly God. 17

The question of God raises the question of the conception of human nature in relation to God. Such a conception is far more complex than and transcends Marx's materialistic conception of human nature. In the light of this, it is to be concluded that it is not God's existence but His absence that would mean man's alienation and diminution. Without God, man would not fulfil himself but ultimately destroy himself. "Having killed God, man would not succeed in outliving him."[18]

At this point, it is well to recall that in our discussion of Marx's theory of history it was noted that there is a tension between human autonomy in shaping its own destiny, in transcending alienation and creating its own free, human essence, and the dialectical understanding of historical materialism. Marx's thesis is: man creates in relation to the possibilities inherent in the level of the economic mode and relations of production. Man is therefore both the subject of the historical process as well as the prime agent for historical change. Koren reminds us of Marx's dilemma of deciding between historical necessity and human freedom, i.e., whether the laws of historical development or human initiative and creativity take precedence over the other, in the historical transformation

of nature, society and man, when he says:

> Marx's key statement in this matter is that man's production of his life is of necessity determined by the development of the material means of production. Is this development of production a physical process governed by laws that can be determined 'with the precision of natural science'? Or is it a development in which man's freedom plays a role, a history that implies the exercise of contingent human activities? Marx disagrees with Marx in this matter. When he states his fundamental perspective, he opts for the former, but when he concretely describes the development of the means of production, he specifically introduces the human subject with his ideas, will, purposes and intentions. 19

According to Marx, man does not need to seek recourse to any higher agent or power than man himself in order to fulfil his messianic role. To do so would be tantamount to further enslavement. But, as we have already pointed out, dependence upon and subordination to God ("Infinite Love") is liberating and not a curb on human initiative. Nevertheless, there are forms of dependence which Christian theology must reject. For example, Christian theology must reject that form of dependence upon God which has no place for human creativity in shaping the world and one's own life in it. Dependence upon God does not mean that man is reduced to an instrument or thing. Ironically, in rejecting such a dependence, Christian theology is engaging in a form of "protest" atheism.

From the foregoing discussion, the following conclusion suggests itself: In response to Marx's world-view, Christian theology must therefore exercise a two-fold critical function - on the one hand, denouncing the limited one-dimensional conception of man, and on the other hand, rejecting any conception of the divine-human relationship which is contrary to the dialectic of love.

It should be clear by now that the concept of God which is being advocated here is one in which God is seen as <u>pro-man</u>. He is the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob ... and of Jesus Christ who is always

acting on man's behalf and with whom man can enjoy a relationship characterized by the "dialectic of love". With this concept of God in mind, it would seem reasonable to ask whether Marx would have still propounded an atheistic world-view. This question gains increased significance for a theological response to Marx's world-view if we accept Koren's argument that "Marx tacitly assumes Zeus is the typical image of God." Koren adds:

> Zeus, however, is a primitive, intraworldly god, a god who is jealous of man's aspirations for independence and self-sufficiency, a god who wishes to keep man in slavery. In the eyes of an authentic believer such a god is merely a pseudo-god, not the God who transcends the world. 20

The Christian should therefore not hesitate in joining the Marxist in his appreciation of Prometheus, who promotes human self-realization, and in his rejection of Zeus who enslaves man. However, in doing so, the Christian needs to remember that his/her stance is a response to the transcendent God who has called him/her to "subdue the earth" (Genesis 1:28). It would seem reasonable to argue that Marx might have evaluated religion more positively if he had not conceived of God in terms of Zeus but in terms of the free, liberating God who acts on man's behalf, i.e., the God who is transcendent yet immanent, who has called man "to subdue the earth". But we have no conclusive evidence to suggest that Marx would have been less an atheist and a materialist whose view of the world would have been other than anthropocentric. Even if we were to speculate and suggest that Marx could have held a theistic world-view, in which God were seen as the God of the Bible, we must inevitably conclude that his theistic world-view would have been ultimately transcended by an atheistic world-view - perhaps similar to the one he did in fact formulate. In the former, God would have become man's agent for humanization and would have therefore eventually rendered himself obsolete when man had attained

to his "full stature". We need constantly to remember that Marx's atheism is inextricably tied to his fundamental assumption that historical materialism and anthropocentric reductionism constitute the dialectic of historical reality.

Let us return to Marx's one-dimensional conception of man. Here man is reduced to a worker and producer. Koren provides a perceptive critique of Marx's reduction of man to productive activity when he says:

> If man's self-realization is considered to be attained solely through productive work, man's existence is viewed as encompassed by being-a-worker. Work, then, is not merely a means of life but the way of life.... Marx, however, through his neglect of the other dimensions of a meaningful existence, practically reduces man to nothing but a worker. Thus the relative value of work is absolutized, which results in a distortion of man's being. 21

In spite of this limitation, Christian theology is confronted with a radical concept of work - the dynamic of *praxis*. It is with the view to change and transformation that man undertakes to understand history *qua* universal history. In this understanding, which is always a dialectical process, man is constrained to act, to lead history to the realization of human liberation. Man is involved as both subject and object of the creative and shaping dialectical process of history. But it is man, Marx seems convinced, who will be able ultimately to take the reins of history and lead it to a liberating *telos*. Man's capacity to both perceive and understand, and act are seen as a unity. This concern with liberation and transformation of the historical process is succinctly expressed by Donald MacKinnon when he says:

> The Marxist is concerned less to understand than to change; his concern with understanding is the concern of a servant of change, a servant who seeks to grasp the interior dialectical movement of historical events, in order that he may work upon the opportunity which they provide to the effective mastery of their deepest tragedy. 22

It is Marx's emphasis upon human *praxis* that prompts Lochman to

argue that "there is a place for Prometheus in our teaching about God," "in our doctrine of evil" and "in the Christian message of grace and justification."[23] Lochman argues that when it is placed in the right perspective, human praxis is not in conflict with the will of God for man and the world. He adds that praxis for liberation is congruent with

> the God of biblical faith (for He) does not intend to keep a man in his place in an ontocratic chains; the God of the exodus and resurrection opens up the way out of all the human captivity, also out of the captivity of death. God is the God of freedom, the liberating God. 24

Consequently, there is a place for Prometheus in Christian theology, i.e., in terms of man's creative response to God's command to "subdue the earth". Grace calls to faith active in love. However, when the creaturely response of man becomes separated from the gift of God and is raised to an absolute position so that God is displaced, and man now becomes the centre of his existence and the sole architect of his own destiny, then there is no place for Prometheus in a theology of grace. Grace and human endeavour are not in congruence with each other, but in opposition to each other. Thus the dialectic of love is destroyed. This is precisely what happens in Marx's Weltanschauung where we find human praxis is removed from the ethical realm - response to God - and made the central means towards human liberation and fulfilment.

This foists an "unnatural" burden upon man. Consequently, man's work ultimately becomes enslaving rather than liberating. As Peter Hodgson reminds us, concerning Ebeling's sober reflections on the legacy of the Reformation: "To be free from God would be the deepest bondage, for then we should have to judge and save ourselves, which is an impossibility."[25] Ulrich Simon writes in the same vein as Ebeling when he sombrely reflects on the message of Auschwitz concerning man. Man, he argues, is made in the divine image, and, hence, to define human freedom

in totally anthropocentric and atheistic terms is a denial of real human freedom. Simon notes that to be made to be like God, though never God, places man in "a unique place in the divine economy."[26] However, to argue for man's attainment of his authentic humanity outside of and apart from God, and thereby to make of man some "superman", is futile and dehumanizing.

> The doctrine of the divine superman died at Auschwitz, and with it anthropology as a disguise for theology. The self-exhaltation of man and the definition of reality in exclusively human terms lead to the denial of freedom which obliterates the human image. 27

The promethean mission of man which Marx expounds is premised upon a one-dimensional understanding of man. Man's future is found entirely within history. According to Christian theology, however, man's humanity transcends history for it has a uniquely eschatological dimension that transcends the history of man. It is a history that is inseparable from the grace of God in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This grace has an indispensable eschatological dimension. Lochman writes:

> In Christian perspective, the hope of salvation is inseparably connected with the one name of Jesus Christ and with what his name stands for, that is, with the liberating involvement of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He is the God of the exodus, and the Father of Jesus Christ. His hope of salvation means history; it is, however, not the sum total of that energy and work. It inaugurates an eschatological revolution; it is, however, an eschatological revolution: the possibilities of the Ultimate are not our ultimate possibilities. In one sentence: The hope of our salvation is in the liberating transcendence of God's grace. 28

There is therefore a diametric difference between Marx's emphasis upon the "absolute" transcendence of human praxis and Christian theology's confession of the transcendent grace of God. "The emphasis on the transcendence of grace as the final dimension of human life is the essential point in which Christianity and Marxism part their ways in the interpretation of the biblical heritage."[29]

It is worth repeating that Marx radically disagrees with the proposition that man's search for meaning beyond the "phenomenal" world raises the question of God. While he does conceive of an "open" future which is characterized by an anticipation of the dialectically new and surprising, he, nevertheless, limits his vision to that future which will arise from the liberating possibilities that will obtain when human praxis-theoria and the forces of history harmoniously combine. That is the Marxian historical telos toward which the dialectic of history is moving. Those "liberating possibilities", which Marx considers to be infinite in number, are in fact finite possibilities - they do not transcend the possibilities which are borne in the womb of history. Marx's future is not as open as we are led to believe. Christian faith, on the other hand, argues that the future of man is infinitely greater than that which is historically possible through human praxis. The future which Christian faith articulates is the future of the transcendent God who brings it in, and, who, in the words of some theologians is Himself the Absolute Future.[30] Therefore, according to the understanding of God as Absolute Future, the possibilities of human liberation latent in history are taken up and transformed by God so that the newness that is promised is not the result of man's effort. It is the gift of God. There is therefore a disjunction between future in history and the future beyond history.

Throughout the preceding discussion we have been trying to establish a case for a particular form of discourse about God. It was agreed that Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric Weltanschauung raises the question of God: Who is He? We noted that to talk about the God of the Bible is to talk about a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of human nature than that presented by Marx in his materialist conception of reality.

God is not an obstacle to human freedom. On the contrary, He is seen as the only One through whom man is able to experience a total, liberating humanity. Man's future, in the light of God, is far more open than the future projected by Marx which emanates from human history, for God transcends history, and He brings His Absolute Future into history from outside of it. To speak of the transcendent God, who is immanent for the sake of man, is to posit hope for man and the world. Only the transcendent God of the Resurrection, who is, at the same time the immanent God of the Cross, can provide hope in the midst of the ambiguities of human existence.

In theological terms, Marx's concept of man and philosophy of history might be considered a form of a "theology of glory". There is an explicit triumphalistic note in Marx's world-view which is integral to it. In spite of the "process of negation" in his concept of the dialectic of historical materialism, there is a pervasive optimism about the successful transcendence of alienation.[31] This "philosophy of success" has no satisfactory means of dealing with evil, suffering, defeat, death, etc. It does not tell us how such negating experiences will be destroyed. We are therefore left to speculate that they will somehow be abolished with the transcendence of the basic socio-economic forms of alienation. In the absence of God

> The penultimate becomes ultimate for man. His total destiny then depends on his accomplishments. He lives with the possibilities of happiness and euphoria in the moments of his success. But he also lives under the law of frustration and despair in the face of defeat and guilt. 32

In contrast to a "theology or philosophy of glory", in which human progress can be unambiguously identified and acclaimed, some Christian theologians, such as Paul, Luther and Moltmann, speak of a "theology of the cross" where healing and wholeness are seen as being paradoxically present even where they are seemingly hidden from "human" sight. This

perception is an act of faith, and it is bound up with a theology of grace, of divine praxis for the sake of man. Lochman explains that in this theology "our salvation does not depend on the success or on the failures of our efforts. What is ultimate is not our accomplishments. The ultimate is not our failure and not even our death. The only ultimate, the proper future of man, is grace."[33] Freedom and salvation of man are real for they are rooted in God's grace in Christ.

Now, to speak of a "theology of the cross" vis-a-vis a "theology or philosophy of glory" implies that there is an understanding of God, and, consequently, of man in the former, which is in contradiction to that in the latter. As we have already noted, only a radical concept of God can meet the Marxian challenge to talk about God. Despite its failures to take fully seriously the ambiguity of suffering, evil, death, etc., the Marxian analysis of alienation challenges Christian theology to return to a theology of suffering and healing, i.e., a theology of the cross. In the theology of the cross the resurrection is not absent but is present in the praxis of the crucified Jesus Christ whose presence in the world, with broken, sinful, alienated man is the presence of God. We are therefore talking about the God who is both present with, and is, simultaneously, the crucified Christ. He is the God who suffers for the healing of man and the world.

There is no escaping the fact that the theology of the cross is essentially paradoxical. In this theology, it is affirmed that contrary to "natural" appearances, where God appears to be absent He is most present, where He appears to be weak as in the cross in Christ, He is most strong. This kind of talk about the strong and powerful God who is most present when He seems to be absent from the world and from the lives of people, especially of believers, is rather foolish and absurd.

It is not without contradictions which, in the eyes of Marx, might well be described as "opium for the people". Mystery and hiddenness are inherent in this peculiar talk about the God of the cross of Christ.

Again, in the light of Marx's critique of ideology as "false consciousness", it would seem appropriate to dismiss the theology of the cross as being simply another theological manifestation of "false consciousness". According to this argument, the theology of the cross is no more than a reorganization of consciousness, a mental change in viewing the world without the necessary accompanying radical praxis to transform the real and actual conditions of life. Furthermore, in terms of the Marxian critique of ideology, the theology of the cross may be denounced as a legitimation of the status quo. Here suffering is glorified and the promise of the future kingdom of God is an illusory hope, a consolatory device to curb the "natural" revolutionary tendencies in man.[34]

But this is a distortion of the truth about the God of the cross. Whereas for Marx this theology is ideological because it is seemingly divorced from (or even devoid of) liberating praxis, according to Christian theology, the praxis intrinsic to this theology is the most radical of all praxeis. Moltmann argues that the theology of the cross embraces a conception of reality which transcends the depths of socio-economic and political conditions of life which it also includes. It is concerned first and foremost with the praxis of the God of love who suffered His Son to die on the cross. It is a praxis whose efficacy is through the contradiction of love in the crucifixion for the sake of the enemy. In Marx, it is the proletariat who are expected to carry out the revolution to abolish alienation and usher in the future society of freedom and love. But nowhere does Marx tells us how dehumanized

human "nature" will become loving in its revolutionary activity. Undoubtedly, love and solidarity are born out of common suffering, but there is no way of guaranteeing the continuation of such love and solidarity after the revolution has been successfully completed (or defeated). In short, the love of man for man cannot come from within man himself; it must come from without, from the suffering God. As Moltmann tells us, "the believer experiences his freedom and the new possibility of his life in the fact that the love of God reaches him, the lowless and the unloved, in the cross of Christ."[35] The purpose of this love is freedom. Thus it cannot coerce anyone to love, nor "prohibit slavery and enmity". Instead, it must suffer the contradiction between its freedom to create its own conditions, in which it is open to the loveless, and its impotence to force anyone to love. It suffers grief over this contradiction and, in so doing, protests against it. This love is not an abstract, eternal principle. It is a historical event - the event of the cross. The "contradiction in men" is met by "unconditional love", i.e., by God Himself.

> God is unconditional love, because he takes on himself grief at the contradiction in men and does not angrily surpress this contradiction. God allows himself to be forced out. God suffers, God allows himself to be crucified and is crucified, and in this consummates his unconditional love that is so full of hope. But that means that in the cross he becomes himself the condition of this love.... The fact of this love can be contradicted. It can be crucified, but in crucifixion it finds its fulfilment and becomes love of the enemy. 36

Here we are not talking about a God who has taken His flight from the world and left man in his predicament. Rather, we are presenting a picture of God who is for man, whose suffering for the sake of man infinitely outstrips man's suffering, including his suffering for the sake of others. This God is not the occasion of man's suffering - man is. Instead, He is seen as the only hope for man in his suffering, and

beyond his suffering. This is the message of the cross and resurrection of Christ.

This talk about the God of the cross is not simply another form of theism in which the nature and activity of God are the objects of speculation. The theology of the cross is trinitarian. It is therefore not a theology which is reduced to Christology.[37] This fact will become clearer especially when we come to discuss the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. In the cross, Moltmann asserts, "The loving Father has a parallel in the loving Son and in the Spirit creates similar patterns of love in man in revolt."[38] The event of the cross is the event of the Trinity. When we posit the freedom of man as being rooted in God alone, we are conceiving of a dynamic God, i.e., the God of the Bible, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and of Jesus Christ. This concept of God in relation to His activity in history is fully dynamic and comprehensive only when it is trinitarian in essence. The Trinity is not the occasion for a speculative discourse on the "substance" of God's nature; rather, it is the occasion for a proclamation of the activity of God, both within Himself and within history. Moltmann claims that there can be no "evangelical" talk about the God who acts in history which is not simultaneously about the God who acts within Himself.

> Between the Trinity in its origins before time and the eschatological glorifying and unifying of God lies the whole history of God's dealings with the world. By opening himself for this history and entering into it in his seeking love through the sending of Christ and the Spirit, God also experiences this history of the world in its breadth and depth. 39

Moltmann insists that "we must drop the philosophical axioms about the nature of God."[40] Such axioms distort the truth about God for they represent Him in static, abstract terms as One incapable of feeling, especially of "feeling" suffering. God must be described in dynamic terms which point to the centrality of "suffering" in His "nature".

> God is not unchangeable, if to be unchangeable means that he could not in the freedom of his love open himself to the unchangeable history of his creation. God is not incapable of suffering if this means that in the freedom of his love he would not be receptive to suffering over the contradiction of man and the self-destruction of his creation. God is not invulnerable if this means that he could not open himself to the pain of the cross. God is not perfect if this means that he did not in the craving of his love want his creation to be necessary to his perfection. 41

Thus the concept of the Trinity becomes integral to our talk about the suffering God for it connotes the dynamic within the Godhead whose praxis as Father, Son and Holy Spirit is not divorced from man's suffering; it fully embraces this suffering, taking it up into itself.[42]

Trinitarian talk about God conceives of God as embracing the whole of reality: God embraces the whole of reality for He is both immanent and transcendent. But Christian theology must not stop here since even Hegel's God does the same. Rather, Christian theology must emphasize that unlike Hegel's God who is incapable of suffering, the Triune God of the theology of the cross shows Himself to be the God who suffers for the sake of Love. As Kazoh Kitamori points out, this distinction is crucial to a Christian understanding of the God who brings salvation to man and the whole of creation precisely because He suffers pain which Hegel's God is incapable of.

> In the gospel message, God suffers pain because he embraces. But in Hegel, God does not suffer pain although he embraces. Even if Hegel's God allows individuals to wound one another, he remains a universal being, undisturbed and invulnerable. This God protects himself from being disturbed by 'cunning of reason' (List der Vernunft). By cunning of reason, Hegel's God never suffers wounds. Thus the abstractness of Hegel's philosophy lies not in his portrayal of God as embracing the world, but in his portrayal of God as a being without pain. Because of this abstractness, Hegel's rationalism cannot bring salvation to our reality. 43

The question of speaking about God in response to the challenge posed by Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric world-view imposes a heavy strain upon the Christian faith. The dilemma may be summed up in terms

of making the faith relevant to the needs of man and his world without losing the identity of the faith in the cross of the crucified and risen Christ. In the discussion above we attempted to point out that the Church may face this dilemma by talking about the "suffering" of God for the pain of man in order to heal him. This theme of the hidden presence of God in the suffering world permeates our study of the theology of the cross as an evangelical response to the challenge which Marx's Weltanschauung presents to theology. Before we turn to Luther's theologia crucis, we will attempt to summarize our argument thus far.

In our appraisal of the challenge of Marx's world-view to Christian theology, it was pointed out that Marx's "radical humanism" calls for a radical concept of God. We pointed out that this radical concept of God is found in a trinitarian understanding of the suffering God of the cross. It was emphasized that this theology of the cross is not a reduction of theology to Christology. On the contrary, it is the way of speaking of the praxis within God, and of God within history for the sake of man. A theology of the cross was conceived of in contrast to a theology or philosophy of glory. Whereas the former took with radical seriousness the human condition, which is understood in more than, but including the socio-economic and political conditions of life, and is paradoxical in nature, the latter was triumphalistic in essence, with its emphasis on unambiguous success. Classifying Marx's world-view as a "philosophy of glory" seems a logical conclusion in the light of its express optimism about, as well as emphasis upon the ultimate success of human effort at ultimate and total self transformation within history. It is a form of justification through human praxis vis-a-vis justification through the transcendent grace of the suffering God. It was maintained

that it is inherently triumphalistic in spite of Marx's radical concern with the pervasiveness of alienation and of human degradation. Admittedly, Marx takes man's suffering most seriously but not seriously enough, for his understanding of man is severely limited. Man, we noted, is both the estimate of what is human and the architect of his own destiny. Everything about him is therefore limited to his own creation within history.

The theology of the cross, on the other hand, provides a radical understanding of man which arises out of its radical concept of God. Here, man's future is not confined to the history of his own creation. His future is bound up with the future of the "crucified" God who transcends history. Yet, human praxis within history, as well as the whole of history are given their correct meaning in the light of the cross. This meaning surpasses that given in Marx's historical materialism. Man's freedom is not denied by the freedom of God, but is found only through the freedom of the suffering God who suffers his Son to die for the sake of man and the whole of creation.

This "suffering" God is not found or met through human speculation. On the contrary, it is He who finds man, comes to man and meets him in suffering and paradox. Though apparently absent, yet He is fully present for He reveals Himself in His hiddenness. Thus, when it may appear that God is absent from the tragedy of the human situation, He is most present, though not necessarily in the triumph of human success and accomplishment. Indeed, He is really most present in nihil. He suffers in and with the suffering.

Moreover, we are concerned that speaking about the suffering God does not lead to the glorification of suffering, and that the presence of God in suffering is not reduced to a mere identification of God with fellow sufferers.[44] Indeed, we wish to show that the presence of the

suffering God is salvatory for man because the God of the cross is also the God of the resurrection. Therefore, in the suffering of the cross there is the resurrection hope. At the same time, we wish to point out that talk about resurrection hope apart from its grounding in the cross seems illusory and triumphalistic, in short, a theology of glory. However, without the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, the cross remains the symbol of tragedy and doom. Thus, in the light of the cross and the resurrection, there is hope for alienated and sinful man: hope in the world, and hope beyond death and the world.

As we shall see below, the theology of the cross does not call man to quietism, and apathy based upon a reactionary ethic of the status quo. This will become especially clear when we finally discuss the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. To speak of the praxis of transcendent grace is to exhort to radical praxis to transform the inhuman conditions which might mean, in many parts of the world, the transformation of the socio-economic and political conditions of life. Moreover, to accept that our ultimate future is in the hands of the suffering God, is not to dismiss or reduce the necessity of and import for a more "human" future of human praxis. On the contrary, radical forgiveness through the cross of Christ calls Christians to radical praxis. This praxis, which is always in danger of becoming legalistic, and of reducing the Gospel to a form of Law through the justification of man by his works, must be complemented by the praxis of celebration: celebration of the future of God which is already here in the presence of the crucified and risen Christ Jesus. At the Lord's table we are called to partake of the messianic banquet which is given proleptically in the Eucharist. Moltmann captures this indispensable sense of joy and celebration, which is also characteristic of a theology of the cross, in Theology and Joy .

In contrast to Marx's critique of religion as belonging "merely to the realm of necessity as the groaning of the creature in bondage," Moltmann argues that it is only partially so, for "it (religion) also and more properly belongs to the realm of freedom as the play of remembrance, as an expression of joy, and as the imaginative hope of man's basic and final humanity before God."[45] It would seem that such talk about joy and celebration in the crucified God in the midst of alienation could arguably be called "ideological" in the Marxian sense of the term. However, Moltmann maintains that

> Religious myths and images are not just ideological tranquilizers which compensate for unbearable conditions or mitigate suppressed misery. They are daydreams of human communities in which the totally-other is made manifest, no matter how inappropriately, and where consequently the transformation of the here and now is already being anticipated. These communities are already celebrating that creative play which heavy-laden and labouring mankind longingly desires when it desires liberty. 46

We conclude, therefore, that the liberating power of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ is present in the anticipatory celebration of the transformation of sin and alienation. The genuine urge for wholeness emanates from God. It is therefore not the product of historical circumstances. It is not the result of human achievement; nor is it sustained and even heightened by optimistic hope in man's capacity to transform ultimately the human condition. It is through the Holy Spirit that man "becomes" the power and love of God in Christ in the world. Openness to God is completely and totally the gift of the Triune God who brings the Absolute Future and who is none other than the God of the cross. But this does not deny the celebration of the real liberating divine-human activities in history. To do so would be to distort the theology of the cross by making it appear and actually become a form of docetism. The cry for wholeness in history is the cry for the salvific presence of God in history which is already available to the "eyes" of faith.

According to this view, God is not confined to history even as He "participates" in the suffering in history. It is a cry whose primary presupposition, contrary to Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric world-view, is not only that God is, but, above all, that He hears the cry of suffering man. The epistemological centre of Christian faith is the revelation of God in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Thus, Marx's proletarian cry: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it," finds its true and most radical meaning and expression, not in Marx's proletarian revolutionary praxis-theoria, but in the loving praxis of the suffering God of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ.

B.

Luther's Theologia Crucis: A theology of "radical reversal".

In our examination of the challenge which Marx's atheistic, anthropocentric and materialistic Weltanschauung presents to theology, we noted that the question of God was primary. We claimed that a radical concept of God not only meets the Marxian demand for the emancipation of man and for an "open" and "free" future, but also redefines human freedom and the future of man and the world. In this redefinition, man and the future are liberated not only from socio-economic and other contingent alienating forces but from a reality limited to an immanent, historical materialism. In short, Marx's concept of the immanent freedom of man is taken up and transformed in Christian faith's concept of the transcendence of God. Here we find that immanence is neither absent nor taken lightly. To do that would lead to a dehumanizing distortion of

reality which would result in an insipid form of docetism. On the contrary, in the concept of the transcendence of God, both immanence and transcendence are taken seriously. As we shall see below, in Luther's theology of the cross, talk about God is simultaneously talk about man, his condition, his suffering, his salvation and his future. Luther repeatedly reminds his readers that God revealed in the cross of Jesus Christ is God pro-me . Consequently, man is not subsequently brought into the theology of the cross following the discussion about God: man is present from the very beginning.

Furthermore, as the discussion in the previous section showed, it was accepted that there are ways of talking about God which do not conduce to man's liberation but to his enslavement. In such cases, Christian theology might find itself supporting the "protest" atheism of Marx (and others). When this happens, Christians are (should be) motivated by altogether, and, ultimately, different reasons from those of Marx or any other "protest" atheist. The Christian theologian wishes to protest in the name of the revealed truth about the "crucified" God, and, in consequence, in the name of man. His protest is prompted by the love of God in Christ and is aimed at pointing to the meaning and implication of that love for the Church and the world at large. This is a cathartic and evangelical protest. On the other hand, Marx wishes to protest exclusively in the name of man whom he claims creates himself and is the ultimate and only measure of himself. Marx's protest is rooted in his humanistic passion for man whose enslavement is pervasively tied to his (man's) subordination to God. There is no doubt about Marx's intention to liberate man from his dependence upon God or any other deity or power to whom man is slavishly held accountable. The fundamental difference between Christian faith and Marx's philosophy is most

vividly and critically expressed in the theology of the cross. It is precisely in such a theology that the question about the God who frees, who suffers, who is for and not against man, which, we have been arguing is raised by Marx, finds its most evangelical explication. This explication is by nature paradoxical as we shall see when we turn to Luther's exposition of his theological method: theologia crucis.

There is no way of escaping the fact that there is a historical distance between Luther and Marx: Luther lived in the sixteenth century and Marx in the nineteenth century. But this is not the only crucial issue which should be considered when any attempt is made to establish a hermeneutical dialogue between the two thinkers. Of even greater significance is the basic difference between their respective ways of looking at historical and eschatological reality. Whereas, on the one hand, Luther was a theologian for whom the existence of God was not the question - he accepted the existence as basic to his own existence - on the other hand, for Marx, the existence of God was a priori and methodologically rejected. Luther, we are told, had been burdened by the crucial question: How do I find a righteous and gracious God? For Marx, the question was: How do we find free, unalienated, autonomous man? This undisputed difference between Luther's and Marx's "ultimate" questions is made even more acute when we consider the attitude of Marx the economist to Luther's works. Per Frostin informs us:

> Already in Marx's early works, Luther is an object of his interests. He is described as a revolutionary, who was nevertheless unfulfilled. Also in Kapital and the Grundrisse Luther is often quoted, but there in a new perspective. Indeed Luther is probably the German economist most quoted by Marx in Kapital, and this with considerable agreement with his views. According to Grundrisse he is the 'earliest national economist'. In Theories of Surplus Value, i.e. in the closing volumes of Kapital Luther is frequently quoted with agreement. For Marx it is not Luther's moral commitment nor his pathos in the fight against incipient capitalism that is important, but his economic analysis.

> He is portrayed in contrast to Proudhon, who showed no lack of moral pathos during his revolutionary phase. Marx indicates, however, that the sixteenth century Luther saw something in developing capitalism that Proudhon did not discover in the fully developed capitalism of the nineteenth century, namely, that capital consists of accumulated surplus value. 47

Marx's preoccupation with economic categories leads him to see Luther's main positive contribution to the liberation of man in Luther's analysis of the evils in capitalism. Needless to say, this interpretation is far from the central thrust of Luther's concern with a gracious God who is pro-man. As we have already shown, Marx, through the influence of Feuerbach, criticizes the concept of man held by Luther (and others), in which man is seen as utterly depraved before the righteous and holy God who alone can save man from sin, death and the power of the devil. In the process of doing so, he posited his own peculiar anthropocentric and atheistic world-view. It is precisely this overriding concern with man that opens up the way for a critique of his world-view from the standpoint of Luther's theology of the cross.

Luther's theologia crucis is a "practical method"; it is not abstract and speculative. Though his concept of man, as well as his understanding of reality as a whole differ fundamentally from Marx's Weltanschauung, there is, nevertheless, a common element in their "living" concern with man. It is this "living" concern in Luther that draws us to him as we seek to articulate a radical concept of God in the face of the challenge which Marx's world-view presents to theology. Thus our concern with Luther's concept of God is existential, and this is paralleled, not only in the situation described by Walter von Loewenich in which he notes that we are "today experiencing a return from a theology of glory to a theology of the cross similar to the one we observe in Luther,"[48] but also in the very fact that Luther's theology arose out of the existential need for a gracious and loving God.

Luther refused to reduce theology to anthropology. Yet he insisted that any talk about God is simultaneously talk about man. It is "relational" talk: the relationship between God and man for the sake of man. As Gerhard Ebeling points out, it is impossible to speak about God in such a way that what is said is not at the same time "the direct concern of man." This "relational" talk occurs because "what is said of God is addressed to man."[49]

Through Christ, God's address to man is salvific. This is apprehended through faith in Christ which is the gift of God initiated and sustained through the Spirit and the Word. Faith then is "certainty": "certainty" that God's address to man through the cross of Christ is a gracious call and "certainty" that it is God, in the first place, who makes such an address. Ebeling writes: "For Luther certainty is the essence of God's being with man and therefore of man's being with God. In the presence of God, and there alone, there is no uncertainty. But uncertainty is man's sin, and certainty is salvation."[50]

When we turn to Marx's world-view we find that the conviction that God's address to man is salvific - it is precisely the means whereby man is made free from sin and all that enslaves him - conflicts with Marx's argument that man's autonomy is lost when it is made subject to any heteronomous power. This question of the "freedom" and "bondage" of the will will be taken up at a later stage in our discussion of Luther's theology of the cross. However, it is instructive here to briefly look at another Christian theologian's approach to the problem of autonomy and heteronomy.

In his discussion on the Christian ethic "as essentially an ethic of redemption," Norman Robinson tells us that the "collision" between heteronomy and autonomy is inevitable. He continues:

> ... the Christian ethic is necessarily related in a quite explicit manner to God's remedial activity in Jesus Christ, to the saving Word of God in Christ and so to the revelation of the divine grace. If, however, the Christian ethic is an ethic necessarily and explicitly related to the self-revelation of God that fact in itself is the immediate occasion of questions and difficulties which are largely concerned with the problem of autonomy and heteronomy. 51

Marx, it should be noted, is heavily dependent upon Kant's definition of autonomy for his own understanding of that concept. Kant, Robinson tells us, describes human autonomy in terms of the situation in which "man himself and by himself can produce from his reason or from any other part of himself, the practical principles and the guiding stars by which he should live."[52] Thus, for Kant, as well as for Marx, man's autonomy as a free agent becomes, and is, in fact, impaired by positing the autonomy of God who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ. In relation to the autonomous will of God, man's will is made secondary, and he is seen as standing in a creature/Creator (and Redeemer) relationship vis-a-vis God.[53] Robinson therefore concludes that in light of the "gift of the Gospel, which is, when seen from within the original or rather from within <u>what man has made of it</u>, the quite unimagined and unimaginable restoration of man by the act and intervention of God and the creation of a kingdom of love within a self-willed world of man's devising," there is a place for creaturely autonomy. He states:

> Accordingly the idea of autonomy is right, but it is the autonomy of the <u>creature</u>, a secondary and derivative autonomy which combines the valid elements of both sheer heteronomy and pure autonomy, it is the autonomy of one whose nature it is to stand by grace in the presence of God his Creator. 54

Needless to say, Robinson's conclusion would represent for Marx a "bourgeois" Christian compromise because man's absolute autonomy is not only not affirmed and God's autonomous power not declared non-existent, but man's autonomy is subordinated to the will of God whose real existence is a primary assumption in the whole argument.

Returning to Luther's argument that God is pro-man, it is to be noted that when we make the assertion that God is pro-man, our concern is not with establishing Luther's proof of God's existence. Instead, we are attempting to demonstrate that in the concept of God of Luther's theologia crucis, the essence of both God and man is defined in dynamic, not static terms. Moreover, it is also assumed that any definition of human nature which is not derived from and rooted in the "crucified" and risen God is deficient and dehumanizing. To posit any other relationship, as Marx does, in which man is the centre of his life, is to distort the fundamental truth about reality: God stands over against man but He is simultaneously pro-man. The theologian of the cross must be completely radical in his declaration of the truth. As Luther explains, "The theologian of glory says bad is good and good is bad. The theologian of the cross calls them by their proper name."[55] The latter is not afraid to recognize reality for what it is - distorted and sinful, and seemingly Godforsaken. He is convinced that in cross and shame, there man actually "finds" the gracious and loving God.

Despite this crucial polarity between Luther and Marx, there is a sense in which their respective concepts of "radical criticism" of reality agree. Admittedly, Marx advocates the doctrine of man's "justification" through human creative activity which finds an indirect parallel in the mediaeval offer of salvation through the sale of indulgences which Luther criticizes and outrightly rejects. However, when the implication of Marx's atheism is seen in terms of "protest" atheism it may be argued that he was standing on common ground with Luther who attacked the religion of indulgences on behalf of a theology of the cross. Thus both Luther and Marx attacked forms of religion which were offering counterfeit goods: according to Marx an opiate, and according to Luther consolation and

peace to stricken consciences through the sale of indulgences. The grace of God is not "opium"; but Marx did not recognize this, and he could not given his a priori and methodological atheism. Again, the grace of God is not for sale, and it does not call man away from the world but drives him into it. In the theology of the cross, man is reminded that he can courageously face the brokenness and sinfulness of the world and humanity. He does not have to fearfully hide from them. Above all, man is able in faith to behold the healing and saving God in the Christ of the cross. The parallel between Luther and Marx should therefore not be pushed too far; it is a limited and qualified parallel.

We noted earlier that talk about God was not exclusive of talk about man; rather, the two are mutually bound together. The human condition is taken completely seriously even as the essence of the "revealed" God is being exposed. Care should be taken, however, to ensure that Luther's insistence upon talking about the God "for us" does not lead to the reduction of God to a mere human projection, manipulated and manipulable. This is a constant danger which, nevertheless, Luther was able to avoid. According to Luther, to speak about the God who is "for man" is a paradoxical statement for it is of the essence of God's freedom that He appears weak and impotent when He acts on man's behalf through the cross of Christ. It is in this light that the following statement by Alves on Luther's understanding of the God "for us" should be understood. Luther, Alves tells us, "stubbornly refused to allow the language of theology to be concerned about a God who had not given himself historically to man. To speak correctly about God is to speak about One who does not have any other mode of determination save that of being for man. For Luther, consequently,

the language of theology was simply the description of a historical person who exhausts the self-determination of God: Jesus Christ."[56]

Therefore when Luther talks about the God "for man" he does not wish to eradicate the qualitative distinction between God and man, between Creator and creature. Paul Althaus points this out clearly when he notes "the close connection which Luther establishes between the theology of the cross and man's sinfulness". He adds that this "does not nullify that fact that this theology is also intimately connected with and expresses Luther's understanding of God's being God."[57] Thus the salvation of man is bound up with the "being" of God. Because God is who He is, man's salvation is guaranteed; man's need of salvation occasions the revelation that God is "for man" even to the extent of suffering death - the death of His Son on the cross. When Luther therefore speaks about God who is pro-man, he is speaking about God who is known through Christ and His cross.

Theologia crucis is therefore a peculiar theology; but it is not one theology among various possible theologies. For Luther it is the only true theology. As Walther von Loewenich reminds us:

> For Luther the cross is not only the subject of theology; it is the distinctive mark of all theology. It has its place not only in the doctrine of the vicarious atonement, but it constitutes an integrating element for all Christian knowledge. The theology of the cross is not a chapter in theology but a specific kind of theology. The cross of Christ is significant here not only for the question concerning redemption and the certainty of salvation, but it is the center that provides perspective for all theological statements. Hence it belongs to the doctrine of God in the same way as it belongs to the doctrine of the work of Christ. 58

Elsewhere in this illuminating and scholarly work, von Loewenich identifies the thesis which he discusses and defends in his book:

> ... the theology of the cross is a principle of Luther's entire theology, and it may not be confined to a special period in his theological development. On the contrary, as

> in the case of Paul, this formula offers a characteristic of Luther's entire theological thinking. 59

This interpretation of Luther's outlook represents a landmark in Luther's scholarship which is clearly shown in the normative place which it occupies in modern Luther studies. It forms the basis of our own understanding of Luther's theologia crucis, as well as our attempt to formulate a theology of the cross in response to Marx's world-view. Accordingly, we shall discuss the theme of the "bondage of the will" in our presentation of the contrast between the theology of the cross and the theology of glory in Luther's thought.

The most comprehensive description of Luther's theologia crucis is given in his theses on "The Heidelberg Disputation" (26th April, 1518), where he contrasts the theology of the cross with the theology of glory. But there are other references to a theology of the cross, both before and after "The Heidelberg Disputation". For example, of special note are his "Lectures on the Epistle to the Hebrews 1517-1518", and two of his later writings, The Bondage of the Will and "Lectures on Isaiah" (1527-1530). It is beyond the scope of our present study to trace the development of Luther's theological method. We shall therefore confine our attention to a brief description of its main characteristics. Some of them have already been mentioned, and they will continue to be used in our development of a theology of the cross in response to the challenge which Marx's Weltanschauung presents to theology.

In keeping with Luther's search for a gracious God, the emphasis in Luther's theology is upon knowledge of God which is saving knowledge. For him, such knowledge is to be found in the God who reveals Himself through Christ and His cross. This revelation is characteristically veiled and hidden, since man is incapable of seeing God in his nakedness. God is always "clothed" when He reveals Himself. In terms of the saving

knowledge of God, man is confronted by God who is "clothed" in the humanity of Christ who rests in His mother's arms, and who eventually hangs upon the cross. In contrast to a speculative knowledge of God, which is derived through reason, true knowledge of God in the theology of the cross is available only to faith which allows God to be God and which seeks God where He is to be found: in the humanity of Christ. Furthermore, this indirect and "concealed" revelation of God is seen in terms of suffering and the cross - both the cross of Christ and the cross of the Christian. The two belong together. Though they must be distinguished from each other, they must not become separated. The theology of the cross is practical and existential. As von Loewenich explains:

> The cross of Christ and the cross of the Christian belong together. The meaning of the cross does not disclose itself in contemplative thought but only in suffering experience. The theologian of the cross does not confront the cross of Christ as a spectator, but is himself drawn into this event. He knows that God can be found only in cross and suffering.... For God himself is 'hidden in suffering' and wants us to worship him as such.... If we are serious about the idea of God and the concept of faith in the theology of the cross, we are faced with the demand of a life under the cross. 60

In his comments on Hebrews 12:11, "For the moment all discipline seems painful rather than pleasant; later it yields the peaceful fruit of righteousness to those who have been trained by it," (R.S.V.), Luther provides a useful illustration of his argument that the theology of the cross is a theology of faith which perceives the saving presence of God in the midst of the experience of its opposite.

> Frequently in the Scriptures there are two opposite ideas side by side. For example, judgement and righteousness, wrath and grace, death and life, evil and good. This is what is referred to in the phrase, 'These are the great works of the Lord.'... 'An alien work is done by him so that he might effect his proper work' (Isa. 28:21).... For in a wonderful way he makes the conscience glad, as it is expressed similarly in Ps. 4:1: 'In tribulation thou hast made me greater,' that

> means, thou hast made more of me, improved me. Now this is what infusion of grace means. As it says in Rom. 5:4: 'Experience worketh hope and hope maketh not ashamed.' Here we find the Theology of the Cross, or, as the Apostle expresses it: 'The word of the cross is a stumbling block to the Jews, and foolishness to the Gentiles' (1 Cor. 1:18, 23), because it is utterly hidden from their eyes. 'It is withdrawn from their eyes and is taught in hiddenness. This means that it is not manifest but is hidden as in the midst of a tempest.' 61

Luther preserves the sovereignty of God in his talk about the revealed God when he points out in The Bondage of the Will that there is a double sense in which God remains hidden: as the One who is revealed in the hiddenness of the cross, and as the One who remains Wholly Other whose mystery faith does not and cannot penetrate. To faith, there are not two Gods but one. However, the concern of faith is with the God who is revealed in Christ ("proper work") who saves, and not the hidden God ("alien work") who is awesome and inscrutable.

With these thoughts in mind, let us turn our attention to the contrast between the theology of the cross and the theology of glory as we continue our response to Marx's world-view.

a.

Theologia Crucis contrasted with Theologia Gloria

In our discussion so far, we have implied rather than explicitly stated a theology of glory which Luther castigated even as he articulated his theology of the cross. This is not at all surprising since Luther's writings do not contain any comprehensive formulation of a theology of glory. According to Luther, the theology of glory is derived from speculation and abstraction which are contrary to evangelical theology: theologia crucis. Like the theology of the cross, a theology of glory

is an orientation, a way of talking about the activity of God.

Luther claims, in thesis nineteen of "The Heidelberg Disputation", that "he is not worth calling a theologian who seeks to interpret the invisible things of God on the basis of the things that have been created."[62] This means that the knowledge about God derived thereby is not true knowledge for it arises out of man's speculation and is not the consequence of God's revelation in the cross and suffering of Christ. As Luther tells us in thesis twenty, "But he is worth calling a theologian who understands the visible and hinder parts of God to mean the passion and the cross."[63] The knowledge of God which the theologian of glory offers through his study of "the invisible things of God" is not salvific. The theologian of glory speaks of God's "strength, his divinity, wisdom, righteousness, goodness and the like. Knowledge of all these things does not make a man worthy or wise."[64] Luther argues that, on the contrary, "The sort of wisdom which sees the invisible things of God in known good works simply inflates a man, and renders him both blind and hard."[65] The way of the theology of glory, in Luther's estimation, is the way of triumph, and of human self-glorification and self-centredness. However, in spite of his great power and awesome majesty, the God of the theology of glory is, nevertheless, subject to human manipulation. He is an ideological God who legitimates the way of salvation and human development chosen by man without reference to God's revelation in Jesus Christ. Such a God is a threat to genuine human salvation. He stands so far above man that he is <u>de facto</u> absent from the world of human suffering. Man's striving for self-liberation and self-affirmation, in the theology of glory, is never satisfied and is ultimately dehumanising. Luther's comment in thesis twenty-two of "The Heidelberg Disputation" is helpful to our argument here:

> For since it is clear that they (theologians of glory) know nothing about the cross and even hate it, then of necessity they love the opposite, that is wisdom, glory, power and the like. Therefore by such a love they become more and more blind and hardened. For it is impossible for cupidity to be satisfied with the things it desires when it has acquired them. For just as the love of money grows as fast as the wealth increases, so it is with the thirst of the soul, the more it drinks the more it thirsts. As the poet said, 'The more the waters are drunk the more they dry up.' The Book of Ecclesiastes says the same: 'The eye is never satisfied with what it sees nor the ear with what it hears' (Eccl. 1:8). The same is true of all longings and desires. 66

The remedy which Luther recommends for this insatiable longing for "wisdom, glory, power", is rather strange. It is a remedy which the casual reader, or the reader who is not acquainted with the paradoxical nature of Luther's thought, would find ridiculous and foolish. The remedy for the theology of glory is the theology of the cross! The two are dialectically related to each other. But they must be distinguished from each other since they are fundamentally opposed to each other. Thus Luther's remedy for a theology of glory is premised upon a reversal of those very things which human wisdom has come to value as being of ultimate significance for man's wholeness. He states:

> It is not cured by satisfying it (insatiable longing for 'wisdom, glory, power') but by destroying it. That is, that he who wishes to become wise should not go forward and seek wisdom but should become a fool, go back and seek foolishness. Thus, he who wants to become powerful and famous, to have a good time and enjoy all the good things of life, let him flee from power, fame, enjoyment and a sufficiency of everything and not seek after them. This is the wisdom we are talking about, the wisdom which is foolishness to the world. 67

The paradox in Luther's thought on the question of real, saving wisdom is found in his claim that the wisdom of the cross is the very opposite to what worldly wisdom thinks it is. It is reasonable to conclude that Luther's theology of the cross is a theology of the "radical reversal". It is this that constitutes the paradox in his theology.

Before we conclude our brief discussion of Luther's use of paradoxical language, it is appropriate here to observe the similarity between

Luther's language and Paul's, where the latter is writing to the Corinthian Christians.

> Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save those who believe.
>
> For Jews demand signs and Greeks seek wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. 68

It is indeed striking that Luther (like Paul before him) uses paradoxical language in his description of his theology of the cross. For him, it is the only adequate way of speaking about evangelical theology, i.e. theologia crucis. Considering the limitations and inadequacies of human language, it is small wonder that the language of the cross, about the suffering and crucified God-Man, Christ Jesus, is intrinsically paradoxical. This is the nature of the revelation of God in the hiddenness of the cross of Christ.

Moreover, since the cross of the Christian is united with the cross of Christ, "the theology of the cross can never be a brilliant statement about life's brokenness, because it participates in what it seeks to describe. Apart from that participation, it would be empty chatter."[69] The language of the theology of the cross is experiential language for it describes the saving presence of God in Christ in the midst of His seeming absence and impotence. Inevitably, therefore, the theology of the cross and the theology of glory are at polar ends.

Our discussion of the theology of glory brings us to the point where it seems reasonable to conclude that Marx's peculiar anthropocentric world-view places his philosophy in the camp of the theology of glory. Whereas Marx "broods" over the history of alienation and

comes up with his concept of man and philosophy of history, the theologian of glory broods over creation and comes up with his attributes of God. Though the former is inherently atheistic in outlook and the latter theistic, or specifically, Deistic, since he thinks of God as being removed from the suffering of the world, they are both united in their respective means of understanding reality by confining their attention and analysis solely upon Creation. They concentrate on different aspects of it, but they are united in their conviction that ultimate answers to the human situation and the world as a whole, are to be found through this means alone.

In the light of Luther's theologia crucis, the theologian of the cross replies to Marx by claiming that the nature and destiny of man cannot be fully known by man through his own initiative. Man's nature and destiny are clouded in mystery and hiddenness because of man's fundamental relationship to the God of the cross. Only God can reveal this hiddenness. Therefore, at best, human insight into man's history and destiny is only partial and temporary. The truth about man is a gift of grace that finds only partial expression through human knowledge. Moreover, man is called to look for the truth about himself by exploring and comprehending the cross of Christ. Similarly, to the theologian of glory, the theologian of the cross replies that God cannot be known in faith as being pro-man, apart from the cross of Christ. The cross of Christ is therefore pivotal for a true knowledge of God and of man, i.e. saving knowledge that pertains to man and his future.[70] Such knowledge is contingent upon revelation - God's self-revelation. Walter von Loewenich's interpretative comment on Luther's nineteenth thesis is instructive here:

> 1. For the theologian of the cross it cannot be a question of brooding over God's being in itself. For example, he is

> not interested in a doctrine concerning God's attributes that substitutes quiescent abstractions for living acts. In fact he considers that extremely dangerous. God does not want to be known in his invisible things but in his visible things. True theology must understand clearly that it has to be a theology of revelation. God has spoken, and therefore we are able to speak about God. God has shown himself, and therefore we know where we must look. 71

We have already noted that Luther, following Paul, calls us to look nowhere else other than at the cross of Christ where we find the power of God revealed in weakness and the weakness of God revealed in the foolishness of suffering and death. This is no mere speculation about the God who is described as pro-man in His revelation in the cross. Rather, it is a knowledge of God which arises out of and is possible only in consequence of God's speaking to man in his suffering, sin and death so that man might hear and be healed. God hears the cry of groaning humanity and graciously acts through the pain of the cross. Marx's "ear" for the groaning and sighing of the oppressed proletariat, genuine though it is, cannot be compared at all with God's "ear" for the groaning of man and the whole of creation. The radical difference here lies in the unbridgeable gap between the Creator (God) and the creature (all men). Furthermore, according to Luther's theology of the cross, only God can suffer and die for man's salvation. Marx, for his part, turns his attention to the creature and the forces of history to find the solution to man's "groaning and sighing". In the light of this, we conclude that Luther's negative attitude to philosophy applies to Marx's philosophy as well as to the theology of glory. In a poignant summary of Luther's negative attitude to philosophy, von Loewenich writes:

> Philosophy has no ear for the groaning and sighing that run through nature. How could it? It knows nothing of a need for deliverance. It has the view of 'moral man' through and through. Just as the theology of glory prefers works to sufferings, glory to the cross, power to weakness, wisdom to foolishness, so philosophy would rather investigate the essences

> and actions of the creatures than listen to their groanings and expectations.... Genuine metaphysics would have to proceed from the principle that creatures are creatures which dare not be absolutized in their being. They are not self-contained. Philosophy overlooks this. It is blind to genuine reality. 72

This negative estimation of philosophy does not fully apply to Marx's world-view. For example, it is necessary for an accurate appraisal of Marx that we recognize the depth of his awareness of human misery under nineteenth century bourgeois capitalism. His perspicuous analysis of man's alienation shows that he is not totally blind to "genuine reality". Indeed it is a tribute to Marx that his concept of alienation continues to be of special significance in understanding the human condition - in socio-economic and political terms - today. However, Luther's negative critique of philosophy is particularly appropriate to Marx's world-view which proceeds from the principle that the creature (man) is absolute, i.e. he is the centre and standard of human existence. Thus, in the face of Luther's criticism of philosophy, Marx's Weltanschauung is not a "genuine metaphysics", and, despite its acute awareness of man's alienation, it is ultimately "blind to genuine reality". What, then, is "genuine reality"? "Genuine reality," which pertains to the "sacred philosophy" of the Apostle Paul, is thoroughly eschatological. Like Marx's philosophy,it embraces history. However, unlike Marx's philosophy, it embraces history in terms of the cross of Christ by which it also transcends history. It is a "philosophy" of grace.

Luther, it should be remembered, is a very complex thinker. It is therefore not surprising that his negative attitude to philosophy finds its counterpart in his approving comments about a "sacred philosophy". Once again we see the depth of the influence of Luther's theological mentor - the Apostle Paul.

> Paul appears to him to be a true philosopher. True philosophy would, of course, be a complete reversal of the hitherto existing kind. While the accustomed philosophy occupies itself with the <u>being</u> of things, this appears to the "apostolic philosophy" as a foolish approach. For the true being of things does not lie in their existence and condition, but in their final purpose. Therefore the apostolic philosophy is thoroughly eschatological.... Such a philosophy is suitable for theology. 73

In speaking about the eschatological dimension of the "apostolic philosophy", Luther is not moving beyond or away from the cross of Christ. On the contrary, he is attempting to emphasise and further explicate the significance of the cross as the source of all definition of the ultimate meaning of human existence.

Reflecting on the meaning of transcendent grace in the face of Auschwitz, Ulrich Simon provides a lucid description of the eschatological dimension in Luther's theology of the cross. Simon writes, "The life of Grace both comes from beyond anything this life can offer and aspires to an eternal consummation which lies beyond death."[74] He is careful to point out the real possibility of the distortion and abuse of this eschatological future. Nevertheless, he insists that the eschatological perspective is indispensable for our salvation which begins now and in the light of which our decisions are governed.

> The theme of the sowing and the harvest cannot be removed from the re-making of life in bondage. Without the eternal perspective our enslavement reaches the proportions of Auschwitz, which Luther seems to have foreseen in his honest, but unattractive warning: 'If you believe in no future life I would not give a mushroom for your God.... do then as you like; for if no God, then no devil, no hell...; then plunge into lechery, rascality, robbery, and murder.' 75

Meaning for human existence is found only in God, not in man, and it is in the God who makes Himself known in the cross. The cross which is the paradigm of suffering is not divorced from real suffering but is a real protest against real suffering. Indeed, it is there that the greatest and only victorious protest was (and is) made, for it is the protest

of God Himself.

A note of caution needs to be sounded at this point concerning equating Marx's philosophy with that which Luther criticized in his day. We recall that Marx saw that philosophy had culminated in his day in the philosophy of Hegel's Absolute Spirit. Marx therefore argues that the problem now was not to promulgate a new philosophy of the mind unrelated to the radical transformation of the socio-economic base of society. On the contrary, he argued that the time had come for philosophy to be transcended by being realized in practice. The problem before man was not to re-interpret the world but to change it, as his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach poignantly makes clear. This call to radical action - praxis-theoria - was not the result of any blindness to human suffering. It was obvious that praxis-theoria was prompted by Marx's concern to understand and transform the alienated human condition. However, the problem with Marx's analysis of the human condition is its unequivocal reduction of all reality to a socio-economic base. Indeed, the crux of the matter is that man is posited as the definition of himself. It is at this point that the theology of the cross stands diametrically opposed to both Marx's philosophy and the philosophy (or theology) of glory in Luther's day. The latter two have both "lost sight of revelation."

> Philosophy crowded out the Bible. Philosophy wanted nothing to do with the way of God; it is offended at the cross of Christ, the great no to all human endeavor, to all opinions of one's own. For that reason philosophy does not speak about this.... For that reason also Luther declaims against the 'seat of the scornful'.... 76

Luther responded to this situation by attacking philosophy and calling for a return to Biblical faith. He felt that he had been divinely commissioned to undertake such a task for which, von Loewenich points out, he was "especially qualified as a philosophically trained theologian."

In Luther's view, the epochal moment had arrived for a "radical reversal": from a theology or philosophy of glory to a theology of the cross. In the words of von Loewenich, the clarion call was: "Turn away from philosophy and turn to Christ the Crucified."[77] The cross of Christ judges all human attempts at defining man in relation to himself alone, or in relation to a future bound up with a speculative concept of God in His glory and majesty.

Marx's man - the proletarian collective - exercises a free will subject to no one or nothing except himself, i.e. man, and the contingency of the forces of production in history. Man as the species-being is called upon to assume the place of God, for Marx, borrowing Feuerbach's concept, is convinced that God is only a projection that arose out of alienation and is kept intact through alienation. In the light of Luther's criticism of "free will" in relation to God, and his argument that in terms of his relationship to God man's will is in "bondage", it is fairly certain that Marx's anthropocentric reductionism with its emphasis upon human autonomy would have been rejected. This crucial difference between Marx and Luther takes us back to their different conceptions of man's enslavement: in Marx, it is basically a bondage to the alienated socio-economic base in society; in Luther, it is a bondage to sin, the flesh and the devil which is reflective of the basic state of rebellion of man against God. Thus, in Luther, the human will which is in bondage is the will of sinful men.

Furthermore, unlike Marx who sees that the will of alienated man is in bondage because it is enslaved to the distorted and dehumanizing mode and relations of production in society, Luther saw that the will of sinful man was also in bondage vis-a-vis the will of God. As Ebeling explains, "Luther is not content with the statement that the human will

is under the dominion of sin, and to that extent is enslaved." Instead, he "goes on to make general statements concerning the necessity of everything that takes place, and asserts the impotence and bondage of the human will in contrast to the free omnipotence of the divine will." Here we have a subtle but crucial difference between Marx's Weltanschauung and Luther's theology of the cross. Whereas, on the one hand, Marx envisages a historical future where man will become an autonomous being living creatively and harmoniously with the material forces of history - admittedly, Marx does not make clear how this state will be achieved - on the other hand, Luther insists that man, as creature, will not and cannot exercise an autonomous will vis-a-vis God. This means that even the man who becomes saved through Christ is not and will not ultimately be given a freedom which is not in bondage to the will of God. Whereas, for Marx this represents perpetual oppressive bondage for man, for the theologian of the cross, it constitutes real, liberating freedom.

Luther's refusal to speak of the "free will" of man in terms of man's salvation is bound up with his concept of the sovereignty of God, i.e. with God being God. To speak of the free, creative will of man, as Marx does in his world-view, is tantamount to attributing deity to man which is an impossibility in Luther's theology. Ebeling sums up Luther's argument well by saying:

> For Luther says that 'free will is a divine name and is appropriate to no one except the divine majesty alone; for the latter can and does do everything it desires in heaven and on earth.' To attribute the term 'free will' to man means no less than to attribute deity itself to him. Consequently this term ought to be reserved to God, and another expression used to refer to man. 78

But, does Marx not infer a different term for man by not positing man as a god in place of the God of Christian faith? It is instructive to remember that it was Feuerbach who claimed that the attributes of God

were in fact the attributes which rightfully belong to free, unalienated man. We have already remarked upon Feuerbach's influence upon Marx - for instance, Marx accepted Feuerbach's concept of God as a human projection. However, it should be emphasised that Marx did not explicitly and directly argue for the deification of man. Nevertheless, we are led to the conclusion that Marx's concept of man as a free, autonomous being, vis-a-vis the Christian faith, is de facto a deification of man. Thus his concept of "free will" is open to Luther's criticism of "free will". For Marx, man's wholeness and salvation are inextricably and completely bound up with the immanent, actual and real conditions of life. God oppresses man and keeps him enslaved. In Luther's theologia crucis, on the other hand, man is enslaved by sin, and his assumption of the responsibility for his salvation is tantamount to damnation. Only the God who reveals Himself in suffering and the cross can release man from his bondage and make him fully human.[79]

The complexity of the issue of the polar difference between Marx's concept of man's autonomy and Luther's concept of the autonomy of God is intensified further by Luther's claim that there is a sense in which Christian faith can talk about the "free will" of man. According to Luther, man is not devoid of a will informed by reason which, when exercised properly, conduces to man's humanization in the world. Man does not exercise a free will in relation to his salvation, but in service to his neighbour. There is therefore a duality in the human will which is simultaneously free and in bondage. As Ebeling explains:

> Man can exercise his will with regard to things which are subject to man, and this includes, in a limited sense, the realm of morality, which we may describe as the sphere of activity of secular righteousness, where the concern is with works. 80

These are the works which are done for the sake of the neighbour, which,

as Ebeling points out further, are not and cannot be considered salvific in the presence of God.

> ... As soon as we turn to consider man in relation to God, it becomes meaningless to speak of free will. In relation to God it is impossible for man to be the subject of action, for here he can only be considered as one who receives, who is acted upon, who is subject to judgement, and who is accepted or rejected. 81

In short, in relation to God, "at the end as at the beginning, 'we are beggars'."[82]

It is precisely in terms of this relationship that Luther finds that man's "essence" is fully defined; this essence remains the same for man even when he is seen in relation to his beighbour and the world. That is, "the being of man in the sight of God is not something extra and additional to the being of man in, and in the sight of the world." Moreover, this concept of man is applicable to all men, both Christian and non-Christian. Whether man admits it or not, his "being in the sight of God defines the meaning of his being in the world."[83] Thus, according to Luther, when one speaks about the "free will" of man, one must do so in relation to what is below man and not above him. Here, in the realm of reason, man is called to act responsibly and freely for it is within his capacity to do so. But even in the sphere where man exercises his legitimate lordship over creation "this too is directed by the free will of God alone, in the way in which he pleases."[84] This closing remark opens the way to further discussion on the ubiquitous question of theodicy. However, we shall not pursue this discussion further. For our purposes, the remark serves to emphasise that the destiny of man is found not in himself, his history, or in his creative praxis, but only in God who alone acts freely. In the context of the cross God's activity for the sake of man is definitely and decisively fully gracious.

In Luther's theologia crucis, man's "essence is not defined a priori

in static terms. On the contrary, it is defined in relation "to the event that takes place between God and man."[85] This is most clearly expressed not only in the doctrine of Creation, but, especially, in the eschatological event of the cross and resurrection of Jesus. Man is no longer taken for granted, neither his freedom nor what is considered "natural" in him. A whole new and fundamentally different situation emerges which leads us back to the question of God. "Who is God," Ebeling asks, "if man cannot remain content with defining himself by comparison with the animals, but makes God the one from whom the whole determination of man's being, the whole definition of man is derived?"[86] This question is most crucial for the theology of the cross since we have denied man's claims to freedom and absolute responsibility in determining his ultimate future. Returning to Marx, we are reminded of the plight of alienated man. Taking the proletariat as paradigmatic of the whole of alienated humanity - alienated in Marx's terms, as well as in terms of Christian faith's understanding with reference to man's relationship to God - we ask: Who is God? More appropriately: Where is He? What answer should the theologian of the cross give? If he is to "call a thing what it is" - in this case, recognize the situation in which he speaks for what it is - then he cannot be oblivious to such stark historical realities as: the suffering of the proletariat (and of all humanity) and its failure to achieve its liberation through its own initiative; the absence of God is acutely pronounced in His impotence to act on behalf of the suffering and exploited; the Marxian immanental and one-dimensional future, as well as the transcendent Kingdom of God are still out there in the future. In his response, the theologian of the cross claims that faith sees that the Kingdom of God has already come in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ; and the Kingdom will

also come. This means that God is paradoxically present in the midst of human suffering, working on behalf of man.

Following Luther's theologia crucis, we claim that God is present, standing in solidarity with suffering man, effecting his liberation through the cross of Christ. God is therefore known "through suffering and the cross", that is, "the knowledge of God comes into being at the cross of Christ, the significance of which becomes evident only to one who himself stands (i.e. participates) in cross and suffering."[87] We have reached a crucial point of departure between Marx and Luther (or the theologian of the cross). Whereas Marx finds that alienation is indisputable evidence for the non-existence of any real, liberating God, Christian faith insists that the God of the cross of Christ is the real and living God, who is most present where man suffers alienation. This claim by Christian faith rests on the conviction that God's revelation is always indirect and veiled, manifest in its contrary. It is a paradoxical revelation. As Paul Althaus tells us:

> The theology of the cross means that God hides himself in his work of salvation and that he acts and creates paradoxically while camouflaging his work to make it look as though he were doing the opposite. In this Luther feels that God glorifies himself as God. God has power to create out of nothing.... God shows that he is God precisely in the fact that he is mighty in weakness, glorious in lowliness, living and life-giving in death. Thus in Luther's thinking, the theology of the cross and God's being are most intimately connected. 88

In the foregoing discussion we attempted to show that Luther's theologia crucis is the only meaningful way whereby Christian theology might meet the challenge of Marx's radical Weltanschauung. Admitting the fact that Luther's preoccupation with the question of finding a gracious and righteous God who is pro-man, i.e., who saves and not outrightly rejects, who stands with suffering man, and even enters into man's suffering by embracing pain, and Marx's preoccupation with the

question of how to find free, unalienated man are two distinct and separate concerns, we, nevertheless, maintained and sought to show that in the radical concept of God in the theology of the cross there is a more comprehensive and authentic concept of man vis-a-vis Marx's concept of man. It was pointed out that God, who is pro-man, frees man to be man, a creature before God. This is in contrast to Marx's assertion that man's future, his salvation and his freedom are his alone to realize in and through praxis-theoria. In consequence, our concern with Luther's concept of God was primarily soteriological. This is not a distortion of Luther's method for, as Moltmann explains, "In fact Luther's theologia crucis here is a radical development of the doctrine of the incarnation with a soteriological intent."[89]

With reference to Marx's challenge which calls for a radical concept of God, the theology of the cross points to a soteriology in which God enters into human history participating fully in the liberation of man and the whole of creation. God stands in solidarity with the weak, the forsaken, and the despised. Solidarity and identification, and crucifixion are salvific in light of the resurrection of the crucified One. Douglas John Hall expresses this outlook very clearly as he focuses attention on the presence of the crucified One:

> The theology of the cross is first of all a way of speaking about the character of God's entry into the sphere of human history. It is not merely a statement about the death of Jesus, but about his life and the meaning of his life for our lives. It is not merely a statement about the human condition; it is testimony to the assumption of the human condition by the One who created and creates out of nothing. The basic point of this theology is not to reveal that our condition is one of darkness and death; it is to reveal to us the One who meets us in our darkness and death. 90

Hall adds that what makes this theology peculiarly a theologia crucis is not that "it wants to put forward this ghastly spectacle as a final statement about life in this world, but because it insists that God,

who wills to meet us, love us, redeem us, meets, loves, and redeems us precisely where we are: in the valley of the shadow of death."[91]

This talk about God is Christological for it is only in and through Christ that God is encountered and grasped in faith by man. Ian D.K. Siggins summarily explains Luther's thought on the subject when he notes:

> He who wants to encounter God must encounter Him where He may be grasped as He cannot be grasped in His majesty: in the incarnate God, who lives in His mother's lap, and in the crucified God. To cling solely to Christ as He goes through death to the Father is the only way to find God. 92

Siggins therefore concludes that, according to Luther, "Since God will not and cannot be found except in and through the humanity of Christ, that humanity is the 'ensign for the nations' of Isaiah's prophecy (Isa. 11:12)."[93] God is available for man to grasp Him, for Christ is the Emmanuel - "God with us". He is God incarnate who suffers death, even death on the cross for the sake of the whole world. Because of Marx's Weltanschauung, as well as in spite of it, Luther's theologia crucis, with its emphasis upon the salvatory encounter between God and man in the cross of Christ, is crucially relevant to the proclamation of the Gospel, in word and deed, in the world today.

In both sections of this chapter we have sought to show that it is at the cross of Christ that God reveals His essence as suffering for the sake of man. This affirmation by Christian theology - indeed by the theologian of the cross - is not an opiate for it calls a thing what it is: it is hope incarnated in suffering. It is hope in the crucified and risen Jesus Christ, the God-Man, who opens the way out of suffering which is, in reality, a way that is present in the midst of suffering and leads through suffering to the resurrection beyond this world. Salvation is sola gratia, which is the praxis of God.

Chapter IV.

Proclaiming and "Incarnating" the Gospel: The double crises of Identity and Relevance.

Introduction.

In this chapter we shall examine the basic features of the theology of Moltmann, on the one hand, and the Theology of Liberation[1], on the other hand. Our overriding concern will be with the respective ways in which they both talk about God in the face of the pressing socio-economic and political problems which confront the world today. Both Moltmann and the Liberation theologians from Latin America recognize that the Gospel of Christ has a peculiar relevance to those problems, and in their own peculiar way they each attempt to articulate this relevance in ways that are rooted in and not divorced from the peculiar identity of the Gospel.

The presentation of Moltmann's theology is based on the primary assumption that his theology of the cross is the fundamental method which he uses in his talk about God. We shall therefore refer to several of his writings, and not only to any one of them.

By the same token it is assumed that, despite the variety of writings on Liberation Theology by a motley group of scholars, there is the primary concern in Liberation Theology with the theme of historical liberation from socio-economic and political enslavement and oppression.

Finally, we shall show that, to a very great extent, in both "theologies" - more especiallyin Liberation Theology - talk about God is in fact a theological explication of the Marxian concept of <u>praxis-theoria</u>. In Moltmann, the main emphasis is on the loving <u>praxis</u> of the

Triune God within Himself and in history, and on the practical-critical activity of the believer in the light of God's praxis. In contrast to this emphasis Liberation Theology stresses the believer's practical-critical activity in history, which is his creative response to the God of justice and liberation. Consequently, when Moltmann's theology is seen in the light of Liberation Theology it appears abstract and vague about the Church's socio-political involvement in any given society. By the same token, when Liberation Theology is viewed in terms of Moltmann's theology it appears that God is so actively engaged in man's liberation in history that He seems more like man's co-agent than as sovereign Lord. Both "theologies", however, are practical "theologies" with significant pastoral import which reflects the tension between the universal meaning of the Gospel, and the particular, indigenous meaning of that message. Moltmann is more concerned with the first emphasis, while Liberation is more concerned with the second.

A.

Moltmann's Trinitarian Political Theology of the Cross - A Radical Concept of God.

a.

Political Theology of the Cross.

It is obvious from Moltmann's explicit description of his theology of the cross that he is greatly indebted to Luther. In Luther he found the radical meaning of the Incarnation most clearly explicated. He accepts Walther von Loewenich's thesis that Luther's theologia crucis

is the distinctive and evangelical method of doing Christian theology. But Moltmann articulates his own peculiar understanding of this theology of the cross in order that it is not left in the sphere of the abstract and speculative. Thus, for Moltmann, Luther's theologia crucis as the method of doing theology must not be viewed as merely a theoretical and analytical exercise removed from the world of human action. On the contrary, true theologia crucis is inextricably bound up with liberating praxis. In Marxian terms, theoria and praxis are held inseparably together; in terms of Christian theology, faith in God through Jesus Christ and love of neighbour are held together in the dynamic activity of "faith active in love". It is with the liberating praxis, which is inherent in a theology of the cross, in mind, that Moltmann argues:

> And yet it only remains theologia crucis in the context of critical and liberating practice in preaching and life. The theology of the cross is a practical doctrine for battle, and can therefore become neither a theory of Christianity as it is now, nor the Christian theory of world history. It is a dialectic and historical theology, and not a theology of world history. It does not state what exists, but sets out to liberate men from their inhuman definitions and their idolized assertions, in which they have become set, and in which society has ensnared them. 2

It is obvious that Moltmann sees the task of the theology of the cross as that of demonstrating the truth of its doctrine by engaging in liberating action on behalf of the oppressed and the dehumanized in society. Theologia crucis is seen therefore not so much as an explanation of history but as a call to transform history in order to make it more human.

Because of Moltmann's explicit concern with the theology of the cross "as a practical doctrine for battle", his vocabulary, unlike Luther's, is pervaded by praxis-oriented terms. This is not to say that Luther was not concerned with practical issues. Such a conclusion

would be incorrect. One only needs to read his teachings on the question of Christian liberty, for example, to find that Luther was concerned with "faith active in love" in service of the neighbour as the true expression of Christian freedom. Therefore the crucial difference between Moltmann and Luther lies in the nature of the fundamental question faced by each in his particular age. Luther, we are told, was concerned with the crucial question: How do I find a gracious and loving God? For Moltmann, the question is: How do we speak of God in the face of socio-economic and political oppression?

This is not to say that Moltmann confines reality to the socio-economic base as Marx does. On the contrary, it is his way of speaking about God which seeks to give the fullest expression possible to His transcendence and His immanence. He wishes to take Marx most seriously. Consequently, his concept of the "Crucified God" shows God suffering within Himself and with suffering mankind instead of merely calling man to resurrection hope without participating in the suffering and oppression of man. All suffering, and this includes but is not limited to socio-economic and political suffering and oppression, is taken up into God Himself.[3]

Moltmann is careful not to speak of man's hope for salvation as simply the result of God's solidarity with man.[4] Transcendent hope in the Resurrection of Jesus is indispensable to his theology of the cross. Cross and Resurrection are bound together; they are not separated from each other. Therefore when Moltmann focuses on the cross of Christ, he does so in order to point out that real, transcendent hope which characterises Christian faith is already present in the world, i.e. in the cross of Christ. He summarises his thesis thus:

> The cross of Christ is the sign of God's hope on earth for all those who live here in the shadow of the cross. Theology

> of hope is at its hard core theology of the cross. The cross of Christ is the presently given form of the Kingdom of God on earth. In the crucified Christ we view the future of God. Everything else is dreams, fantasies, and mere wish images. Hope born out of the cross of Christ distinguishes Christian faith from superstition as well as from disbelief. The freedom generated by the cross distinguishes Christian faith from optimism as well as from terrorism. 5

Only the resurrection of the crucified God, Jesus Christ, provides hope in history and beyond history. This does not detract from the penultimate meaning human effort has for man's future. However, man's future is not the future of man's effort, but the future of the crucified God which is the real and only basis for man's total liberation.

Moltmann is therefore concerned that talk about God does not become divorced from talk about the divine-human activity in the world. For him, then, theology of the cross must be "political" theology of the cross. Explaining the inclusiveness of this theology which he and Johannes B. Metz have both call <u>political theology</u>, Moltmann writes:

> For us the field of politics designates the extensive field of constructive and destructive possibilities of the appropriation and utilization of nature's powers as well as of human relationships by human society. Nature and human history come together in the process of civilization. In it there can no longer be a distinction between cosmology and anthropology. For man and nature, politics is becoming a common destiny. We take up the ancient concept of <u>theologia politica</u> or <u>theologia civilis</u> to point out the fundamental situation in which the God-question is raised and which Christian God-talk must become relevant today. 6

Continuing the description of his "synthetic" and "holistic" approach to theology, Moltmann adds that "political" theology of the cross is also bound up with the question of theodicy. The political question which has replaced the traditional "cosmological theodicy question about evil and misfortune" makes it necessary that Christian faith in the salvation of God which liberates the world from its self-imposed enslavement shows itself to be practically relevant to the situation at hand. The primary focus of talk about God today must be

the political questions which contemporary man faces, i.e., the questions of history and the practical-critical activity of man. Consequently, Christian faith should not be restricted to the private realm of individual existence and thereby allow the "godless and inhuman powers" to have full control over the realm of politics as has been done in the past.

The dilemma with which Christian faith is faced as a result of the dichotomy between the private and political dimensions of human existence is aptly summarised in the question: How can Christian theology continue to profess faith in God in the face of the obvious absence of God from the world? When the world is left to its own whim and fancy and the creative activity of God is confined to the inner, spiritual sphere of the individual soul, then, for all practical purposes "God is dead". Unfortunately, Christian theology is partly responsible for the "death of God" which has naturally strengthened the cause of Marx and other "protest" atheists.

> That faith which no longer seeks God and his righteousness in the world but only in the soul has allied itself with a practical atheism which seeks the world without God and righteousness, and with it has contracted an alliance of death, of the 'death of God' in the world. 7

It is therefore with the aim of recalling theology to the intrinsic unity between the activity of God in the soul and His presence and activity in the world, that Moltmann articulates his peculiar "political" theology of the cross. God's concern for man, individually and corporately, and for the world are not separated from each other but held together. This is clearly revealed in the salvific suffering of the Truine God in the event of the cross of Christ.

No doubt, there is always the danger that any attempt to correct the distortion of the Christian faith by way of a <u>political theology</u>

might result in a political ideology. In that case it will not be the truth of the Gospel of the crucified and risen Christ Jesus that will be presented, but a distortion of it which inevitably will be tied to a political system, order, class, etc. Taking full cognizance of this insidious danger, Moltmann is quick to qualify his concept of a "political" theology of the cross by stating:

> Political hermeneutics of faith is not a reduction of the theology of the cross to a political ideology, but an interpretation of it in political discipleship. Political hermeneutics sets out to recognize the social and economic influences on theological institutions and languages, in order to bring their liberating content into the political dimension and to make them relevant towards really freeing men from their misery in certain vicious circles. 8

Political theology of the cross takes up the challenge in Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, but it does so on its own terms, i.e., in terms of the cross of Christ. This means that it is not afraid of being subjected to Marx's critique of ideology. As incarnational talk about God, it is concerned to make the Christian faith relevant in the face of contemporary challenges to it. Political hermeneutics does not lead to a dissipation of the substance of Christian faith even when political hermeneutics asks: "What is the function of" talk about God and what effect does it have? On the contrary, instead of any loss of the substance of the faith, "faith gains substance in its political incarnations and overcomes its un-Christian abstraction, which keeps it far from the present situation of the crucified God." It is therefore necessary that Christian theology makes clear whether, in its political formulations and activities, "it is disseminating faith or superstition.[9]

Moltmann's political theology is a dialectical theology. It is a critical-historical theology since it combines talk about God and man. Unlike Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric philosophy, it talks

about God "for man", and does not leave God out of man's struggle for liberation. At the same time, unlike theology characterized by an "other" worldly piety and the search for the inner salvation of the soul, political theology of the cross talks about human activity in the world for the sake of the world. This activity is rooted in and built upon God's gracious and salvific praxis in and through Christ. It is only by exercising a continual critical appraisal of its talk about God that political theology of the cross can maintain that intrinsic dialectical unity between the praxis of God and the praxis of man's response to God's gracious activity in the cross of Christ.

Moltmann is concerned that the political theology of the cross which he advocates is a theology of Christian faith and is not reduced to politics or to any form of humanism, Marxian or non-Marxian. He explains:

> If we would in practice put man in place of the divine, we would theoretically have to put the human essence in place of the divine. If we would change religion into politics, as our 'leftist' friends and Marxists demand, politics would have to become our religion. The state or the party would then become the Leviathan, the mortal god on earth. That would mean abolishing once again the sacralization of politics which Christianity has effected. This divinization of politics is a superstition which Christians cannot accept. They are Christians and hold to the crucified one in order to witness to men of a greater freedom. 10

Therefore, in facing the Marxian challenge to theology the Church should not capitulate to Marx's anthropocentric and socio-economic and political reductionism, by, for example, becoming a power bloc in society. Instead, she should stand at the foot of the cross of Christ where all superstition - of politics, economics, man's capacity to end his historical alienation, etc. - is exposed and rendered impotent. Christians cannot show the relevance of their faith in the "crucified" God and maintain their identity as Christians except by standing with the Lord who is the

crucified One.

b.

Trinitarian Theology of the Cross.

If the caption political theology shows Moltmann's concern with relevance, then the caption "trinitarian theology" shows his concern with identity. Moreover, the question: What is it that makes theology of the cross evangelical theology? finds its answer in the peculiar "trinitarian" character of Moltmann's theology of the cross. It has been noted already that Marx's atheism (and all forms of atheism) cannot seriously be met by positing theism, for the God of theism is not necessarily the suffering and crucified God of the cross of Christ. In place of theism, Christian faith, if it is to be true to its roots, must point to a "trinitarian" theology of the cross. This is evangelical theology for it seeks to explicate the event of the cross as an event of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It is an event within the "Triune" God Himself for, as Moltmann tells us:

> It is an event between the sacrificing Father and the abandoned Son in a power of sacrifice that deserves to be named the Spirit. In the cross, Jesus and the Father are in the deepest sense separated in forsakenness, yet are at the same time most inwardly united through the Spirit of sacrifice. From the event between Jesus and his Father at the cross, the Spirit goes forth which upholds the abandoned, justifies the despised, and will bring the dead to life. 11

This theology of the cross is not a reduction of theology to a theology of the Son, the Second Person of the Trinity. It is "trinitarian" theology which is characterised by the inherent unity which exists between the God who suffers externally for the sake of His people, and the God who suffers within Himself. Thus Moltmann's Christology is not reduced

either to a monotheism of the Father or to a monotheism of the Son, but is conceived of as the activity of the Triune God.[12]

By insisting upon such a trinitarian theology of the cross, Moltmann demonstrates that the quest of the Church for relevance of the Christian faith in the world must not shape and give content to the message of the salvific work of the crucified and risen God. He claims that to describe the contemporary situation of socio-economic and political oppression and, then only afterwards, to raise the question of God is not to understand adequately either the situation of man and the world, or the presence and activity of God which describe His being. Relevance and identity are bound together. They must not be separated into entities standing totally unrelated to each other; they are complementary to each other.

Moltmann notes, however, that it is a curious phenomenon that where the Church finds its identity, the question of relevance arises, and, similarly, where the Church achieves relevance in the world, the question of her identity arises. It seems that only one or the other may obtain at any given moment in history, but not both simultaneously. This situation presents what Moltmann calls the "double crisis" which may be viewed more specifically in terms of the Christian faith. When this is done, it is seen that "each of these crises is simply a reflection of the other." Thus you cannot have one without the other.

> ... Both crises can be reduced to a common denominator. Christian theology must be theology of the cross, if it is to be identified as Christian theology through Christ. But the theology of the cross is a critical and liberating theory of God and man. Christian life is a form of practice which consists in following the crucified Christ, and it changes both man himself and the circumstances in which he lives. To this extent, a theology of the cross is a practical theory. 13

When God and man are spoken of together in the theology of the cross, then there is the explicit concern with relevance and identity.

Moltmann expresses a profound awareness of and concern for suffering humanity. He recognizes that man's suffering includes socio-economic and political suffering but is not limited only to those forms of suffering, pervasive and acutely pronounced in our world though they are. It is out of his concern to bring a prophetic witness to bear on the situation that he, as a Christian theologian of the cross, places and interprets the event of the cross in the context of the prophetic theology of the Old Testament.[14] He reminds us of the continuity between "the Jewish God-situation" in the Old Testament and "the passion of God according to the New Testament."

> Christian faith does not have a new idea of God, but rather finds itself in a different God-situation. It is defined through the passion of God and the cross of Christ. It is related to the Jewish God-situation, for the pathos of God in the Old Testament is the presupposition for the passion of God according to the New Testament. 15

Despite this fundamental continuity, a fundamental difference between "the pathos of God in the Old Testament" and "the passion of God according to the New Testament" exists. The crucial difference lies in the "bipolar" nature of the former, and the "trinitarian" theology of the latter. Whereas, on the one hand, "the prophetic theology of pathos proceeded from God's covenant with his people and, on this basis, developed a bipolar theology between the pathos of God and the sympathy of the Spirit in man," on the other hand, "those who discern the God-situation in the crucified one are men from among all peoples." In the latter, the universality of God's pathos is most emphatically made manifest. Furthermore, the contrasting difference in the two forms of theology is seen in the different way in which each apprehends the reality of God: while Israel apprehends God in terms of the covenant, Christians have "Christ himself, who mediates the fatherhood of God and the power of the Spirit." The latter is distinctly and necessarily

a trinitarian theology of the cross.

> Christian theology cannot develop (as is often done in process theology) a bipolar theology of interaction between God and the Spirit in man. It must, for the sake of the crucified one, intentionally become a trinitarian theology. Through the crucified one, that dialogical God-relationship is first opened up. Through Christ, God himself creates the conditions necessary to enter upon a relationship of pathos and sympathy. Through the crucified one, he creates a new covenant for those who cannot meet these conditions because they are Godless and Godforsaken. 16

Because of the trinitarian nature of the event of the cross, even those who are without hope - to whom the conditions of existence and their outlook on life bear striking witness - are offered genuine hope in God through Christ.

When he contrasts the "bipolar" theology in the Old Testament with the trinitarian theology in the cross of Christ, Moltmann is not suggesting that the phenomenon of God's suffering (even unto the death of the Son) for the sake of man, which characterises trinitarian theology is lacking in the former. Indeed, "bipolar" theology is characterised by the pathos of the suffering God. But the difference lies precisely in "the recognition of God in Christ, and above all in the crucified one."[17] In the crucified one we find the very completion of God's humiliation. There God has not only entered "into the finitude of man but also into the situation of his God-abandonness." This means that Jesus is seen as God's representative "as man" for the sake of man. Simultaneously, He is man's Saviour and Liberator precisely in the God-forsakenness in the cross. God shows that He is the God <u>for</u> the forsaken and alienated in the experience of God-forsakenness of His Son. Jesus is <u>for</u> man because He is of God and man. At the same time, He acts <u>for</u> God because He is the Son of God. In the Incarnation, the two components, acting <u>for</u> God and <u>for</u> man, are inseparably bound together. This dialectic is in God Himself and in His activity in His Son on the cross for the sake

of man and the world.

Summarising the efficacy of this paradoxical activity of God, Moltmann tells us:

> The Godforsaken Son of God takes the eternal death of the forsaken and the damned upon himself in order to become God of the forsaken and brother of the damned. Every person damned and forsaken by God can, in the crucified one, experience community with God. The incarnate God is present and accessible to the humanity of every man. No one needs to play a role or to transform himself in order to come to his humanity through Christ. 18

Man is freed from having to do works in order to be free. Through Christ, man is freed from and not further enslaved by the responsibility of self-transformation. This is the work of the Triune God in the cross of Christ. The dynamic "essence" of the trinitarian God is always for the sake of man. "Nothing more exists that could exclude the lost man from the situation of the pain of the Father, the love of the Son, and the life of the Spirit. Without limits and without conditions, unhappy man is received into full community with God."[19] In this emotionally charged description of God's gracious activity on behalf of man, Moltmann posits a genuine and liberating praxis. It is praxis of the sovereign yet humble and loving God who freely suffers the pain of His love for the sake of the salvation of suffering, oppressed and alienated humanity.

We returned once again to the question of the danger of talking about God "for man" in such a way and to the extent that the sovereignty of God is impaired and subordinated to the needs of man. Man, we have already noted and emphasised, is always involved in any talk about the "crucified" God. But by talking about the dynamic of (and within) the Trinity in relation to the double crises of identity and relevance in the Christian faith, it would appear as if the needs of sinful, alienated man are the primary occasion for the revelation of God in His Godforsaken-ness in the cross of Christ. This suggests that God's sovereignty is

violated for He is portrayed as being subject to man's needs. Moltmann attempts to avoid this danger by arguing that, on the one hand, to say that God reveals Himself for the sake of man is not to reduce, distort, or dispense with the concept of the freedom and sovereignty of God. Indeed, on the other hand, Moltmann adds, God does what He does because it already exists within the Godhead. This means that suffering is in God Himself.

> In the cross of Christ, a rupture tears, as it were, through God himself. It does not simply tear through Christ, as the doctrine of the two natures states. At first, it sounds paradoxical if one says that God himself is abandoned by God. God rejects himself. God cries out to God. Or, as Luther said: 'There God dies to God.' 20

The solution to the dilemma is contingent upon whether God's revelation in the cross of Christ is found in the paradox of suffering within the Trinity itself - the suffering of God by God. For Moltmann, therefore, man's needs did not occasion a radical transformation in the nature of God but a salvific revelation of the dynamic of and within the Trinity. There is an essential unity and harmony within the Trinity. Only because of this unity and harmony between "the sacrificing Father", "the abandoned Son", and "the Spirit of sacrifice" that the God-forsaken condition of sinful humanity could be transformed by the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.[21]

Moltmann's argument that the cross is both the inner event within the Trinity, and the external event of suffering love for the sake of man and the world seems to echo Hegel's thesis that Absolute Spirit realises itself by positing itself. But there are significant and striking differences between the revelation of the Triune God in Moltmann's theology of the cross and the self-manifestation of Absolute Spirit in Hegel's philosophy - not least of all is the notable "pathos" in the former and the lack of pathos in the latter - to refute any argument

equating the two. His trinitarian theology of the cross capitulates neither to Feuerbach's anthropological reductionism nor to Hegel's philosophy of Geist. Instead, it seeks to be a Biblical theology of the cross by embracing the "pathos" of Yahweh in its description of the trinitarian event of suffering and crucified love in the cross of Christ. We will return to this point below.

Here it is appropriate to raise the crucial question of "change" within God. Moltmann's trinitarian theology of the cross inevitably gives rise to speculation concerning the relation between the "dynamic" activity of the Trinity in the cross of Christ and the tendency towards "change" in God Himself. Moltmann asserts, "The suffering and dying of Jesus, understood as the suffering and dying of the Son of God ... are works of God towards himself and therefore at the same time passions of God."[22] These inner works of God are contrasted with His external works of "Creation, new creation and resurrection" which were directed "against chaos, nothingness and death."[23] Accordingly, when it is viewed correctly, the event of the cross reveals a stasis within the Godhead. This stasis is linked to the formula "God is love". The dynamic outworking of love implies of necessity a "change" within God who is other, i.e., God turns towards man and assumes responsibility for man's sin. He "changes" from the God who is wholly other to the God who is "for man".

> God overcomes himself, God passes judgement on himself, God takes the judgement on the sin of man upon himself. He assigns to himself the fate that men should by rights endure. The cross of Jesus, understood as the cross of the Son of God, therefore reveals a change in God, a stasis within the Godhead: 'God is other.' And this event in God is the event on the cross. It takes on Christian form in the simple formula which contradicts to all possible metaphysical and historical ideas of God: 'God is love.' 24

In the light of the event of the Trinity in the cross of Christ,

the history of God's suffering for the sake of man is in reality a dialectical history involving God's suffering in history, i.e. in the suffering of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, upon the cross, and God's suffering within Himself. Thus, the truth of God's salvific suffering is distorted when the dialectic is destroyed and the message of God's suffering in history is viewed in isolation from God's suffering within Himself. "To think of 'God in history' always leads to theism and to atheism." However, when history is viewed in a "panentheistic" way, i.e., as existing in God, then, theism and atheism are transcended. "To think of 'history in God' leads ... into new creation and theopoiesis. To 'think of history in God' however, first means to understand humanity in the suffering and dying of Christ, and that means all humanity, with its dilemmas and its despairs."[25] We conclude therefore that Moltmann's trinitarian theology of the cross views history in a dialectical way: it is the dialectic of "God in history" and "history in God". As we have already shown, his theology of the cross is also political theology where the double crises of identity and relevance formed the dialectic.

c.

The "Unreligious" Cross in Christianity and the Critique of Religion as Ideology.

Any talk about God in response to the challenge of Marx's Weltanschauung must take constant cognizance of Marx's critique of religion as false consciousness. It is therefore instructive to pause at this point in our discussion to consider whether Moltmann's theology of the cross is an attempt to legitimate the status quo, or any power

grouping, be it economic, political, social or religious. Is Marx's advocacy of the proletarian cause not matched, and, indeed, surpassed by God's solidarity with all of suffering humanity? We have already noted on several occasions that the cross of Jesus refuses to be tied to any "worldly" system. No one can invoke its salvific efficacy on the basis of merit. It is always simultaneously judgement and grace, law and gospel. To say that the poor are blessed by God is not the same as saying that they have merited that blessing. The miracle of God's presence with them is a miracle of grace. By the same token, to say that those who oppress the poor and the lowly, the "marginal" people, are judged guilty by the cross of Christ is not to say that God is without mercy for them. The point here is that the cross is the place of God's sovereignty even as it is also the place of His love. It is this sovereignty that prevents the cross from being the ideological tool or weapon of any group or structure. The cross is the only true symbol of liberation. Moltmann captures this inherently "pilgrim" quality in the cross of Christ when he notes:

> A rejuvenation of Christianity when it has grown old and grey is only possible on the basis of its own origin, and becomes a dangerous and liberating reality when faith becomes aware of the incommensurability of the cross of Christ with the revelation of God, and realizing this, becomes aware too of its own strangeness and homelessnesses in its own Christian world. 26

The cross of Christ does not conform to the expectations of either the religious or the non-religious. The "foolishness of God" leads to a "revaluation" of values. This is the paradox of God's revelation in the cross of Christ. It is contrary to human expectations and contradicts human estimation of what is good, beautiful, etc.

> If faith in the crucified Christ is in contradiction to all conceptions of the righteousness, beauty and morality of man, faith in the 'crucified God' is also a contradiction of

> everything men have ever conceived, desired and sought to be assured of by the term 'God'. That 'God', the 'supreme being' and the 'supreme good', should be revealed and present in the abandonment of Jesus by God on the cross, is something that it is difficult to desire. 27

Moltmann insists that there is no logical connection between "the religious longing for fellowship with God" and the peculiar "foolish" revelation of God as the "crucified" One who is powerless and abandoned "in absolute death." Conditioned as it is by the world's uncritical acceptance of human triumphalism, religious longing for fellowship with God sees in the cross of the "crucified" One, only abandonment, shame and powerlessness but not the power of God. Consequently, the history of religion and theology in relation to the cross is replete with attempts at making the cross less the scandal it is and more a symbol of beauty and human achievement. This history of distortion and misinterpretation might be called "ideological" because of the obvious manipulation of the event of the cross to suit human desire. Moltmann reminds us, however, that, despite the ideological use of the cross of Christ, it still retains its insuperable resilience as the definitive and decisive event of God - of both judgement and grace.

> In spite of all the 'roses' which the needs of religion and theological interpretation have draped round the cross, the cross is the really irreligious thing in Christian faith. It is the suffering of God in Christ, rejected and killed in the absence of God, which qualifies Christian faith as faith, and as something different from the projection of man's desire. 28

Thus, even Marx's critique of religion as projection and as an opiate, and the challenge of Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric world-view to Christian theology, as well as the attacks of those of the school of "modern criticism of religion" on "the whole world of religious Christianity", cannot dull the poignancy of the message of the "irreligious" cross of Christian faith. Furthermore, all forms of human deification,

be they religious or secular, are crucified in the cross of Christ. Marx's Weltanschauung is not exempt from this judgement but stands at the centre of it. Speaking about the absolute inclusiveness of the power of negation (judgement) of the "irreligious" cross, Moltmann writes:

> The modern criticism of religion can attack the whole world of religious Christianity, but not this unreligious cross. There is no pattern for religious projections in the cross. For he who was crucified represents the fundamental and total crucifixion of all religion: the deification of the human heart, the sacralization of certain localities in nature and certain sacred dates and times, the worship of those who hold political power, and their power politics. 29

The cross of Christ overturns the "apple cart" of human achievement and human speculation about the meaning of existence, of history, and of the future of man and of the cosmos as a whole. Neither the "religious" power politics of the bourgeois capitalist class nor the secular, messianic revolutionary politics of the proletarian class can claim theirs is an inspiration that is totally sanctioned by the "irreligious" cross without any distortion of the message of that cross. Properly understood, the cross of the "Crucified" One does not allow of ideological manipulation; instead, it negates all ideology. It brings freedom and new life.

The question of the altruistic transformation of the proletarian consciousness was inevitably left unanswered by Marx. Yet, the future of the proletarian revolution and the possibility of man's liberation from alienation is dependent upon it. Marx, we recall, was unapologetically critical of any interpretation or re-interpretation of reality which left the mode and the relations of production unchanged or even just partly changed. According to him, the only transformation that is radical, and, hence, liberating is that which would overthrow the bourgeois-capitalist system and replace it with the so-called "communist" mode. Such a change, he argues, would be real for it would involve a real change in the socio-economic (material) base of society. In

Moltmann's theology of the cross, the need for this "materialistic" transformation is not de-emphasised nor totally rejected. On the contrary, it is called for. However, there it is premised upon the liberating and gracious praxis of God.

Praxis-theoria in Moltmann's theology differs fundamentally from what it is in Marx's philosophy; it is premised upon and made possible only in the cross of Christ. "The symbol of the cross in the church points to the God who was crucified not between two candles on an altar, but between two thieves in the place of the skull, where the outcasts belong, outside the gates of the city." Praxis-theoria, is directed towards the liberation of those who are oppressed and are without hope.

> The cross does not invite thought but a change of mind. It is a symbol which therefore leads out of the church and out of religious longing into the fellowship of the oppressed and abandoned. On the other hand, it is a symbol which calls the oppressed and godless into the church and through the church into the fellowship of the crucified God. Where this contradiction in the cross, and its revolution in religious values, is forgotten, the cross ceases to be a symbol and becomes an idol, and no longer invites a revolution of thought, but the end of thought in self-affirmation. 30

Moltmann places heavy stress upon critical thinking that results in transformation of thought and action: reflection upon the cross of the "crucified God", as the place of refuge, hope and salvation for "the oppressed and godless", leads to inner conversion and outward, visible fellowship among "the oppressed and abandoned". This is the dialectic of praxis-theoria in Moltmann's theology of the cross. Theology which does not call for true conversion even when it claims the cross of Christ as its centre and source of life is not a theology of the cross but a theology of glory - "revolution of thought" is replaced by "the end of thought in self-affirmation."

Let us turn our attention once again to the question of the paradoxical nature of the theology of the cross in which, as Moltmann points

out, a "revaluation of values" occurs. Perhaps his finest and most pungent expression in his writings on this matter is to be found in his insistence upon the reversal of the title "Jesus Christ is Lord" to "The Lord is Jesus".

> It is only through this reversal of emphasis that this image of the ruler is related to the person and history of Jesus and thus radically transformed. For early Christianity to use titles of rule and lordship in order to term Jesus the true Lord and ruler of the world - the Jesus who was mocked because of his helplessness and murdered on the cross by the world's rulers - involves about the most radical reversal of the ideal of rule that can be conceived: the Lord as servant of all; the ruler of the world as a friend of tax-collectors and sinners; the judge of the world as a poor outcast. 31

In support of his argument for the reversal of Jesus' title Moltmann points out that there is the danger that in calling Jesus "the Lord" the picture of lordship becomes divorced from "the man from Nazareth", and, instead, "is derived from the experience of and longing for power." On the other hand, the title "the Lord is Jesus" is modelled after "the crucified Son of man on Golgotha." This gives it a distinctive and new meaning. The gospels show Jesus as the servant "for freedom". Jesus, who is not only the crucified and risen Son of man, but also "Lord of the world", stoops low and "washes His disciples' feet like a house slave (John 13:1-16)." For the sake of liberation, Jesus empties Himself and chooses the way of radical obedience and "self-surrender" instead of the path to violence and oppression.[32]

In keeping with this theme of the "revaluation of values", there is also the emphasis upon the "agape" partisanship of Christ's solidarity with the poor and the oppressed. This partisanship does not negate the universal scope of the gospel of Christ. On the contrary, it is the paradoxical way of proclaiming the message of universal salvation in the crucified God in the midst of the ambiguities of existence. Though "the goal of glory is intended for all men," God has chosen to bring

this about by being partial to the "humble". "Because not all are 'people' in the same way, as far as their means, rights and freedom to live are concerned, the fellowship in which all are to see the glory of God 'together' is created, through the choosing of the humble and through judgement of the violent."[33] Thus partisanship on the part of God is inevitable and intentional. Its function is not to ultimately exclude any from, but to include all in the salvation of God. Hence, partisanship and universalism are dialectically related for they are held together by universal love.

> This form of partisanship does not destroy Christian universalism, nor does it deny God's love for all men; it is the historical form of universal love in a world in which people oppress and hate each other. Jesus turned to the sinners, tax-collectors and lepers in order to save the Pharisees and the healthy as well. Paul turned to the Gentiles in order to save Israel too. Christian partisan support for the oppressed is intentional and its goal is to save the oppressor also. 34

God's partisanship is therefore not an end in itself. His rejection of the oppressor is not the last word of the cross. Love, acceptance, and the will to save them are the ultimate motivations, not the thirst for revenge. Rejection is to have a positive, cathartic effect for those who oppress others: "Masters are rejected because of their oppression, so that they may experience the fulness of the common humanity, of which they are depriving themselves and others."[35] The oppressor is himself a victim of his own (and fellow oppressors') oppression! But the suffering love of God is open to all, including the rich and powerful. Furthermore, this love is not available for use as a legitimation of any acts of revenge by the oppressed. Such an interpretation is a distortion which is, in turn, judged by this sacrificing love.

However, to talk about the universal salvation of the "crucified" God runs the risk of being abstract and speculative unless this partisanship is practiced by the Church. Moltmann recognizes the need for a word

of caution here lest the very attempt at avoiding mere abstraction and speculation ends by being simply a reversal of places between the oppressors and the oppressed. When that happens the Church is no longer the broken community serving the world in love for the sake of and in the name of Christ - the Lord who is Jesus. Rather, grace is replaced by a new form of Law. Moltmann therefore soberly reminds us concerning Jesus' teachings:

> But he did not call upon the poor to revenge themselves upon their exploiters nor the oppressed to oppress their oppressors. Theologically, this would have been no more than the anticipation of the last judgement according to the law, but not the new righteousness of God which Jesus revealed in the law of grace. Instead, its consequences is: 'Love your enemies and pray for those that persecute you.' 36

Hence the liberation of Christ, which is offered to all people everywhere, may be described as the revolutionary <u>praxis</u> of <u>agape</u>. It is the "'human revolt' of Jesus."[37]

d.

Definition of Man.

We continue our discussion of Moltmann's theology of the cross with a brief consideration of the nature of man's being. Recalling Marx's theses that man makes himself, and that history is the process of man's creation of himself, we note the influence of Marx's world-view in Moltmann's emphasis upon man's realisation of himself "in mission". Moltmann argues that man is defined in relation to the divine mission and call of God. This mission reveals the gap between man and the fulfilment of his mission which he is incapable of fulfilling.

> The dominant question of all anthropology - who or what is man? Who am I? - does not arise in the biblical narratives

> from comparing man with the animals or with the things of the world. Nor does it arise simply Coram Deo, as Augustine and the Reformers affirmed. Rather, it arises in face of a divine mission, charge and appointment which transcend the bounds of the humanly possible. 38

Moltmann finds Biblical support for his argument. For instance, he notes that:

> ... Moses (Ex. 3-11) asks in the face of his call to lead the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt: 'Who am I, that I should go unto Pharaoh, and that I should bring forth the children of Israel out of Egypt?' Thus, too Isaiah (Isa. 5-5) in face of his call recognizes himself to be personally guilt-laden in the midst of a guilt-laden people: 'Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips.' Thus Jeremiah in face of his call recognizes what he is and what he was: 'Ah, Lord God: behold, I cannot speak: for I am a child' (Jer. 1-6) 39

He therefore concludes that in the face of his discovery of the obvious gap between the "divine mission" and man's "own being", man learns "what he is", "what he is to be", and, above all, that by and "of himself" he cannot be.[40]

Man is not defined by past and present but by the future. His nature is not fully revealed but still hidden with Christ in God. He is homo absconditus.

> The very call to the possibilities of the future which are as yet obscure, makes it clear that man is hidden from himself, a homo absconditus, and will be revealed to himself in those prospects which are opened up to him by the horizons of mission. The mission and call do not reveal man simply to himself with the result that he can then understand himself again for what he really is. They reveal and open up to him new possibilities, with the result that he can become what he is not yet and never yet was. 41

In the scriptures, the call of those who are given special tasks includes a "new name and a new nature and a new future." The hidden nature of man is not fixed and static, it is dynamic, and it will unfold itself in the future to which God has called man. What man discovers about himself through his participation in this future will be new and different from what man thought he was before he became aware of God's call.

Now, in speaking about the future of man, Moltmann does not wish to deny the significance of the past and the present for man's identity. Indeed, his concept of man embraces the past and the present, but seen from the perspective of the future. In this way, he points beyond the possibilities of man's creative activity to the creative and gracious call of the "crucified" God who alone can lead man out from his enslavement and sin to freedom and a new and complete humanity. In the context of God's gracious call, man's total passivity is simultaneously a call to a totally human and liberating praxis of radical obedience. The "crucified" God not only calls forth the believer, but He also dwells within and stands alongside of him. The believer and his world are totally embraced by God. Consequently,

> In his call man is given the prospect of a new ability to be. What he is and what he can do, is a thing that he will learn in hopeful trust in God's being with man. Man learns his human nature not from himself but from the future to which the mission leads him. 42

What man is will be revealed in the history of the call of God which man experiences within the wider and totally inclusive embrace of the twofold history of the Trinity. This unfolding of man's nature in history is therefore totally the result of grace - the praxis of love. However, man is also engaged in the unfolding of this mystery, i.e., as a creature of response.

In spite of Moltmann's attempt at maintaining the dialectic of the freedom of God (grace) and the secondary and creaturely freedom-in-bondage of man, the problem still remains of whether man has not been circumscribed within political history which is partially calculable and manipulable. In answer to the question of transcendence which raises itself here, Moltmann points out that real eschatological history is both "God in history" and "history in God". He therefore departs from

Marx, Bloch and other Marxists who limit history to human projection and achievement, by remaining within the domain of orthodox Christian theology. Hence man's future is firmly planted in the "history" of the Trinity in the "crucified" God. There is therefore an indispensable tension between immanence and transcendence, history and eschatology.

Man is not oppressed by a definition of his nature exclusively in terms of the socio-economic and political forces in history. His future transcends those forces for it is inextricably tied to the mission he receives from the "crucified" God. At the same time, man's nature is not conceived in docetic terms, i.e., as being totally separated from those historical forces.

In the context of the cross, God understands human suffering to the extent that he suffers within Himself for the sake of man. The "praxis of pathos" in the event of the cross takes with utmost seriousness the pervasiveness of human sin, meaninglessness and death, and offers forgiveness, reconciliation, hope, and life, both within and beyond history. Even now, the believer, in the midst of suffering, can celebrate in the "Spirit of sacrifice", who is the ἀρραβών (2 Cor. 1:21; 5:5), that salvation has come and will come through the suffering, death and resurrection of Christ - the Lord who is Jesus.

e.

A Critique of Moltmann's Radical Concept of God.

There is no doubt that speaking about God in terms of the theology of the cross presents a radical concept of God. We have repeatedly referred to the pathos in Marx's description of the suffering of alienated

man in capitalist society. It was pointed out that in spite of its one-dimensional character, Marx's concept of man must not be by-passed by Christian theology but must be seriously faced in its entirety. By engaging in such a dialogue, Christian theology places itself in the situation in which it must articulate the radical concept of God which Christian faith confesses is to be found only in the cross of Christ. In this dialogical situation, Christian theology is challenged by the question of relevance, relevance of its talk about God in relation to human suffering. This includes socio-economic and political oppression, but is certainly not limited to those "historical" forms of suffering. For Christian faith, the question of sin, evil and death are most crucial.

In Moltmann's view, the challenge of relevance of the Christian faith in the situation of suffering is found in the concept of the "crucified" God. The "crucified" God comprehends human suffering and takes it into Himself because His nature is love, and this makes Him "open" to the pain of suffering. When the tragedy of the human condition is seen in the context of the suffering within the Godhead, then, as was already noted, the crises of identity and relevance find their solution there as well. What can be more relevant about the Christian faith than that God incarnate suffers in solidarity with suffering humanity? What can be more definitive of the Christian faith than that suffering finds its true definition in the cross of Christ? As Moltmann says:

> In the passion of the Son, the Father himself suffers the pains of abandonment. In the death of the Son, death comes upon God himself, and the Father suffers the death of his Son in his love for forsaken man. Consequently, what happened on the cross must be understood as an event between God and the Son of God. In the action of the Father in delivering up his Son to suffering and to a godless death, God is acting in himself. He is acting in himself in this manner of suffering and dying in order to open up in himself life and freedom for sinners. 43

But Moltmann's radical concept of God is not without difficulties which cannot be overlooked in our attempt to formulate an evangelical theology of the cross. Has Moltmann fully dispensed with "philosophical axioms" about God? Has he dispensed with the mystery of God as Wholly Other? Is there no necessary place for talk about man's nature coram Deo? We will offer some tentative criticisms of Moltmann's theology in the light of these questions.

In the face of the meaninglessness and hopelessness that characterize human existence today, Moltmann's emphasis upon the suffering of God for the sake of man is of significant pastoral import. It is comforting to hear that God who is love fully identifies with us in our suffering, sin and death. Jesus, the Son, suffers Godforsakenness and death, while the Father does not suffer death but the pain of His love in His Son's Godforsakenness and death. The Spirit of sacrifice - Moltmann is not clear on this - "suffers" the pain of such a sacrifice. Suffering is in the Trinity itself; hence the concept of the "crucified" God in the cross of Christ.

But God not only identifies with suffering humanity, He suffers the death of the Son for the sake of healing broken humanity. Absolute Love cannot do, nor be otherwise; it must suffer the extremities of pain which is intrinsic to such love. God as Absolute love is therefore not equated with Hegel's Geist. Moreover, love must suffer pain because of the existence of "non-love". Moltmann is very careful to place the latter, suffering for the sake of alienated humanity, in the context of the former, suffering of love in itself. Salvation is sola gratia. What we have here is a dynamic God. All three Persons of the Trinity are actively engaged in the cross of Christ for the sake of love and the liberation of humanity.

The problem is, however, how do we know this? Where is the Totally Other God, the One who remains fully hidden from human scrutiny? Admittedly, God as Totally Other "remains" in terms of the peculiar twofold nature of His love: love of God in Himself and love of God for humanity. Still, Moltmann's dynamic of the "crucified" God is unavoidably partly speculative. Though Moltmann does not capitulate to Hegel's concept of Geist, his concept of the dynamic God in the cross of Christ is nevertheless influenced by the concept of the all-embracing nature of Absolute Spirit. But Moltmann's "crucified" God feels pain - did not Yahweh feel wrath and love and joy, etc.? In the cross the suffering love of God becomes universal love. This is achieved because a stasis occurs within God Himself; the Wholly Other becomes wholly pro-man. The Trinity is no longer enshrouded in total mystery.

It is true that the event of the cross embraces the whole of creation, but in the face of human suffering, sin and death the believer can only say that God in Christ understands and suffers because Christ suffered death on the cross. God who loved the world and allowed His Son to die for humanity and all creation knows the pain of loving. That is comforting to the believer. But the event of the cross does not reveal even to the eyes of faith that the "Wholly Otherness" of the Triune God has been totally transformed into being totally pro-man. The dynamic of the Trinity in the event of the cross does not exhaust the mystery of God who, as Totally Other, remains hidden and eludes definition even in such a concept of the Trinity. This "hidden" God remains in the background; He is not our concern. Our concern is with the gracious and loving God whom we meet in the man on the cross. Through the Spirit, humanity is called to reconciliation to and fellowship with the Triune God.

By speaking of the God who is transcendent future and who calls man to mission, Moltmann partially minimizes the criticism that he distorts the concept of God as Totally Other. As Absolute Future, God remains a mystery which man cannot unravel. However, this mystery is weakened because this God is all that God is. But God is more than the God of loving praxis; He is also necessarily the One who is not always active, calling man to a liberating future. In spite of this criticism, however, it is ultimately crucial for man that the God who reveals Himself to man is totally pro-man.

When Moltmann describes the passion of Christ as the passion of the Trinity - the "crucified" God - he is not formulating "a new idea of God". Instead, he is pointing to the fact that talk about God today is being done in "a new God-situation", i.e., in the realm of politics. This process replaces the old theodicy question about evil in the cosmos. But in making this transference, Moltmann unwittingly places evil in God Himself. The "crucified" God, who is unlike Hegel's God who cannot suffer pain, is in fact like Hegel's God for He embraces everything. Thus history and its ambiguities and dilemmas, and sin and evil are now placed within God. This implication is contrary to Biblical and Confessional theology where evil is not in God. This problem needs further exploration which is beyond the scope of our study. In appraising Moltmann's radical concept of God and its universal scope of the passion in the cross, evangelical theology of the cross sums up the present dilemma thus: how do we proclaim the word of hope that the love of God "embraces" all suffering and distortion, including sin and evil, and transforms it by bringing healing and wholeness through the passion of the cross of Christ, without, at the same time, placing not only the potentiality of evil but the actuality of evil in God? Can we resolve

this dilemma within the context of the church's historical confession of the two natures in Christ?

Moltmann suggests that we can do so only partially, as is evident from his peculiar trinitarian theology of the cross by which he attempts to go beyond the traditional explication of the suffering love of God in the cross of Christ. God who loves unreservedly and unconditionally is "the other". Man cannot and is not such a God but needs such a God. This love suffers infinite pain for "God dies to God". In the event of the cross of Christ, the Son of God experiences Godforsakenness and death. At the same time, God the Father experiences the Godforsakenness of his Son. Moltmann argues that in the latter emphasis, the implication concerning God's love must be embraced in a radical concept of God.

This implication is speculative and, as we have already seen, must be viewed in tension with the concept of God who is totally pro-man, and at the same time is Totally Other, not only in the sense of suffering and embracing love, but also as the Totally Other whose feelings we cannot know, directly or indirectly. Theology of the cross does not exhaust the mystery of the Deus Absconditus. Therefore, in our attempt to appropriate Moltmann's explication of the cross, we maintain the historical doctrine of the suffering love of God in Christ, for, as we have seen, in both Luther and Moltmann, man learns about the gracious and loving God precisely through the cross of the Lord who is Jesus. The believer looks to the cross and sees the suffering and death of the Son, the God-Man, who loves both the Father and the world. By implication, the Father who loves both His Son and His world, suffers as well. God is love. Theology of the cross is a practical-critical activity which is done within the context of Christian faith.

Despite Moltmann's refusal to accept the Marxian one-dimensional

definition of man, his own concept of man's nature is significantly influenced by the Marxian concept of historical transcendence. We recall that Moltmann defines man's nature in terms of the missionary hope to which God calls him. Such a definition is inadequate for it fails to account for the evil in man (and in the world) - unless it places it in God! Man is not totally perfectable in history. Sin cannot be adequately described in Marx's concept of alienation. It is more pervasive than that. The gap between sin and grace cannot be bridged by man, not even by man participating in missionary hope. Man does not have to run after God who is out there in the future to know who he is. God is already here and coram Deo man knows himself. He is fundamentally separated from God. Despite the static nature of the concept of "original sin", it cannot be dispensed with in our definition of man. To do so would not ultimately liberate man but further enslave him. Therefore in defining man's nature, we would speak of man as being basically estranged from and in rebellion against God, who calls man to a future which is shrouded in mystery - it is hidden in Christ.

Such a definition of man obviously has implications for the way we talk about the event of the cross. The praxis of love is not the transformation of Hegel's Geist into a being of pathos who dynamically continues to embrace the whole of creation without end. Rather, the praxis of love is primarily the love of the Triune God who experiences the pain of the death of the Son for the salvation and reconciliation of sinful humanity and of all creation. Through the Holy Spirit - the Spirit of sacrifice and fellowship - all are invited to see the gracious God in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This invitation is also a call to fellowship with Him and all of His creation which He has redeemed. The "crucified" God alone is the revealed God

who is pro-man.

B.

Liberation Theology: A Theology of Human Brotherhood.

The following discussion is based upon two of the pivotal works in Latin American Liberation Theology: Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, and Jon Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads. Gutierrez's initial exploration into theology as a critical reflection on human praxis in the light of the dawning of the Kingdom of God is taken a step further by Sobrino's formulation of a critical Christology in which the Kingdom of God and not just fellowship with God is seen as Jesus' ultimate focus. The two "theologies" are therefore not opposed to each other but are functionally complementary.

Unlike the "theologies" of Luther and Moltmann, Liberation Theology comes out of a situation of widespread socio-economic poverty and political oppression. Consequently, Liberation Theology is more pervasively bound up with the problem of socio-economic and political liberation. Its themes of "universal brotherhood", "justice for the poor", "solidarity among the oppressed", "destruction of all that injures or totally prevents the emergence of the Kingdom of God which Jesus claimed has come" - themes which are all related to the primary motif of "liberation as salvation" - significantly reflect the profound influence of Marx's world-view upon Liberation Theology.[45] There is an obvious attempt to articulate a radical concept of God who is God of the Exodus, of justice and freedom, of the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Here we are confronted with a God who sides with the oppressed against the

oppressor, in the concrete, historical conditions of life, for the sake of both the oppressed and the oppressor.

Liberation Theology sees the task of theology as a process of critical reflection which is done in the context of the socio-economic and cultural issues that actually exist in society. Critical reflection is done by the Christian community which attempts to make its talk about God relevant to the needs of the oppressed. But the content of critical reflection is not just the material conditions of life; it includes that which is peculiarly Christian and theological as well. There is therefore an ongoing dialogue between theology and sociology. The Christian community is always listening to both the scriptures and the human condition. Presuppositions are altered, corrected or totally rejected in the light of _praxis_ which is also informed and corrected by the scriptures and the symbols of the Church. This is the hermeneutic circle. By maintaining the hermeneutic circle, the Church moves away from being a supporter of the oppressive _status quo_ to being a community for liberation and justice in society.

According to Gutíerrez both Church and society are criticized to the extent that "they are called and addressed by the Word of God". This Word serves as a critique of any critical theory which emerges out of theological reflection. The authenticity of any theology is determined by its positive evaluation in the light of the Word and its call for genuine liberating historical _praxis_.[46] Writing in the same vein, Sobrino distinguishes between inauthentic and authentic theology in terms of "an inherited faith that is rather abstract", on the one hand, and "a concrete faith that is truly liberative", on the other hand.[47] Let us now look more closely at some of the main emphases in Gutíerrez, and then in Sobrino.

a.

Gustavo Gutíerrez - Theology of the Neighbour.

In keeping with his emphasis on "theology as critical reflection on historical praxis", Gutíerrez insists that theology is not concerned simply with the liberation of the privileged minority in the Church, but with the universal liberation of the whole of humanity. Indeed, it is because of its basic concern with "the liberating transformation of the history of mankind" that it is consequently concerned with "that part of mankind - gathered into ecclesia - which openly confesses Christ."[48]

This claim is based on the conviction that as a result of the Incarnation of God in Jesus, the erroneous distinction between the religious and the secular realms has now become dissolved. "Since God has become man, humanity, every man, history, is the living temple of God. The 'pro-fane,' that which is located outside the temple no longer exists."[49] The God of the Exodus and of the cross of Christ reveals Himself to all men; He is available to all men everywhere. Every person has a new dignity because of Christ. Socio-economic and political, and other distinctions, which have been hitherto used to divide and separate humanity into superior and inferior classes, are no longer operative as far as God is concerned. Divisions and separations which exist are therefore to be historically abolished. The mandate to do so comes from God Himself.

But God not only calls man to engage in liberating praxis, He leads the way by generating that living faith and hope that are born out of involvement in praxis and continually nourished by Him precisely where such liberating activity occurs.

> Where oppression and the liberation of man seem to make God irrelevant - a God filtered by our longtime indifference to

> these problems - there must blossom faith and hope in him who comes to root out injustice and to offer, in an unforseen way, total liberation. This is a spirituality which dares to sink roots in the soil of oppression - liberation. 50

Liberating love and faith are "the gift of the Kingdom of God."[51]

Gutíerrez reminds us that love of humanity, of the neighbour, does not violate the sovereignty of God for it is precisely in the concrete love for man that God becomes God. Hence man should be loved for his own sake and not merely for the sake of God. Only in this way can love for man not distort the dignity of man but promote and strengthen it. Man is not a means to an end; he is a person created in the image of God. He must not therefore be made into "an instrument for becoming closer to God." Only when man is loved for his own sake can there be a genuine encounter with God. Love of man and love of God form a dialectic of love fully embracing the dignity of man and the sovereignty of the liberating grace of God. "That my action towards another is at the same time an action towards God does not detract from its truth and concreteness, but rather gives it even greater meaning and import."[52]

Gutíerrez is acutely aware of the fact that theology is a human exercise which is equally concerned about God and man. He insists therefore that if talk about God distorts the dignity of man, then it is irrelevant and illegitimate. It is not grounded in the liberating Word. Such ideological discourse about God must be replaced by a "new way" of making God relevant and necessary to the needs of the majority of exploited humanity. Gutíerrez pushes his point so far that it reads thus: the existence of God as love in history is <u>dependent</u> upon the concrete <u>praxis</u> of love for the liberation of man.

Gutíerrez points out that love of man for his own sake qualifies as love of God, not only because man "has been made in the image and likeness of God," but, more especially, because man is "<u>the sacrament</u>

of God." Man cannot come to an authentic knowledge of God by mere theoretical reflection which is removed from the concrete socio-economic and political struggles in society. If man wishes to encounter God he must draw near to those whose wretched existence is an offence to God. Both the self-satisfied religious person and the earnest seeker of God are reminded that "to oppress the poor is to offend God himself; to know God is to work justice among men." Man knows that he is in the presence of God when he joins the struggle for the liberation of his neighbour.[53]

When Christian celebration of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is divorced from a radical commitment to liberation, then there is no genuine celebration, but only "an empty action." According to Gutíerrez the loving fellowship between the Triune God and man is the basis for the brotherhood of the poor and the oppressed. God initiates and nourishes that twofold bond of unity - between man and God, and among men. In the Eucharist the bond is "effectively recalled and proclaimed" provided that there is "a real commitment against exploitation and alienation". Only on this basis can those who participate in the Eucharist gain God's acceptance of their celebration.[54] Worship and "living" are two aspects of one fundamental activity - living and even dying for the sake of others. There is no other way of effectively remembering and celebrating the fellowship between God and man.

> 'To make a remembrance' of Christ is more than the performance of an act of worship; it is to accept living under the sign of the cross and in the hope of the resurrection. It is to accept the meaning of a life that was given over to death - at the hands of the power of this world - for the love of others. 55

The cross of Christ means cross and suffering for the Christian community.

But the cross of the Christian community is not just any cross; it is a specific cross, i.e., a cross of solidarity among the oppressed.

Knowing that one encounters God in the neighbour, the Christian must therefore make his neighbour's suffering his own, and join in the struggle for liberation. Such an unequivocal call seems to leave little or no room at all for the gracious presence of God among those who fail to maintain the unity between worship and liberating praxis. Sola gratia has become impaired. There is less grace for those who are not involved in the specific praxis for liberation, than for those who are. To follow Christ is to walk the way of the cross. But it is the way of grace without merit or praxis. This sanguine reminder needs to be more clearly sounded in Gutíerrez's theology.

Furthermore, it needs to be clearly stated in any theology of Liberation that sin is still more inclusive than alienation as a description of the human condition. By the same token, salvation includes historical liberation but points beyond it to the more inclusive reconciliation and fellowship with God in His Kingdom beyond this world. When this is forgotten or its significance reduced the theology of the cross is turned into a theology of glory - resurrection glory transforms the cross into an ideology of liberation.

Gutíerrez's reflections on a "theology of the neighbour" and the shortcomings in his theology must be understood in the light of Jesus' discourse on the last judgement in Matthew 25:31-46. We shall therefore turn attention now to a summary of his interpretation of that text as it pertains to his theology.

Matthew 25:31-46 - Discourse on "Christ in the Neighbour."

According to Gutíerrez, to many people this vision or discourse of the last judgement with which Matthew concludes his eschatological discourse appears to summarise the very "essence of the Gospel message."[56]

In the light of the preoccupation of Liberation Theology with the solidarity of God with the oppressed, it is not at all surprising that Gutíerrez, among others, expressly enunciates a "theology of universal brotherhood" premised primarily upon Matthew's discourse here and upon a reading of various scriptural texts which speak above love of neighbour.

Reviewing Jean-Claude Ingelaere's elaborate study of the text, Gutíerrez points out that the two basic questions which Ingelaere finds in the text are: "Who are the nations judged by the Son of God and who are 'the least of the brethren' of the Son of Man?" In Ingelaere's answer to those two questions, Gutíerrez notes that there are three possible interpretations: universal judgement of all people, both Christian and non-Christian, on the basis of their love for the neighbour, and especially of those in need; judgement of Christians in relation to "their behaviour towards the disadvantaged members of the Christian community itself"; and, finally, it is a "judgement of pagans based on their attitude towards Christians." The third interpretation, which is expoused by Ingleaere, is rejected by Gutíerrez because of the restrictive and selective judgement it describes. Since Gutíerrez himself agrees with the majority of the exegetes who support the first interpretation, it is not surprising that he argues that "the two restrictions in this third exegesis... go against the obvious sense of the text and the context, which stress the universality of the judgement and the central and universal character of charity." He is in agreement with the conclusion that "all nations" (v.32) clearly points to the universal sense in which no distinctions are made between Jews and Christians, and pagans. In short, all men, pagans, Jews and Christians are included in the term "all nations".[57]

This conclusion provides a solid Biblical basis for Gutíerrez's

argument that God is encountered in and among men, i.e., that man is the sacrament of God. Furthermore, on the question of the meaning of "the least of my brethren" (v. 40), he declares his support of the view held by most scholars that here we have another expression of the universal scope of the brotherhood of man. All the needy, both Christian and non-Christian, are included in the designation "the least of my brethren." In keeping with his agreement with the "universalist" school of interpretation, Gutierrez emphasises three points pertaining to the text: "the stress on communion and brotherhood as the ultimate meaning of human life; the insistence on a love which is manifested in concrete actions, with 'doing' being favoured over simply 'knowing'; and the revelation of the human mediation necessary to reach the Lord."[58]

At this point it would seem appropriate to ask: How do we encounter the Lord? recognizing that such a dynamic encounter answers the questions: Where do we find God? How do we get to know Him? It is reasonable to conclude that, in the light of Gutíerrez's three emphases, his response to these questions is to be found in a reiteration of the central argument in this discussion of Liberation Theology: God is encountered in history in our encounter with fellow human-beings, especially the culturally, economically and politically exploited and oppressed. Gutíerrez concludes that, in Matthew 25:31-46, what Christ reveals to us through His identification with the poor is that the locus of God's salvation in the world is found among the poor. Consequently, "our attitude towards them, or rather our commitment to them, will indicate whether or not we are directing our existence in conformity with the will of the Father."[59]

b.

Jon Sobrino - Christology of Radical Discipleship.

In his attempt to talk about God in a meaningful and relevant way in the context of Latin America, so that the movement from an inherited faith to a liberating faith may occur, Sobrino formulates a radical "relational" Christology which is trinitarian in outlook. This is the only way of doing Christology in the face of the "material" challenges in Latin America today.

> Christology is possible only if the Father continues to be the ultimate horizon of reality, the Son continues to be the definitive example of how human beings can correspond to the Father, and life according to the Spirit of Jesus continues to be the authentic Christian way of acting that makes us sons and daughters in and through the Son. 60

One cannot know God except through Jesus. But to know Jesus one must follow Him in radical discipleship. Thus the Son, the Spirit and the Father are seen to be related to each other through the praxis of love, and both God and man are related to each other through the praxis of the Father in the Son through the witness of the Spirit of Jesus.

Understanding and participating in the relational dynamic within the Trinity involves liberating praxis in the world. Apart from such a participation man cannot "understand and appreciate the Jesus who sends the Spirit".[61] Genuine knowledge of God does not arise out of theoretical and abstract reflection upon the "numinous" mystery of God's being; nor does it arise simply from some other reflection on praxis tied to the status quo. Rather, authentic knowledge of God results from man's engagement in the praxis that is prompted by the Spirit of Jesus. Knowledge comes from action which is not simply mental activity - God is not a metaphysical being whom man knows before and apart from his encounter with the neighbour.

The definitive criterion of all praxis is the history of Jesus Himself. Jesus' love of the Father is not a theoretical or a sentimental love; nor is it a love that is mechanically exercised. On the contrary, it is a love of the Son who struggles against oppression and sin on behalf of the oppressed and suffering. This synthesis between love of God and love of neighbour was historically fashioned throughout Jesus' earthly ministry.[62] The confident love which Jesus displayed in his address to God as "Abba" "reaches its culminating point in the agony in the garden. Poles apart from some ideological optimism, it becomes a confidence that has been thoroughly tried and tested."

Jesus' confident love is well founded for it is in God who is "greater" than human beings. For Jesus to have such a God "means responding to the demands laid down by love. It is in and through the historical unfolding of those demands that the reality of God as someone 'greater' is made concrete horizontally in history." The ultimate test of the truth of love is incarnation and praxis. Jesus responds to the demands of love placed upon Him by God by a life of radical obedience even to the point of death on the cross. The cross is the culmination of love that is fashioned in the encounter with the material world. Such is the nature of His love which cannot violate the sovereignty of God - the ultimate horizon.

> Neither conflict, nor failure, nor rejection, nor death itself can set limits on God's demand. This is the way in which the greatness of God is brought out in history and respected to the very end. At no point in his history can Jesus get a 'fix' on God once and for all. 63

It is precisely through Jesus' historical and existential commitment and obedience to and love of God that the sovereignty of God is historically displayed. This is the very revelation of God Himself.

In the cross of Jesus we therefore see the triumph of Absolute

Love (God). Love that is grounded in God and historically fashioned in the real material conditions of life will not remain negated in suffering and death. It will ultimately triumph because Absolute Love remains its source and horizon. This is the confidence of the love of God in the cross of Christ. But in looking for God, one is not called to reflect upon Absolute Love, but upon the historically fashioned love. "In the Christian view his (God's) locus is not only the resurrection but also the cross of Jesus." Today, the cross of Jesus (God) "is to be found in the crosses of the oppressed rather than in beauty, power, or wisdom."[64] This is the *praxis* of the love of Jesus in the Spirit.

It is in the context of Jesus' *praxis* of love that the Christian learns about God and comes to know Him through his imitating *praxis* of love. The Christian must recognize that he cannot love God directly - that is impossible - but only indirectly through the mediation of a historical love. This mediating love is an unconditional and unreserved love of the neighbour. Sobrino writes:

> When Christians talk about love of God, then, they are talking *materially* about real, historical love for human beings. It is the *formal* nature of this love of neighbour that determines whether it can also be called love of God. If that love is displayed unreservedly and unconditionally, if it is done in the conviction that those who love to the utmost have lived life in all its fullness no matter what happens, then the historical experience of love for neighbor is formally meaningful as love for God. 65

This love for neighbour, like the *love of Jesus* which it emulates, is not *a priori* or mechanically received from the Spirit. Instead, it is born and nourished in the midst of liberating engagement for the transformation of the world. The love of neighbour creates a brotherhood which reveals both the genuineness of the Christian's love of God and neighbour as well as the very existence of God Himself.

> Brotherhood is not just an ethical consequence deriving from a God already constituted and known; it is *the* very way in

> which God really is the Father, and in that sense, God. In Jesus' eyes, a God who does not create brotherhood simply is not God at all. 66 (Emphasis mine)

The "existence" of many "false" gods is a real possibility, and, in fact, it does occur. Sinful man is not easily persuaded to participate in liberating praxis for the sake of the neighbour, and thereby to come to know God. Idolatry was present in Jesus' time, no less than today. Sobrino soberly points out that Jesus presents us with a radical concept of God: "a God who stands in complete contradiction to the existing religious situation. His God is distinct from, and greater than, the God of the Pharisees."[67] Jesus' God loves, unconditionally and unreservedly, all people, especially and including the poor, those who are without hope, and who are therefore in need of a miracle from God to transform their situation.[68] From the standpoint of Jesus' life, the privileged place of access to God - which Jesus widened - is not the temple but people themselves. "More specifically, it is the person who is poor, who has been forced into impoverishment." This salvific partisanship is precisely the way in which we come to know God. To speak of "access" to God is to speak of knowing Him in the way He chooses to make Himself known to us, which is by making contact with the very people whom the religious mentality of the Jews saw as completely estranged from God: the alien, the heretic, the ritually impure person, the sinner, the distinherited, the poor, the orphan, the widow, and the enemy.[69]

The poor are not man's way to God but the medium - chosen by God - through which man comes to know Him. The salvatory "contact" with the poor is a consequence of God's sovereign grace. Thus "making contact" with the poor does not mean the poor are "simply the 'passive material' on which one works to attain access to God through virtuous dealings

with them." One cannot experience the liberating power of God through the poor without an unconditional and unreserved love for them. Nothing short of an actual struggle to transform the material conditions of the poor to bring to them true dignity as persons, as Jesus intends, can qualify as solidarity with the oppressed and as "making contact" with the poor. He who would know God through such solidarity must imitate the way of Jesus.

Sobrino's onesided emphasis upon knowing God through loving the neighbour does not do justice to the New Testament teaching on *sola gratia*. Admittedly, he wants to correct the ethical "quietism" of so many Christians who remain unmoved by human suffering perhaps because they feel confident in their knowledge of God which does not demand radical action in society. But Paul's writings represent a significant part of the New Testament which are necessary for a more inclusive Christology. Just as we need those writings which speak of the imperatives of the Gospel which remind us that the indicative of the Gospel is not "cheap grace" so we also need Paul's writings, in particular, with their emphasis upon the wholly gratuitous nature of God's love which *invites* man to life in the Spirit.

Sobrino is correct in his emphasis upon the ultimately triumphant power of Absolute Love, but he neglects to emphasize that the grace of God allows for failure and blindness, and continues to accept the unacceptable, the proud, the mighty, the self-sufficient, and not just the poor, humble and the oppressed. Care should be taken that in emphasizing the inclusive nature of Jesus' love, in terms of the poor and the outcast, the marginal people, we do not fall prey to an exclusiveness that limits the saving presence of God to the marginal people. The tendency towards such an exclusiveness arises in spite of Liberation

Theology's claim that all men are the sacrament of God. There is therefore the need for a more inclusive concept of the poor that transcends the socio-economic and political factors which delineate the poor. At the same time, such a concept must be radical in its attempt to do justice to that large majority of humanity that actually experience material poverty and oppression.

In Sobrino's presentation of the material and dynamic development of Jesus' messianic consciousness which is characterized by "confident love" we are given a stimulating theological explication of the Marxian concept of praxis-theoria. Like Marx's proletariat Jesus' comes to an awareness of His messianic mission through His participation in the real material conditions of life. His consciousness of His mission is not given mechanically, it does not simply unfold itself as if it were pre-programmed: that is not what "incarnation" means. Rather, Jesus' mission and His consciousness arises through practical-critical activity. But we should not push the Marxian parallel too far, for Sobrino explicitly states that Jesus' ultimate horizon is the Father and the Kingdom, and this includes humanity. This is in direct contrast to the proletariat's horizon of man and history.

When we turn to the development of the Christian's life under the cross in the material conditions of life, we find that both Sobrino and Gutierrez use Jesus' "experience" as the paradigm for imitation. It is not that the Christian repeats the life of Jesus; instead, he follows Christ in radical discipleship by seeking out the poor and creating human brotherhood. Solidarity and brotherhood are found precisely in those very situations that deny them and make talk about God seem irrelevant. So far Liberation Theology is a theology of the cross. But Liberation Theology abbreviates the Word of the cross, the scandal and

foolishness of the announcement that in spite of the failure to create brotherhood, to love unconditionally and unreservedly, God accepts us. Theology of the cross is both life under the cross and Word of the cross. The two are indispensable. Indigenization of theology must not silence or eclipse the universality of the cross and the preaching of the Word. Despite Sobrino's and Gutíerrez's emphasis upon both *praxis* and *theoria*, the paradoxical Word of the cross has been circumscribed within the sphere of radical discipleship.

Furthermore, the abundant life to which God calls us through Christ cannot be equated with living life, in the midst of ambiguities, suffering, sin and death, with unconditional and unreserved love for the neighbour. This is only a foretaste which is received in paradox. There is also the hope of the "resurrection and eternal life" which God offers to all unconditionally. Realized eschatology, in terms of such confident love for man, and, consequently, for God, can awaken, correct and transform the longing for the Kingdom of God and fellowship with God beyond this temporal life. By the same token, it can make such confident love an end in itself and thereby abbreviate hope.

This discussion of Sobrino's Christology of radical discipleship leads us to a more elaborate critique of Liberation Theology as a whole. Some of the foregoing criticisms of Sobrino's and Gutíerrez's "theologies" will be repeated in the hope that a clearer picture of the theology of the cross, which is being formulated in this work in response to Marx's world-view, will emerge.

c.

Critique of the concept of God in Liberation Theology.

It should be clear by now that in the "Theology of universal human brotherhood" considerable emphasis is placed upon the immanence of God vis-a-vis His transcendence. Though Sobrino, in particular, speaks about the Father as the ultimate mystery and horizon beyond Jesus the Son, i.e., the God who as the "other" is "greater", there is no question that Liberation theologians are primarily concerned with a God who is present in history among humankind actively engaged (and engaging them as well) in real human liberation in history. The paradigm of God in the Bible shows us One who participates in Exodus and in Cross and Resurrection - always within history, not above, outside or beyond it. Of course, this does not mean that God is wholly immanent; such a conclusion is a distortion of Liberation Theology. Rather, it means that transcendence is subordinated to immanence for the sake of man. The liberating God acts on behalf of man and is thereby simultaneously revealed. To know who He is and where He is acting, we need to look for "signs" of the Kingdom. Where a situation of oppression and dehumanization exists, there you will find God. The fragmentary indications of various and incomplete forms of solidarity among the alienated and exploited masses are expressions of the presence of the Kingdom. God as divine love exists wherever we find there is solidarity among the poor. But this is a peculiar solidarity: solidarity that leads to and is not divorced from genuine liberating praxis. God is given a "face" whenever and wherever there is a concrete expression of love for the neighbour. It is the "praxis of love" and not merely the ethics of love which says that God is, and that He is love and justice and freedom.

The problem with this kind of discourse about God is that the primary emphasis is placed upon the critical reflection and analysis of the human condition in the quest to know where God is, i.e. where He is acting. Revelation becomes reduced to the findings of "critical reflection", and authentic Christian faith is viewed as a consequence of correct practice (praxis). Thus Paul's encouragement to the Corinthian Church: "For we walk by faith and not by sight," is reversed - sight and not faith determines the Christian "walk".[70]

On the critical question of how do we therefore talk about God, it is to be noted that in Liberation Theology the motif of the Deus Absconditus is downplayed. If God is not up and around effecting noticeable historical transformations in the oppressive and inhuman structures in society, then He does not exist, or, if He does, He is merely the ideological idol of the oppressive class in society. The true God is the One who is characterised less by mystery and more by His increasing unambiguous presence among the poor and needy to whom He is thereby revealed. Such a conception, however, does not take seriously the inherent discontinuity between God revealed in the suffering of man, and God who is always more than what man is and who stands above him and his suffering, even as He is simultaneously present in that alienated and sinful situation.

It is not surprising that the "mystery" of God, the Deus Absconditus, is absent from Liberation Theology. This crucial omission which severely distorts the truth of the Gospel seems inevitable when one operates within the framework of Marxian categories as Liberation Theology does. "The impact of this alliance is to press religion into the straitjacket of political humanism, the idea of transcendence being consequently flattened out and confined to a 'negative dialectic' in the material

course of history."[71] In dialogue with Marx's philosophy, the breadth and height and depth of evangelical theology is reduced to those aspects of the Christian faith which are more amenable to the Marxian over-riding emphasis upon liberating praxis and the human future. Consequently, the indispensable tension between immanence and transcendence is eclipsed through the absorption of the latter in the former.

When we view Liberation Theology's emphasis upon the immanence of God in the light of the theology of the cross, which was discussed above, it is to be noted that the emphasis upon "God for man" in the former sounds a primary note found in the latter. For example, it was emphasized that in the theology of the cross God reveals Himself in history as always being "for man". Instead of speculating about the hiddenness of God shrouded in mystery, i.e. the "otherness" of God which we cannot see, it was pointed out that we should be concerned with the God who meets us in the cross of Christ in judgement and grace. However, the theology of the cross does not reduce God to the dialectics of history for it proclaims the "resurrection of the body and the life of the world to come". In short, true and ultimate liberation transcends history, even though it begins in history. This is crucial to our talk about God. God—the "crucified" One—is totally concerned about the historical condition of man. He is pro-man and He comes to man and the whole of creation as Absolute Future. But He is simultaneously present in the cross of the crucified and risen Christ. We therefore maintain the tension between His immanence and His transcendence. History cannot exhaust the transcendence of God; and transcendence should not be seen as a check on God's immanence but rather as a check upon the euphoric triumphalism of man's hope in his efforts to eradicate all oppression and sin and usher in the age of freedom here on earth. In other words,

without the transcendence of God, man will be confined to history, whether history as his own creation or history as a co-creation with God. In either case, history circumscribes his future.

When Liberation Theology presents man as God's co-worker for man's liberation (in history), the result is that, on the one hand, it is not so much man who is chosen by God to be His co-creator, as God who comes to man's aid to free him to create, i.e., God is man's co-agent for liberation, and on the other hand, the truth that man's freedom is a gift of grace is distorted and made into "a sophisticated new form of Pelagianism" in which "God is seen as needing man to help him create the future."[72] In both instances the sovereignty of God is violated. In Liberation Theology, the freedom to create which is given by grace is so much wrapped up with man's praxis that grace is made partial in man's salvation: sola gratia is made to read sola gratia plus human praxis. This is a modern form of synergism. While the indicative and the imperative of the Gospel must never be separated from each other if theology is to remain evangelical, it should be remembered that the imperative arises out of the indicative. Freed by God, we are free to serve the neighbour in love. Hence we do not serve in order to assist in our salvation.

Unfortunately, as Liberation theologians, among others, know only too well, the message of sola gratia has been so very often distorted by an ethical "quietism" that allows inhuman and oppressive structures to remain intact without being seriously questioned and attacked with the practical intention of transforming and humanizing them. The truth of this accusation is borne out by the history of the Church. In its own attempt to respond theologically to the challenge in the historical context of Latin America, Liberation Theology has not, however, avoided

the equally distorting conversion of Gospel into Law. Instead of Gospel as "cheap grace", Liberation Theology, in overstating its case for knowledge of God as "doing", presents us with Gospel as Law - the imperative of the Gospel has abbreviated the indicative of the Gospel. In spite of the hermeneutical circle in Liberation Theology, in which the final horizon of theological praxis-theoria is the liberating Word of God and the Kingdom of God, this abbreviation of the Gospel occurs. Indeed it is, more significantly, because of its peculiar theological hermeneutics that such a distortion arises. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, since the horizon of Liberation Theology is not a metaphysical reality which is known apart from praxis, but one which becomes known and proves its authenticity through praxis-theoria, that horizon becomes subordinated to the dialectic of history. The dialectic of history de facto is given priority over any horizon which is merely a word about objective, vicarious liberation. Accordingly, on the other hand, when the indicative of the Gospel is subordinated to the ethical imperative, i.e., made subject to the demands of and for liberation - programmes and strategies for liberation are continually being formulated and evaluated in the light of praxis - the result is Law, not Gospel.

We return once again to the dilemma of maintaining the necessary tension between the freedom of the will (God) and the bondage and freedom of the will (man). In the ongoing attempt to resolve this dilemma which is elusive of any final historical resolution - it presents itself in various forms - the theologian of the cross maintains that the Word of the cross of Christ and, consequently, the cross of the Christian, must be affirmed and proclaimed. Indigenization of the cross of the Christian does not encapsulate the whole of the Gospel. We are not suggesting that the Word of the cross is to be separated from the cross of the

Christian - they rightfully belong together. However, the Word of the cross, its scandal and foolishness, is the sovereign Word of grace whose "demand" for liberating praxis-theoria is an "invitation" to a discipleship of radical grace and brokenness.

This point brings us back to our earlier emphasis upon the transcendence of God which has an historical character, but which transcends history and moves into the realm of eternity. In addition, it reminds us that even before we begin to engage in liberating praxis, the word of grace from the cross is addressed and is real to us in faith. This does not deny that this word may be and is heard in the midst of the struggle for better socio-economic and political conditions of life. In fact, the word of grace frees man for such action. But that word remains the word of grace because it announces forgiveness and hope and new life to all those whose praxis have met with partial success or ended in disaster. The loving God whom man meets in the Christ of the cross is the sovereign Lord. He is free to have mercy on whom He will have mercy. Thus, the word of grace is also available to the oppressor who is confronted by the word of judgement. Likewise, the oppressed, despite their chosenness for the Kingdom are no less sinners than the oppressors. To both of them, therefore, the word of judgement and grace are offered. Gazing at the man upon the cross who is the risen Lord, the Church cannot be true to Him if it reduces the gospel to law and turns the message of grace into an ideology for liberation, however pressing and imperative the need for real material liberation is. The Church must be ever vigilant in its proclamation of the Gospel and its separation of Law and Gospel without dispensing with either. She must insist upon the dialectic of the divine indicative and imperative and guard against the danger of capitulating to political or other euphoria which openly or subtly identify

with the indicative what is achieved in obedience to the imperative of the gospel. Jesus Christ is not just an example for man to follow; He is not a political agitator; He is not an ideological weapon of the oppressed or oppressor, though He has been thus abused. He is the Saviour and Lord of the world.

This brings us to the crucial question of sin and grace. As presented in Liberation Theology, man the oppressed and needy is a victim of exploitation and alienation. In Marxian terms, he is alienated from the mode and relations of production, from his fellow human beings, and from himself. In Latin America such alienation is pervasive and there is no question that the socio-economic and political structures are largely responsible for the human misery we find here. These structures are sinful: they dehumanize rather than humanize man. They do not conduce to "abundance of life" but to increases in "unfreedom" and wretchedness. But this description of structural and "human" sinfulness does not exhaust the meaning of sin. Sin is more basic than that, and redemption more inclusive than socio-economic and political emancipation in history. "The qualitative opposition between sin and grace is more fundamental in the Christian interpretation of history than in the opposition between unliberated and liberated, oppressed and oppressors".[73] Thus, even if man were able to achieve socio-economic and political emancipation - with or without the aid of God - and thereby achieve a level of freedom hitherto unattained by man, man would still be a sinner: "for it is in freedom that we all sin." We need to constantly remind ourselves that there is a real and necessary distinction between the consequences of sin and sin itself, which is fundamentally a broken-relationship with God. Only God can restore, or, better still, create, a new relationship. Langdon Gilkey writes:

> The freeing of freedom, liberation, achieves the conquest of the consequences of human sin in history (i.e., fate) and so - let us repeat - is an essential aspect of Christian concern and action. Nevertheless, it does not represent the conquest of the sin itself out of which fate and fatedness continually arise. Only a new relation of mankind to God, to self and to the neighbor can achieve that goal, an achievement far beyond the range of political activity. 74

Undoubtedly sin separates humanity into classes but this "is not the same thing as the universal solidarity of humanity in the structure of sin against God."[75]

In keeping with the concept of unconditional grace, the message of justification by grace alone is paradoxical in its implications. We argued earlier that Liberation Theology as "a theology of universal human brotherhood" places emphasis upon the salvific efficacy of human praxis to the detriment of sola gratia and sola fides. Now, in contrast to the demand in Liberation Theology for manifest signs of the solidarity of brotherhood based on the gospel of love, evangelical theology of the cross calls for such manifestations, and it also dares to celebrate that brotherhood as a prolepsis. This celebration constitutes a crucial difference between evangelical theology and Liberation Theology. What might appear to some as ludicrous, and as a violation of the Gospel is acknowledged as intrinsic to the existential experience of the Gospel. Therefore it should not be dismissed as being ideological quietism, even though unfortunately, there are historical grounds for so arguing. Carl Braaten sums this paradox very aptly when he says:

> According to the message of justification by grace alone, we can already celebrate and practice a unity of brothers and sisters in Christ. We can already declare that in Christ there is no East or West, no rich or poor, no slave or free man, no male or female, no Jew or Greek, no Black or white, no Brahman or pariah, no prince or pauper. None of these distinctions counts as the ultimate mark of human identity. Yet this fact is not a self-evident truth. It is a gift of the gospel already shared as a datum of eschatological salvation

> even prior to its actualization in history and in spite of the ambiguities of present social reality. 76

It is only in such a paradoxical celebration that the triumph of the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ are held together and man is given the courage to transcend his oppression and alienation in whatever forms he finds and experiences them, knowing that his justification is in the "Crucified" God, and not in the failure or success of his human endeavours.

Finally, a word about critiquing Liberation Theology is in order at this point. No responsible critique of Liberation Theology based on an evangelical theology of the cross should attempt to proclaim "cheap grace" to those who are made uncomfortable by the socio-economic and political critique of society and the consequent radical demand for revolutionary change made by Liberation Theology. The critique of society based on Marxian sociology is very incisive and cannot be dismissed because it is Marxian. In a real sense, to do that would be to provide salve for stricken consciences by removing Law and judgement. It would be another form of idolatry - having a God whom we can manipulate. Liberation Theology has arisen out of a context of real "material" oppression which places humanity in a situation where the extravagance of some means the poverty of many others. In such a situation, no theologian of the cross can summarily conclude God desires it to be so and remain a theologian of the cross. Nor can he argue that the "extravagances" of those who have are the blessings of God for them, and that, consequently, there is no need to suffer pangs of conscience for the sake of the poor neighbour whose life is both miserable and really all that he or she has. When we paint the conditions in Latin America (and elsewhere) in such vivid terms, it seems unbelievable that man can be so blind and insensitive to the needs of his/her neighbour. Why? Can

the Church point the way towards a creative and "material" response? As a result of its peculiar theological method, Liberation Theology de facto attempts to do that: to make the world hear the cry of the oppressed in and among whom Christ dwells. Liberation Theology talks about the God who fully understands suffering for that is the meaning of the Incarnation. This theology is not afraid of talking about the God of the oppressed, the Christ who is found in the needy, even if such a description falls prey to idolatry and ideology. It is confident in the liberation of God and in the God of liberation.

When, for example, liberation theologians speak positively of their programme and strategy for the praxis of faith and love in their context, should we, from a political standpoint and in a theologically irresponsible way, simply denounce and reject their praxis as ideological - as so often happens - by using our own ideological premise? Are not both forms of ideology judged by the cross of Christ which has no handles for an individual, group or society to grip and control? Before God all men stand as beggars with open hands: all are in need of His grace. This is a Creative Word of freedom, hope and love for all, which is active here and now, but which points beyond history to its eschatological fulfilment.

Pointing out the inadequacies and deficiences of Liberation Theology without listening to and taking seriously its clarion call to struggle for a better world, so that the Gospel may be preached and people hear and believe and live in, and in the light of the Gospel, is unfair to Liberation Theology and an injustice to the Gospel. We are free to hear criticism because it is Christ who makes us free. The theologian of the cross needs to remember, however, that the credibility and efficacy of the Gospel does not ultimately depend on how much justice and freedom

and solidarity (or lack thereof) are to be found in society. The efficacy of the Gospel is the work of the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, the Kingdom of God is present in the most sinful situation, and may even be ultimately fulfilled when all the "signs" point to the absence of God and His Kingdom. This is the paradox of the Kingdom.

Chapter V.

Christianity, Marxism, and the Caribbean.

Introduction

In our study so far we have presented Marx's concept of man and his theory of history, followed by a discussion of the question of a radical concept of God. This radical concept, we claimed, was the essence of the critical and decisive challenge to the Christian Church arising out of Marx's Weltanschauung. Such a concept of God is found in a theology of the cross whose chief exponent was Martin Luther. Of course, this association with Luther does not deny its fundamental Biblical roots, especially in Paul. In addition to the Reformer's theologia crucis, we looked at Jürgen Moltmann's "Trinitarian political theology of the cross", and, then, finally, we asked whether there was a clear and explicit theology of the cross in the Theology of Liberation.

In the theology of the cross it was seen that God, far from forsaking man in his sin and suffering, and even further oppressing him, was most close to man and present in his suffering. He is present in that He suffers with man and for man. This knowledge is made unmistakably clear in the cross of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ. Marx's radical concept of man in which man has not only alienated himself through his participation in the alienating and alienated mode and relations of production, but who will also, eventually, through his own "Promethean" efforts, historically transcend his alienation and liberate himself and the whole cosmos, is countered by a theology of the cross which argues for a more wholistic and comprehensive view of man. In this theology man's "nature" is not limited to his relation to the socio-economic conditions of life and to the history and future of man's

own creation. His nature, history and future are radically defined in the cross of Christ. His future is hidden with God in Christ. Through faith in Christ, man knows that in spite of his failure, he is and will be totally liberated.

Turning our attention now to the Caribbean, we will attempt a presentation of the state of Caribbean society in terms of its critical and acutely crucial challenge to Christian theology. In the Caribbean, our primary focus will be on the so-called "Caribbean man", his history, his consciousness, his vision or lack thereof, his longings and aspirations. This is a very difficult undertaking, as we shall see below, for we are dealing with a very complex issue which is punctuated by subtleties and nuances which are easily, and, hence, often lost to the casual observer of Caribbean society and Caribbean man, be the observer an outsider from the region, or even Caribbean man himself. Our task is made more difficult by the fact that our discussion involves not two parties, Caribbean man and Christian theology, but three parties because of the inclusion of Marx's anthropology and view of history, as well. Therefore, with Marx's anthropocentric Weltanschauung presenting a serious challenge to the mission of the Church and the future of man, i.e. man's salvation, our dialogue shall proceed, for the most part, with Caribbean man and Marx, on the one hand, and Christian theology on the other.

Our repeated emphasis upon the salvation of man sola gratia and upon a definition of human nature in terms of man's relationship to God, in contrast to Marx's socio-economic reductionism, leads us to a critical consideration of Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. This will follow our attempt at formulating a "Theology of Alienation and Reconciliation in the Caribbean."

Finally, we enter into this dialogue recognizing that Christianity has both a dialogical and proclamatory character. It is instructive to note R. J. Neuhaus's comment on Theme 5 of the Hartford theses on the question of the false dichotomy between the prophetic and priestly ministries of the Church which must be overcome in order that social action and evangelism may not be crippled further.

> . . . Christianity must have a dialogical relationship to other ways of putting the world together. But Christianity is proclamatory as well as dialogical. As embarrassing as it may seem in a world sated by the deceits of subjectivism, Christian claims present themselves as objective and normative. Related to many cultural idioms, historically conditioned in ways beyond number, seen through the prism of myriad world views, the Word nonetheless goes out: Jesus Christ is Lord. 1

Moreover, recognizing that the Church has often neglected evangelism in its pursuit of its ministry to the socio-economic needs of people, Neuhaus adds the sober warning:

> To abandon that Word and the mandate to proclaim it, is to lose all claim to Christian identity. Christians proclaim it, not necessarily (or not only) in order to prevent other people from going to hell but because they believe it as true, because they believe it is the most important single thing to be said about human existence, and because they are commanded to proclaim it. The failure to proclaim that Word with clarity and courage is one of a part with the capitulation to political agendas that are designed either in indifference or in overt hostility to the lordship to Christ. 2

These insights are very relevant to our response to the challenges facing the Church in the Caribbean today. Those challenges may be summed up in terms of the interrelated crises of identity and relevance which are peculiar and intrinsic to the Church's presence and ministry in the world. Though identity and relevance have been separated innumerable times in the history of the Church, they must always be held in dialectical unity if the Church is to be true to the Gospel that has called it into being and which continues to give it life. Thus, it is only through dialogue and proclamation that the Church can attempt to establish and

maintain that dialectical unity of identity and relevance.

Furthermore, to meet the challenge of Marx in the Caribbean (and elsewhere), Christian theology must have a genuine openness to the cry of the human condition as expressed in that society, admit failures and defeats, be willing to be corrected on its false assumptions about Caribbean man and his society, as well as criticise the false assumptions and shortcomings of its dialogical counterparts. However, and most importantly, it must also proclaim the Lordship of the suffering Christ if it is to be faithful to its roots, its source of energy and power, and bring with it to the dialogue, its "whole" perspective, and not merely part of it, i. e., the apparently more amiable and compromising aspects of its perspective. This is the way that evangelical theology may seek authentic expression of the Gospel with relevance and identity inextricably and dialectically bound together.

A.

Alienation, Marxism, and the Caribbean: A Challenge to the Church.

In the first chapter of this study entitled "Marx's concept of Man" we noted that Marx's description of man was based on the concept of alienation. Marx, we saw, conceived of man's "nature" in socio-economic terms. Since the productive process was dominated by the capitalist, the worker found himself alienated from himself, his fellow workers, his product and his species-being. Marx, it was mentioned above, based his analysis of alienation on his observations of nineteenth century burgeois, industrialised western Europe. Philosophically, he stood within the

Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment traditions. He was therefore influenced by many and varied thinkers who preceded him. It was Hegel, above anyone else, and to a lesser extent Feuerbach, who influenced his thinking on alienation. Thus, it is fairly obvious that Marx is historically, philosophically, and in many other ways, removed from the contemporary Caribbean situation. Simply to apply his ideas on man and history, however critically, to twentieth century Caribbean society without paying due consideration to this hermeneutical distance would be ahistorical, and it would be unfair to both Marx and Caribbean man. Indeed, such a transference would run the risk of denunciating Marx for being ideological.

It does come as a great surprise to the student of Caribbean history that Marx paid no attention to plantation slavery. Instead, he concentrated primarily on proletarian alienation in industrialised European societies. Anyone who studies the sociology of "New World" slavery, where the slave was a part of plantation property, a mere chattel who did not even own himself or herself, let alone their offspring, and compares the situation of the slave with that of the proletarian worker, would have to conclude that the former was no less alienated than the latter. Perhaps there are even some who would argue that the slave vis-a-vis the proletariat was more alienated. Without entering into such a debate, we find it useful for our understanding of Caribbean man today to use Marx's concept of alienation, albeit with considerable reservations and qualifications.[3]

Who is Caribbean man? What are his characteristics? Is he the descendant of African slaves, or of East Indian, Chinese, Portuguese or European indentured immigrants? Is he of mixed parentage -- for instance European and African? Is he the descendant of Aboriginal Indians who

were there before Columbus came to the West Indies? Is he not an enigma? If he is an alienated man, what is he alienated from; and, what is alienated from him? What precisely do we mean when we use the concept alienation in the context of the Caribbean? The answers to these and other relevant questions are partly found in the history of the Caribbean. There can be no serious attempt to describe Caribbean man which does not make the history of the region of central importance. For instance, of central importance is that portion of the history of the Caribbean which began with the arrival of Europeans, followed by Africans and then by Asians, of various tribal, national, linguistic and cultural varieties. Such a detailed study is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is difficult to avoid describing in some detail, explicitly and implicitly, some of that very history. This will become obvious to the reader as we proceed with our discussion. Attention will be focused on Caribbean man as he is today. It is to be recognized that there were over four hundred and fifty years of domination and exploitation under colonialism which have shaped the consciousness, the language, and the cultural and religious expressions of the Caribbean peoples.

a.

Alienation and the Caribbean Man: An Historical Overview.

The history of the Caribbean is a history of colonialism, of the plantation system, of slavery and indentureship. It is a history characterised by the domination and exploitation of the masses by a disproportionately smaller elitist ruling class motivated first and foremost by the desire for economic gain.[4] The legacy of this history

hangs like a millstone around the neck of Caribbean man. It is a legacy that eludes transcendence and even leaves Caribbean man without any lasting answer to the question of who he is. Philip Mason succinctly sums up this predicament when he states:

> But it is the essence of colonialism, and indeed of most forms of rule of the many by the few, that the few impose on the many a spiritual yoke which comes to govern their day-to-day actions, more constantly and pervasively, if less obtrusively, than the physical force which lies in the background. Nowhere did this happen more completely than in the Caribbean. Whole societies were persuaded to imitate a way of life that was quite unfamiliar to them, one they had little hope of attaining and not in itself particularly estimable; what was more serious, they came to despise themselves and their own way of life. 5

Because of the grouping together of peoples from Europe, Africa and Asia, during the centuries of colonialism, the subject peoples were directly and indirectly forced to imitate the values and patterns of behaviour of the plantocracy. Their consciousness of themselves, of their roots vis-a-vis their supervisors', was determined by the ruling class. Their values were therefore alien to them, having been imposed upon them through coercion, at first, and, later, through servile and dehumanising imitation. Whatever values the slave or indentured immigrant brought with him from his ancestral land was relegated to an inferior status relative to European values, mores, patterns of behaviour, etc. Barbadian novelist, George Lamming, gives us another negative appraisal of colonialism when he writes:

> It is the brevity of the (British) West Indian's history, and the fragmentary nature of the different cultures which have fused to make something new; it is the absolute dependence on the values implicit in that language of his coloniser which has givern him a special relation to the word, colonialism. It is not merely a political definition; it is not merely the result of certain economic arrangements. It started as these and grew somewhat deeper. Colonialism is the very basis of the West Indian's cultural awareness . . . .A foreign or absent Mother culture has always cradled his judgements. 6

This dependence mentality which always looks to the outsider for its

cue, which despises the locally manufactured commodity and exalts what is manufactured and imported from abroad, i.e., especially, from Europe and North America, has left Caribbean man in a quandry as to how to govern himself politically once he has gained political independence from the Mother country. In his novel, The Overcrowded Barracoon, Naipaul gives us a vivid description of his own perception of Caribbean man's predicament when, with characteristic pessimism, he claims that

> These Caribbean territories are not like those in Africa and Asia, with their own internal reverences, that have been returned to themselves after a period of colonial rule. They are manufactured societies, labor camps, creations of empire; and for long they were dependent on empire for law, language, institutions, culture, even officials. Nothing was generated locally; dependence became a habit. How, without empire, do such societies govern themselves? What is now the source of power? The ballot box, the mob, the regiment? When, as in Haiti, the slave-owners leave, and there are only slaves, what are the sanctions? 7

Any return to ancestral roots in Africa, Asia and Europe, even if that were possible -- it is doubtful whether that is really a viable possibility -- will be, at best, only a partial solution, or, more particularly, an aid to a solution to Caribbean man's search for his identity and for sanctions with which to govern himself with dignity and increasing "humanity". Whatever is imported today from outside of the Caribbean, i.e., from Europe and North America, does not automatically apply to the Caribbean. It must still be "Caribbeanized". The Christian Church must be firm in its insistence upon an empathetic understanding of and attempt at a solution to the problem of alienation in the Caribbean. The good of one group must not be promoted and realized at the expense of making other groups suffer the reduction to marginality in society.

Both Lamming and Naipaul write as if colonialism as an alienating experience has left an indelible mark on Caribbean's man's consciousness. Caribbean man has never known real freedom for he has never been

responsible for the selection of the criteria which defined (and even now continue to define) him as a person. He possesses a slave mentality which sees people as things, objects, rather than as persons, independent and other. Both master and slave, under slavery, were alienated. But it was the master who dominated the slave. In a curious way, however, the master found that his identity was bound up with the master-slave relationship in which he had placed himself and his slave. Hegel's observations on this phenomenon are helpful for our purposes. For example, in his Phenomenology of Mind, he says that in the master-slave relationship

> It might seem that the master has now obtained recognition as an independent being. But since this recognition is accorded him by the slave, who is not an independent being but merely does his master's will, it does not constitute an objective confirmation of the master's identity.
>
> The slave, on the other hand, realizes himself and objectifies himself through work for the master. In shaping and forming the natural world, he can find in the product of his work an objective and lasting expression of his own identity, whereas the master, whose relationship to the natural world is entirely one of desire and consumption, is incapable of doing this. Moreover, the slave has experienced fear, fear for his life, and therefore knows that his whole existence has been at stake; through the experience of service, this fear has spread itself over his whole life; and consequently he has experienced to the full that consciousness of his own existence which can be given objective expression in work. 8

We need to be careful here that we do not push Hegel's analysis of the master-slave relationship too far. It must be recognized that he did not have plantation slavery in mind, but the concept of slavery in classical Greek and Roman societies. Furthermore, Hegel's analysis is philosophical, and, therefore, it does not take full cognizance of the pervasive influence of socio-economic and political factors which are so characteristic of plantation slavery. Again, Caribbean societies were characterized by absentee-ownership which meant there was a great

geographical distance between the slaves and the real plantation owners; and the culture in which the master was immersed was one from which slavery was absent. Despite these differences, however, Hegel's description of the master-slave relationship in which the master was in a curious way dependent upon the slave for his (master's) plantation identity still remains.

It should be pointed out from the outset that in terms of plantation slavery in the Caribbean the slave, far from realizing and objectifying himself through his work for his master (who was not necessarily, and, more often than not, the plantation owner), was alienated from his work, in Marxian terms.[9] In slavery, he experienced an almost total loss of self. Moreover, as was pointed out above, the master was not dependent on the slave for his identity, in Hegelian terms. The master perceived himself in terms of European values which gave him his sense of cultural, and other, superiority vis-a-vis his slave. But the master's consciousness of himself as political ruler invested with economic and sociological power, was nevertheless, enslaved by the unshakable conviction that freedom for the slaves would be tantamount to ruin for the colonies. He did not know how to rule when the sanctions that bolstered slavery no longer existed. It was therefore not surprising that he tried to cling tenaciously to his power during the short-lived apprenticeship system (1834-1838).[10] Moreover, the slave mentality of the former slave masters persisted during the period of indentured immigration whose description, "A new system of slavery", aptly describes the continuation of the alienated "master" mentality even after slavery had been legally abolished by an Act of the British Parliament.[11] This is the mentality that has characterized colonialism.

But it was not only the plantocracy that was unprepared for

Emancipation; the slaves were unprepared as well. The apprenticeship scheme was an inevitable failure, and the newly freed slaves were left without any liberating pattern of behaviour which they might emulate in order to be, and act as free men. All they had were the centuries of schooling in imitating European ways without any hope of gaining full and equal status with, and recognition from, their former master. A reading of reports of ex-slaves' views about the meaning of freedom reveals an odd mixture of visions of being like "Massa", being free of agricultural labour, etc. There was certainly no clear picture of returning to a primordial African paradise, or even of creating such a paradise in the New World.[12] The crucial point is that there was a lack of a Marxian proletarian solidarity among the ex-slaves, as well as any concerted effort to achieve a primitive communist utopia.[13] Slavery had taken care of that. It is against this background that Eric Hobsbawm perceptively writes that the Caribbean region is "a curious terrestrial space-station from which the fragments of various races, torn from the worlds of their ancestors and aware both of their origins and of impossibility of returning to them, can watch the remainder of the globe with unaccustomed detachment."[14] Commenting on Hobsbawm's observation, Sidney Mintz raises the question of Caribbean man's vision of his future:

> Indeed, if enslavement disjoined once-free men from a past they would have preferred to cling to, then renewed freedom -- freedom from slavery -- must prove a very different state from preslavery. The special enigma of Caribbean peoples may well lie in their never having settled for a vision of history as something that must or should repeat itself. 15

Freedom from slavery has left Caribbean man with an ambiguous mixture of ingredients with which to carve out a new and liberated future. But though he does not wish to repeat the past, he cannot avoid its debilitating legacy. It is sobering to recall that the principal ingredients

that make up contemporary Caribbean society were not selected either by the ancestors of the Caribbean peoples, or by the Caribbean peoples themselves. For example, as Mintz explains, the "unusual ethnic and physical heterogeneity of the Caribbean region . . . reveal the economically motivated intents of distant rulers." He therefore concludes that "it would be fair to say that almost no one who was not European ever migrated to the Caribbean region freely; and surely no non-European born in the region was ever consulted about the advisability of additional migration."[16]

With this peculiar history in mind, it is no wonder that politicians, academics, literary artists, church-leaders, among others, who have emerged from the ranks in the Caribbean, have been calling on their people to begin building their own liberated future. It is argued that it is only the people themselves who are capable of creating their own destiny. The truly independent and free Caribbean man will only emerge through the self-assertive, self-sacrificial efforts of Caribbean man himself. He must extricate himself from the enslaving colonial legacy. Only he can do so, i.e., by drawing from that legacy those liberating cultural fragments which have been passed down through the centuries.

Political and ideological sloganeering, however, is a far cry from true human dignity as a person.[17] Political independence is a mere step, however significant a step, in the direction of achieving total human liberation. We do not need Marx to remind us of this; we need only to look at the history of our independent territories since the achievement of independence for us to realize that alienation is still with us. Several times above we used the term "Caribbean peoples" instead of "Caribbean people". The plural form was chosen with care. Nowhere can anyone accurately say that in the Caribbean there is a pervasive feeling

among a majority of the people of being first and foremost a Caribbean people in contrast to being simply many peoples with more significant characteristics separating them from each other than those uniting them as one people. For example, there is a greater feeling of being Antiguans, Barbadians, Guyanese, Jamaicans, Trinidadians, etc., than of being West Indians. Moreover, even in each separate society, it would be inaccurate to say that we have a strong nationalist feeling which is unmistakably greater than and takes precedence over any ethnic, colour or class "in-group" feeling. In short, each separate society is a macro-cosmic view of the fragmented, alienated individual West Indian.

Governments in the Caribbean are acutely aware of the deep-seated racial, colour and class distinctions and rivalries within their respective societies as evidenced by the various national mottoes purporting to promote if not create oneness and unity among the various and differing (and oftentimes conflictual) sectors in Caribbean societies. With great insight into this phenomenon, David Lowenthal tells us:

> Guyana, once the 'Land of Six Peoples,' now proclaims it is 'One People, One Nation (and one Destiny)'; Trinidad's coat of arms reads 'Together We Aspire, Together We Achieve,' and the ruling party's slogan is, 'All o' we is one'; Jamaica proclaims 'Out of Many, One People,' and the island's Five-Year Independence Plan insists that 'racial integration in our society, is not merely an ideal; . . . it is in fact a part of life.' 'Nowhere in the world,' asserted Jamaica's premier in 1961, 'has more progress been made in developing a nonracial society . . . in which color is not . . . psychologically significant.' 18

Viewed in terms of the objective realities of Caribbean societies, such claims to national unity still represent aspirations and ideals which, to many, are more elusive now than at the time when they were each announced.

Let us now look more closely at this multi-faceted fragmentation within individual Caribbean societies (and, of course, within so-called

Caribbean Society as a whole). This fragmentation is far more complex than a simple Marxian two-class stratification based on ownership and, hence, control of the means of production, on the one hand, and lack of ownership and control of the means of production, on the other hand, would indicate. To describe Caribbean society using Marx's analysis of class structure, without paying due attention to factors such as race and colour which militate against the development of a genuine working class consciousness and solidarity, would be non-Marxian since it would be ahistorical.

b.

Alienation and Pluralism

When Caribbean society is compared with North American society there are two striking demographic contrasts. Firstly, in the former, with the exception of Guyana, there are hardly any aboriginal inhabitants remaining, while, in the latter, significant numbers of American Indians from various tribes still exist. Secondly, whereas, in the Caribbean the European grouping of the total population is significantly small, in North American society, in spite of a large Black minority, the European grouping forms the bulk of the population. Throughout the period of colonial rule in the Caribbean, plantation society was characterized by absentee-ownership. Fewer and fewer European owners lived in the West Indies. The majority elected to stay at home and appoint deputy managers to take care of their affairs. As was already noted, this practice of absenteeism was a crucial factor in the development of Caribbean societies.

Bearing in mind that the Europeans formed the ruling class with the

bulk of the population being comprised of African slaves, we are able to understand the pyramidical social structure that eventually emerged.[19] At the top of the pyramid were the European ruling elites and at the base were the African slaves. In the middle strata, forming a buffer between the Europeans and the Africans, were the people of mixed blood. Thus, instead of a two-tiered class system, there eventually emerged a three-tiered social hierarchy.[20] It should be noted that during slavery, indentured European immigrants were part of the lowest strata. However, when their contracts were over they were free to move up in the hierarchy. The absenteeism practised by plantation owners served to enhance the importance of the mulattoes who, because of their European blood, came to regard themselves as superior to the Blacks who were invariably below them. The Europeans allowed them certain privileges which were denied the Blacks. The colour consciousness, where whiteness and close proximity to it in terms of skin colour, texture of hair, etc., were given preference, and blackness was despised, became increasingly acute following emancipation in the 1830's. Aspirations of upward social mobility meant imitating European ways.

It was soon noticed that colour was an important criterion for deciding one's suitability for important jobs and positions in society. As Mason explains, the termination of the legal distinctions between free (white or mixed) and non-free (black), led to an increase in prejudice based on the "formal distinction based on colour". Mason continues: "When the legal barriers go down, the psychological defences go up. We should expect, and do in fact find, that when slavery came to an end there would be an increase in discrimination based on shades of colour." There is no denying the fact that Caribbean people are both race and colour conscious. Mason provides a useful summary of the general picture

of the social structure in the Caribbean at the time of Emancipation. He does so as he notes the growing significance colour came to play in the social structure.

> In the Caribbean, the main distinction at first was between slave and free, but this broad distinction was quickly modified by considerations of race and colour. The European indentured servants worked out their time and became free; some of the children of African women and some of the more skilled and trusted slaves were released, and an intermediate class of free blacks and free coloured arose. It became a society of many grades and distinctions -- but the distinction of slave and free continued to be of overriding importance until slavery showed signs of coming to an end. At this stage, the free part of society first closed its ranks against the slaves and then when emancipation became a fact, established strong barriers of discrimination against the former slaves, for whose identification colour became the principal badge. 21

Following Emancipation, the ensuing shortage of labour for the plantations eventually led to the establishment of indentured immigration from Europe, China, Madeira, Africa and India. Through the process of trial and error it was soon found that Indian (or East Indian as the immigrant from India came to be called) immigration was the most viable form of immigration. Thus East Indians came to form the largest immigrant community in Caribbean society as a whole following Emancipation. They were transported to the region between 1838 and 1917. It is the coming of East Indians, in contrast to any other ethnic group (with the exception of the Chinese in Jamaica), which led to the further complexity in Caribbean social structure. In Guyana and Trinidad, their numerical preponderance and near preponderance in the population, respectively, became a significant factor in the interracial rivalry between themselves and the "Africans". Though they initially occupied the lowest rung in the hierarchy which was vacated by the ex-slaves, they perceived themselves as superior to the Africans whom they came to dislike. Likewise, they were despised by both the European and Black communities. In fact, the former thought of them as despicable heathens, while the latter

pejoratively nick-named them "coolies".[22]

What we find emerging here, therefore, are societies in which race, colour and class were fundamental criteria for determining cultural values, people's social perceptions of themselves and others, and their overall outlook on life. Naturally, these factors militated against cohesiveness and integration within each of the societies, and, indeed, in the society as a whole. Whereas, on the one hand, significant similarities were found between lower class Africans and East Indians in Guyana and Trinidad, and between lower class Africans and Chinese in Jamaica, on the other hand, there were significant and divisive differences as well. For instance, as Mintz points out, "Colour and ethnicity are not neatly correlated with class membership."[23]

Despite this obvious conflictual situation, a growing measure of consensus emerged among the various ethnic groups comprising the population in each society. This consensus was the result of an acceptance of certain common values known as "creole" values which were greatly influenced by values from outside, i.e., from Europe. The sad truth is, however, that in spite of perceived improvement toward greater consensus -- about common values, for example -- a basic situation of divisiveness and conflict still persists. There is still a cultural gap between the "poor" class and the more affluent class.[24]

One of the primary problems that emerges from this complexity is the extreme difficulty of classifying Caribbean society. In tackling this particular problem, many social scientists have opted for the "plural" model which was developed by the Dutch scholar, J. S. Furnivall.[25] In summary, when this model is applied to the Caribbean the attempt is being made to take full cognizance of separate and different, even conflictual, social groupings, be they based on cultural, ethnic or

colour differentials. It is not our intention to argue for or against the analytical and sociological appropriateness of the plural model as a description of Caribbean society. Rather, we wish to draw attention to it in so far as it serves to accentuate the fragmentary and "conflict-ridden" character of Caribbean society. More precisely, it invariably draws attention to the fact that Caribbean man is alienated from his fellow citizens either because of economics, race, culture or colour, or because of a configuration of these and other factors. This cannot be denied, and it is to be noted that a significant degree of inter-class, inter-racial, etc., suspicion and mistrust exists. Such an attitude of suspicion and mistrust does not follow rational and logical patterns.[26]

The failure to recognize the "plural" nature of Caribbean societies is often the result of a disproportionate feeling of optimism about the efficacy and growth of "creole" culture, and/or a naive expectation that the legacy of history could be easily transcended without undue conflict and loss of individual freedom. The relinquishing of freedom, whether willingly or through coercion, in order to gain more freedom, i.e., a more total freedom, often leads to a decrease in personal freedom; in short, the opposite effect is created. This is not a judgement on anybody, nor is it a questioning of motives. It is rather an attempt to make a realistic appraisal of historical realities.

In a very lucid study on Socialism in Guyana, which is viewed from the perspective of the pluralist model, Paul Singh reaches some very sobering conclusions which are well worth noting. Summing up the inevitable and disastrous failure of socialist experiments in Guyana, he says:

> Each ideological approach (transplanted Fabian labourism, Jaganite Marxism/Leninism, Burnhamite co-operation) failed to take sufficient cognizance of the forces of pluralism.

> There was a common gross neglect or common gross under valuation of these pluralist forces . . . . Socialism has failed to have the desirable impact both as an integrative force and as a method for bringing about radical changes in society. It lacked the power to enthuse, to inspire, to pull the sharply differentiated cultural groups into a common will and a more universal acceptance and participation in new beliefs and new values. 27

Furthermore, noting that Guyanese Marxian socialists have tended to see society as having only one basic social division, i.e., between the capitalist and the proletariat, Singh goes on to point out that such socialists were under the illusion that race prejudice could be eliminated by simply abolishing its root cause: capitalism. This "simplistic conclusion" is without historical foundations for nowhere has the abolition of capitalism and the emergence of some form of Marxian socialism resulted in total solidarity among the various societal and other groupings in the particular society in question. Admittedly, a Marxist might insist that nowhere has there been a "true" Marxian revolution, hence, social divisions remain. But this reply does not remove the fundamental criticism of Guyanese socialists. Regrettably, Singh tells, the situation in Guyana is characterized by "the absence of unified pressure from the working class" and the likelihood of such a consciousness emerging in the near future is still to be wished for in order that there might be radical and concerted action to eliminate inequalities, poverty, etc. He admits that these are national and global problems and they call not only for working class solidarity, but, also, solidarity among all peoples, both capitalist and proletariat, on behalf of man.[28]

What we find emerging here from Singh's discussion is the point that the pluralist forces in Guyanese (and Caribbean) society do not allow of an uncritical transference of Marx's theory of the class struggle to that area. The Marxian prerequisites for the proletarian

revolution are simply not present there; of course, certain partial requirements like a class struggle do obtain.

> The Marxist alternative of seeking integration by the mechanism of struggle and contradiction assumes a degree of class consciousness which is largely absent from the plural society. Furthermore, the dialectic in Marxism achieves synthesis by liquidation of the separate identity of the preceding thesis. As such it is essentially anti-pluralistic, and politically it means that conflicts can be resolved only in terms of absolute victories and the elimination of the defeated cultural group. The conflict between proletariat and bourgeoisie ends in the total victory of the proletariat and the utter annihilation of the bourgeoisie.[29]

In contrast to the Marxist alternative to the plural society, Singh advocates the "concept of compromise". Instead of the Marxian elimination of the so-called exploitative class in order to end pluralism, he calls for "acceptance of pluralism" and "a reduction of violence." This, he explains, will be achieved through "the proposed form of democratic regionalism (which) produces a climate of peaceful reconciliation between the conflicting interests." Furthermore, he argues that the lesson to be learnt from the Guyana experience is

> the necessity for socialists in plural societies to give as much emphasis to de-pluralisation as to egalitarianism. The revolt in the plural society is a revolt against privilege of class as well as race. A planned socialist programme, with clear egalitarian objectives and utilising democratic regional and neighbourhood units to place socialism at the doorstep of the differentiated cultural groups, is a positive approach towards easing the situation. 30

This is the essence of Singh's "concept of compromise".

It would be fair to say that he envisages that "radical" socialism would take root in Guyana if its introduction and growth in the country is accomplished democratically. In this way, the ostensible and apparent central concern of socialism, man, alienated man, would be the genuine and real concern. Thus, rather than further abusing and dehumanizing man and offending his dignity and contracting his freedom, through the coercive

imposition of another alien ideology with its own system of values, democratic socialism would conduce to a gradual de-pluralisation which would eventuate in the achievement of an ever approaching approximation of egalitarianism.

At this point let us return once again to our original question as to the precise meaning of the term alienation as a description of the condition of Caribbean man today. Simultaneously, we shall try to delineate certain basic criteria by which we may define what is meant by the term "Caribbean man". Finally, we shall attempt to articulate the multi-faceted challenge which the condition of Caribbean man presents to the Christian Church. In the process of doing this, we shall also attempt to meet the challenge placed before the Church by Marx's anthropocentric world-view which is evaluated as a "soteriological" system having its own prescriptions for the historical achievement of full human emancipation for Caribbean man.

c.

Towards a more specific delineation of the characteristics of Alienation in the Caribbean.

It should be mentioned at the outset that the following list of the characteristics of alienation in the Caribbean is viewed as being partial and tentative. It may therefore be enlarged, modified or even reorganized in order to allow for greater precision and comprehensiveness.

(i) Caribbean man is a stranger to his environment, an environment to which his ancestors did not freely choose to come. Thus it is appropriate to ask: To which part of the globe does he belong? Africa?

Asia? North America? The Mother Country of England? Another way of stating this rootlessness is to say that Caribbean man is a lonely person. This point is related to the second point but it still merits standing on its own. Responding to Monty Williams' question: "Do you see any themes in Caribbean literature that interest you, or any common themes?", Father Richard HoLung, a Jamaican Roman Catholic priest, replied, "Well, there are really a number of them. The loneliness of Caribbean man, the sense that he does not belong to the old simple world of island life . . . calypso-style life."[31] In the writings of Trinidadian novelist, V. S. Naipaul, to take another example, the theme of "strangeness", of the Caribbean man's search foran identity in a "home" environment is very pervasive. In his novel, The Mimic Men, he tells of a West Indian politician who had failed in the West Indies and so had to turn to London as a place of refuge. Naipaul writes: "I know that return to my native island and to my political life is impossible . . . . For those who lose, and nearly everyone in the end loses, there is only one course: flight. Flight to the greater disorder, the final emptiness: London and the home counties."[32]

(ii) Caribbean man suffers from separation from his fellow inhabitants in the region. He does not fully understand them, and, by the same token, he is not fully understood by them at least to the extent of relating at various levels in society without the negative and debilitating use of stereotypes. He is unable to empathetically appreciate the cultural, economic, racial, colour, religious, political, social, etc. differences among the various groups of people in society. Social intercourse is characterised by a high level of subtle but real suspicion and hostility.

(iii) In the region fragmentation and disunity seem to be more

dominant than wholeness and unity. Territorial insularity takes precedence over the feeling of oneness as a people shaped by a common history. Even within each separate political unit (including the independent territories) there is the notable absence of a national identity and national unity.[33] National mottoes espousing oneness and unity, as we have already noted, reflect aspirations for future realization rather than describe existing historical realities. Indeed, the declaration of such sentiments in the mottoes are an acknowledgement of the lack of unity and of the need for a national identity. To reject this appraisal of the situation is to descend from noble ambition to ideological fantasy.

(iv) The region suffers an ambiguity in its classification on the world scene. Today it is common to speak of "First World" and "Third World", indeed of various worlds with the distinctions being made on the basis of criteria such as economics, political stability, cultural advancement, education level of national population, etc. Noting the enigma of "the so-called Third World", Sidney Mintz argues that "the Caribbean region can only be part of it figuratively."[34] He rejects Naipaul's view "that the islands are merely the 'Third World's third world'," and explains the peculiar ambiguity in placing the Caribbean in a global perspective:

> . . . these lands were being force-fit into the First World, the European World, before the Third World even existed. It is being rural, agrarian and poor that makes Caribbean folk look like Third World peoples elsewhere; it is being so anciently heterogenized, enslaved, colonized, proletarianized -- yes, and Westernized -- that makes the Third World label inappropriate for them today. 35

(v) Finally, Caribbean man suffers from political alienation. As we have already seen, his ancestors were never free to decide whether to come to the Caribbean, or not. The reins of government were never in his hands; it was not until modern times that members of the rank and file

began to assume positions of leadership and importance in the political apparatus in their respective countries. Sehon Goodridge recognizes this fact when he says:

> The Caribbean man finds himself today part of a state order based on a borrowed political philosophy and characterized by the absence of ideological choice on the one hand and on the other, an escalating constriction of the avenues of constitutional change. 36

Goodridge then draws attention to the glaring and depressing political failures of the 1950's and 1960's which have left the Caribbean region to be plagued by the lack of employment, human dignity, freedom, and with the continued presence of corruption. Moreover, he notes that the inherited political structure is "less accommodative of change".

> As a concomitant to ideological barrenness, our political systems are becoming less accomodative of change. A basic premise of the Westminster-originated political system is that a regular interchange of power will normally occur between the major parties. 37

Unfortunately, historical experience contains scant evidence of such "a regular interchange of power" and the possibility of it occurring more frequently in the future is very difficult to predict with any degree of optimism.

> The dark days ahead for the constitutional orders in the Commonwealth Caribbean are evident from the increasing prevalence of what have been called 'constitutional dictatorships' -- the continuing hegemony of one party through frequent reordering of voting regulations and the restructuring of constituency boundaries. Racial and interest group differences among the masses are exploited frequently, all adding up to make change through constitutional means more and more unlikely. 38

In our dicussion of alienation in the Caribbean it was noted that we did not strive for a precise definition of the concept, i.e., our conception of the meaning of alienation was not characterized by an empirical specificity of criteria. In fact, in none of the writings quoted above did we find the word alienation used. Yet we have

persisted in using the term, implicitly arguing that it is a useful concept for summarising the predicament of Caribbean man. Certainly, from the peculiar features of his history, it is evident that Caribbean people are different from any other people, be they from Europe, North America, Asia, Africa or Latin America. This is not to deny that Caribbean man shares a common humanity with the rest of humankind. What we are saying is that Caribbean man is still to find himself and his "home".

Returning to our earlier discussion on "Alienation in Popular Usage," we find that alienation in the Caribbean qualifies as another popular usage of the concept. With respect to the Caribbean, we did not speak of alienation in terms of a separation between "essence" and "existence"; neither did we claim that Caribbean man is alienated because he chose, of his own volition, to be separated from European culture — for example — in the same way as we noted a religious Jew or a Christian may actively and positively separate himself/herself from the world and its corrupting influences. Hence Caribbean man is seen as a victim of colonial historical circumstances and their enslaving legacy. It should be recognized that the problem of making a contrast between Caribbean man as a passive victim of alienation and the Christian, who actively separates himself/herself from the world, is further complicated by the fact that the majority of the Caribbean people are nominally Christian. This point leads us to a consideration of the meaning and function of religion in the Caribbean. We shall give a summary treatment of this topic below. Before we do so, however, let us turn our attention once again to Marx.

In our treatment of Marx's concept of man and his theory of history, we argued that Marx does not posit a fixed "essence" of man. We saw that this "essence" or "nature" was related to human "needs" which were

tied to the nature of the productive forces in society. Man, Marx says, in fulfilling both his animal and species-needs, continually produces new matrices of his nature. At the inner core of this dynamic activity are the mode and relations of production. Thus man is free to create himself, but is limited in scope by the existing level of production at any given point in history. However, Marx did envisage that the ever advancing technology would produce ever increasing and widening possibilities for man's creativity, and for the fulfilment of his total needs. The key to the achievement and enjoyment of such a total and liberating fulfilment was the attainment of harmony between human needs and liberating human praxis, and the possibilities for the fulfilment of those needs in the productive process. This means that man will have to be able to discern the arrival of the kairos and act decisively and with revolutionary zeal. It is the proletariat who is going to embark on such a revolutionary and emancipating praxis. As the most dehumanized class, they are the only ones qualified to recognize and capable of grasping the kairos when it arrives, and to act upon it.

When we turn to the condition of Caribbean man, we find that Marx's description of proletarian praxis has a particularly inviting and salutary appeal. Caribbean man is alienated and he lives in an explosive situation. He was forced to "misshape" himself and his history; and, if we accept the Marxian thesis that it will be only Caribbean man himself who will ultimately emancipate himself, then all that Caribbean man needs to do is act. He looks around and he finds that he is producing for another's benefit -- the rich at home and abroad. He does not own the means of production; and neither does he control the distribution of what he produces. He has inherited an economic system in which the relations of production and the concomitant hierarchy among the workers

were determined by a small administrative class. Because of race, colour and class, and other differentials, he has been denied the freedom of upward mobility -- economically, socially, politically, etc. Only a few ever move-up, and then only by hard work and favour. Attempts from the top to alleviate the situation are moderate and futile because they are based on the premise that the existing system must be preserved at all costs. The system is primary, people are secondary. All talk about improving the lot of the masses is mere ideology. Such an explosive situation, it would seem, would be a fertile breeding ground for the "revolutionary" enactment of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it," and his clarion call in The Communist Manifesto: "The workers have nothing to lose but their chains; workers of all lands unite."[39]

But the situation in the Caribbean, however explosive it may be, does not possess the principal characteristics of the kairos that Marx envisages. In fact, nowhere in the world, even in communist and socialist countries, "real" and so-called, where "proletarian" revolutions have occurred, followed by the introduction of socialism and communism, has Marx's vision come to fruition. There has been no situation where a revolutionary vanguard and elitist party did not promote and usher in the revolution. It is to be noted that either those societies are still in a state of continual revolution, or else the proletariat has been betrayed, since we find oligarchies existing in those societies, instead of proletarian governments. In the Caribbean, not only is there the absence of a genuine proletariat, in Marx's sense, but there is the notable and obvious lack of natural resources and ever advancing technologization in the region. The Caribbean simply does not fit the scheme for Marx's

description of the alienated proletariat. This is not to deny that the plight of Caribbean man is in need of radical and imminent redress. But it is certain from the experience of other nations and from the uniqueness of the Caribbean situation that Marxism, whether in its pure or in its Marxist-Leninist form, will not conduce to the enjoyment of greater freedom by Caribbean man, and to the emergence of a Caribbean identity without the loss of human dignity and the erosion of fundamental political and economic power of the majority of the people, in addition to the destruction of their cultural and religious uniquenesses. Notwithstanding the differences that exist between the Sitz im Leben of Marx's proletariat and that of Caribbean man, however, the revolutionary call to alienated man to accept the challenge and responsibility to historically transform himself and his real and actual conditions of life presents one of the most crucial problems facing the Church in the Caribbean today. Once again, it is being called upon to reaffirm that its identity is found only in the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and that its utmost relevance to the total condition, past, present and future, of the whole human person, is definitively and decisively bound up with that Gospel. The Church must not be afraid to face this challenge, nor too proud to openly acknowledge her failure to boldly proclaim, and relentlessly seek to make concrete, the message of the love of God in the crucified and risen Christ. Her history in the Caribbean shows many things of which she can be proud, as well as many other things which will cause her to hang her head in shame and admit her guilt. But she knows that she was born out of the forgiving love of God and that her present and future remain tied to this forgiving love. The life of the Church is therefore one of continual dying to "self" and rising in Christ.

But, we ask, what relevance does this have for the mission of the

Church in the Caribbean today? The answer to this question will unfold itself as we proceed below.

d.

The Centrality of man to the task of doing theology in the Caribbean.

In the first two chapters of this thesis, we directed our attention to Marx's anthropocentric Weltanschauung. We noted that Marx's concern for man -- that he is alienated and needs to be emancipated -- serves as a unifying theme in his early and mature writings. We discussed his critique of religion as false consciousness, as an opiate, and as ideology. Marx did admit that religious suffering was real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Nevertheless, he claimed that the idea of God as Creator and Redeemer is false, and that it also dehumanizes man. According to Marx, man is the real centre of the universe. He is his own creator, and only he can be and is his own liberator. He even has to liberate himself from his need of God. This he will achieve after he has transformed the productive process.

Furthermore, from our discussion of Marx's anthropocentric Weltanschauung, we proceeded to discuss the theology of the cross as a critique and response to the Marxian challenge to Christian theology. In the theology of the cross, it was argued, we find God is for man and not against him. Through faith in Christ, man sees God as the One who frees rather than enslaves him. Moreover, in the midst of sin and alienation, suffering and even death, God does not flee and consequently become absent; on the contrary, He is most present when He seems to be

absent. This is the paradox of the Cross and Resurrection. It should not be construed that when we speak of the liberation or salvation of man through the activity of God that there is no place for human participation in God's Kingdom which is proleptically present in the world. Indeed the commandment to love our neighbour which is inseparably linked to love of God, bears out that the Church is called to care for the neighbour. In the context of the Caribbean, the Church is faced with the challenge of mediating this love of God-for-the-neighbour through those structures in society where power is exercised in justice. In the command to proclaim that Jesus is Lord and to serve as unto the Lord who is Jesus, the Church knows that its response should be based on loving and willing obedience, and not, simply, on fear of punishment or on guilt. Even when it thus responds, the Church still runs the risk of being described, in the light of Marx's concept of ideology, as reactionary, and as the advocate for a dehumanizing and alienating base in society. It is therefore instructive to our task to reiterate the question: Does the Church vis-a-vis Marx argue for a more authentic humanity? Our affirmative response was formulated in terms of the theology of the cross. The task before the Church now in the Caribbean is to articulate an indigenous evangelical theology of the cross. What follows will be our attempt at moving in that direction. Finally, the idea of attempting to explicate the Christian faith in a new and different environment is in keeping with the dynamic activity of the Triune God, and with the formation of the scriptures themselves which bear witness to the very revealing activity of God.

B.

Doing Theology in the Caribbean: Caribbean Voices.

In her attempt to seriously apply herself to the task of articulating an indigenous Caribbean theology, the Church in the Caribbean must listen to the criticisms, reflections and suggestions that are emanating from the people of the region, both Christian and non-Christian, if her concern for indigenization is to be more than an empty word. In this way she will be able to take due cognizance of contributions that are peculiar to Caribbean man. The process of theologization will therefore include cultural forms that are more Caribbean than European or North American. Thus the Church will be announcing through its theology that there are many cultural, social and even political and economic expressions, which have arisen out of our historical experience, which are legitimate forms of expression for Caribbean man in the same way as European expressions are legitimate for Europeans. There is no way that the Church can avoid doing this in response to the challenge to "incarnate" the Gospel among the people. This process is intrinsic to the task of indigenization. Her theology must reflect the Sitz im Leben of Caribbean man if it is to be an indigenous theology. In the past, indigenization was done partially and often unconsciously; the task now is to engage in "theological indigenization" in a more complete and explicit and conscious way.

But indigenization of theology is not simply allowing the situation to be reflected in the Church's worship and liturgy, pastoral care and ministry, social action and preaching. That is only a necessary part of the process. The Church must also maintain its distinctive character and message, for it has a peculiar origin, source of life and identity in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Identity must not be submerged by

relevance. The two must continually form a dialectic. The quest for relevance in the Caribbean must not lead to the situation where the conditions of Caribbean man and society not only shape the message of the Gospel but also give it content. This would mean that the Church has lost its peculiar character of being "Christian". At the same time, the Church should not proclaim a message that is irrelevant to the real, concrete historical hopes and fears, joys and sorrows of the Caribbean people. Such a message would appear as being docetic. Furthermore, it would lead to the unconscious or even conscious imposition of a particular "foreign" cultural pattern upon the people whose own cultural values would thereby be rejected or made inferior. The content of the message of the Gospel must be presented in cultural forms and expressions of Caribbean people.

The task of maintaining the dialectic of identity and relevance is a very difficult one, and it must be tackled critically and with openness. Moreover, the Caribbean theologian needs to remember that the Gospel always comes wrapped in a cultural package and it is therefore impossible to strip it, for example, of all its Western cultural packaging and then re-wrap it in a Caribbean form. Likewise, the opposite applies equally as well. In the context of Christian theology, the process of indigenization (or "incarnating" the Gospel) calls for vigilance and openness: vigilance in discerning Law from Gospel and openness to both Law and Gospel, judgement and grace. It is with the view of taking note of the suggestions being made by Caribbean people concerning the task of doing theology in the Caribbean today that we now turn to the appropriate writings of four Caribbean writers: Michael Campbell-Johnston, S. J.; The Reverend Idris Hamid; The Reverend C. S. Reid, and Dr. Paul Singh.[40] Campbell-Johnston, Reid and Singh focus attention on the specific

question of a Christian-Marxist dialogue in the Caribbean, whereas Hamid concentrates primarily on the question of "theology and alienated Caribbean man". However, the reflections, criticisms and suggestions of all four are directly pertinent to our main concern with how to "theologize" in the Caribbean in the light of the alienating and explosive situation that prevails, in which Marxism and Socialism present a very critical challenge to the Church and to the people as a whole.

a.

Paul G. Singh: On Synthesizing Christianity and Socialism.[41]

According to Singh, there is an indispensable need in the Caribbean for "a radical God" and "a revolutionary Marx". The two are functionally necessary for the ongoing development of the Caribbean, and for the present and future welfare of the people. His conclusion is based upon an historical appraisal of the needs of the Caribbean people which have arisen out of the historical experience of exploitation under colonialism, slavery and indenture. Today, Caribbean man is faced with the problem of satisfying basic human needs: food, clothing and housing.

In this situation, Singh argues, a Christian-Marxist dialogue is of particular significance to the Caribbean. Noting that there is an unfortunate absence "of an indigenous philosophical tradition which clarifies the meanings of such basic concepts as justice, freedom, equality, democracy, brotherhood, truth within the Caribbean construct," he suggests that such a dialogue could lead to the creation of such a humanising and unifying tradition. He adds that in the process of the transference of cultural values from Europe to the Caribbean those values were

significantly distorted. It is hoped, therefore, that a Christian-Marxist dialogue will serve to generate a peculiarly Caribbean ideology which is not only appropriate to the needs of "a new Caribbean" but which is also acceptable to an overwhelming majority of Christians and Socialists. In the eyes of the Socialist, such an ideology must reflect the fundamental concern with the condition of the working-class who have been exploited under "colonial capitalism", while, in the eyes of the Christian, it must reflect the "functionally deeper religious experience" of the people which cannot be easily dismissed "as a mere 'opium of the people'."[42]

It is obvious that Singh is thinking of a particular brand of Socialism as well as a particular theological expression of the Christian faith. On both sides there must be the desire for neither confrontation nor accommodation, per se, but synthesis.[43] It is only through a synthesis that Singh finds the ideology for development emerging. This synthesis will not emerge from a dialogue between "both the imported forms of conservative Christianity and vulgar Marxism". Both "conservative Christianity" and "vulgar Marxism" need to be transformed and thereby be made open to each other, i.e., to a creative synthesis of the two.[44]

In this synthesis whereby a "radical God" and a "revolutionary Marx" meet, the overriding concern is with the needs of Caribbean man. According to Singh, this meeting will allow for a wholistic approach to man. At the same time, neither Christianity nor Socialism will suffer distortion, if, ultimately, they are both concerned first and foremost with man in his particular historical situation. In the creative synthesis where the "radical God" is needed to give the people "greater hope, courage and spiritual strength," and the "revolutionary Marx" is needed "to provide them with a quicker and bigger supply of better food, housing and clothing," the two are mutually complementary. Man's basic needs

are separated into two realms existing simultaneously: the inner, spiritual realm, and the external, material realm. Neither is dispensable in this life, but the Christian message is seen as transcending temporal existence, and as completing and fulfilling the partial and fragmentary redemption and happiness enjoyed in this world. Moreover, Singh points out, eschatological hope acts as a check against naive optimism in the possibilities for human liberation which Socialism offers, and this function does not necessarily qualify eschatological hope as "opium of the people".

> Poverty cannot be eliminated in a hurry. Planned Socialism can definitely hasten the process of alleviation. But while this is going on from generation to gereration, people must live and die, fortified by the superior Christian hope of absolute redemption and eternal happiness. 45

In his discussion of the question of a Christian-Marxist dialogue in the Caribbean, Singh shows an acute awareness of the danger that, despite its present dominance, Christianity may disappear from the consciousness of the people. This danger stems from the fact that Christianity has allowed itself to be too closely and uncritically allied to exploitative capitalism. Thus the worker who has traditionally thought of the two as being synonymous with each other, in rejecting capitalism, comes to reject Christianity as "an opium of the people". It is therefore with the view of avoiding this danger that Singh opts for a sacramental theology. Such a choice is inevitable considering his argument for a synthesis between Christianity and Socialism. In this theology, man, in his daily life, comes to have a satisfying experience of God. Speaking in the context of Guyana, Singh argues that theology must use non-religious terms in order that the Guyanese person might meet God in the material world which is outside of the formal structures of the Church and worship.

Singh does not, however, elaborate on what he means by man meeting God in the material world. Instead, he reminds us of the dilemma facing the Church as she seeks to "theologize" in the Guyanese context.

> Those Christian leaders who do not wish to see religion being swept out of human experience have two options: either reconcile Christianity with Socialism and hope that the worker will meet God in his secular condition, or make people aware of the transcendent presence in the midst of life and work in such a way that the secular becomes the possibility of the sacramental when faith opens their blind eyes. 46

He rejects the former which represents a reduction of Christianity to the point where it becomes subservient to Socialism, and shows his obvious preference for the latter when he notes a further positive function it might play in correcting certain inherent excesses in Socialism. That is, in addition to satisfying "certain social, psychological and spiritual need", sacramental theology, which upholds the total dignity and freedom of man, therefore

> . . . functions to remind over-zealous Socialists of what has been overshadowed by the over-emphasis on conformity, co-operation, togetherness, groupness: the view that the human person ought to be independent, self-directing, autonomous, free -- that is, an individual, a unit distinguished from the social mass rather than submerged in it. 47

There is no doubt that Singh wishes to preserve talk about God in Guyana and in the Caribbean as a whole. He is also concerned that a democratic form of Socialism be implemented for the development of the region. Both are necessary for and in the interests of the future of Caribbean man. Therefore he advocates a synthesis between a positive Christianity and a progressive Marxian-Socialism. The theology that emerges out of this debate for a synthesis is sacramental and, consequently, indigenous. Unfortunately, Singh fails to make clear how the sovereignty of the "radical God", who forms a synthesis with "a revolutionary Marx", is maintained. This failure is noticeable in his emphasis upon

the primacy of the condition and future of Caribbean man in the whole discussion on the question of a Christian-Marxist dialogue in the Caribbean. It is also precisely this emphasis upon Caribbean man that leads to the impairment of the concept of the sovereignty of God.

b.

Michael Campbell-Johnston, S. J.: Christian Socialism[48]

Campbell-Johnston, in appraising the critical question of how the Church in Guyana might respond to the growing challenge of Socialism, argues for a particular, synthetic Socialism: Christian Socialism. His argument stems from his basic conviction that properly qualified, "the basic aspirations of socialism are profoundly Christian in their inspiration". Consequently, he finds that "there is no reason why a Christian cannot be wholeheartedly a socialist." According to him, as long as Socialism promotes those values which are intrinsic to human development, then the Christian should not be afraid of wholeheartedly supporting it. This means that in the context of Guyana, the Church could freely join, and even play a leading role, in building a socialist society without losing its Christian identity. Campbell-Johnston explains what he means by a "Christian-socialist" society by quoting from Pope Paul VI's letter on "The Development of Peoples":

> 'A world where every man, no matter what his race, religion or nationality, can live a fully human life, freed from servitude imposed on him by other men or by natural forces over which he has not sufficient control; a world where freedom is not an empty word and where the poor man Lazarus can sit down at the same table with the rich man.'

Christian-Socialism, vis-a-vis any other form of socialism, as well

as the existing capitalism in the Caribbean, allows for the total development of man and not just for the satisfaction of physical and material needs, however important and basic they are. Thus Campbell-Johnston criticizes Capitalism for its preoccupation with "private gain and profit", and Socialism for its preoccupation with "merely economic growth and material standards of living." Both systems do not ultimately focus on the "fully human life" but only on significant facets of it. Consequently, where socialism attempts to correct the inherent evil of capitalism it errs by reducing man to mere material and socio-economic needs and their satisfaction. It is only in Christian-Socialism that "man does not live by bread alone" and, instead, "a person is valuable for what he is rather than for what he has." Moreover, under such a system, the liberating benefits of technology are maximized while the potential for human enslavement in technology is held in check. The primacy of man over structures and technology is unceasingly championed to ensure such a balance.

Reflecting on the divisions within Guyanese society which are made on the basis of race, colour, class, etc., Campbell-Johnston points out that "the fully human life" which Paul VI spoke about in his letter means that in Christian-Socialism all forms of discrimination are anathema. He therefore argues that any programme for the redistribution of the wealth in society on a more equitable basis cannot be determined by either race, colour, class, or political affiliation, etc. Rather, it must be "based on the assumption that all men are equally entitled to it." Christian Socialism insists upon a radical equality among all members of society. It is in this vein that Campbell-Johnston soberly warns that "as long as race continues to be a major divisive element in our society, then the road to true socialism will be effectively blocked." The

situation is made worse when the issue of racism is overlooked or downplayed as it is in classical Marxism where society is divided only along class lines.

Campbell-Johnston acknowledges that Socialism as an ideology did not have its origins in Guyana or anywhere else in the Caribbean. It is a "foreign" import. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that Socialism emerge from below, i.e., become indigenized. In this way it will become true Socialism relevant to the needs of the Guyanese people. Rejecting that form of Socialism which is characterized by the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or by "the dictatorship of the Comrade Leader of the Peoples" because it destroys rather than builds up the individual and intensifies oppression rather than abolishes it, Campbell-Johnston maintains: "True socialism cannot be forced upon a people nor can it flourish in an atmosphere of mistrust, fear or hatred. It has to grow from below in a climate of brotherly sharing, mutual respect and love."

Furthermore, he points out that the Marxian assumption that the abolition of private property would lead to the eventual eradication of socio-economic exploitation and oppression has not been verified by historical experience. This is because state ownership of the means of production and state control of distribution of the wealth produced in any given society, which are achieved through a programme of nationalization, are not synonomous with real and effective control of the productive and distributive processes by society. Under certain brands of Socialism, nationalization has led to various kinds of state exploitation and enslavement of the worker. In the light of this, Campbell-Johnston asserts that the "Christian socialist" must opt for a "mixed" economy of state control and private ownership. He explains that the "mixed" economy he has in mind will "both guarantee an individual's right to own and

posses the fruits of his labour and also ensure that his private property is not used to exploit someone else." He adds that Christians should diligently work to ensure that the socio-political climate that is engendered in the society is characterized by a balance between individual and societal freedom. Moreover, in full awareness of the historical context in which he speaks, he emphasizes that his concept of freedom is very inclusive of certian basic freedoms: "Freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of education, freedom of travel, freedom of election."

Finally, Christian-Socialism is where ". . . THE POOR MAN LAZARUS CAN SIT DOWN AT THE SAME TABLE WITH THE RICH MAN." This means that a concerted unrelenting effort must be made to gradually erode economic distinctions among the people in the society so that the gap between rich and poor might grow increasingly narrow. The purpose behind the struggle to bring about genuine fellowship between rich and poor is twofold: to "guarantee the widest possible participation in decision making at all levels", and, contingent upon that, to provide an effective means of preventing a new elitist class from emerging and occupying "the positions of power and privilege vacated by the former oppressors."

c.

The Reverend C. S. Reid: Towards critical but friendly collaboration between Christians and Marxists.[49]

Unlike Singh who calls for a synthesis of "a radical God" and "a revolutionary Marx", and Campbell-Johnston who advocates Christian-Socialism, Reid cautiously suggests that Christians and Marxists should

co-operate with each other in tackling basic problems such as the alleviation of poverty. Where such co-operation occurs, both parties need to recognize and appreciate what binds them together -- concern for the poor and the oppressed, for example -- and not delude themselves into believing that there are no fundamental and irreconcilable differences between them. He points out that, for instance, the two parties will need to recognize that there is a basic theological disagreement between them: the Christian is inspired in his social concern by his faith in God, while the Marxist, who is an atheist, is motivated by his love for man. Thus, for there to be a significant and meaningful co-operation between them, both must be guided in their attitude and action by the tenet "that one of the precious rights which makes man human is the right to dissent from the next man!"[50]

Furthermore, he criticizes the false assumption made by Marxists, in particular, "that to be a Christian is to become innocuous, or a non-person." At the same time, Reid reminds Christians that even where Marxists are seen as the "enemy", Christians are commanded to love and not despise them.

> Christians who enter into collaboration with Marxists must know with whom they are dealing and keep their eyes wide open. Marxists are not men of God -- but they are men for whom Christ died. Therefore, they are not to be seen as Social lepers. And their agitation and action have brought great gain to the peoples of the world. Even where they have not gained power, the force of their existence and Criticism has created conditions for Change. The Psalmist says, 'He maketh the wrath of man to praise Him.' 51

On the question of whether the Church in the Caribbean has been irrelevant to the needs of the people, Reid challenges Marxists to re-examine the historical record of the Church from a peculiarly Caribbean perspective. That is, instead of being "textbook Marxists" who merely imitate Marx's and Lenin's polemics against a reactionary Church,

Caribbean Marxists should show that they are progressive and open in the light of the significant differences in the conditions in the Caribbean vis-a-vis those in Marx's Europe or Lenin's Russia.[52] Referring specifically to Jamaica, Reid notes that Marxists need to honestly face the fact that the Church has played an invaluable role in education, in land reform programmes, and "in every working-class institution for the betterment of the masses". Thus, if Marxists are really concerned about the poor and the oppressed, they should not distort the Church's past in order to gain political power. It is obvious that such an act would not lead to an indigenous Marxism; instead, Marxism will remain a "foreign" importation and an exploitative imposition.[53]

The "alienness" of Marxism in the region is accented further by the way in which "successful" poor people are condemned and ostracised by Marxists. "Successful" poor people are treated as if they form part of a large and widespread bourgeoisie. But, Reid tells us, "we are not cursed with too great a body of bourgeoisie in the Caribbean." It is the poor who are widespread not the "successful" poor. The latter have been helped by their poor parents "to be <u>less poor</u>", and, therefore, in the midst of their "success" they carry with them the burden of many obligations to others. In Reid's view, Marxists (and others) need to see in the "success" of the poor "the symbols of the ability of man to rise out of the dust of poverty" rather than the grounds for abusing and ostracizing man.[54]

Reid sounds a strong note of the unique obedience of Christians to Jesus who is the transcendent Lord. According to him, it is Christianity and not Marxism that is more indigenous in the Caribbean. Furthermore, he insists that Caribbean people have had a unique history which does not fit Marx's or Lenin's analysis of society. On the crucial question

of "theologizing" in the Caribbean, he implies that it should be done in the light of the Church's discipleship to her Lord who calls her to love the "enemy". Finally, "theologization" does not mean that the challenge of Marxism must be made of central importance. Dialogue with Marxism calls for significant co-operation on socio-economic issues and not for a creative synthesis, Singh's or Campbell-Johnston's.

d.

The Reverend Idris Hamid: Towards a theology of human development in the Caribbean.[55]

The writings of Idris Hamid are seminal in the development of a Caribbean theology. They contain one of the most radical critiques of the dehumanizing influence of colonialism, slavery, indenture, and, even of neo-colonialism, in the Caribbean. The significance of his critique is made even greater by the fact that it is made by someone from the "inside". Hamid writes as one who has inherited a "colonial mentality", and who participates in a "sub-culture" which is what Caribbean culture is to him. In his critique, he severely attacks the Church for having allowed itself to be an accessory in the crime against Caribbean man.[56] For example, he points out that when the historical role of the Church is seen in the context of the centuries of colonial exploitation, it is found that it has had a noticeably debilitating and <u>domesticating</u> influence. Hamid writes: "when domestication meant a channeling of our energies and instincts into creative ways, this was not altogether wrong, but this was not the kind of domestication that took place."[57] The domestication that took place was equated with Christian conversion which was therefore

very often regarded not as a process "of quickening of the spirit but of accomodation."[58]

This process of domestication was not surprising when, as Hamid points out, it is remembered that in the theology of the Established Churches God was very often presented as the One who subscribed to and preserved the status quo. He was made captive to the politics, economics, sociology, etc., of the ethos of colonialism. He was therefore foreign to and even absent from the suffering and oppressed masses. He was made a partial God who favoured the exploitative ruling class. The Church was indeed an instrument of colonialism, albeit very often an unwary instrument. This situation was made even worse by the Church's failure to listen to and heed the prophetic voices which were present in some quarters in it. Consequently, the end product of her labour is "Colonial Man" who is still with us today.[59]

Hamid explains that when the open and crude forms of violence of the earlier period of colonialism were replaced by equally dehumanizing but subtler and less blatant forms of violence, the Church, by and large, failed to assume its prophetic role. Colonialism is both blinding and debilitating. Thus, the vision of liberation which was born among the oppressed was transformed into "assimilation". Hamid states: "Now the oppressed were worshipping at the same altars of the oppressors, striving to imitate their life styles, and accepting their values. Liberation now meant beating the oppressor at his own game -- even wanting to be an oppressor!"[60]

The message of God's partiality towards the powerful and dominant was emphasised by the notable and "conspicuous absence of the Exodus event as a meaningful symbol among the main-line churches."[61] Such a distortion of the Gospel of Liberation and freedom through omission, Hamid reminds

us, was consistent with the Church's capitulation to the ethos of colonialism. He says, "the Churches that accepted the ethos of colonialism could not have used the biblical Exodus motif with its implication for deliverence without calling into question that ethos."[62]

Despite the misrepresentations of the message of the Gospel in the main-line Churches, God as Liberator was felt and experienced by the subjugated people as being present among them. He was seen as the mighty Deliverer who accepted the people as they were, and who was working for their historical as well as spiritual freedom. Hamid argues that it was paradoxical that God was more present here than in the Established Churches and His partiality was more towards the poor and the oppressed than towards the mighty and dominant in society.

> In the innumerable and intangible ways in which he gives grace to men he gave to the oppressed and the down-trodden. He was present more in the canefields then in the cathedrals, more in the barracoons than in the basilicas, more in the 'protest' than in the 'obedience', more in their sorrows than in the sacraments of the Church. 63

The suffering masses experienced God in ways consonant with their real historical experience. Such an experience, it should be noted, inevitably contrasted with that prescribed by the theology of the ecclesiastical establishment in the Caribbean.

> When the Church preached many listened through the ears of their experience. God and Jesus Christ were understood in ways far different from that presented. This Christ is the one who sustained the people of the Caribbean when they were in the grip of civilized barbarity. He quickened their weary hearts to work for freedom, to hope in the midst of despair, to fight when the evil was overbearing. Thus God was working to undermine the establishment, not to stabilise it. And in so doing he worked against and in spite of the church at times. 64

By His actions on behalf of the poor, this God surprised the God of the Establishment.

The problem with this argument is that it tends towards projecting

two Gods. In terms of a theology of the cross, what Hamid says about the God of the oppressed is apt and evangelical. However, he fails to make clear whether the "two" Gods are not in fact one God, or not. This may be done in terms of using the Law-Gospel dialectic by speaking of a theology of glory where the Gospel is transformed into Law to legitimate the ascendancy of the ruling class over the masses, and a theology of the cross where God is paradoxically present among the poor and the oppressed working for their salvation which includes, but is not limited to concrete, historical liberation. In the latter, God who is sovereign Lord, surprises both the ruling elite as well as the subjugated class by refusing to be tied to the status quo and by befriending the poor and powerless. However, He is one Lord and not two, and His presence among the dominated class was not given for revenge on the dominant class. He cannot be made the ideological weapon of the poor and still remain sovereign Lord whose nature it is to love. Hamid fails to overcome this danger as we shall see when we come to his discussion on how theology may be done in the Caribbean.

In the light of his argument that the suffering masses experienced and responded to God in Christ in their own peculiar ways, he concludes that "in a sense there has already been an indigenous theology at work in the Caribbean."[65] He points out further that this "radical" response was a constant cause of disappointment among missionaries who were too tied to the ethos of colonialism where faith was expected to produce domestication and accommodation among the masses instead of the desire for and orientation towards freedom in the cultural and structural forms in society.[66] The fragments of an indigenous theology which Hamid finds in the history of the Church in the Caribbean are crucial for his own description of a theology of human development in the Caribbean. In attempting to elaborate on this theology, it is instructive to ask:

If, as Hamid persuasively argues, the situation in the Caribbean today is one which is characterized by "an inherited foreign structure, with a laity whose vision is largely colonial, and with a theology which is the theology not only with blind spots but also colonial orientation",[67] how do we therefore attempt to do theology in the Caribbean?

In answer to this question, Hamid suggests that we need to begin with a decolonialization of theology. This is a process which recognizes that political independence of individual countries is not equivalent to real and complete human emancipation. However, the former is a necessary step towards the achievement of the latter. The Church needs to recognize this in terms of its attitude toward society as a whole, as well as in terms of its theological reflections and <u>praxis</u> as a distinctively Christian community. As Hamid explains: "Decolonialization seeks to come to terms with this violent history and the new surge of social energy for deliverance. Decolonialization means the death of the Church as it is now: or to say it more mildly -- it means radical transformation of the Church as it now is."[68] It is therefore a negative and positive process, both death and resurrection. Also, it is simultaneously a movement away from one undesirable state of things and a movement toward a desired state of things. That is, the Church "has to move from the posture which produces a Colonial man and a system of values, theology and so forth, which validates the Colonial ethic, to forging a vision of a new man and providing the spiritual resources and theological underpinning for such a vision."[69] Furthermore, Hamid insists that the theme of Freedom or Liberation must be made central to the talk about God in the Caribbean. This is the only way in which a truly historical Caribbean theology may be fashioned to meet the current challenges in society. Only when Caribbean man himself engages in the process of theologization

in which the primary focus is on alienated Caribbean man and his need for genuine and wholistic liberation, Hamid reiterates, can we have a distinctive Caribbean theology of human development.[70] Hamid's emphasis upon the conditioning influence on "all forms of human thinking", which the social context has, leads us to ask the question: What does he see as the universal core of theology and how is it related to the social context? The answer to this question illustrates further Hamid's emphasis upon the "redemptive" nature of the decolonialization of theology.

In summary, he explains that the universal core of theology is the "living WORD" concerning "the activity of God". Whereas theology is a human activity of thinking and acting -- of reflection and response -- in a particular historical context, and, therefore, theologies are temporal, the WORD is eternal. Furthermore, theology is usually done "within a community of faith and experience". Hamid perceptively notes, however, that the theology of any believing community, which, it is hoped, emanates from the prompting and guidance of the living WORD, "never becomes that living WORD". This distinction is crucial if theology is to be distinctively Christian. Thus the decolonialization of theology "should not be considered an attempt on the part of the Church or churchmen to keep up with the current field, but rather as an attempt by the Church to come to an understanding of its mission in the new situation."[71]

As to what exactly he means by the "living WORD", Hamid does not make clear. This lack is understandable in the light of the suggestive and tentative nature of his writings which remain very brief. Nevertheless, his challenge to speak about the activity of the liberating God in the context of the Caribbean remains crucial, an aspect which the Church should not minimise or fail to recognize outright in her struggle to be faithful to her Lord. The significance of this fact is heightened when

it is recognized that, as Hamid argues, "the church is not in the world to service the world and keep it up. Rather the church, drawing its inspiration and stimulus from the future which God promises, challenges this world and calls into question the present world."[72] Thus, instead of developing a definitive understanding of the concept of the "living WORD", Hamid points us in the direction of eschatology, and to a much lesser extent, in the direction of Christology as the possible routes which Caribbean theology must begin exploring in great depth. Here eschatology, and Christology, viewed from a soteriological standpoint, are placed in the service of ecclesiology which is Hamid's main concern. In fairness to him, it should be noted that despite the primacy of ecclesiology in his theology, he does not indicate a separation between any of the major doctrines of the Church: they are all intertwined. He finds the eschatological dimension of the Christian faith especially applicable to the Caribbean situation.

> The future we abandon is the fruitless and futile futuristic hope. We now see the future as closer -- as tomorrow. So close that it impinges on the present and draws it forward. It does not lead to resignation but to action. He calls us to create a new vision of the future. This means the weight of the past injustices and the present dilemma is not left fatalistically for history to correct itself but that the Christian Community will labour toward the future. 73

He envisages a revolutionary participation of Christians in the struggle for a more just and human world. In this struggle the traditional divisions between faith and works, individual and communal freedom, material and spiritual, profane and the sacred, body and spirit, etc., will be dispensed with in preference for a more liberating unity which is closer to the truth of the "living WORD". Once again the fundamental question between the world and the Kingdom of God arises. This will be taken up in our discussion of Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.

According to Hamid, in the context of the Caribbean, a new approach to the Incarnation must be guided by the central concern by destroying the false dichotomy between body and spirit, etc. What he fails to recognize is that even modern eschatological theology suffers from a distorting dichotomy: between the Absolute Future which is coming and is already proleptically present, and the past which is being transformed by the radical inbreaking of the Absolute Future. As Langdon Gilkey poignantly states:

> The qualitative opposition between sin and grace is more fundamental in the Christian interpretaion of history than is the opposition between unliberated and liberated, oppressed and oppressors, and a fortiori more fundamental than the temporal opposition between past and future within history. 74

This criticism is most appropriate in view of Hamid's undue optimism concerning the imminence of the liberated future which is as close "as tomorrow". There is "a qualitative opposition between sin and grace" which still remains after, and inspite of the attainment of human liberation. Thus talk of two Kingdoms may not be anachronistic in the Caribbean, and in the world as a whole, today.

In the light of his emphasis upon an indigenous Caribbean theology which abolishes the false dichotomy between faith and works, theory and praxis, Hamid boldly claims that the Church must even "take the risk of preaching a theology of works!" By so doing, the Church will make her theology relevant to the material needs of the Caribbean people. As Hamid points out, "Once we sweated in labour of non-creative activity; in the era of independence we are faced with prospects of inactivity. From mal-employment to unemployment!" A theology of works is therefore necessary to the process of decolonization of theology. Through such a theology, the Church will be able to show that she is seriously concerned about the question of "human creativity within the purpose of God and

the fact of the destructiveness of that gift in our history."[75] Thus, whereas during slavery and colonialism, work was an enslaving activity, now, in the situation of political independence and post-colonialism, it must become a creative and liberating activity which is inseperable from the faith and worship of the believing community. Hamid admits that this synthesis does already exist "in the best of Christian theological understanding." What he is therefore calling for "is not the mere setting up of new attitudes to work," but the redemption of "work itself in the community; involving such things as for whom and to what end work is used."[76]

At this point, it is worthwhile to ask: How does Hamid's theology of human development compare with the theology of the cross? Like the Theology of Liberation and Moltmann's Political Theology, his theology points to an overriding concern with praxis-theoria and the human future. Furthermore, he shares an affinity with Liberation Theology in his argument that the process of theologization involves taking alienated man -- from the Caribbean -- and his social context seriously, i.e., to the extent that the starting point of theology is alienated man himself. Concern with God is therefore primarily soteriological. But the direction in which his understanding of soteriology moves shows that he is particularly interested in soteriology as human liberation and development. Talk about God "for man" has as its primary objective the humanization of man. Thus, in Hamid's theology immanence eclipses transcendence, and theology is reduced to an ideology of liberation. Moreover, in his attempt to theologize, in the Caribbean, in a responsible and relevant way, Hamid proceeds to minimize the themes of sola gratia and sola fides.

Finally, the fundamental Christological centre of evangelical theology, that God meets us in Christ even before we ever begin our militant praxis, is described in such a way that the God of the oppressed is not quite

the God of the oppressor. This contradicts the message of the Church that when God reveals Himself in the paradox of the cross of Christ, He does so for all people, both rich and poor, powerful and powerless; and, not only are the latter surprised to find He is on their side, but so are the former, as well. But God is also for the powerful. Judgement and grace are for them as well as the poor and the oppressed. Furthermore, the proclamation of the message of the presence of God in Christ who liberates all of creation from sin and the powers of evil is a call to life under the cross where real and ultimate, immanent and transcendent, hope is found. Therefore the call to liberating work is always a call to the response of grace, not a call to achieve merit in place of or through the aid of grace. It is a call to hope in God in the shadow of the cross, instead of hoping in the results of our human efforts to make God's tomorrow arrive today -- that is impossible to do! Thus an indigenous Caribbean theology must begin with the cross of Christ for it is only there that we find Cross and Resurrection are held together in a dialectical unity. In short, theologization in the Caribbean must lead to the theology of the cross, where the identity and relevance of the Christian faith form an intrinsic unity, if it is to remain firmly rooted in the decisive and definitive paradoxical revelation of God in Christ for the salvation of man and the whole cosmos.

C.

Towards a theology of Alienation and Reconciliation in the Caribbean.

One of the ways in which the Church may respond, creatively and meaningfully, to the challenge to articulate an indigenous theology of the cross in the Caribbean is by exploring the theme of a theology of alienation and reconciliation. This theme naturally suggests itself in view of the history of alienation in Caribbean society. Furthermore, it provides a unifying centre for an evaluation of Marx's Weltanschauung, the theology of the cross, and the task of theologization in the Caribbean.

It has been noted already that Marx's primary preoccupation was with alienated man and the historical process by which man may transcend his alienation. This concern with man finds an affinity with the interest in man displayed by the theology of the cross. In the latter, it was emphasized, all talk about God, who reveals Himself through Christ, was simultaneously talk about man since the gracious and loving God, whom man comes to know in faith, through and in Christ, has revealed Himself in this way for the sake of man. Thus, in the theology of the cross, we speak of the God "for man". This talk about God "for man" is, however, diametrically opposed to Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric world-view, in which God is a priori and methodologically dismissed from any talk about the humanization of man. According to Marx, God enslaves, not liberates man. In spite of this qualitative difference, however, Marx's emphasis upon man's liberation of himself and society through praxis-theoria has been significantly influential in many modern "theologies", not least the Theology of Liberation. Though his influence in the theologization process in the Caribbean is still in its nascent stage,

nevertheless, his call for historical liberation from all forms of socio-economic alienation -- the root of all alienation -- provides a challenge to the future, not only of Caribbean man, but of the Christian faith itself. Concern for the welfare of man and the proclamation of the Gospel go together -- in the form of relevance and identity -- but the two must not be equated and the distinction between them dissolved.

In the face of the pressing need for the liberation of Caribbean man from the enslaving legacy of colonialism, there is the constant danger that the Church may reduce the message of the Gospel to the task of ending alienation. Such a reduction may result not only from the more obvious and blatant accommodation of the Gospel to the Marxian ideals, but also, and, more significantly, from the attempt at forming a synthesis between the Gospel and Marx's philosophy for the sake of man. This point brings us to the crucial question: How do we define the "nature" of man? Are sin and alienation the same phenomenon?

In Marx's view, man does not have a fixed "essence" but one that is constantly changing in relation to the mode and the relations of production. To posit an eternal and static "essence" is to distort and dehumanize man and keep him in perpetual bondage. Marx therefore rejects any concept of "original" sin even as he rejects the Christian (and religious) belief in the existence of God. He argues that the only radical criticism of man is that which restores man to his rightful place, i.e., at the centre of all historical reality. Since such radical criticism ends with the call for the abolition of alienation, Marx's anthropological reductionism goes beyond Feuerbach's by calling for the revolutionary transformation of the socio-economic base of society.

When Marx's concept of alienation is made the functional centre of any theological approach to man, it is very difficult for the Church

to avoid the danger of ultimately contributing to the further enslavement of man by reducing him to a creature of real, material needs which can and will be historically satisfied. This danger occurs even when we talk about the praxis of the liberating God of love. In fact, when God is brought into the picture, it seems that He is made the instrument for humanization, manipulated and manipulable by man. All forms of "triumphalistic" praxis-theoria must be judged by the cross of Christ: they do not have their own self-legitimating principle. Where they seem to do, the sovereignty of God is minimized.

Moreover, an indigenous theology of the cross needs to emphasize, again and again, that the miracle of God's love is that He loves the poor, outcast and downtrodden whose lives can only be transformed through such a miracle. But God also extends His love to those who are classified as exploiters and oppressors. Only through the miracle of His love can they, too, be saved from idolatry and sin. If God's love is partial towards the poor and the oppressed, then His love is not universal and fully gracious. When today's oppressed becomes tomorrow's oppressors, can it be said that the love of God intends that? In the New Testament, the miracle of Jesus' love for the poor is not that He loves them instead of the Scribes and the Pharisees. Rather, it is that He loves those who belong to the Establishment, but also those who are "disestablished" by the Establishment.

Now, in contrast to the radical socio-economic immanentism found in Marx, which is significantly present in Liberation Theology, evangelical Christian theology proclaims the Gospel of reconciliation through Christ. It declares that the crucified and living God is both present in the world and is also coming as Absolute Future to transcend and heal all brokenness, alienation and sin. Hope based upon the promises of the

God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob . . . and of Jesus Christ, sees the presence of the Kingdom of God in history as a gift; and, it sees it coming from beyond history. There is therefore a tension between "in history" and "beyond history", between the "already" and the "not yet".[77]

This talk about the prolepsis of the Kingdom of God seemingly obscures alienated man and his present historical condition . However, this obscurity is only apparent and not real in the theology of the cross. As we have repeatedly stated above, man's total alienation is more fundamental and pervasive than his alienation from the socio-economic and political conditions of life. According to evangelical Christian theology, man is basically alienated from God, and, therefore, man's past, present and future must be seen from the perspective of his relation to God from whom he is separated. In existentialist terms, man's separation from God is expressed in his feeling of separation from himself and from others. The end of socio-economic alienation, through human effort, with or without the help of the praxis of God, which dissolves man's separation from others, does not constitute total humanization and reconciliation of man: man still remains a sinner separated from God. This fact does not mean that the Church must not engage in the struggle for the liberation of man. On the contrary, it is a call to such a struggle but with the recognition of the fundamental separation between man and God which man cannot bridge or heal. Only God can do that. This separation must not be confused with the creatureliness of man and the "Creatorhood" of God. Certainly, this duality constitutes a qualitative difference between man and God. But man is separated from God because of his sin and not because of his finitude as a creature. To be a creature is not dehumanizing; to strive to be God is!

Caribbean man, like all people, is alienated from God. This fact

needs to be clearly stated in any attempt at indigenizing theology even as it is being stated that Caribbean man is a peculiar "creature" because of his history, etc. In true egalitarian style, he, too, stands before God as a sinner. He stands alongside his colonial and neo-colonial exploiters and oppressors, as they (oppressed and oppressor) are both confronted by the cross of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ. Before God, both stand as beggars -- with open hands -- displaying no merit or grounds for His favour. That God should choose that His Son, the exalted Lord, should be served in the "least of the brethren" is His prerogative, not man's. His revelation is always paradoxical for it is never devoid of mystery. In Luther's terms, revelation is always done in "hiddenness".

By now, it should be clear that we wish to have a more inclusive concept of alienation than that posited by Marx. Recognizing the indispensable need to include the Marxian sociological account of alienation, we insist that sin embraces the individual, psychological, ontological and cosmic dimensions of alienation. In short, it takes us back to the primary alienation from God. Admittedly, such a concept does suffer from the inadequacy of presenting the human condition in static, not dynamic terms. However, in spite of its inadequacy, it still serves as a check on any fanatical and overly-enthusiastic expectation that the Kingdom of God, whether in its religious or in its secular form, will be achieved through human activity. This check still stands even when it is argued that man is seen acting in cooperation with God as a co-creator. But its usefulness is not only functional, but also evangelical, i.e., it is derived from the theology of the cross which we have advocated in response to Marx's Weltanschauung.

Our argument for the more inclusive concept of "sin" vis-a-vis the concept of alienation, leads us to a brief consideration of the concept

of "Original Sin". If the end of socio-economic and political alienation will not mean the total "humanization" of man, then, it is argued, the human condition transcends such alienation; alienation is a primary but partial description of the human condition. On the question of "Original Sin", Article II of the "Augsburg Confession" reads thus:

> It is also taught among us that since the fall of Adam all men who are born according to the course of nature are conceived and born in sin. That is, all men are full of evil lust and inclinations from their mother's wombs and are unable by nature to have true fear of God and true faith in God. Moreover, this inborn sickness and hereditary sin is truly sin and condemns to the eternal wrath of God all those who are not born again through Baptism and the Holy Spirit.
>
> Rejected in this connection are the Pelagians and others who deny that original sin is sin, for they hold that natural man is made righteous by his own powers, thus disparaging the sufferings and merit of Christ. 73

Caribbean theology must therefore examine the meaning of "Original Sin" as it seeks to work on behalf of man, in the name of Christ. Can theology remain Christian, Biblical and Confessional by obscuring or removing outright the concept of "Original Sin" from its vocabulary? Can it continue to talk of the decisive and definitive act of God in Jesus Christ for the salvation of the world while it articulates a "soteriology" based upon divine-human cooperation in the world to transcend sin as alienation? These are difficult but crucial questions which must be faced squarely if the Church's confession of, and life in the faith is to be evangelical and simultaneously relevant to the needs of man. As we have already noted this combination forms a dialectic. At best, to man, it remains ambiguous. In this perspective, faith in God through Christ plays a decisive role in distinguishing between ambiguity and paradox, Law and ideology, and Gospel. Once again, we turn to the Augsburg Confession and note, in Article IV on "Justification":

> It is also taught among us that we cannot obtain forgiveness of sin and righteousness before God by our own merits, works,

> or satisfactions, but that we receive forgiveness of sin and become righteous before God by grace, for Christ's sake, through faith, when we believe that Christ suffered for us and that for his sake our sin is forgiven and righteousness and eternal life are given to us. For God will regard and reckon this faith as righteousness, as Paul says in Romans 3: 21-26 and 4: 5. 79

The question to be asked here is: Can such "justifying" faith become active in love for the neighbour at the individual and societal -- spiritual and structural -- levels of human existence to the extent that such an expression of the faith is not seen as being tied to the status quo in society? Can it do so by talking about Jesus as the "Liberating One", the One whose name means "Freedom",[80] without reading the conditions of alienated (Caribbean) man back into the life, death and resurrection of Jesus so that it is the condition of man and his society that both explicates and shapes, as well as provides the content of the message of hope and salvation? The Confessions of the Church, used as an ongoing historical aid to the interpretation of Scripture, can certainly serve to recall the Church from any dehumanizing distortions.

This brings us to the central thesis of our argument: Christology is the key to doing theology in the Caribbean, and elsewhere. Any talk about the power and presence of God in the midst of Caribbean man's predicament must be Christological, embracing the cosmic as well as individual dimensions of God's work of reconciliation through Christ. Reflecting on the need for the talk about cosmic reconciliation in the face of widespread alienation and sin in the world, John Macquarrie writes:

> As I see the situation, the problem for religious communities is to find the best means (which will no doubt vary from one area to another) of bringing their vision of a cosmic overcoming of alienation to bear on the alienation of contemporary societies. 81

In specifically Christian terms, this means that the emphasis must be

placed on God's reconciling work in Christ. Writing in this vein, Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that the "the unity of one history" that has been effected through the event of Christ embraces "antiquity, modern times, and their future."[82] This means that the history of Caribbean man is not left isolated and alienated, without the hope of participating in Christ's cosmic redemption. The Christian tradition is a "unifying bond" which keeps antiquity, modern times and their future from falling apart. This is a message of hope to Caribbean man who does not need to reject his present because of its alienated and alienating antecedent; but, in critical awareness of his past, he can, in the light of the vision of the future transcendent reconciliation, work creatively to proclaim hope in the world and beyond it. His hope is not rooted in a future separated from the present, but in a future that is already present in the cross of Christ. Resurrection hope and liberation in and through, and, ultimately from suffering are seen through the "eyes" of faith in the cross of the gracious God who is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Let us now look more closely at Pannenberg's comments about man's nature and "the unity of one history".

He argues that man, as creature, is inherently dependent upon God. Man is created to be in a relationship of trust in God, not in a relationship of control of his own future. Thus, contrary to Marx's concept of man as his own creator, Pannenberg points out:

> Man always perceives himself as dependent on something before which he stands: beyond the world on God and within the world itself on the material basis for all technological development. He is dependent on the social and intellectual traditions out of which he lives, <u>even where he turns against them</u>. He is dependent on what happens to him from day to day and from hour to hour without his cooperation. He is dependent on the men who are with him, and upon everything that is given to him through them. In all that and beyond that he is dependent on God. (Emphasis mine.) 83

Furthermore, man's essence is not limited to the socio-economic conditions in society, for, "Just as exchange and the division of labour do not necessarily lead to the loss of man's essence, so the pressure of serving mammon is not a fateful power."[84] This is a direct refutation of the Marxian thesis that man is alienated through the division of labour and by seeking the monetary rewards of his labour, instead of finding his fulfilment in the enjoyment of what he has produced. Pannenberg does admit, however, that "money frequently becomes an idol to which a person sacrifices everything else." But he refuses to accept the definition of human nature in terms of the existence of money, for example. Money, he insists, is merely a functionary and an expression of the more pervasive evil: greed. He explains that

> greed is always present first as the dominating impulse. It is not man's alienation through money which brings to power the sense of possession, as Marx thought. It is rather the latter which sets the former process in motion. Only where greed for money already completely fills a man can money attain such a power over him that everything else, things as well as men, has significance only in relation to money. Only where man has become entirely enslaved to covetousness does the automation of the economic development of capitalism, which Marx described so impressively, take place. 85

At its very root, such covetousness is a consequence of man's separation from God. Therefore, while it is accepted that economic and political systems need to be radically transformed -- they have demonically enslaved man and distorted his humanity -- in order that they may conduce to man's enjoyment of a more humane existence, it is to be recognized, at the same time, that this separation through rebellion can only be overcome through the gracious act of God. According to Pannenberg, man's control over the world must be distinguished, though not separated, from his relationship of trust in God -- control is derived from trust. "Only faith in the infinite God of the Bible, who is beyond everything finite,

has given the world of finite things completely into man's control." In other words, "the power to control the world has its origin not in man himself but in trust in the infinite God, through which man soars out beyond the limits of his finitude."[86] Pannenberg concludes that "where control over the world becomes its own end, the perversion has already taken place." (Emphasis mine.) Consequently, "life becomes absorbed in procuring the means of life; life is no longer received as a gift."[87] (Emphasis mine.)

Finally, we turn to Pannenberg's description of the "unity of history". He paints a picture of the Biblical hope in the transcendence of all separation, alienation and sin. Unlike the Marxian vision of an unalienated future in history created by man alone, his is a vision of "the future of God". This future is centred in and promised through Christ. "Through Jesus men have a future of salvation with God beyond all earthly suffering, which was concentrated in Jesus' cross." Participating in this future through faith, the Christian loves Jesus for the sake of his neighbour. As Pannenberg says: "Such a person can now open a future for other men in a similar way, through the loving devotion that corresponds to what he himself has already experienced from God."[88]

Moreover, the power of this message of hope for man (including Caribbean man) is not exhausted by human suffering. Aware of the problem of theodicy that arises in the face of so much inexplicable and demonic suffering in the world, Pannenberg, nevertheless maintains that in the unity of history that is rooted in the God of Israel, who uniquely revealed Himself in Jesus of Nazareth, "man's destiny attains its unified configuration, which incorporates each individual man with his uniqueness and his particular path."[89] Reconciliation is given through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. In the unity of the destiny of all men,

the individuality, the personhood of each unique individual, is not destroyed nor damaged, but fulfilled and recreated. In Pannenberg's view, the "unity of history as it is established in Jesus' fate makes it possible for each individual to attain the wholeness of his own life by knowing that he, together with all men, is related to that center."[90]

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that the Church in the Caribbean would find the critical need for a theology of alienation and reconciliation as she seeks to fulfill her mission in society. Such a theology, we have tried to point out, must deal with the historical experience of alienation of Caribbean man, but, it must also go beyond that to deal with the question of sin as separation from God. In meeting this challenge, the church will need to explicate the individual and cosmic dimensions of the Incarnation. It was with this aim in mind that we briefly examined Pannenberg's concept of universal history.

Now, the question of man's creaturely control over the finite things of the world leads us back to the concept of the "Two Kingdoms". We will therefore turn our attention below to a discussion and a critical appraisal of Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. This undertaking will be done in the recognition of the need to place man's activity in its proper perspective vis-a-vis God's work of redemption and reconciliation through Christ. In the Caribbean, the Church is confronted with the task of finding a way of participating meaningfully in the building up of the future, liberated Caribbean man and his society. Is this a task that is firmly planted within the kingdom of the world? How might the Church theologize on this issue in order that she may faithfully proclaim the Gospel and administer the Sacraments which are her primary tasks? These and other pertinent questions are strategically placed before us as we

prodeed with our discussion of the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.

D.

Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.[91]

We have already noted that when Marx wrote, "The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it," he issued a critical challenge not only to philosophy but also to theology. This challenge, we argued, surrounds the task of describing the world as it is, and, more particularly, of enunciating and implementing a comprehensive strategy for the radical transformation of the world. To simply talk about the state of the world without engaging in revolutionary praxis is to indulge in the process of ideologization and, in doing so, to provide further legitimation for the status quo. Theory which does not result in liberating praxis may and can only bring partial freedom which, according to Marx, will be eventually overshadowed by the actual intensification of alienation.

Thus, in order to achieve the historical transcendence of alienation, there must, and will be, a creative synthesis between theory (theoria) and praxis among the proletariat, the most dehumanized class in society. Out of this synthesis, man will be able to create real human history and genuine and dynamic, human "nature". In Marx's ethics, man is the measure of himself; he is answerable to himself alone. This means that there is no transcendent Creator, who is the ground and source of man's life and creative capacities, to whom he is answerable. The truth about man is that he is in fact his own and only creator. According to Marx's concept of man, man's response to his needs, his accountability to himself,

is not a response to grace, but of human necessity. In theological terms, this means that man creates his own merits, his own "righteousness", through human effort in order to "justify" himself in the community of production. Therefore, he does not depend upon the graciousness of God or any other transcendent being in his quest for authentic, unalienated existence.

In the theology of the cross, however, we speak about man as a creature whose freedom is bound up with his response of faith to the God whom man experiences as gracious and loving in the crucified and risen Lord, Jesus Christ. As a creature, man is dependent upon God, and in his sin, he is incapable of transforming his condition of rebellion against God. Only God can heal this broken relationship that is the result of man's active rebellion against Him. Thus, in doing so, through His gracious act of suffering the death of His Son for the sake of man, God reaffirmed man's condition before Him as a creature of response. Before God the Creator and Redeemer, man is always in the situation in which he may respond in faith or "unfaith" to the grace of God. Acceptance or rejection of the grace of God does not abolish the fundamental condition in which man is placed, that of creature, vis-a-vis God. Moreover, whatever man's response may be, God, who meets man in the contrariness of cross and suffering, is also sovereign Lord. It must be said, however, that it is only to those who respond in faith in Christ that Jesus is de facto Lord; and, to those whose response is rejection Jesus is de jure Lord, i.e., Jesus' Lordship remains hidden.

The response of faith is not without implications for the Christian in society. Indeed, such "saving" faith is characterized by love for the neighbour. Thetwo -- faith in God through Christ and love of the neighbour -- are inextricably bound together; they form the dialectic of

Christian existence in the world. Properly experienced in the life of the Church, this dialectic calls for neither an ethic of quietism and of withdrawal from the world through a total concentration on the development of an exclusively inward piety which has no direct bearing on the life of the Christian in society, nor a praxis of justification by concentrating on the transformation of the world into the Kingdom of God or of Christ (or its closest approximation), to the extent that one is justified before God by such praxis. In the former, there is a dichotomy between "other worldly" and "this worldly" piety so that the world is seen to be in the hands of the evil powers, and God is absent from it. In the latter, this dichotomy or dualism is replaced by an equally distorting monism in which the Kingdom of the world is, fully and totally, the only Kingdom of God. In an evangelical Christian theology, both dualism and monism are seen as distortions of the Gospel. Thus it insists upon maintaining the dialectic of faith and love, the transcendent and the immanent, as the authentic expression of the encounter between God and man in the world.

Our argument here therefore leads us to a critical examination of Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms where he explicates the dialectic of Christian existence in the world we have just been describing. Luther's understanding of the Two Kingdoms is viewed from the perspective of his theology of the cross. Thus his ethics of love is seen as arising out of his doctrine of justification. Acts of love which the Christian performs, are directed towards the neighbour and not towards God who does not need them for Himself. Yet, in acting on behalf of the neighbour, the Christian is simultaneously exercising his faith in God "in terms of obedience, and of thanks and praise to God."[92] Moreover, at the same time, the Christian is responding in the freedom of the Gospel since he

no longer needs to worry about his own salvation. Christian freedom that is rooted in our justification by God, through faith in Christ, is made concrete in the form of care for the neighbour and him/her alone. As Paul Althaus explains:

> The man who does something to gain his own salvation really cares only for himself. However, God has already provided for my needs -- therefore I do not need to be concerned about myself. Indeed, God gives me what I need in advance when I, through faith, receive his grace and favor. Beyond that, nothing more is needed. 93

Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms is therefore practical and experiential, not theoretical and speculative. It is concerned with the activity of God in the life of the believer, and, also, in the life of the unbeliever, for both are His creatures. Let us now look more closely at some of the main features of this doctrine.

From his study of scripture,[94] Luther concluded that, from the perspective of faith, God exercises a twofold rule over and in the world. There is a spiritual rule and a secular rule, corresponding to a spiritual kingdom and a secular kingdom, respectively. He writes:

> . . . we must divide the children of Adam and all mankind into two classes, the first belonging to the kingdom of God, the second to the kingdom of the world. Those who belong to the kingdom of God are all the true believers who are in Christ and under Christ, for Christ is King and Lord in the kingdom of God as Psalm 2 (: 6) and all of Scripture says. 95

It should be noted that though it is through the Church, which proclaims the Word and administers the Sacrament, that people are called to faith in Christ -- by the power of the Holy Spirit -- this does not mean that the Church is equated in Luther's thought with the Kingdom of God. Even to the "eyes of faith" the Kingdom of God is only partially revealed, for Christian existence is always under the paradox of cross and suffering. This necessary distinction between the Church and the Kingdom of God is and evangelical critique of any ecclesiastical triumphalistic

pretensions and tendencies. We shall return to this point below.

In his assertion that the two classes of humanity stand before God in different relationships, Luther uses fairly clear language. He explains that, whereas those in the Kingdom of God are "under Christ", those in the Kingdom of the world "are under the law." Here we see his use of the Law-Gospel dialectic to describe the nature of man's relationship to God. He claims that if there were Christians alone in the world then there would be no need for the restraining influence of the law. In saying, "There are few true believers, and still fewer who live a Christian life, who do not resist evil and indeed themselves do no evil," Luther is suggesting that the believer who lives out the freedom of the Gospel is less tempted by evil than the unbeliever. Therefore, because there are both Christians and non-Christians in the world, God has had to make provisions to restrain those who would be given to the practice of evil, i.e., the unbelievers.

> For this reason God has provided for them a different government beyond the Christian estate and kingdom of God. He has subjected them to the sword so that, even though they would like to, they are unable to practice their wickedness, and if they do practice it they cannot do so without fear or with success and impunity. 96

We notice here that Luther uses the concept of "government" as well as the concept of "kingdom" in his description of God's way of dealing with His Creation. The two are related to each other: God's rule in His two kingdoms is exercised through two governments which He has set up. In the Kingdom of God we have the spiritual government, and in the Kingdom of the world we have the secular government. Whereas the term "kingdom" may suggest withdrawal (of God), the term "government" suggests a more dynamic and active presence of God in the spiritual and secular realms. According to Heinrich Bornkamm, this means that "both duality

and unity thus seemed to be preserved."[97] Commenting on the fact that God has established these two governments, Luther notes:

> . . . God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, by which the Holy Spirit produces Christians and righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which restrains the un-Christian and wicked so that -- no thanks to them -- they are obliged to keep still and to maintain an outward peace. 98

We return once again to the use of the Law-Gospel dialectic in God's twofold rule in the "world" -- by the Law in the secular government and by the Gospel in the spiritual government. Again, it should be emphasized that the relationship between political government and God's secular government, as well as the relationship between the Church and God's spiritual government is a dialectical, not a natural and unambiguous one. Furthermore, the terms "kingdom" and "government" must not be separated from each other nor seen in opposition to each other. Rather, as Bornkamm argues, both their duality and their dialectical unity must be preserved in order that they may "indicate the two inseparably intertwined aspects of the whole, the realm of lordship ('kingdom') and the mode of lordship ('government'), and [that] they may be used to distinguish these aspects."[99] The originality in Luther's thought, Bornkamm adds, lies precisely in the fact that he combines both perspectives of two kingdoms and two governments which means that, on the one hand, there is "the ruthless separation of the world and the kingdom of Christ as well as, on the other hand, the governance of both of them by the will of God according to the modes of his love."[100]

In distinguishing both kingdoms and governments from each other, the Christian must remember, at the same time, that they are both necessary. Only Christ's government makes people righteous. Thus the temporal government must not be allowed to usurp the place of Christ's government. Noting the indispensable nature of Christ's government which extends

beyond history into eternity, Luther argues that where Christ's kingdom is abolished or becomes absorbed by and is therefore indistinguishable from the temporal government and only the latter "or law alone exists", "there sheer hypocrisy is inevitable, even though the commandment be God's very own."[101] In this case we will have a theology of glory, not a theology of the cross. By the same token, Luther adds,

> where the spiritual government alone prevails over land and people, there wickedness is given free rein and the door is open for all manner of rascality, for the world as a whole cannot receive or comprehend it. 102

Notice that here Luther does not speak about the doctrine of justification and its distortion. According to his understanding of the function of the spiritual government, the absence of this form of rule will not mean that God's righteousness, which justifies the sinner, will become impaired. Instead, its absence will result in libertinism and its accompanying wickedness and violence. The body may be harmed but the soul will remain unscathed.[103] It must be emphasized, however, that the Kingdom of the world is established to serve the Kingdom of Christ, i.e., by preserving peace and preventing chaos, the temporal government allows for an atmosphere in which the Gospel may be preached and the Sacraments administered. But even where such peace is absent and chaos reigns, the Church is still called upon to carry her ministry for her existence is always sub cruce.[104]

From our presentation of Luther's teaching concerning the Two Kingdoms, it should be noted that there are certain serious ambiguities and contradictions. For example, he speaks of Christian existence as being under the Gospel and not under the Law, while non-Christian existence is under Law, not Gospel. The result of such a separation between Law and Gospel is a false and dangerous dualism between Christian and non-Christian existence, and an eclipsing of the fact that the Christian is simul justus

et peccator.[105] The Christian, who is simultaneously righteous and sinful, needs both Law and Gospel. As sinner, he needs to be restrained by the civil and political law -- and not judged by the "spiritual" law alone -- so that he may not injure or neglect his neighbour. This does not deny the truth that the Christian is freed from the Law as a means of righteousness before God, nor that he has the guidance of the Holy Spirit available to him. Indeed, because of his freedom through the Gospel -- he needs to hear this message again and again -- in contrast to the non-Christian, he is called to a higher obligation to the secular government in the Kingdom of the world. He needs to be constantly reminded that in this kingdom he is serving God and not someone else. This is precisely how the unity and duality (not dualism) of the Two Kingdoms are maintained: through the life of the Christian in both kingdoms. Of course, this does not mean that God does not -- the truth is that He does -- use those who have not as yet come to faith in Christ to carry out His will and purpose.

The distinction between God's work in His Two Kingdoms may be seen in terms of Luther's use of "proper" and "alien" to describe God's activity in the Kingdom on the "right" and the Kingdom on the "left", respectively.[106] The first and the second Articles of the Creed, on Creation and Redemption, respectively, are therefore seen as forming a unity.[107] In terms of Luther's theologia crucis, the personal word of grace for man is seen in the context of Christ, while the preserving work of God is seen in His provision for continuing and sustaining life. Bornkamm provides a useful summary of Luther's understanding of the unity of God's love for and work in the world when he says:

> The fundamental tenet of Luther's political ethics grew out of the center of his theology. It rests upon faith in the unchangeable relation of God to the world, which has not suffered alteration in will or purpose because of the abyss that sin has opened up between them, but has only changed in means.

> Because of sin, the free community of love which God has wanted humanity to be, and which gleams again in the life together of true Christians, has changed into an order of law and coercion. The distinction is similar to that between God's 'strange work' and his 'proper work' about which the young Luther liked to speak. 108

Another ambiguity in Luther's thought, which is related to the problem of the proper understanding of the use of the Law-Gospel dialectic in both kingdoms, concerns the Lordship of Christ in the Two Kingdoms. We spoke of both kingdoms as being the realm in which God's activity occurs. Thus the Kingdom of the world, and not only the Kingdom of God, is also the sphere of God's <u>love</u> as well as His wrath. However, we did not refer to this Kingdom as being Christ's. Does this mean that the Lordship of Christ, that is proclaimed in terms of cross, resurrection and exaltation, does not embrace this realm as well? If, as Althaus points out, "God — and not Christ -- institutes" the secular kingdom, which is indeed God's not Christ's, and "Christ is concerned only with the spiritual kingdom. He concerns himself about secular government as little as about God's working in nature -- as about storms, for example,"[109] does this not lead to a false and debilitating dichotomy between the presence of Christ's Lordship in the spiritual kingdom and the absence of His Lordship in the secular kingdom? We return once again to the distinction between the <u>de facto</u> Lordship in the former, and the <u>de jure</u> Lordship in the latter. This is a paradox. Christ's universal Lordship is real but hidden for it awaits eschatological fulfilment. Describing His Lordship in terms of a paradox is inevitable in view of the fact that Christ's Kingdom is in the heart of the believer. It is a Kingdom that emerges through the activity of the Holy Spirit who moves people to faith through the proclaimed Word. The Holy Spirit builds up the Kingdom of Christ through the Word, the Sacraments, and brotherly consolation. By this means, the

de facto Lordship of Christ is achieved.[110] It needs to be pointed out, however, that the building up of the Kingdom of Christ is not to be equated with the triumphalistic Christianization of society by gradually absorbing everyone into the Church. In the light of the theology of the cross, the "growth" of this Kingdom can only be perceived partially, and, then, only through the "eyes" of the cross. The surprise of those chosen in the final judgement, according to Matthew 25: 31-46, is a clear reminder against any definitive quantification of those who belong to the Kingdom of Christ.

At this point it is appropriate to ask: Since Christians, in view of their membership in both Kingdoms, have a higher obligation to serve the neighbour in love as unto Christ Himself, what sort of ethic of the cross is to be suggested for Christians? Furthermore, since the Christian is called to renounce all claims to self-glory and attempts to merit God's favour and grace, can this ethic ever be a mere imitatio Christi? In answer to the second question, it must be initially pointed out that imitatio Christi, whether it leads to "worldly" triumphalism or to suffering, shame and even death, is not a way of salvation, and, also, is not really possible in terms of contemporary conditions in the world. Certainly, an ethic of the cross calls the Christian to bear his/her cross, but in the particular situation of his/her own existence. Mere imitatio Christi is rather static and runs the risk of making Christ and His Gospel into Law. Yet, the truth is that the Christian is called to follow Christ, and to experience anew daily his baptism, i.e., a continuous dying to self and rising in the crucified and risen Christ. Douglas John Hall writes:

> The beginning of the ethic of the cross is the identification of this people [Christians under the cross] with the Crucified One. It is the reduction of this people to nothing,

> beggarliness, and brokenness. Only through that reduction, continuously accomplished, is it possible for this people to be truly identified with God's work in the world. 111

Thus the ethic of the cross embraces the duality of Christian existence which is *simul justus et peccator*. The Christian is free to stand in solidarity with all people, irrespective of their race, religion, class, etc., in the struggle to bring greater dignity, humanity and wholeness to human living in the world. He is not afraid to admit his beggarliness before God, nor does his "hiding" in the righteousness of Christ mean that he is to be blind to his experience of total sinfulness *coram Deo* in common with all humankind.[112] As Hall notes, the Christian, on the basis of the social ethic of the cross, even dares to stand with the Marxist -- of course, from a responsible and critical perspective.

> Thus the point of departure for *this* social ethic may be the only one that is finally legitimate, even in terms that secular men, such as Marxists, can recognize: namely, *a real solidarity with those who suffer*. Only as the Christian community permits itself to undergo a continuous crucifixion to the world can it be *in* the world as the friend of those who are crucified . . . . Real solidarity with those who suffer recognizes that their condition is our own: we are all beggars together. 113

With Hall, we suggest that an ethic of the cross of Christ means that Christians are to see their cross as meaning suffering with those who suffer. If we expand the meaning of the word suffering to include both spiritual suffering -- i.e., in relation to God -- and material suffering -- i.e., socio-economic and political suffering -- then it can reasonably be concluded that the crucified and risen Jesus Christ is present, though veiled from human eyes, in both forms of suffering. Through the proclamation of the Gospel, He becomes revealed to the eyes of faith. The Christian therefore bears his cross in the world because he believes in the hope of Christ in the world and for the world. Once again, we are confronted with a dialectical unity: the unity of the

Lordship of Jesus Christ in the Two Kingdoms through the presence of Christians in both kingdoms, that is, the paradoxical unity between the cross of Christ and the cross of the Christian in the world.[114]

The issue we have been debating thus far may be aptly summarized thus: How does God continue "to keep alive a world which has fallen prey to death, after the new aeon in Christ has already been inaugurated in its midst and has become a reality in the life of Christians through the Holy Spirit"?[115] In pointing out that Luther responds to this question in terms of the concept of the Two Kingdoms, we insisted that the two kingdoms must neither be separated from, nor equated with each other. However, in arguing for a creative dialectical harmony between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of the world, it may have appeared that there is the absence of conflict or struggle between the two. The truth of the matter is that there is a real struggle which the Christian should feel all the more because of his twofold existence.[116] The Church must be vigilant in maintaining this struggle not as an end in itself but as a reminder that the Kingdom of Christ has not been fully revealed: "Just this is the sign of the eschatological situation, which is not yet the end itself."[117]

In his description of existence in the secular kingdom, Luther speaks positively about the role of reason. As Carter Linberg argues, "This is the radical element in Luther's theological-political thought. The ecclesiastical legitimation of the state is overturned and replaced by the legitimation of reason."[118] At first glance, this idea of "the legitimation of reason" in Luther seems to contradict his emphasis upon a theology of the cross. But this is not a contradiction but a tension for reason has a rightful place in the secular sphere where both Christian and non-Christian are called to act "through law and justice, to preserve the

world from chaos."[119] In doing so they participate in the sovereign power of God. This is another mode of God's love which is often experienced as wrath because of sin. That is, "there is an inherent and necessary element of coercion which contradicts the free order of love in the kingdom of God".[120] When reason is used in the context of the secular kingdom, there is a relativization of all social structures. These structures are de-absolutized and freed for rational analysis. This does not mean that they are devalued or that God is no longer present in the realm in which they exist and operate. Rather, it means that Christians are free to serve their neighbour in love through a recognition that all structures are relative and temporary; only the Kingdom of God is eternal. But does this radical relativization not lead to withdrawal from the world and the process of humanization? Does "penultimacy" not result in a reduction of Christian commitment to the world? Unfortunately, the history of the Church does show instances of an affirmative answer to these questions. But this does not invalidate our argument for the necessity of the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. Indeed, as we have repeatedly emphasized above, the tension between the two kingdoms, between reason and revelation, Law and Gospel, is intrinsic to an evangelical theology of the cross. It is in this vein that Linberg, writing on the temporalizing influence of reason on the social structure of Luther's day (and those that have since emerged), says:

> In other words, the Christian is to take seriously the task of world-building and the maintenance of culture, and civilization, but always with the condition that every culture, every system of justice, and every political structure is only relative and instrumental for the humanization of persons. Tradition is to be conserved with insight into its dehumanizing aspects and its penultimacy. Reason and love are to be active in the continual task of socialization in the recognition that God, not the Law, nor the past, nor the empire, nor the church, is sovereign in history. For Luther, faith alone grants the security to

> live within the insecurity of relative structures. It is only by faith that persons can avoid the defensive sanctification of past, present, or future goods and values. Faith enables persons to be persons because it lets God be God. 121

We see, then, that reason, when exercised in relation to the neighbour and to socio-economic and political structures, i.e., in relation to the secular government and kingdom, does not contradict, nor conflict with God's universal love for humanity nor His specific love in Christ. Rather, it acts in harmony with it. Such a conclusion, according to the theology of the cross, is based upon faith.

Our discussion of the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms brings us to the critical point where we must now appraise Marx's Weltanschauung from the standpoint of that doctrine. Whereas, before, in our discussion of the theology of the cross we were attempting to formulate an evangelical Christian response to the challenge which Marx's concept of man and theory of history presents to Christian theology, at this point, it is appropriate to reverse the order. When we do this, it becomes very obvious that Marx's discussion rightfully belongs to the secular realm, to the realm of reason. He is concerned about man, society and nature, which, according to the theology of the cross, are all temporary and transitory. They will pass away. Marx himself recognized this but this did not mean that he thereby became open to the transcendent power and Kingdom of God. Instead, in terms of his understanding of historical and dialectical materialism, he posits an eternal and dynamic process of mutation in human history which, under the "free" future, will be unalienated, and will continually produce an unalienated human world.

Though it is being argued that Marx's Weltanschauung "rightfully" belongs to the secular realm, it should be pointed out that, because of its atheistic base, it stands at polar ends with the theological talk about

man coram Deo. His "ethics", for example, are not built upon a theological but an anthropocentric and "materialistic" base. Moreover, his radical immanentism, in which there is a monistic, not dualistic view of reality, is an antipode to the theological concept of the Two Kingdoms. Thus, his naive optimism about the emergence of the liberating proletarian revolution is to be rejected. Yet, in doing so, the theology of the cross must recognize that it must not minimize the centrality of Christian celebration in Christian worship and existence. It must guard against using the concept of the Two Kingdoms as an ideology of the status quo which seeks the preservation of the "old order" because it is seen as being absolutely binding since it was ordained by God, and/or because the transformation of the "old order" will mean an end to the privileges and dominance of a particular class or elitist group in society.

But, it is not only Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric world-view that is judged by the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms; any theological formulations that would suggest that sin is not basically a separation from God from which all other societal forms of alienation are derived, but that it is primarily socio-economic and political alienation, are likewise judged and condemned by the Law. Such a reduction of sin does not fully conduce to human liberation since it does not allow God to be God. Reason has usurped the place of faith. In the light of this, any synthesis of Christianity and Marxism which is not seen as no more and no less than an appropriate strategy for humanization of man and society, but is seen as a definitive expression of the Christian faith, is to be rejected. In the ongoing quest for an indigenous expression of the Christian faith, the Church must guard against reducing the Gospel to Law by making the imperative into the indicative of the Gospel.

Finally, the Church is called to be the Church of Jesus Christ and

not an agency for social action. While it works for the humanization and not the Christianization of the world, it must ever be vigilant in its proclamation of the Word and the administration of the Sacraments, and in its solidarity with the poor and the oppressed. It proclaims that, in the eyes of the crucified and risen Christ, even the misfit, the unproductive and "colonialized" person is invited to share in the Kingdom of Christ and experience in faith the de facto Lordship of Christ in his/her life and in the world. The Christian, who is simul justus et peccator, is a citizen of two kingdoms but of one world.

CONCLUSION

The overriding concern in this thesis has been with the question of confessing the Christian faith in the Caribbean. It was pointed out at the beginning that this task points the way towards an explication of the theology of the cross where we find God is paradoxically revealed in hiddenness. Where God seems most absent, i.e., in the cross of Jesus Christ, there He is most present, revealing Himself as gracious and loving.

In our discussion of the Church's mission of confessing the faith, in word and deed, in the Caribbean, we approached the question of a theology of the cross as a response to the challenge of Marx's Weltanschauung. Moreover, we also attempted to show that in responding to the challenge of the Caribbean situation, the Church is called to speak about God in terms of a theology of the cross. We pointed to a theology of the cross not only because of its particular relevance to the situation in question, but, more especially, because it is a sound evangelical theological method, universally applicable to the task of doing Biblical and confessional theology. Accordingly, we followed the method of Luther's theologia crucis, in particular, as well as Moltmann's "Trinitarian political theology of the cross" and Liberation Theology in our attempt to articulate a theology of the cross. Looking at the thesis from an overall perspective, it will be seen that there are three significant facets: a theology of the cross; Marx's concept of man and his theory of history; and the alienation of Caribbean man and the need for the transcendence of his alienation.

In the foregoing critical description of Marx's anthropology, the concern was with showing that Marx's writings, both early and mature,

contain a peculiar Weltanschauung, in which man was viewed as the centre of his existence and of all historical reality. It was asserted that this anthropological preoccupation is more evident in Marx's early writings rather than in his mature writings. Thus, our presentation of Marx's Weltanschauung was derived primarily from his early, philosophic writings, especially the 1844 Paris Manuscripts. However, the primary assumption in this discussion was that there is a fundamental continuity between the early and the mature Marx which was based upon Marx's basic concern with alienated man under developing and increasingly degenerate capitalism. This anthropological concern was not replaced in Marx's later writings by any other concerns such as describing the economic laws of history. On the contrary, the philosophic and humanist perspective sketched out in the early writings continued to provide the inspiration of Marx's other, later emphases.

Marx's world-view, it was pointed out, functioned (and functions) as a soteriological system by which man, not God, has the sole responsibility for the transformation of the very basis of society, the mode of production, and for the "recreation" and redirection of the forces of history so that they will eventuate in the transcendence of alienation, and continually conduce to man's creation and enjoyment of real human freedom.

It was argued that in the concept of alienation, which he borrowed from Hegel, Marx found an inclusive concept with which to describe the condition of man in the history of the world so far. According to Marx, even before the emergence of industrial capitalism in western Europe, in the nineteenth century, which marked the apogee of human degradation, man lived under alienation. Indeed history up until Marx's day was regarded as the history of alienation. He called this period pre-history. Moreover, alienation was supposed to continue until after the occurrence

of the proletarian revolution and the emergence of the future society under communism. Communism was itself viewed as a transitory phase, for it will in turn be transcended ad infinitum by future "free" societies. This whole process was to be the creative activity of man himself -- freed from all dependence upon or enslavement to gods or God, or any other transcendent power or being which might have hitherto claimed man's obedience.

Marx's insistence that man is the real architect of his own destiny, the creator of his own essence and future, must be seen in the light of Marx's understanding of the forces of history. In his view, the forces of history were comprised of two fundamental components: the mode of production, and the relations of production. However, it was the former that was the primary determinant, though the latter also influenced the former. One of the fundamental theses in Marx's philosophy was that revolutionary changes occurred in history whenever the mode and the relations of production came into conflict; out of this conflict, a new dialectical harmony was created.

It is crucial for an accurate reading of Marx's Weltanschauung to remember that, according to him, man's ultimate liberation will only occur through the critical and revolutionary activity of the proletariat. As the most dehumanized class in society, Marx found that they alone are capable of acting as a universal class to transform the socio-economic base in society. Such a revolution will only occur when the material conditions of society (forces of production) reach that critical conflictual point, mentioned above, and when, simultaneously, the proletariat are possessed of a "liberated", messianic consciousness. The "kairos" will have then arrived.

Unfortunately, Marx was far from clear and unambiguous in his

description of this "kairos". He failed to maintain the indispensable tension between both the primacy of human freedom and the primacy of the forces of production, in his argument for the eventual emergence of "final" communism from alienating capitalism. He was not totally empirical in his analysis of the capitalist mode of production, and in his anticipation of its radical demise. Despite Marx's own feeling to the contrary, it is conclusive that his analysis of capitalism and of the alienation of the worker were ethical in inspiration and intention. This conclusion is tied to our argument that Marx's world-view functioned (and functions) as a soteriological system. In Marx's view, his so-called non-ethical pronouncements stemmed from his actual discernment of certain "laws" of history.

The main argument in the presentation of Marx's concept of man and theory of history was that throughout his entire writings, both early and mature, Marx was preoccupied with man. He was convinced that his philosophy of man was far more humanizing than any other philosophy, both religious and secular (and this included Hegel's and Feuerbach's), which had been hitherto promulgated. In fact, his concern was with real, living man, and with genuine historical, liberating praxis-theoria. It was, finally, his radical reduction of all reality to human history, to an atheistic, anthropocentric, immanental reality, where man is viewed as the final arbiter and standard of himself and of his future, and where the material forces of history dialectically conduce to human liberation, that constitutes the fundamental component of Marx's Weltanschauung.

The central argument in the discussion of the theology of the cross was that Marx's world-view posed (and poses) a crucial challenge to Christian theology: how might it continue to speak about God? And, who is this God? Where is He? Put more elaborately, the question was:

how might Christian theology give due consideration to the legitimate criticisms of religion explicitly stated by Marx, not by opting for a Marxian hermeneutics, or for a Marxian future vis-a-vis any version of the Christian hope, but precisely by arguing from an explicitly Biblical and theological base, in its confession of the faith? Noting Marx's obvious and, indeed, noble struggle on behalf of man, Christian theology found itself faced with the task of once again explicating the faith so that the truth of God's transcendent and immanent concern for man was most visible. Such an enterprise, it was argued, may be effectively undertaken in an evangelical theology of the cross. This enterprise was construed as a call for an explication of the radical concept of God contained in that theology. It was a return to the paradoxical revelation of God through the cross of Jesus Christ. Furthermore, it was pointed out that cross and resurrection were held together and not separated from each other. Hope in history and hope beyond history, i.e., in the Absolute Future of God, were seen in the context of the cross of Jesus. There we find the gracious God. God is paradoxically present in the cross of Jesus Christ. It is the cross of the risen Christ Jesus who had been crucified for the sake of man. The last word of the cross is not despair and nihil, but hope: hope in the presence of the God of wrath and of love.

In the theology of the cross we are given a description of God who reveals Himself, not in glory and triumph, and power -- according to the world's standards -- but in shame and defeat, and powerlessness, i.e., in the suffering and death of Jesus Christ upon the cross. Through the Holy Spirit, the Church bears witness to the message that the liberation of man as well as the true definition of man's nature are not and cannot be the product of human effort; instead, it occurs solely through the efficacy of the Word of God in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

When man raises the question of the tragedy of human existence, he is to look to the God of Jesus Christ for there he will find a gracious God hidden in His wrath. He wills to be ultimately gracious. He does not turn a blind eye nor a deaf ear to human suffering, pain and death. The Triune God suffers for the sake of man. Only through the God of the cross can man find real, human freedom. To ask man to liberate himself is further enslaving and will lead to demonic consequences, as history has vividly demonstrated. Salvation and reconciliation are sola gratia.

It was maintained, however, that human praxis, because of the gospel of justification by grace alone, was free and humanly fulfilling in relation to the neighbour. In other words, being reconciled to God through faith in Jesus Christ, the Christian is free to serve his/her neighbour in love. This service involves both individual and corporate action, and it also calls for both inner spiritual transformation as well as external transformation of the socio-economic, political, and other material structures of human existence. It is especially in relation to the latter that Christian theology may and does find some significant grounds for dialogue and co-operation with Marxists. But it does so on the basis of the conviction that God in Christ acted decisively and definitively for the sake of man. Like the Marxist, the Christian works on behalf of man; however, unlike the Marxist, the Christian is motivated by his/her obedience in discipleship to the crucified and risen Lord, Jesus Christ. Such a motivation, it was argued, does not impair the dignity of man, nor does it display a concern for man which is subordinate to that of the Marxists'. On the contrary, it is a confession that man's "being" transcends man's own self-definition, for it is bound up with the suffering and crucified God Himself.

This point leads us to note, in passing, that our concern, in

responding to the Marxian challenge, was not with the Christian-Marxist dialogue per se. It was certainly evident in our discussion that we were aware of that phenomenon. However, in the context of our primary concern with the mission of the Church in the Caribbean, we sought to engage in that dialogue only indirectly. Instead of concentrating primarily upon finding common ground for dialogue and co-operation with Marxists, attention was directed to the question of how the Church in the Caribbean might continue to speak about God and confess her faith in Him and in His presence in the world, as well as confess the hope in the resurrection of the dead, and in the eschatological fulfilment of reconciliation through Christ.

Here it should be noted that the theology of the cross which was articulated was not simply a presentation of the difference between sin and grace, human freedom and divine freedom, etc. These were necessary aspects of the theology of the cross which is both a practical method for "talking" about God as well as an evangelical proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Those motifs are all interrelated to each other and their foundation and focus is the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

Following the discussion of the theology of the cross, attention was drawn to the peculiar history and dilemma of Caribbean man. It was pointed out that the appeal of Marx in the Caribbean was not because of the presence of a proletariat in the region, nor because of the presence of the degradation and alienation that have accompanied the ever advancing technologization of the society. The region is mainly agricultural, and certainly not industrialized on any such scale comparable to what Marx may have envisaged when he viewed and analysed western European society and its future. Furthermore, it was emphasized that there are pervasive plural divisions and forces within the societies in the region. Therefore

Marx's division of society into two fundamental classes -- the capitalist and the worker -- was found to be far from an adequate description of any of the Caribbean societies, and, certainly, of Caribbean society as a whole. There is the notable and crucial absence of a Marxian proletarian consciousness among the masses in the region. In short, according to the Marxian view, the conditions are not "ripe" for the proletarian revolution.

However, in spite of the obvious absence of those components which are necessary for the occurrence of the proletarian revolution according to the predictions of classical Marxism, the Caribbean region is a very explosive situation. It is a situation which has arisen out of the economic, social, political, racial, etc., problems which plague Caribbean societies. The challenge to the Church, which these conditions pose, did not arise out of her own failure, per se, to fulfil her social mission as best she could; rather, it is the result of the failure of capitalism whose roots go back to the very formative years of Caribbean society which was founded upon the alienating plantation system. Under this system, a small European oligarchy enslaved and exploited a disproportionately larger non-European population. These were the conditions under which Caribbean man's ambiguous mentality was formed and historically passed on from generation to generation.

In comparing Marx's description of the alienation of the worker with the alienation of Caribbean man, we acknowledged that the two were not the same though they shared significant similarities, such as lack of ownership of the means of production, and powerlessness in relation to the overall economic structures in society. With reference to Caribbean man, it was argued that he was an enigma, that he was neither African, nor Indian, Portuguese nor Chinese, European nor North American. Moreover,

to say that he is a West Indian or a Caribbean person, which points to his historical, cultural and geographical orientation, does not solve the problem, but merely contributes a significant and necessary ingredient to the definition of who Caribbean man is.

It is merely wishful thinking to argue, as Marx does, that the abolition of private ownership of the means of production will generate the radical proletarian changes in the attitudes and behaviour of the masses which Marx anticipated it would. This criticism is not intended as a dismissal of the acute need to end economic exploitation by large, impersonal corporations. It needs to be recognized, however, that the real symbolic power in communal ownership of the means of production, in Marx's terms, is mitigated by many factors, not least of all the inaccuracy and naiveté of his utopian predictions based upon his obvious positive humanism. In the context of the Caribbean, the factors noted above in our discussion of alienation and pluralism severely diminish the symbolic power in "worker" ownership of the means of production. The conclusion therefore is that ideas and consciousness as a whole -- i.e., the superstructure -- have an inherent life of their own in the sphere of human reality. This superstructure is shaped and influenced by the socio-economic conditions in society. However, they are not derived solely from that base. Thus awareness of and dependence upon God is not the result of the alienated productive process. On the contrary, it results from the fact that the question of God is intrinsic to all reality -- and this includes human reality -- and to the quest for authentic humanity, both historical and eschatological.

On the question of doing theology in the Caribbean, we looked at some tentative suggestions of four Caribbean churchmen. They provided an ecumenical and pan-regional flavour to the debate. It was found that all

four writers were acutely concerned with Caribbean man. In their writings, there was an explicit awareness of the alienation of Caribbean man, and of the need to work for his real historical liberation. Singh, Campbell-Johnston, and Reid openly discussed the question of a Christian response to Marxism. In Hamid's presentation there were obvious echoes of this concern, though there was no clearly stated reference to that particular problem. On the whole, in these Caribbean "voices" of the Church, the three primary factors, which the Church should consider in its confession of the Christian faith, and which we have attempted to describe in this thesis were present: Christian identity in Christ and the need for a kerygmatic, "servant" and sacramental theology; Marxist/Socialist way to human liberation and the building of the future utopia; and the alienated condition of Caribbean man and his society.

The central thesis in our argument above has been that the first of the three factors is the overriding concern of Christian theology. But it is precisely that concern that leads to a critical consideration of the other two factors. The content of the Christian message is revealed in the cross of Christ. It does not arise out of a speculative appraisal of the historical context in which the message is proclaimed, in word and deed. When the church does not take the situation seriously, she runs the risk of proclaiming a "docetic" Incarnation. By the same token, when the situation shapes and gives content to the message of the Gospel, an ideology of glory results.

Moving from the discussion and appraisal of the Caribbean "voices", we then turned our attention to the question of a theology of alienation and reconciliation in the Caribbean. It was emphasized that the peculiarity of Caribbean man (of his history of alienation, etc.), should not minimize or obscure the inherent commonality of the fundamental separation

from God which he shares with sinful and reconciled humanity. Caribbean man is also fundamentally separated from God and can be ultimately reconciled to God, to himself, and to his fellow human persons, through faith in Jesus Christ. Such a reconciliation is not triumphalistic for it is experienced sub cruce: the cross of Christ leads to the cross of the Christian. It is only through Jesus Christ that the Kingdom of God has come and will come. Therefore Caribbean man's salvation and reconciliation are also sola gratia.

It was argued, further, that only in the context of sola gratia that human praxis is placed in its true perspective which is the basis of, and conducive to real, human freedom. This freedom was described as eschatological in scope, and is not merely confined to history where it is proleptically present. However, instead of speculating about who and where such a God is who offers this salvation and reconciliation by grace alone, we argued that Christian theology looks to the paradoxical revelation of the love of God in the cross of Jesus Christ. There it finds its hope, both historical and eschatological. Consequently, attention was finally drawn to Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, where, it was argued, a critical use of this doctrine is necessary to maintain the tension between the "already" and the "not yet", between historical anticipation and eschatological fulfilment of God's reconciliation of the world to Himself through the suffering, death and resurrection of His Son, Jesus Christ.

If the Church's existence and mission arise out of the activity of the Triune God in the definitive and decisive activity of God in the God-Man, Jesus Christ, which means that the "nature" of the Church comprises both an historical and an eschatological dimension, then the Church cannot avoid concrete, incarnate and loving action in society on behalf of man;

nor can it avoid pointing to the presence of transcendent hope in the world today. Concrete action alone, even in response to the Marxian or other challenge, without the accompanying proclamation of the presence of faith and hope in the midst of and beyond the results of human praxis-theoria, is in danger of reducing the Church to the status of just another social relief agency. Moreover, it would not be the most loving thing to do for the sake of man. As we have shown above, it does not constitute a fully radical and wholistic view of man; and, certainly, it is not radical obedience to the God of Jesus Christ. The Weltgeist is not the Holy Spirit. Scriptural texts, such as Matthew 25: 31-46 -- whether taken by itself or in the context of the rest of scripture -- do not legitimate such an exclusive interpretation of the Church's mission in the world, or in any particular society.

However, proclamation of faith and hope in God, when divorced from real, genuine and loving action, is a blatant distortion of the Gospel, and it leaves the impression that the message of the cross is just a speculative message among other messages, and not the peculiar message of the scandal that God the Son became incarnate and suffered and died and rose again for the salvation of the whole world. Here faith and hope are empty of meaning in the world, and the cross is no longer central to Christian theology.

The message of the love of God becoming incarnate which does not find expression in concrete action, including simple acts of kindness and radical acts for the transformation of structures which dehumanize man as well as allow for unchecked manipulation of human sin and greed in the lives of individuals and groups, and in society as a whole, will seem hollow and ineffectual. It is a distortion of the evangelical meaning of the powerlessness of God. In other words, the power of God

in His powerlessness on the cross does not provide the basis for Christian or so-called Christian societies, or any individual or group, to enslave and dehumanize individuals, groups or societies. Such an ethic is not an ethic of the cross, but of a theology (and ideology) of glory. Both the history of Christendom and of Marxism have repeatedly fallen victim to this distortion which has led to demonic consequences. When such an ethic is practised by parties identifying themselves as being Christian -- and who are identified by their victims as such -- God is presented as the promoter of injustice and oppression, instead of as the One who supremely suffers on behalf of man to the extent of allowing His Son to die on the cross to break the power of sin and the demonic forces, and to pay the cost of human sin. It is true that the Church is made up of sinners, but this is not an excuse for inactivity, or indifferent or distorted activity. Rather, in the name of Jesus Christ, those very sinners, and this means all, who are freed by the Gospel, are called to engage in both individual and corporate liberating activity on behalf of the neighbour. By neighbour is meant those "who are of the household of faith" as well as those who are regarded as being outside that household. In other words, the neighbour is to be found both within and without the visible Church. This is the way of Jesus who came for sinners.

Finally, it is sobering to note that Marx's philosophy, as a Weltanschauung, might easily gain a strong footing in society through the "legitimate" route of "protest" atheism. As a social institution, the Church must be open to criticism, including the Marxian critique of ideology. However, the Church must not allow herself to be guided or manipulated by such criticisms. The Church must remember that she is also a divine creation and she is judged and forgiven by the Law and the Gospel, not by Marx's "principle of ideology critique". Through Word and

Sacrament, which find simple and radical, and, at best, ambiguous and fragmentary expression in concrete action among believers and in society, the Church is called to be faithful to her Lord, Jesus Christ. In the face of the challenge of Marx's Weltanschauung, the Church dares to proclaim Jesus Christ and him crucified, that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, that Christ will come again to judge the quick and dead and to bring His Kingdom to completion. In other words, the Church dares to articulate a theology of the cross.

N O T E S.

INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER I

1 By Caribbean is meant those areas which today make up the Commonwealth Caribbean (British). This means that the non-English-speaking islands, including Cuba, Puerto Rico, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the French Islands, and the Dutch Islands are not included. Besides the English-speaking islands, including St. Lucia, we include Guyana and Belize, (on the South and Central American mainlands, respectively,) which have shared a common history with these islands.

2 Wolfhart Pannenberg, The Apostles' Creed, trans. by Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1976), p.13.

3 Ibid., pp. 13 - 14.

4 Wolfhart Pannenberg, What is Man?, trans. by Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), pp. 116 - 117.

5 As their name implies, these writings were fragmentary in nature. Marx himself did not give them a collective title, but they have come to be popularly called the Paris Manuscripts, 1844 Manuscripts or Economics and Philosophic Manuscripts. From here on we shall, for the most part, refer to them as the 1844 Manuscripts. See Karl Marx, Early Texts , trans and ed. by David McLellan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), pp. xxvii - xxix.

6 Marx's writings after 1844 have come to be popularly known as his "later" works. They are also referred to as the "mature", "authentic", "historical", "official" Marxian writings. It should be noted that reference to the "young" or the "mature" Marx is another way of indicating that it is with the thought, theory, or philosophy contained in the early or later Marxian writings, respectively, that we are concerned. See Robert A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (London: Heinemann, 1966), p. 285.

7 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 386 - 387.

8 See Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Unger Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 70 - 71.

9 Adam Schaff, "Studies of the Young Marx: A Rejoinder", in Revisionism, ed. by Leopold Labedz (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962), pp. 188 - 189.

10 Marx denounces "Ideology" as being "false consciousness". Ideas, he argues are derived from the socio-economic base of society. In his state of alienation man is constantly creating illusions of reality which are relative to each historical epoch. In our use of the term here we are intending a more positive connotation than Marx did. It is taken to mean a programme for the transformation of society. Whether positive of negative, Marx spoke of such programmes as being transitory.

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11 Iring Fetscher, "The young and the old Marx", in Marx and the Western World, ed. by Nicholas Lobkowicz (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 20.

12 See Ibid., p. 22.

13 Ibid., p. 20.

14 Donald Clark Hodges, "The Young Marx - A Reappraisal", Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, Vol. xxvii, no. 2 (December, 1966), 219.

15 Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1965), p. 111.

16 Ibid., p. 113.

17 Ibid., p. 111.

18 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 362.

19 Ibid., p. 361.

20 Daniel Bell, "The 'Rediscovery' of Alienation", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. Lvi, no. 24 (November 1959), 951.

21 Ibid.

22 See Ibid., p. 935.

23 David McLellan, Early Texts, pp. xxxii - xxxiii; see also, Daniel Bell, "The 'Rediscovery' of Alienation", p. 945.

24 Marx, "A correspondence of 1843", in Early Texts, p. 82.

25 Ibid.

26 More will be said below about Hegel's influence on Marx when we come to discuss the concept of alienation. Bertell Ollman, Alienation (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 35, perceptively notes Marx's heavy reliance upon Hegel's vocabulary when he writes:- "It is hardly remarkable (though seldom remarked upon) that whenever any system - owning attribute of a factor is at question, Marx generally relies on Hegel's vocabulary. 'Identity', 'abstract', 'essence' and 'concrete', for example, are all used by Marx as they were by Hegel, to mark some aspect of the whole in the part, to refer to an ontological and not a logical relation. These terms which appear in rich profusion throughtout Marx's writings - late as well as early - cannot be consistently interpreted in any other way".

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27 Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (second revised ed., London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 170.

28 Ibid., p. 172; see also Max Braunschweig, "The Philosophic Thought of Young Marx", in Alienation Vol. 8, ed. by Gerald Sykes (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 503, 508.

29 McLellan, Early Texts, p. xxxv.

30 V. Lenin, Aus dem Philosophischen Nechlass, trans. given by D. McLellan (Berlin: 1949), p. 99, quoted in D. McLellan, ed. Early Texts p. xxxv. Of course, Lenin's interest in Hegel was not the same as Lukacs' or the other scholars' who, after 1932, became involved in deciphering the early writings of Marx.

31 See McLellan, Early Texts, p. xxxix.

32 Ibid., p. xxxviii; see also, Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962), p. 146, E.J. Hobsbawm, "Introduction", in Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, trans. by Jack Cohen (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1978), pp. 9 - 11.

33 See Iring Fetscher, "The young and the old Marx", in Marx and Western World, pp. 31 - 32.

34 Helmut Thielicke, The Hidden Question of God, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1977), p. 35.

35 McLellan, Early Texts, pp. xxxviii - xxxix

36 Hobsbawn, op.cit., pp. 84 - 85.

37 See, Kamenka, op.cit., p. 144, and D. Bell, "The 'Rediscovery' of Alienation", p. 943.

38 See Gajo Petrović, "Marx's Theory of Alienation", Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, Vol. xxiii (September, 1962 - June 1963), 419.

39 See Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1954), p. 432, quoted in McLellan, Early Texts, p. xxxvi.

40 McLellan, Early Texts, p. xxxvi.

41 Ibid., pp xxxvi - xxxvii.

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42 Ibid., p. xxxvii; see also Gaylord C. Le Roy, "The Concept of Alienation: An attempt at a Definition", in Marxism and Alienation, ed. by Herbert Aptheker (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), p. 9. "Marx did not drop the concept of alienation but he did come to subordinate it, to make it a part of a larger and more complex system of ideas. It is retained in the theory of fetishism of commodities in Marx's mature theory, but whereas in the early manuscripts alienation has a central importance, the theory of fetishism functions in the later work as only a subordinate part of a bold, extensive, and complex apparatus of theory".

43 McLellan, Early Texts, p. xxxvii; Fetscher, op.cit., p. 35, points out: "In his (Marx) study of the commodity character of products, his analyses from his early writings are taken for granted".

44 Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1954), p. 488, quoted in McLellan, Early Texts, p. xxxvii.

45 Marx W. Wartofsky, "Comment", in Marx and the Western World, ed. by Nicholas Lobkowicz, p. 40, disputes the argument that the 'young' Marx was 'abstract' while the 'mature' Marx is more 'concrete'. He finds that this is "a positivist myth" and suggests: "A profound view of the integrity of Marx's views from 'young' to 'old' is to see in Marx the fundamental continuity of of certain root-concepts - in particular, the central ones of alienation and objectification".

46 It is debated whether in his early writings Marx conceives of a fixed "essence" in man. Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, pp. 150 - 151, argues that there was achange in Marx's conception of human nature. Marx, he points out, came to reject his earlier concept of a fixed nature. Despite this change, Kamenka insists that the fundamental continuity between the early and mature Marx's conception of man was not destroyed.

47 Kostas Axelos, Alienations, Praxis and Technē in the Thought of of Karl Marx, trans. by Ronald Brunzina (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), p. 49.

48 The amount of material available on this topic is very exhaustive. Among the works that were of significance for our discussion are: Frank Johnson, ed. Alienation (New York: Seminar Press, 1973); Walter Kaufmann, "The Inevitability of Alienation", in Richard Schacht, Alienation (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971), pp. xiii - ivi; Schacht, op.cit., pp. liv - lxv; István Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation (London: The Merlin Press, Ltd., 1970), pp. 27 - 65.

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49 See Schacht, op.cit., p. lix; David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, Fontana Library of Theology and Philosophy (London: Collins, 1973), p. 219.

50 Kaufmann, op.cit., p. xvii, points out that "the modern interest in Hegel's and Marx's discussion of alienation seems to date from" the publication of George Lukacs' book, Der junge Hegel (The Young Hegel).

51 Johnson, Alienation, p. 3.

52 Kaufmann, p. xxii.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., p. xxiii

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., p. xxviii

57 This point is discussed below in greater detail; see, pp. 58 - 64.

58 Kaufmann, op.cit., p. liii.

59 Ibid.

60 Schacht, Alienation, p. lxiii.

61 Arnold Kaufman, "On Alienation", Inquiry, Vol. 8, no. 2 (Summer, 1965), p, 143, as quoted in Schacht, p. lxiii; see also, p. 238.

62 Lewis Feuer, "What is Alienation? The Career of a Concept", New Politics, Vol. no. 3 (Spring, 1962), p. 132, as quoted in Schacht, p. lxiii.

63 Ibid.

64 Kenneth Keniston, The Uncomitted : Alienated Youth in American Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), p. 452, as quoted in Schacht, pp. lxiii, 238.

65 Schacht, p. lxiii

66 Ibid., pp. 251 - 252.

67 The legacy of Hegel was taken up particularly by his disciples, including the Bauer brothers, Bruno and Edgar, D.F. Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx. For an informative discussion of the "Young Hegelian Movement of the Left", see David McLellan, The/

The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx (London: MacMill an and Co. Ltd., 1969), especially, pp. 1 - 20; and Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. 1, The Founders, trans. by P.S. Fulla (London: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 81 - 95.

68 For an illuminating but brief discussion of the main difference between Aristotle's philosophy and Hegel's 'expressivist' philosophy, see Charles Taylor, Hegel (Lond on: Cambridge University, Press, 1975), pp. 15 - 18.

69 Ibid., p. 76.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid. For a definition of 'expressivism', see p. 540; Taylor, p. 548, argues that Marx belongs to this tradition or movement.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.; see Also Kolakowski, The Founders, pp. 56 - 70, for his informative description of "Hegel's understanding of the movement of consciousness towards the Absolute.

74 Ibid., pp. 76 - 77.

75 Ibid., p. 88.

76 See Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and General Philosophy", Early Texts, p. 174. The implict circularity in Hegel's argument, as described by Marx, is noted by Kolakowski, op.cit., p, 61.

77 Taylor, p.89.

78 Ibid.

79 Schacht, Alienation, p. 35. For the purpose of ease in following his discussion on alienation, his use of the subscript "1" and "2" when he speaks of "Hegel's twofold Use of 'Alienation'" - 'Alienation' and 'Alienation'- are retained in the main body of the text of this thesis.

80 Ibid., pp. 38 - 39.

81 Ibid., p. 38; see also, Taylor, pp. 68 - 75.

82 Ibid., p. 41.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., pp. 50 - 52

85/

85 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J.B. Baillie (revised second ed., New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 509, quoted in Schacht, Alienation, p. 46.

86 Ibid., p. 517, quoted in Schacht, p. 51.

87 Schacht, pp. 51 - 52.

88 Taylor, p. 74, observes: "In other words the notion that man is related to a larger, cosmic subject went along with a displacement of the subject of history in Hegel's thought, who is no longer simply man - if indeed, he ever clearly conceived it as such - but Geist. What needs to be done in the sense carried through by intentional action is thus not the institutional transformations of history, for these can no longer be intentionally encompassed in this sense, but rather the recognition of what Geist has in train and the connecting of oneself to it. It is this, of course, that the young Marx was protesting against when he complained that 'philosophers' had only interpreted the world, whereas the task was to change it. The young Hegel would have been closer to agreeing with him than the mature philosopher".

89 Marx, "Hegel's Dialectic", Early Texts, p. 165.

90 Ibid., p. 172.

91 See Ibid., p. 174; Kolakowski, op.cit., p. 61.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 See Schacht, p. 70; Richard Norman, Hegel's Phenomenology : A Philosophical Introduction (London: Sussex University Press, 1976), p. 98; see also Taylor, p. 551.

95 Schacht, p. 70.

96 Ibid.

97 Norman, op.cit., p. 98.

98 Ibid.

99 Marx, Early Texts, p. 162.

100 See Richard Schacht, Alienation, pp. 65 - 114, for an excellent, lucid and detailed study of the question of the use of alienation in Marx. Here see, especially, p. 83.

101/

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 See Kolakowski, The Founders, pp. 132 -134.

104 See Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Early Texts, pp. 140 - 143.

105 John Plamenatz, Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 125, refutes Marx's conclusion that the worker is powerless to determine the use to which his product is put. According to him, even if the workers did find the system of production "oppressive and restricting", that "is not a sufficient condition" for them not to "understand and control it".

106 Marx, Early Texts, p. 134; see also, Kolakowski, op.cit., p. 139; Bertell Ollman, Alienation (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 198 - 204.

107 Marx, Early Texts, pp. 134 - 135

108 Ibid., p. 143; see also, Marx's attack or money, pp. 112, 178 - 183, 188 - 203.

109 Ibid., p. 135.

110 See Ollman, pp. 137 - 147, for a more elaborate treatment of Marx's understanding of the worker's alienation from his own productive activity.

111 See Schacht, p. 92, where he perceptively notes the ambiguity in Marx's use of alienation : "In conceiving of this alienation in terms of a separation through surrender to another, however, Marx obscures its basic character, and encounters problems of both over - and under - inclusiveness".

112 Plamenatz, op.cit., p. 153, correctly points out that the separation of mental from manual labour, along with production, constitute the three characteristics of the division of labour which gave rise to alienation. Furthermore, he disputes Marx's assumption that the three are necessarily connected.

113 Ibid., pp. 149 - 160, notes the difficulty in determining precisely what Marx means by the term "division of labour"; see also, Ollman, pp. 185 - 167, where he attempts "to lay bare the ties between man's alienation ... and the whole sphere of economics".

114/

114 Marx, Early Texts, P. 137.

115 Ibid.

116 See Ibid., p. 167, where McLellan points out in footnote 1 the meaning of the concept "species-being" which Marx took from Feuerbach. For a systematic treatment of "Man's relation to his species", see Ollman, pp. 151 - 153.

117 See Plamenatz, pp. 69 - 78, and Ollman, pp. 111 - 115, for two helpful discussions on how man expresses his 'species' character.

118 Ollman, pp. 116 - 120, attempts to place Marx's thesis on freedom as the essence of man in the context of man's various activities under communism.

119 See Axelos, op.cit., pp. 175 - 194, especially, p. 176 where he notes that Marx displays an "extremely ambiguous and ambivalent" attitude towards art. Plamenatz, p. 49, criticizes Marx's distinction between physical (basic) needs and species - needs by claiming that the two are interrelated. Thus, "Many of the wants satisfied by material production could just as properly be called moral or spiritual as material".

121 Marx, Early Texts, p. 138

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid., p. 139

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid., p. 138

126 See Ronald Bruzina, "Translator's Introduction", in Kostas Axelos, Alienation, pp. x - xiv.

127 See Kolakowski, The Founders, pp. 155 - 159.

128 See Marx, Early Texts, pp. 140, 149 - 154.

129 Ibid., pp. 138 - 139.

130 Ibid., p. 140.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

134/.

134 Ibid., p. 142.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid., pp. 142 - 143.

137 See Ollman, op.cit., pp. 154 - 157.

138 Marx, Early Texts, p. 142.

139 See Ibid., pp. 149 - 151 ; Plamenatz, pp. 153 - 155.

140 Plamenatz, p. 69, argues that "these three processes - becoming self-conscious, becoming aware of other selves, and coming to recognize oneself as being of a certain kind - are inseparable but distinct parts of the same precess".

141 Marx, Early Texts, pp. 193 - 194.

142 Ibid., p. 145

143 Karl Marx, Thesis 1 of "Thesis on Feuerbach", in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, Marx and Engels : 1845 -47, ed. by F. Engels, translator (not given) (London: Lawrence and Wishart, New York: International Publishers Co. Inc.; Moscow: Institute of Marxism - Leninism, 1976), p. 6.

144 Marx, Early Texts, p. 142.

145 Ibid., p. 37.

146 Ibid., p. 48.

147 Russell B. Norris, God, Marx, and the Future (Philadelphia Fortress Press, 1974), p. 18.

148 Marx W. Wartofsky, Feuerbach (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 305.

149 Marx, Early Texts, p. 18.

150 Wartofsky, op.cit., p. 338

151 See Ibid., p. 224

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 See Marx's 'Fourth thesis on Feuerbach', in Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 7.

155/

155 Howard L. Parsons, " The Prophetic Mission of Karl Marx", The Jounal of Theology, Vol. XLiv (1964), 57.

156 Ibid., p. 59.

157 ibid.

158 Marx, Early Texts, p. 116.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid., See also, Herbert Aptheker, The Urgency of Marxist - Christian Dialogue (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), pp. 25 - 28.

161 Marx's 'Fourth thesis on Feuerbach', in Collected Works, Vol. 5, p.7.

162 Marx, Early Texts, p. 53.

163 Ibid., pp. 156 -157.

164 Norris, op.cit., p. 28.

165 Marx, Early Texts, p. 155.

166 Ludwig Feuerbach, Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion, ed. by Wilhelm Bolin (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1908), p. 21, quoted in Schacht, Alienation, p. 68. (Translation provided by Schacht.)

167 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical Germany, ed. by C.P. Dutt, translator (not given) (New York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1941), pp. 83 - 84.

168 Schacht, p. 100.

169 Ibid.

170 Ibid., see also, Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. and ed. by T.B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 126.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid., pp. 100 -101.

173 Ibid., see Bottomore, Early Writings, p. 58.

174 Ibid., pp. 101 -102.

175 See Axelos, Alienation, pp. 131 - 142.

176 Eugene Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, p. 146.

177/

177 Ibid.; see The Communist Manifesto, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House,n.d.), p. 55, Vol. 11, p. 8, Vol. 111, p. 12, quoted in Kamenka, p. 146.

178 See Leszek Kolakowski, Marxism and Beyond, trans. by Jane Zielonko Peel (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 76.

179 See Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, p. 82, and Plamenatz, Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man, p. 77.

180 Plamenatz, p. 48.

181 Ibid.

182 See Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961), p. 24.

183 See Mészáros, op.cit., pp. 173 - 175.

184 Taylor, Hegel, pp. 180 - 181, 551 - 556, points out that the absence of criteria in Marx concerning the constitution of human "essence" is directly related to Marx's failure to provide a material substitute for Hegel's Geist which Marx rejects.

185 Marx, Early Texts, p. 36.

186 Axelos, Alienation, pp. 315 - 316; see also, p. 135; Plamenatz, op.cit., p. 34.

187 See Ibid., pp. 41 - 44; Kamenka, op.cit., p. 150; Kolakowski, Marxism and Beyond, p. 70.

188 See Mészáros, pp. 165 - 168, for his discussion on "The Limits of Freedom" in Marx's thought.

189 See Gajo Petrovic, "The Philosophical and Sociological Relevance of Marx's concept of Alienation", in Marx and the Western World, ed. by N. Lobkowicz, p. 138.

190 See Joseph J. O'Malley, "History and Man's 'Nature' in Marx", The Review of Politics, Vol. 28, no. 4 (October 1966), 508 - 527, especially 513 - 517, for a helpful discussion of the process of the humanization of man and nature through their mutual interaction with each other.

191 See Plamenatz, op.cit., pp. 176 - 180.

192/

192 Taylor, Hegel, p. 554, says: "Marx never ironed out his wrinkle. No doubt if it had been pointed out to him it would have seemed impossibly precious and 'philosophical'. His scientific work was cut out by the urgent practical needs of bringing the revolution against capitalism to term. Speculation on the transition to communism was a luxury barely to be indulged in, much less on the epistemological problems raised by the existence of such a transition".

193 Marx's vision of the future dealienation society can, at best, only be partial, transitory and fragmentary, because of the very obscure and fragmentary nature of his early writings in which he attempted to sketch a programme of dealienation. See Plamenatz, pp. 3 - 5.

194 See Axelos, Alienation, pp. 240 - 241, 221.

195 Marx, Early Texts, p. 92.

196 Ibid., p. 91.

197 See Axelos, p. 233.

198 Marx, Early Texts, pp. 93 - 94

199 Ibid., p. 94.

200 Ibid., p. 95.

201 Ibid., p. 108

202 Axelos, Alienation, p. 233.

203 Marx and Engels, German Ideology, in Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 47.

204 Axelos, op.cit., p. 257.

205 Ibid.

206 Ibid., p. 241.

207 Ibid.

208 Ibid., p. 242.

209 Taylor, Hegel, pp. 550 - 551, disputed this conclusion. He argues that in Marx the future is a present state which cannot be transcended. Thus, to speak of complete reconciliation in the future is mere wishful thinking. Marx's view that history is open is unfounded. Contrasting the Hegelian concept of reconciliation through recognition with the Marxian concept of reconciliation through human creativity, Taylor writes:- "The well-known short-hand formula differentiating the two thinkers, that/

that Hegel speaks of contemplating the real while Marx wants to change it, is grounded ultimately in their different ontologies. Since for Hegel the subject is Geist, the Spirit of all, reconciliation must come through recognition, since a transformation of the whole universe is without sense. Marx's reconciliation on the other hand must come through transformation, because his subject is generic man; and man, unlike God, cannot recognize himself in nature until he has put himself there through work. Marx's reconciliation will, of course, always he incomplete; it never extends beyond the (always receding) frontier of untransformed nature. But this is the price of his Promethean notion of self-creation".

210 Axelos, p. 242.

211 Marx, Early Texts, p. 151.

212 Axelos, p. 247; see also, p. 245.

213 Ibid.

214 Marx and Engels, German Ideology, in Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 49.

215 Axelos, pp. 267 - 268.

216 Marx, Early Texts, p. 157.

217 Axelos, p. 268.

CHAPTER II

1 See Axelos, Alienation, Praxis and Techne, p. 227.

2 "Preface", in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, Marx and Engels : 1845 - 47 (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd.; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. xv.

3 Ibid.

4 See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifest (New York: International Publishers Company, Inc., 1948), p. 9.

5 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 60.

6 Ibid., P. 61.

7/

7 Ibid.

8 Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, trans. by John O'Neill (London: Heinemann Educational Books Lts., 1969), p. xix.

9 Ibid.

10 Marx, Early Texts, p. 156.

11 Ibid., p. 155.

12 Ibid., pp. 156 - 157.

13 Axelos, Alienation, Praxis and Techné, p. 219.

14 Karl Marx, Economie politique et philosophie, trans. by J. Molitor, Oeuvres philosopheques (Paris: Costes, 1927 - 1938), p. 163), quotes in Axelos, op.cit., p. 222.

15 Axelos, Alienation, Praxis and Techné, p. 222.

16 Marx, Early Texts, p. 152.

17 See Axelos, pp. 222 - 223.

18 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975), p. 554.

19 Axelos, p. 223.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 225

22 Ibid.

23 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 31, see also Axelos, p. 225.

24 Axelos, pp. 225 - 226

25 See Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction", in Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, trans. by Jack Cohen (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), p.20.

26 See Marx, Pre-Capitlaist Economic Formations, pp. 68 - 120, where he sketches out this development.

27 Ibid., p. 20.

28/

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., p. 11. Formen is the beginning of the German title of Marx's work which has been translated into English under the title Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations; Preface is of Karl Marx, Critique of Political Economy.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 12.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., p. 13.

36 Ibid., p. 12.

37 Ibid., pp. 11, 43 - 44.

38 Ibid., p. 44.

39 Ibid., pp. 37 - 38.

40 Ibid., p. 38.

41 Ibid., p. 14.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., pp. 14, 96.

44 Ibid., pp. 15-16.

45 Ibid., p. 96.

46 Ibid

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., p. 15.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., pp. 84 - 85.

51 As we shall see below, despite Marx's optimism about the arrival of the future free society, it is, nevertheless, inconclusive whether the humanization of man will be gradual or cataclysmic. The word gradual is therefore used with caution in the text above. It/

It is to be noted that Marx encapsulates the whole of human history in his discussion of pre-capitalist economic formations.

52 Marx, Early Texts, p. 146.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Axelos, Alienation, Praxis and Technē, p. 231.

56 Marx, Early Texts, p. 146.

57 Ibid., pp. 146 - 147.

58 Ibid., p. 147.

59 Axelos, p.cit., p. 231

60 Ibid.

61 Marx, Early Texts, p. 147.

62 Ibid., pp, 147 - 148.

63 Ibid., p. 148.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Schlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 70.

68 Ibid., pp. 72 - 77.

69 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifests, p. 9.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., p. 10.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., p. 11.

74 Ibid., p. 12.

75 Ibid., p. 13

76 Ibid., pp. 13 - 14.

77/

77 See Marx - Engels, Gesamtausgabe, ed. Marx - Engels Institute, Moscow; Frankfurt a.M., 1937f., Section 1, Vol. 6, pp. 516 - 519, quoted in Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1962), pp. 153 - 155.

78 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 15.

79 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 54.

80 See Axelos, Alienation, Praxis and Techné, pp. 157 - 158.

81 Marx and Engels, German Ideology, p. 54; see Avineri, pp. 142 - 144.

82 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 15.

83 See William H. Shaw, Marx's Theory of History (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 113, for a useful discussion of the crucial difference between the rebellions of earlier classes, such as slaves and serfs, and the proletarian revolution.

84 Axelos, po.cit., p. 248; see also, Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, pp. 132 - 125.

85 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 44.

86 Karl Marx, Capital, "Afterword to the Second German Edition", p. 18, quoted in Jean Hyppolite, op.cit., p. 147.

87 Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, pp. 157 - 158, notes Marx's optimism about the future society as well as his uncertainty about the disappearance of alienation through the abolition of private property.

88 See Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p.92.

89 This conclusion, which is a primary presupposition in Marx's anthropology and theory of history, shows an evolutionary development in his thinking. See Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, pp. 17 - 25.

90 Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, p. 124. Charles Taylor, Hegel, p. 419, explains that the difference between Marx's concept of human freedom and Hegel's concept of the absolute freedom of Geist lies precisely in the fact that Marx sees freedom as a conscious act, whereas Hegel sees it as the fulfilment of Geist. Taylor writes:- "Hence while Marx takes up Hegel's concept of the cunning of reason, this fails to apply to the last great revolution. In Marxist thought, the bourgeois, and earlier political actors cannot understand the significance of/

of their acts; they do more and other than they think. But this is not true of the proletariat. These have in Marxism a scientific view of things. In this case the significance of their innovative action is understood by the actors.

In Marx the equivalent thesis to the cunning of reason is based on the notion of a species nature of man. What gives the hidden significance to men's actions in history is the as yet unknown nature of man. But with the breaching of the last contradiction, this comes to consciousness. Men see what they are, and since the agent is generic man, those who are capable of acting at the level of humanity as a whole, that is, the proletariat, can see clearly what they are doing. To put is another way, the unseen agent in history, what corresponds to Hegel's 'reason' is generic man. As long as generic man is in contradiction to his actual historical embodiment, in class society, then man cannot be clear what he is doing. But once this contradiction is overcome, as it is with the proletariat, his action is self-conscious".

91 See Avineri, op.cit., pp. 144 - 149.

92 Ibid., p. 144.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 See Marx and Engels, German Ideology, p. 82.

96 E.A. Olssen, "Marx and the Resurrection", Jounral of the History of Ideas, Vol. xxix, no. 1 (January - March, 1968), 135.

97 See Hyppolite, op.cit., pp. viii - ix, 95 - 98.

98 Avineri, p. 150.

99 Ibid.

100 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 21.

101 Avineri, p. 151. See also, Hyppolite, pp. 147 - 148; T.A. Jackson, Dialectics (New York: Burt Franklin, Lennox Hill Publ. and Distrib. Co., 1936), p. 193.

102 Shaw, Marx's Theory of History, p. 5. Avineri, p. 153, holds a contrasting position to that held by Shaw. According to him, a technological, determinist position is more reflective of Engels' thought than of Marx's.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105/

105 Ibid., p. 62.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid., p. 63.

108 Ibid., p. 65.

109 See Bertell Ollman, Alienation, Marx's conception of man in Capitalist Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p, 17; also, Shaw, "Dialectics and the Proletariat", pp. 103 - 104.

110 Shaw, pp. 69, 72. See also, "'Engels to Schmidt', August 5, 1890", as quoted in Shaw, p. 69. P.M. John, Marx on Alienation (Columbia, Missouri: South Asia Books, 1976), p. 212, perceptively points out: "When the spontanious possibilities of creative interaction between men and nature are replaced by mechanistic laws determined from the outside, man is moulded by circumstances instead of man moulding his own circumstances. When the fact that circumstances are changed by men is forgotten, it is an indication that man is alienated not only from nature but also from himself". Jackson, Dialectics, p. 190.

111 See Ollman, op.cit., p. 18. Kenneth Neil Cameron, Marx and Engels Today: A Modern Dialogue on Philosophy and History (New York: Exposition Press, Inc., 1976), pp. 28 - 31, indicates a preference for the word "process" vis-a-vis "law" to describe the phenomenon above. On the question of the relation between Marx's Philosophy and science see Taylor, Hegel, pp. 551 - 552. Ollman, p. 26, writes: "So, too, instead of seeking a strict casual tie between the mode of production and other institutions and practices of society which precludes complex social interaction, we must begin by accepting the existence of this interaction and then seek out the ways in which Marx believes that the effects proceeding from the mode of production and other economic factors (narrowly understood) are more important .... This, and not technological determinism, is the conception of history illustrated in all Marx's detailed discussion of political and social phenomena".

112 Shaw, op.cit., p. 101

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid., p. 81.

116 Ibid., pp. 1 - 8.

117/

117 Ibid., pp. 109 - 110

118 Ibid., p. 101

119 The term "historical reality" is being used here to include both socio-economic, political and philosophical factors or constituents of reality. This means that both infrastructure and superstructure are included.

120 Ollman, Alienation, p. 12.

121 See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, Reason and Revelation, Being and God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 239.

122 Ollman, p. 12. See also, Avineri, op.cit., p. 68.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid., p. 13

125 Ibid., pp. 14, 25 - 26.

126 Ibid., pp. 13 - 14.

127 Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, trans. by G.A. Bonner and Emile Burns (London, 1951), p. 302, quoted in Ollman, p. 14.

128 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. by Samuel Moore (Chicago, 1945), p. 33, quoted in Ollman, p. 14. Here, Ollman also points out the contrast between capital as a "'definite social relationship'" and Ricardo's conception "where capital 'is only distinguishable as accumulated labor from immediate labor'".

129 See Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, trans, by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Moscow, 1958), p. 209, quoted in Ollman, p. 14.

130 See Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik des Politischen Ökonomie (Berlin, 1953), p. 412, quoted in Ollman, p. 14.

131 Ollman, p. 14.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid., p. 18.

134 Ibid., See also, pp. 27-42, where Ollman discusses the philosophy underlying the internal relations between social factors of historical reality.

135/

135 Shaw, Marx's Theory of History, p. 70.

136 See Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, p. 144.

137 See Marx's fourth Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 4.

138 K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 2 (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1945), p. 187.

139 Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, p. 145.

140 Popper, op.cit., p. 187.

141 Kamenka, op.cit., p. 145.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid.

145 John Plamenatz, Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 177-178, observes: "But should the theories that appeal to the revolutionary workers be any nearer being true, any more free of illusion, than the theories of other revolutionary groups? This is the question that Marx, so it seems to me, never answers. He is merely dogmatic, and resorts to forms or words whose persuasive power comes largely of their being echoes of Holy Scripture. The most alienated, the most dehumanized of men, in redeeming thenselves will redeem mankind. What is this but another way of saying that the last will be first, that the humble will be raised up?"

146 Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, p. 145.

147 Ibid.

148 Antonio Labriola, Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History (Chicago, 1908), p. 75, quoted in Svetozar Stokanović, Between Ideals and Reality, A Critique of Socialism and its Future, trans. by Gerson S. Sher (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 137.

149 Stojanović, p. 140, mentions the following scholars who argue that Marx's philosophy "has ethical content" : Eduard Bernstein, Maximilien Rubel, Karl Popper, John Lewis, Eugene Kamenka. In contrast to these, the following argue that Marx's thought is a-ethical : Werner Sombart, Benedetto Croce, Karl Kautsky, Max Adler, Rudolf Hilferding, Lucien Goldmann, Stojanović also states: "Some of them hold that the absence of an ethical position is a shortcoming of Marx's thought and, therefore, seek to supplement Marx through Darwin (Kautsky), Darwin and Kant (Ludwig Woltmann), or Kant (the neo-Kantians)".

150/

150 Ibid., p. 138.

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid.

153 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, Part 1, p. 15, quoted in Stojanović, p. 139.

154 Stojanović, p. 139.

155 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Die Deutsche Ideologie", Part III, Werke, Vol. 3, p. 229, quoted in Stojanović, p. 139.

156 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, Part 1, p. 26, quoted in Stojanović, p. 139.

157 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 21. See also, Stojanović, pp. 142 - 143.

158 Stojanović, pp. 140 - 141.

159 Marx, Early Texts, p. 123.

160 Stojanović, p. 141.

161 Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", Thesis 10, in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 5.

162 See Marx, Early Texts, pp. 139 - 142.

163 Stojanović, p. 142; see also, Axelos, op.cit., p. 246.

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid., p. 143.

167 Ibid., p. 144.

168 "'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, p. 97", quoted in Stojanović, p. 145.

169 "Marx's Letter to L. Kugelmann of April 17, 1871; in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 320", quoted in Stojanović, pp. 145 - 146.

170 Eugene Kamenka, Marxism and Ethics (London: Macmillain and Co. Ltd., 1970), p. 22.

171 Ibid., pp. 22 - 23.

172/

172 Ibid., p. 23.

173 Ibid., pp. 22 - 23.

174 Ibid., p. 23.

CHAPTER III

1 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. by Eberhard Bethge, trans. by Reginald Fuller, et. al. (Enlarged edition; London: SCM Press Ltd., 1976), pp. 278 - 281.

2 Ano J. van der Bent, "Christian and Marxist Responses to the challenge of Secularization and Secularism", Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter, 1978), 164.

3 José Míguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 55 - 56.

4 Milan Machovec̆, A Marxist Looks at Jesus, trans. from the German ed., with an introduction by Peter Hebblethwaite (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 21.

5 Henry J. Koren, Marx and the Authentic Man (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967), p. 98.

6 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, trans. by R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974), pp. 223.

7 Ibid., p. 251

8 Machovec̆ op.cit., p. 21.

9 Jürgen Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, ed. and trans. by M. Douglas Meeks (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1975), p. 69.

10 Russel B. Norris, God, Marx and the Future, Dialogue with Roger Garaudy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), p. 51.

11 Thomas Dean, Post-Theistic Thinking, The Marxist - Christian Dialogue in Radical Perspective (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1975), p. 5; see also, Jürgen Moltmann, Religion, Revolution, and the Future, trans. by M. Douglas Meeks (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), pp. 7, 219.

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12 Bonino, Christians and Marxists, p. 39.

13 Ibid., p. 40.

14 Giulio Girardi, Marxism and Christianity, trans. by Kevin Traynor (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 78 - 79.

15 Ibid., p. 81.

16 Ibid.

17 Koren, op.cit., p. 98; see also, Norris, p. 47.

18 Girardi, op.cit., p. 81.

19 Koren, p. 48.

20 Ibid., p. 97.

21 Ibid., pp. 45 - 46.

22 Donald MacKinnon, "Absolute and Relative in History", in Explorations in Theology 5, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1979), p. 55.

23 Jan M. Lochman, "The Place of Prometheus", Interpretation, Vol. xxxii, no, 3 (July, 1978), pp. 246 - 247.

24 Ibid., p. 246.

25 Peter C. Hodgson, New Birth of Freedom, A Theology of Bondage and Liberation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 334.

26 Ulrich E. Simon, A Theology of Auschwitz (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1967), pp. 157 - 158.

27 Ibid., p. 158.

28 Lochman, op.cit., pp. 252 - 253.

29 Ibid., p. 253.

30 There is a "School of Hope" theologians which includes Johannes Metz, Jurgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, in West Germany, and Carl E. Braaten, in North America, who are among the most prominent scholars in this movement. The movement is by no means uniform as the perspectives, hermenetical centres, etc. of the various writers reflect significant differences.

31 Marx fails to explain how the negation of the negation in the productive process will be transformed into a positive process. It is a fair conclusion that he assumes this "fact" as self-evident. This question is tied to Marx's teleological expectation of an unalienated human future.

32 /

32 Lochman, "The Place of Prometheus", p. 253.

33 Ibid.

34 See Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, in Early Texts, pp. 115 - 116.

35 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 248.

36 Ibid., pp. 248 - 249.

37 Moltmann, Experiment Hope, pp. 80 - 81.

38 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 248.

39 Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit, trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1977), p. 62, See also, Experiment Hope, p. 78.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Moltmann, Experiment Hope, pp. 78 - 81.

43 Kazoh Kitamori, Theology of the Pain of God, trans. from the Japanese (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1966), p. 27 - 28.

44 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 532, cited in Moltmann, Experiment Hope, p. 80.

45 Jürgen Moltmann, Theology and Joy, with an extended introduction by David E. Jenkins (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1973), p. 75.

46 Ibid.; see also, Moltmann, Church in the Spirit, pp. 264 - 265.

47 Per Frostin, Materialismus Ideologie Religion, translation mine (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1978), p. 194. See also, Martin Luther, "On trading and Usury", Works of Martin Luther, Vol. iv, pp. 12 - 27, in Hugh T. Kerr, ed., A Compend of Luther's Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), pp. 183 - 185.

48 Walther von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross, trans. by Herbert J.A. Bouman (Minneapolis: Augusburg Publishing House, 1976), p. 14.

49 Gerhard Ebeling, Luther, trans. by R.A. Wilson, Fontana Library Theology and Philosophy (London: Collins, 1975), p. 248; see also Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. by Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), p. 27; Martin E. Marty, "Whenever God dies: Protestant Roots of the Problem of God", in Speaking of God, ed. by Denis Dirscherl, S.J. (New York: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 85 - 86.

50 Ibid.

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51 N.H.G. Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics (London: Collins, 1971), p. 148; see also, pp. 153 - 154.

52 Ibid., pp. 155 - 156.

53 Ibid., p. 170.

54 Ibid., pp. 222 - 223.

55 Martin Luther, "The Disputation Held at Heidelberg, April 26, 1518", afterwards referred to as "Heidelberg Disputation", The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. xvi, Luther: Early Theological Works, ed. and trans. by James Atkinson (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1962), p. 291.

56 Rubem Alves, A Theology of Human Hope (St. Meinrad, Ind.: Abbey Press, 1975), p. 99.

57 Althaus, Theology, pp. 34, 9; see also, Ebeling, Luther, pp. 232 - 233.

58 von Loewenich, op.cit., pp. 17 - 18; see also, Ebeling, op.cit., pp. 226, 234; Douglas John Hall, Lighten Our Darkness, Towards an Indigenous Theology of the Cross (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), p. 118; Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 72.

59 von Loewenich, pp. 12 - 13.

60 Ibid., p. 113.

61 Martin Luther, "Lectures on the Epistle to the Hebrews", in The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. xvi, pp. 233 - 234.

62 Luther, "Heidelberg Disputation", p. 290.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., p. 292; see also, Althaus, Theology, p. 27.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 1 Corinthians 1:20 - 25, Revised Standard Version (R.S.V.) translation, New Testament Section, Second Edition, copy right 1971.

69 Hall, Lighten our Darkness, p. 117. Quotation is used as cited in Gordon Rupp, The Righteousness of God (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1953), p. 227.

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70 von Loewenich, p. 69; see also, Althaus, Theology, p. 10.

71 Ibid., p. 19.

72 Ibid., pp. 69 - 70; see also, Luther's Works, Vol. 25, American Edition, ed. by Hilton C, Oswald, trans. by Walter G. Tillman (ch. 1-2), and J.A.O. Press (ch. 3-16) (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1972), pp. 361 - 362.

73 Ibid., p. 69; Luther's Works, Vol, 25, pp. 360 - 361.

74 Ulrich E. Simon, A Theology of Auschwitz, pp. 146 - 147.

75 Ibid.

76 von Loewenich, p. 68; see also, Luther's Works, Vol. 14, American Edition, ed. by Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,1958), pp. 293 - 294.

77 Ibid., pp. 68 - 69; see also, Luther's Works, Vol. 25, p. 361.

78 Ebeling, Luther, p, 217.

79 Martin Luther, "The Bondage of the Will", in Luther's Works, Vol. 33, American Edition, ed. and trans. by Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 138; von Leowenich, p. 31; Ian D. Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 82 - 84.

80 Ebeling, Luther, pp. 218 - 219.

81 Ibid., p. 219

82 Hall, Lighten Our Darkness, p. 117.

83 Ebeling, Luther, p. 219.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., p. 224; see also, Aarne Siirala, Divine Humanness, trans. by T.A. Kantonen (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), p. 76.

86 Ibid., p. 225.

87 von Loewenich, p. 20, see also, pp. 112 - 143, 159, Althaus, Theology, p. 28; Kitamori, op.cit., pp. 4 - 49.

88 Althaus, Theology, p. 34.

89 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 212.

90 Hall, Lighten our Darkness, p. 149.

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91 Ibid.

92 Siggins, Luther's Doctrine of Christ, p. 84.

93 Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

1 Liberation Theology is the name given to the theological method that characterizes the movement within the Latin American Church which came to prominence in the late 1960's, with the Medellín Conference (Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops), Medellín, Colombia, in 1968. A fairly comprehensive treatment of Liberation Theology is found in the seminal work of Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, History, Politics and Salvation, trans. and ed. by Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1973).

To date, the variety of material written by Latin American scholars reflects a growing diversity of interests in and approaches to the task of "theologization" on that continent. It is significant that there are both Roman Catholic and Protestant scholars, including so-called conservatives among the latter, who have been contributing to the wealth of literature that is commonly referred to as espousing and/or advocating some particular aspect of Liberation Theology. Besides Gutierrez, other writers of note include Hugo Assmann, Leonardo Boff, José Míguez Bonino, Orlando E. Costas, Enrique Dussel, Ignacio Ellacuría, José P. Miranda, Juan Luis Segundo, John Sobrino, S.J.

For an informative summary of the development of the themes of liberation and of Liberation Theology, see Hugo Assmann, Practical Theology of Liberation, trans. by Paul Burns, with a Preface by Ernesto Cardenal, and an Introduction by Gustavo Cutierrez (London: Search Press Ltd., 1975), especially, pp. 43 - 56.

2 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, trans. by R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974), p. 72.

3 Ibid., pp. 178 - 195.

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4 Jürgen Moltmann, The Experiment Hope, ed. and trans. by M. Douglas Meeks (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1975), p. 80.

5 Ibid., pp. 57 - 58.

6 Jürgen Moltmann, Religion, Revolution, and the Future, trans. by M. Douglas Meeks (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), pp. 218 - 219.

7 Ibid., p. 219.

8 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 318.

9 Ibid.

10 Moltmann, Expermiment Hope, p. 117 - 118.

11 Ibid., p, 81.

12 Ibid., p. 80.

13 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 25.

14 In Experiment Hope, pp. 75 - 78, Moltmann expressed his appreciation of and indebtedness to rabbinic theology, especially Rabbi Abraham Heschel's explication of it. The motif of "The pathes of God and the Sympathy of Man" in this Old Testament theology already contains an implicit theology of the "cross". Hence, Moltmann claims, there is a continuity between the "crucified" God in the event of the cross of Christ and the suffering God in the Old Testament.

15 Ibid., p, 78.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 79.

19 Ibid., p. 80.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., pp. 80 - 81.

22 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 193.

23 Ibid., pp. 192 - 193.

24 Ibid., p. 193.

25 Ibid., 246 - 247.

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26 Ibid., p. 37.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., p, 40.

31 Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit, trans. by Margaret Kohl (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1977), p. 102.

32 Ibid., pp. 102 - 103.

33 Ibid., pp. 351 - 352.

34 Ibid., p. 352.

35 Ibid.

36 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 141.

37 Ibid., p. 142.

38 Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, trans. by J.W. Leitch (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967), p. 285.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., p. 286.

42 Ibid.

43 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 192.

44 See Carl E. Braaten, "A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross" review of Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, in The Journal of Religion, Vol. 56, no.2. (April. 1976), pp. 118 - 119.

45 See Juan Luis Segundo, Liberation of Theology, trans. by John Drury (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976), pp. 7 - 38; also, Robert McAfee Brown, "Reflections on Detroit", in Christianity and Crisis, Vol. 35, no. 17 (October 27, 1975), pp. 225 - 256; Ignacio Ellacuría, Freedom Made Flesh, trans. by John Drury (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976), pp. 15 - 18; José Porfirio Miranda, Marx and the Bible, A Critique of the Philosophy of Oppression, trans. by John Eagleson (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1974).

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46 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, p. 11; see also, pp. 12 - 15.

47 Jon Sobrino, S.J., Christology at the Crossroads, A Latin American Approach, trans. by John Drury (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1978), p. 87.

48 Gutiérrez, op.cit., p. 15.

49 Ibid., p. 194.

50 Ibid., p. 204.

51 Ibid., p. 15.

52 Ibid., p. 202.

53 Ibid., p. 295.

54 Ibid., p. 265.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., p. 196.

57 Ibid., p. 197.

58 Ibid., pp. 197 - 198.

59 Ibid. p. 203.

60 Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, pp. xxiv - xxv.

61 Ibid., p. xxv.

62 See Ibid., pp. 162, 201 - 217.

63 Ibid., p. 174.

64 Ibid., p. 201.

65 Ibid., p. 172.

66 Ibid., p. 357.

67 Ibid., p. 207.

68 Ibid., pp. 49 - 50.

69 Ibid., p. 207.

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70 2 Corinthians 5:7. Revised Standard Version (R.S.V.), copyright 1946, Division of Christian Education of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America.

71 Carl E. Braaten, The Flaming Center (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), p. 154.

72 Orlando E. Costas, The Church and its Mission : A Shattering Critique from the Third World (Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. 256.

73 Langdon Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind, A Christian Interpretation of History (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 237.

74 Ibid., p. 236.

75 Braaten, Flaming Center, p. 156.

76 Ibid., p. 152.

CHAPTER V

1 Peter L. Berger and Richard J. Neuhaus, Against the World for the World (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 158. "Hartford Theses" is the name given to the text of "An appeal for Theological Affirmation", which was issued on 26 January, 1975, in Harford, Connecticut. The eighteen (18) signatories of the affirmation included well-known Christian laypersons and theologians from the Protestant, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox communities, in North America. The summary of their affirmation reads thus: "The renewal of Christian witness and mission requires constant examination of the assumption shaping the Church's life. Today an apparent loss of a sense of the transcendent is undermining the Church's obility to address with clarity and courage the urgent tasks to which God calls it in the world. This loss is manifest in a number of pervasive themes. Many are superficially attractive, but upon closer examination we find these themes false and debilitating to the Church's life and work". Thirteen such false themes were listed; see The Presbyterian Layman (March, 1975), p. 5. For an elaborate and lucid account of the "Hartford Theses", see Berger and Neuhaus, op.cit.

2 Ibid.

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3 Among the factors of crucial importance in any consideration of using Marx's concept of alienation to explicate the past, present, and, even future of Caribbean man, are : the obvious historical distance between Marx and today; the relative lack of industrialization in the Caribbean vis-a-vis Marx's day (in Western Europe), and certainly of other New World countries, North America being the example par excellence; there are various "official" brands of authentic Marxism; finally, alienation, as used in Marx, does not fully describe either the particular conditions of Caribbean man, or the fundamental condition of a broken relationship between God and man in which man stands. In other words, the concept of "Original Sin" must be central to any theological explication of the condition of Caribbean man, even, and, precisely, where Marx's concept of alienation is used as a heuristic device.

4 There is general agreement among scholars that economic considerations were primary in establishing and promoting human exploitation under slavery in the New World. See Mintz, Caribbean Transformations, pp. 63 - 64. Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), for example, in noting this point, goes even further in arguing that the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade, and of plantation slavery itself, in the New World, was prompted primarily by economic motives, and, only secondarily, by humanitarian and Christian considerations.

5 Philip Mason, Patterns of Dominance (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 274.

6 George Lamming, The Pleasures of Exile (London: M. Joseph, 1960), p. 60, quoted in Slavery, Colonialism, amd Racism, ed. by Sidney W. Mintz (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., In., 1974), p. 45. (Mintz's emphasis)

7 V.S. Naipaul, The Overcrowded Barracoon (New York: Knopf, 1973), p. 254, quoted in Mintz, Slavery, p. 45.

8 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J.B. Baillie (london, 1931), pp. 234 - 237, and 237 - 240, respectively, quoted in Richard Norman, Hegel's Phenomenology : A Philosophical Introduction (London: Sussex University Press, 1976), p. 50.

9 Under the plantation system, the slave was a mere chattel. He did not own his labour, his product, nor his life, He belonged totally to his master. Moreover, on the question of his relation to his species-being, it was very evident that the slave was considered an inferior human species. Community life was regulated by the plantocracy who were at liberty to break-up "marriages" and family clusters according to the economic climate of the time.

10 Dwarka Persaud, "Light and the Evolution of the free society: An Appraisal of Governor Light's administration, 1838 - 1848" (unpublished Long Paper, History 401, University of Guyana, 24 May, 1974), pp 3 - 4, states: "When the momentous decision was/

was made to abolish slavery, it was strongly felt that it would not be prudent to terminate the system unconditionally on 1 August, 1834, but rather have a 'phasing-out' system of apprenticeship. Ostensibly and ideally, this provision was intended to re-educate and acclimatize the planters and the ex-slaves for their new roles as employers and eomployees in the 'free' society .... Its success depended almost entirely on the support of the plantocracy. Unfortunately, such support was withheld. Consequently, the British Parliament decided to terminate apprenticeship prematurely on August 1, 1838, two years before the original date for its termination".

11 Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery, the Export of Indian Labour Overseas 1830 - 1920 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), provides a most informative and detailed study of the phenomenon of Indian indentureship which emerged after the failure of the apprenticeship system. Tinker, p. 383, states: "For slavery is both a system and an attitude of mind. Both the system and the attitude are still with us". See also, pp. 18 - 19. The irony of the persistence of slavery even after it had been declared illegal by an Act of The British Parliament is also well illustrated in Alan H. Adamson, Sugar Without Slaves, The political economy of British Guiana, 1838 - 1904 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

It is instructive to recall Marx's thesis that consciousness cannot be radically transformed by merely re-interpreting the world. Real, material transformation in the superstructure (and this includes ideas and consciousness as world-view) will only be achieved through the revolutionary transformation of the socio-economic base of society. Despite the fact that history has not demonstrated the total accuracy of Marx's thesis, it is, nevertheless, of significance to remember that neither legislation nor coercion or both can transform human consciousness overnight. Unfortunately, even Marxists suffer from such an insidious "loss of memory" which leads (and has led) to dehumanizing and demonic consequences.

12 See Mason, op.cit., pp. 285 - 290.

13 See Sidney Mintz, "The Rural Proletariat and the Problem of Rural Proletariam Consciousness", Journal of Peasant Studies, 1 (1974), 291 - 325.

14 Eric Hobsbawm, New York Review of Books (February 22, 1973), p. 8, review of Irene L. Glendzier, Franz Fanon: A Critical Study, quoted in Mintz, Slavery, p. 46.

15 Mintz, Slavery, p. 46.

16 Ibid., p. 47.

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17 V.S. Naipaul, The Mimic Men (London: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 8, in his characteristically cynical tone, writes of the colonial politician : "We lack order. Above all, we lack power, and we do not understand that we lack power. We mistake works and the acclamation of words for power; as soon as our bluff is called we are lost".

18 David Lowenthal, "Race and Color in the West Indies", Daedalus, Vol. 96, no. 2 (Spring, 1967), pp. 580 - 591.

19 For two excellent studies on the development and nature of Caribbean social structure, see Orlando Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1967); and Elsa V. Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the end of the Eighteenth Century (London: Yale University Press, 1965).

20 See Mason, op.cit., pp. 278 - 279.

21 Ibid., p. 281.

22 On the question of some of the stereotypes held by Africans and East Indians of each other, see Mason, pp. 296 - 297. On the question of the European "officials" attitudes to this conflict-ridden situation, see Paul Singh, Guyana : Socialism in a Plural Society (London: Fabian Society, 1972), p. 20, where he points out: "The British constitutionalists have from time to time camouflaged the antagonism that flared up repeatedly in the plural society. They propagated the popular concept that crown colony government provided for an equitable representation for different groups and that the attitude of the governor and chief administative officials was one of impartiality to the various groups. They spared no pains to point out that they had no particular concern in wanting to promote the interest of any section of the population at the expense of the others, and they were well equipped to hold the scales evenly".

There is a measure of truth in such claims by colonial officials which must not be overlooked in the anti-colonial animosity that has been surfacing in the post-colonial era. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the dominance of that minority group, not only in politics but in every significant aspect of West Indian life conduced to the growth of such stereotypes as arose among the masses. The defining values operative in Caribbean society were imported from Europe, more specifically, Britain.

23 Mintz, Slavery, p. 53.

24 See Mason, pp. 290 - 294.

25 J.S. Furnival, Colonial Policy and Practice : A comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1948); see also, M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkley and Los Angeles : University of California, 1965).

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26 It is very distressing and perplexing to notice young children displaying hostility and suspicion towards children and older members of another ethnic group. Prejudice and stereotypes are easily picked up by children who observe the adults with whom they socialize. Though this phenomenon is by no means peculiar to the Caribbean, because of the "closeness" of social intercourse there, prejudice is acutely felt. We cannot go on blaming our history or those who are ethnically, culturally, etc. different from us for the continuation of the problem which this phenomenon represents. Breaking down walls of prejudice is one of the pressing tasks facing the Church today.

27 Singh, op.cit., p. 20.

28 Ibid.

29 See Roger Garaudy, "As Marxists, we are struggling on Behalf of Man", Background Information for Church and Society, no. 34 (December, 1965) (Geneva: World Council of Churches), pp. 5 - 9.

30 Singh, p. 24.

31 Father Richard Ho Lung, "Perspectives on Caribbean Culture", interview with Monty Williams (published from a recording on tape), in GISRA (The Guyana Institute for Social Research and Action), Vol. 5, no. 4 (December, 1974), p. 61.

32 Naipaul, The Mimic Men, p. 8.

33 Mintz, Slavery, pp. 47 - 48, perceptively points out: "From one perspective, of course, the Caribbean region is merely American - for all American societies are migrant societies, and all are composed in some measure of the descendants of strangers. But with several significant exceptions - the hispanophone societies in particular - the people of the Caribbean region are marked by the absence of a central tradition through which migrant populations could mediate their relationships to each other. The lack of just such a tradition has affected qualitatively the emergence of an ethnically based national consciousness, and has required of Caribbean people a social innovativeness more in tune with the modern world than with the world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Neither perceived differences in physical type nor in ethnicity has been irrelevant in the development of that innovativeness, but such differences may well have intensified one variety of consciousness".

In North America, the ethic was that derived from the Puritan religion. Thus, it is common to speak of American civil religion as an outgrowth of Puritan religion which began on North American soil with the arrival of the first settlers. For a Protestant treatment of this theme, see Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant, American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), especially, pp. 1 - 35.

K.V. Parmasad, "By the Light of a Deya", Tapia, 22 (1971), p. 5, reminds his readers that an Afro-Caribbean culture is not the authentic culture of the East Indians in Trinidad. He recognizes the need for a social order in Trinidad that transcends the/

the alienated past. However, he insists that if the price of gaining such an identity and national spirit is the stripping of other ethnic groups of their uniquenesses, then such a national spirit is a misnomer for it promotes alienation even further. It is very sobering to reflect upon the mission of the Church in this complex and frustrating situation.

34 Mintz, Slavery, pp. 47; see also, Mintz, Caribbean Transformations, pp. 37 - 38.

35 Ibid.

36 Sehon Goodbridge, Politics and the Caribbean Church : A Confession of Guilt, CADEC, Study Paper, no. 2. (Barbados, W.I.: Catholic News Printery, (n.d.)),p. 6.

37 Ibid. On the question of the need for a Caribbean ideology for change and transformation so that the new, liberated Caribbean man may emerge, see William G. Demas, Change and Renewal in the Caribbean, ed. by David I. Mitchell (Barbados : Caribbean conference of Churches Publ. House, (n.d.)).

38 Ibid., pp. 6 - 7.

39 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 44.

40 In spite of their different approaches to the task of theologization in the Caribbean, these four writers reflect the growing spirit of ecumenism within the Caribbean "Church". Campbell-Johnston was one of the most important voices in the Roman Catholic Church on the question of social justice. Idris Hamid is a Presyterian from Trinidad and Tobago, C.S. Reid a Jamaican Baptist, while Paul Singh is a Methodist Layman from Guyana.

41 The writings considered here are Paul G. Singh, "Marxian Socialism", (paper presented at a public meeting held at Redeemer Lutheran Church, Georgetown, Guyana, 16 November, 1975), pp. 1 - 10; "The Christian - Socialist Dialogue", in Moving into Freedom, "Working Together with Christ", Series no. 2., The Second CCC Assembly, Guyana, 1977, ed. by Kortright Davis (Barbados: The Cedar Press, 1977), Reconciliation?" Guyana Graphic, 17 August, 1975; "With God and Marx : Towards a people's democracy?" Guyana Graphic, 24 August, 1975.

42 "Christian - Socialist Dialogue", p. 81.

43 Ibid., pp. 81 - 86.

44 "Towards a people's democracy?" See also "Christian - Socialist Dialogue", p. 84.

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45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 The following discussion is taken from the newspaper article, Michael Campbell-Johnston, "Basic aspirations of Socialism are profoundly Christian", Guyana Graphic, 10 August, 1975.

49 Reid's argument is extracted from the "U.T.C.W.I. Founders Day Lecture"; see C.S. Reid, "A Christian Evaluation of Marxist Trends in the Caribbean", (n.d.), (mimeographed), pp. 1 - 8.

50 Ibid., p. 7. (Emphasis Reid's)

51 Ibid., p. 8.

52 Ibid., p. 6.

53 Ibid., pp. 6 - 7.

54 Ibid., p. 6.

55 The argument developed here is based on three essays written by Idris Hamid : "Decolonializing the Christian Faith : A Fresh Approach to the Christian Faith in the Context of the Caribbean", in Fambli, The Church's Responsibility to the Family in the Caribbean. A Consultation conducted by CARIPLAN, ed. by Lilith Haynes (New York: Church World Service, (n.d.)), pp. 152 -172; In Search of New Perspectives, Caribbean Ecumenical Consultation for Development (Bridgetown, Barbados : CADEC, (1970 or 1971?), pp. 1 - 19; "Theology and Caribbean Development", in With Eyes Wide Open, ed. by David I. Mitchell (Barbados : CADEC, (n.d.)), pp. 120 - 133.

56 Hamid, "Decolonializing the Christian Faith", p. 164. It is be noted that Hamid writes as one who has grown up in the Caribbean. This does not mean that someone from the "outside" cannot write sympathetically and with deep insight about the experience of colonialism in the Caribbean.

57 Ibid., p. 154

58 Hamid, "Theology and Caribbean Development", p. 124.

59 Hamid, "Decolonializing the Christian Faith", p. 155.

60 Ibid., pp. 153 - 154.

61 Hamid, "Theology and Caribbean Development", p. 125.

62/

62 Ibid., p. 126

63 Ibid., p. 125

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., This conclusion is one of the primary assumptions in James Cone's analysis of Black Theology. A reading of any one of Cone's major works will indicate this. See, James H. Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation (Philadelphia + New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1970), God of the Oppressed (London: SPCK, 1977); The Spirituals and the Blues : An Interpretation (New York: The Seabury Press, 1972).

66 Hamid, "Theology and Caribbean Development", p. 125.

67 Hamid, "Decolonializing the Christian Faith", p. 171.

68 Ibid., pp. 158 - 159.

69 Ibid., p. 159.

70 See Hamid, In Search of New Perspectives, pp. 7 - 8.

71 Hamid, "Decolonializing the Christian Faith", p. 159.

72 Hamid, In Search of New Perspectives, p. 8.

73 Ibid.,

74 Langdon Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 237.

75 Hamid, "Decolonializing the Christian Faith", p. 165. See also, p. 164.

76 Ibid., p. 166.

77 In accordance with the distinction between God and the future He gives and will give through Jesus Christ, it should be pointed out that the concepts of "in history" and "beyond history", the "already" and the "not yet", which are commonly used in modern eschatological theology to distinguish between the present and future liberation, cannot be read back into Luther's theology without qualification. Salvation and liberation from sin and the powers of evil are already present to the eyes of faith. Luther tells us : "We do not wait for forgiveness and all the graces as though we would not receive them until the life to come, rather, they are now present for us in faith, even though they are hidden and will be revealed only in the life to come". Luther's Works (WA), Vol. 17, Pt. 2, p. 229, as quoted in Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. by Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), p. 404. Both the Church and the individual Christian find that historical reality contradicts faith. Thus theology is always a/

a theology of the cross and is always thoroughly eschatological. See Althaus, op.cit., p. 404. These ideas have been incorporated into the theology of the cross presented in our study.

78 The Book of Concord, trans. and ed. by Theodore G. Tappert in collaboration with Jaroslav Peliken, et.al. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), p. 29.

79 Ibid., p. 30.

80 Among the great number of works which discuss this theme from various, different, and, even, conflicting perspectives are: Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator : A Critical Christology for our Time, trans. by Patrick Hughes (New York: Orbis Books, 1978); James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed (London: SOCK, 1977); Ignacio Ellacuría, Freedom Made Flesh, trans. by John Drury (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976); Ernst Käsemann, Jesus Means Freedom, trans. by Frank Clarke (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977).

81 John Macquarrie, "A Theology of Alienation", in Alienation, ed. by Frank Johnson (New York: Seminar Press, 1973), p. 320.

82 Wolfhart Pannenberg, What is Man? trans. by Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), p. 148

83 Ibid., p. 117.

84 Ibid., p. 119.

85 Ibid., pp. 119 - 120.

86 Ibid., p. 37.

87 Ibid., p. 38.

88 Ibid., p. 134.

89 Ibid., p. 148.

90 Ibid., p. 149.

91 Franz Lau, "The Lutheran Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms", Lutheran World, Vol xii, no. 4 (1965), pp. 355 - 356, points out that speaking about a doctrine of two kingdoms in Luther is misleading. He argues that the "doctrine" was more specifically a Reformation conception than just simply Luther's. There are therefore grounds for " designating the doctrine of the two kingdoms as a common Christian teaching" which is "not entirely meaningless". However, its meaning "is possible only to a degree", i.e., to extent to which we are able to maintain the tensions by playing off its inherent contradictions against one another.

In/

In Luther's writings, the two most significant works which help us to understand his view of ethics sub cruce in the world are : "Temporal Authority : To what extent it should be obeyed", in Luther's Works, American Ed., Vol.45, "The Christian in Society", pt. 2, trans. by J.J. Schindel and ed. by Walther I. Brandt (Philadelphia : Muhlenberg Press, 1962), pp. 81 - 129; and "The Freedom of a Christian", trans. by W.A. Lambert, in Three Treatises (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1960), pp. 277 - 316.

From the vast corpus of writings on Luther's teaching on the Two Kingdoms, ethics and culture, politics and government, etc., the following works were given special consideration in the development of our discussion here : Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther, trans and with a Foreward by Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972); Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms, trans. by Karl H. Hertz, Facet Books (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966). Carl E. Braaten, The Flaming Center (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), pp. 57 - 62; George W. Forell, Faith Active in Love (Minneapolis, Mn. : Augsburg Publishing House, 1964), and "The Political use of the Law", in Luther and Culture, Martin Luther Lectures, Vol. iv, ed. by G.W. Forell, et.al. (Decorah; Iowa: Luther College Press, 1960), pp. 3 - 23; Douglas J. Hall, Lighten our Darkness (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), pp. 138 - 152; Karl H. Hertz, ed., Two Kingdoms and One World (Minneapolis, Mn.: Augsburg Publishing House, 1976); Franz Lau, op.cit., pp. 335 - 372; and Carter Lindberg, "Theology and Politics : Luther the Radical and Muntzer the Reactionary", Encounter, Vol. 37, no. 4. (Au tumn, 1976), pp. 356 - 371.

92 Ibid., p. 5; see also, pp. 3, 9.

93 Ibid., p. 5.

94 The significance of Luther's use of scripture in his formulation of his doctrine of the Two Kingdoms cannot be overemphasized. Lau, pp. 358 - 359, writes: "The double antitheses, (anti-enthusiast and anti-scholastic), however, proceeds directly from Luther's study of Scripture and indicated that Luther is a biblical theologian and allows his questions to be raised by Holy Scriptures. Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms must be understood, in the first instance, on the basis of the fact that he could not come to terms with Holy Scripture except by means of his doctrine of the two kingdoms".

95 Luther's works, Vol. 45, p. 88; see also, Althaus, Ethics, pp. 51 - 53, who points out that Luther's thought shows a shift from his earlier emphasis upon the opposition between the two kingdoms, to the positive role of the Kingdom of the world which also expresses the goodness of God.

96/

96 Ibid., p. 90.

97 Bornkamm, p. 2.

98 Luther's Works, Vol. 45, p. 91.

99 Bornkamm, p. 17.

100 Ibid., p. 18.

101 Luther's Works, Vol. 45, p. 92; see also, p. 105.

102 Ibid.; see also, p. 110, and Althaus, Ethics, p. 55, on the Kingdom of wrath.

103 In his comments on Romans 13:1, Luther points out that the secular authority deals with external matters, not with matters of faith. "St. Paul is speaking of the governing authority. Now you have just heard that no one but God can have authority over souls. Hence, St. Paul cannot possibly be speaking of any obedience except where there can be corresponding authority. From this it follows that he is not speaking of faith, to the effect that temporal authority should have the right to command faith. He is speaking rather of external things, that they should be ordered and governed on earth". Luther's Works, Vol. 45, p. 110. See also, J.M. Porter, ed., Luther Selected Political Writings (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), p. 19.

104 Lau, op.cit., p. 365.

105 See Althaus, Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 242 - 245, for a brief but clear description of Luther's teaching that the Christian is "simultaneously righteous and sinner".

106 There are many nuances in Luther's use of opus alienum and opus proprium which we cannot take up here. However, for our purposes, it needs to be recognized that God's "proper" work is His saving work through Christ and His "alien" work is His hidden work of continuing to preserve His creation from ruin and chaos. The latter serves the former for both constitute a unity in the twofold nature of God's love. See Althaus, Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 120, 274 - 280.

107 See Gustaf Wingren, Creation and Law, trans. by Ross Mackenzie (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd Ltd., 1961), pp. 149 - 173, 174 - 197, where he treats the use of the Law in relation to the world, and in relation to the conscience of the individual, respectively, "The article of the Creed which refers to Creation must precede the second article which deals with redemption, even when the Creation referred to is Creation in Christ. The order in which the two are given does not represent the sequence in our acquisition of knowledge concerning God, but the sequence in God's dealings with us". (p. 41).

108/

108 Bornkamm, p. 14.

109 Althaus, Ethics, p. 46.

110 See Hertz, op.cit., pp. 323 - 324

111 Hall, Lighten our Darkness, p. 152.

112 Luther argues that the Christian's righteousness before God is not his but Christ's. It is therefore an "alien" righteousness under which the sinner "hides" through faith. Luther is therefore consistent in his description of the Christian as being simul justus et peccator. See, Althaus, Theology of Martin Luther, pp. 227 - 242.

113 Hall, p. 152

114 See Regin Prenter, Luther's Theology of the Cross, ed. by Charles S. Anderson, Facet Books (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), pp. 3 - 7. "But a cross which is either only objective (outside of us) or only subjective (personal to us) is not the cross of Christ which is the means of our salvation. The deep truth of Luther's theology of the cross is that it views the cross on Golgotha and the cross which is laid upon us as one and the same". (p. 18)

115 Bornkamm, op.cit., p. 33.

116 Care should be taken here lest the impression be given that the Christian is called to experience a cosmic battle within himself/herself. The idea of "feeling" the tension connotes being aware of its reality through faith in Christ. But the Christian is assured that Christ has already defeated the powers of evil and will disclose that victory at the eschaton. The Christian is therefore at peace in the peace of God through which the Holy Spirit effects.

117 Bornkamm, p. 33.

118 Lindberg, op.cit., p. 363.

119 Bornkamm, p. 24.

120 Ibid., p. 35

121 Lindberg, p. 371.

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